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0 Svnor)sis, 
This thesis is intended to provide the first considerable history 
of the sustained political offensive which was mounted against chain 
stores in the 'United States between 1927 and 1940. The work falls 
into five divisions. Part One examines the overall pattern of chain 
store development during this period and the impact of the changing 
interpretation and enforcement of the antitrust laws on the "chain store 
question". Part Two begins the chronological account of the anti-chain 
movements describing the attempts made by independent merchants$ 
principally in the South and the interior states, to whip up feelings 
of "home town loyalty" to encourage a popular boycott of chain stores. 
After 1930s agitation of this character subsided, but the chains were 
then confronted by a more substantial threats that of discriminatory 
taxation. The development of the chain store tax weapon up to 1935, 
in which year the U. S. Supreme Court approved the principle of confiscatory 
chain store taxation and two states enacted severely repressive measurest 
is reviewed in Part Three. In 1935-1936 the chains also fell foul of 
Congressq a complex sequence of events - the subject of Part rour - 
resulting in enactment of the Rcbinson-Patman price discrimination laws 
the only substantial legacy of the anti-chain movement. To this points 
the record was one of ever worsening danger for the chainsg but 1936 
proved to be the turning of the tide. The levelling off of chain store 
growth; the general economic upturn; the more relaxed competitive 
relationship between chains and independents fostered by price maintenance 
legislation, and the collapse of the broader politics of discontent which 
had done much to help the cause of the enemies of the chains in the 
mid-19301ss all served to hasten the demise of the anti-chain movement. 
Part rive relates its remorseless descent to oblivion. 
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Preface 
During the economic depression and political turmoil of the 1930's 
nearly every country in Europe imposed restrictions of various kinds on 
the opening of chain stores. In Belgiumg the "Padlock" lawss enacted in 
response to the spread of unit-price (limited-price variety) stores* 
virtually stopped expansion of large-scale retailing outside the 15 major 
cities after 1936. In rrance) where there was a long tradition of hampering 
large retail companies by the use of discriminatory taxationt a 1936 law 
prohibited the opening of new unit-price stores for one year. A 1933 Swiss 
federal decree s introduced originally as an emergency measure but left in 
force throughout the decades prohibited the opening of new or expansion of 
existing chain; department or large independent stores without a permits 
and graduated sales taxes were also used to discourage large-scale 
retailing. Austria completely banned the operation of unit-price stores 
in 1933; Czechoslovakia prohibited the opening of new unit-price stores 
from 1933 and closed down the mail order shoe business. In Germanyq 
Chancellor Brueningl in an effort to deflate the strong appeal made to the 
retailers by the Nazi Party$ which promised the abolition of department and 
chain stores and cooperativess in 1932 issued a decree prohibiting the 
opening of new variety chain stores in cities of less than lOOjOOO population 
for a period of two years. on assuming powers the Nazis prohibited the 
creation or expansion of chain storesp although modifications to this policy 
were subsequently introduced and the struggle within the party between the 
advocates of a populist "middle class syndicalism! 's urging the expropriation 
of big retailersg and forces identified with economic rationalisation and 
the supremacy of the needs of industry and the militarys resulted in a 
i 
stalemate in which no action was taken to break up the existing chain and 
department stores. It seems that only in Britain and Sweden did the chains 
escape severe regulation in the 1930'st and in Sweden the modesty of chain 
store developtnett made that escape of slight consequence -1 
When measured against this record the curbs imposed on chain stores in 
the United States may seem trifling. Twentyeight states enacted chain tax 
laws but without any severely restrictive tax ever 'comilig into effect; 
Congress enacted an anti-price discrimination law (the Robinson-Patman Act) 
but failed to respond to calls for a federal "death sentence" tax on chains. 
Howevers another measure of the opposition to chain stores in the United 
States is not what it accomplished but what it attempted. ror more than a 
decade militant independents mounted a sustained political attack on the very 
existence of the chainsg an attack which was in some respects unequalled 
anywhere in Europe. In most European countries the restrictions on chain 
stores were only secondarily the result of distinct political movements of 
wholesalers and retailers; primarily, they had merely the character of 
extensions of the already rigorous licensing arrangements applied to 
distribution as a whole. In many countries the 1930's brought restrictions 
on entry into the trade for aspiring independents quite as much as for chain 
storess with trade associations or governments or both in corbination 
maintaining rigid trade regulation akin to that of the Medieval guilds. 
Quite oftenj such regulation was also used to prevent existing retailers 
1. Jean J. Boddewyn and Stanley C. Hollanders'Ptiblic'P61ipy Td%4ard'Retailing: 
An Intertatiotal Symposiumg Lexingtong Mass. $ 1972D pp, 45b 284,352; James 
B. Jefferysý and Derek Kneeb Petailltig*ln'EUroP6v, Proýgibnt Structure and Future 
Trends, London, 1962D p. 56; istina Fulop$'CoMetition-forý-corigtimers: A 
Study 'of 'the 'Chah; tirig'Channels of DiEfttibutionb Londont 1964, pp. 212-3; 
Paul Uckerg fSwiss Retail Trade and Fascis Vol. 6 
(1941), pp. 50-53; Walter rroehlichg 'Change's In the central European Retail 
Tradelt'J6urzial'cif'Marko-t3. nr, b vol. 4 (1940)b pp. 258-63; Temporary National Economic. Comitte-ei'Mdriogrlaph*Nd. ''406 'Regulation of Economic Activities in 
Foreign Countriez's p-99, David SchoenbauTný'14itldtlsi*Sdcial'P, 6v6lUti6ii,. *'Class, 
and'Status -it -Na: ti, cdftdny; 'l933-; 1939 , L=6ý71=9675 pp, 136-50, 
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from adding sidelines (e. g. a greengrocer from selling bread) and to 
enforce price-fixing and standard hoursb on pain of revocation of license. 
Thus the Nazi government in Germany not only controlled large stores: after 
1933 no one could open a retail store without government pemissionb and in 
19396 in the first steps to obtain labour for war purposesb the government 
decreed the closure of supposed superfluous outlets in 'overcrowded' trades. 
As few European countries had any significant chain store development - in 
southern Europe chain stores were almost non-existent and in the north of 
the continent only variety chains had shown much growth by this time - the 
principal impact of such controls was inevitably felt by the small 
independents 62 
This sort of rigid trade regulation was unknown in the United States. 
Although trade associationso acting in concert with government, assumed 
unprecedented powers over pricess discounts and 'various trade practices 
under the National Recovery Administrations there were no controls on entry 
into the trade. Even within the ranks of the trade associations suggestions 
were rare that such controls should be actively sought and it was certainly 
never expected that such controls would be granted. Many American merchants 
in any case suspected that any form of licensing would be abused by 
politicians as a source of patronageb and there qas also a quite common 
belief in the inviolability of the right of any man to try his luck in 
business provided that he kept within certain limits in his conduct. Only 
in the drug trade, whose peculiar character necessitated certain regulations 
andq after 1933) in the liquor trades was there any important exception to 
this broad freedom. Thuss in demanding curbs on chain stores, American 
2. See ýorks in rootnote lt generally; also Walter rroehlich, "European 
Experiments in Protecting Small Corpetitorstb'HaisVard'Bti-liridr; t. 'ReviewI Vol. 
17 (1939)) pp. 442-52; Richard Grunbergert'AMcial'History of-the Third 
ReiChs Londonb 1971b pp, 167-740 pp. 180-1; =rthur Schweitzer* Big'Btisiness 
in thý Third *Rdich, Londont 1964t p. 158. 
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independents were deviating sharply from the principles upon which their 
own sector of the retail industry was conducted. They were also demanding 
curbs of much greater likely economic significance than those in Europe, 
for American chain stores were far more numerous and enjoyed a far larger 
share of the market than their continental European counterparts. The 
structure of retailing in the United States was comparable only with that 
in Britain whereo with the consumer cooperatives included$ large scale 
distributors had a similar share of total retail sales. However, in Britain 
there was neither anti-chain legislation in the 1930's nor any considerable 
demand for it. British shopkeepers seemingly aspired to little more than 
making life as comfortable as possible by means of resale price maintenance, 
which increased steadily to cover 30% of goods sold by 1938 notwithstanding 
the contemporaneous growth of chain stores. Conservatively-inclineds well- 
accustomed to chains - the growth of chains was apparently a more leisurely 
affair than in the United Statesp beginning'well back in the nineteenth 
century and with no sudden great explosion in numbers such as occurred in 
America in the 1920's - and lacking any strong sense of identify of class 
or even interests British shopkeepers had no collective political weight. 
3 
They also lacked that widespread public sympathy for the 'little fellow' 
in business battling to make a living in the face of the big predatory 
corporations which was so distinctively American and an indispensable element 
in the building of a political movement against the chains. 
American merchants had little of the obsessive preoccupation with status, 
that deference to 'betters' and dread of 'proletarianization, that is saido 
with what degree of caricature is uncertain, to have characterised merchants 
3. James 13. Jefferyso 'R6tail'Txkadizi$ 'in '13titclibi ASSO-619505 Cambridgel 19546 
pp. 53-40 61-63; r. G. Pennance and B-S, Yameyb competition in the Retail 
Grocery Tradeg 1850-1939', -td6t6Yhicab Vol. 22 (new series) (1955) pp. 303-17. 
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in Europeo especially in the countries of central Europe$ at this time . 
Them was no equivalent concept to the Germah'Mittdltt&hd 0 just as there 
were no organised middle class political parties. 
4 American independents 
in any case existed within the context of a society with a greater in-built 
tendency to favour free competition and the survival of the economically 
efficient, and they could tot afford to neglect the straight economic struggle 
with the chains even while they opposed them politically. Many independent 
retailers, regardless of their general attitude towards the chain stores, 
declined to sink into a guild mentality and instead madeevery efforts often 
with much success$ to copy or improve chain store methods to their own 
advantage. American independent storesg no less than American chain storess 
tended in general to be many years ahead of those in Europe in their methods 
of operations with widespread use of such innovations as the voluntary chain 
which did not appear in Europe until the 1950's or later. Trade regulations 
in all its formsw was very much a second string to the independents' bow. 
Buts on the other hands the very concept of the independent merchant 
possessed an ideological force it did not have in Britain. If the term 
Mittelstand cannot be properly translated into American idiom it is equally 
true that the ideas packed into the American expression "Main Street" cannot 
be similarly encapsulated in (British) English. No British Sinclair Lewis 
could ever have written a novel sirply entitled'High'Streets and few British 
politicians have ever been known to dwell on the virtues of their old home 
town High Street with its little stores and easy ways9 a stock in trade of 
American legislators in the 1930's. Likewiseb the powerful sectionalism 
4. Robert Gellately g 'The Politics -of 'Edotomic Tespair.,, Shopk6epers 'and 
German Politict. 1890"19149-Londons 19_7'rs pp. 8-10; Herman Lebovicso 
Social'Consetvdtism*and the'Middle Clastet'in Germanyý. 1914-1933D Princetons 
1969s pp. 3-12. 
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found in the United States introduced an element into the anti-chain store 
agitation barely cotceivables at least in the solely economic sphereg in a 
geographically colVact and economically tight-knit country such as Britain. 
ror many of those active in the anti-chain store movement - especially for 
those not themselves involved in the distributive trades - the attempt to 
cut off the tentacles of the 'chain store octopus' was but a part of a wider 
battle to restore economic independence to the South and the West. Furthermore, 
the political ideologies of populism and progressivism, in all their diversityp 
have no real equivalent in mainstream British political thought. In Britain 
the main attack on big business came from socialisml and in the 1930's the 
shopkeepers in many cases merely formed part of that bland consensus which 
sustained the politics of the National Government against the left. In the 
United States, where socialism was a negligible force by the 19301sj the 
attacks on big business carridd on an altogether different tradition$ a 
tradition with-which many small businessmen could and did identify with great 
enthusiasm. American merchants were not caught looking two ways - fighting 
socialistic cooperatives to the left of them and chain store corbines to 
the right of them - as happened in parts of turope. Their attack was all 
in one direction: against the chain stores. As a consequences they proved 
able to mount a fairly uninhibited campaign of opposition to the chainss 
secure in the knowledge that no group in society was meanwhile plotting 
their own regulation or destruction. They also proved able to mount a trul! j 
independent type of political movement. That the militant opponents of the 
chain stores never won the backing of a nationally-organised political party 
inevitably frustrated many of their effortsb but it perhaps also proved a 
strength. Unlike German retailerso they were never absorbed into a party 
apparatus to be regimented and 'coordinated' in the interest of the party. 
vi 
Tor amoverant which threw. up a huge contemporary record of itselfl 
the anti-chain storemovement has lain curiously forgotten since it expired. 
There has tot been one considerable attempt - with due respect to the worthy 
but necessarily superficial treatment given in one short M. A. thesis - to 
describe the 'main linet of development of the opposition to chain storest 
though the peripheral areas of the subject have not gone neglected. The 
thinness of the historiography appears to reflect a general indifference to 
the study of retailers' movements in other countriess though there are 
6 
probably some additional explanations involved in the American case. The 
intention behind this thesis is to fill the gap by providing a straightforward 
0 narrative account of the principal episodes in the opposition to chain stores 
5. Carl G, Ryants 'The Unbroken Chain: Opposition to Chain Stores during 
the Great Depression's unpub. M. A. Thesiss University of Wisconsins Madisons 
1965; see also Týyantfs articles 'The South and the Movement Against Chain 
Storesl''Jo-briial'of'Southern'HistoEy 0 _s 
vol. 39 (1973), pp, 207-222. Godfrey 
M. Lebharg'Chain'Stopos in'Arherica 
, 
(N. Y. several editions) also follows 
the track of the anti-chain store movement but without adding much not 
found in articles in'Chain Store Ages the magazine of which Lebhar was 
editors in the 1920fý-and 19301s. Joseph C. Palamountains The'Pdlitics 
of Distributions Cambes Mass. $ 1955p intersects with this thesis at 
Various 
points b fact largely about the economics, not the politicsq of 
distribution. 
6. For some comments on this indifference, see Arno J. Mayerg 'The Lower 
Middle Class as an Historical Problem' s 'Joilmal *of 'Mddern -History I vol. 47 (September 19700 pp. 409-36; and Gellatelys op-cit-t pp. T-T_ The anti- 
chain store movement was not directly part of the New Deal, which tends to 
be the unifying theme in most writing on the 1930'st and this may have 
deterred interest; the subject also straddles a number of disciplines in 
an awkward manner. Historical 'questions' also have a way of being 
overlooked altogether unless they have been answered in sore way before. 
It is interestingg for examples to notice how T. Harry Williams in his 
monumental biography of Huey Long does not once refer to Long's opposition 
to chain stores even though virtually every issue of Long's newspaper, the 
Louisiana (Ametican)'Progress contains attacks on the chains. Obviouslys 
Williams had read these speeches but they did not 'ring a bell' or fit 
into any context, 
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between 1927 and 1940. The economics of chain store distribution, the 
detailed effect of chain store competition on independent businesses - as 
opposed to the effect on the attitudes of independent businessmen - and 
even the subterranean efforts to hinder the chains by boycotts and other 
such sanctions internal to the trade are not considered below except where 
they bear directly on the political fight. The primary concern of the 
thesis begins where the merchants come into the open and oppose the chains 
in public and by political -means. 
In the several years týken in the preparation of this thesis I have 
benefitted from the assistance and kindnesses of many people. In the 
course of extensive corTespondence'with trade association executives and 
other individuals in the United States I have received much encouragement 
from the warmth of interest shown in my work and have obtained various types 
of background material which would not otherwise have come my way. Great 
thanks are also due. to Professor Royden Harrison and members of staff at 
the Centre for the Study of Social History for their long-suffering patience; 
to my typistb Deirdre Hewitt; to my friends Nigel and Carol Rigby for 
their repeated hospitality upon ty many visits to the British Libraryb and 
to my parents for their unswerving support during the period in which the 
fruits of research were turned into a piece of writing. 
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Abbreviations 
ACCO - Atlantic Commission Co. 
AGMA Associated Grocery Manufacturers of America. 
ARF American Retail rederation. 
AWGA American Wholesale Grocers' Association (became USWGAs 1933). 
CFDA Cooperative rood Distributors of America (succeeded National 
Retail-Owned Wholesale Grocers' Association, 1935). 
FGCSA rood & Grocery Chain Stores of America (became National 
Association of rood Chains t 1936). 
IGA Independent Grocers I Alliance 
IRMA Independent Retail Merchants' Association. 
LPVSA Limited Price Variety Stores' Association, formed 1933. 
MMM Merchant Minute Men. 
NAITD National Association of Independent Tire Dealers. 
NARD National Association of Retail Druggists. 
NARG National Association of Retail Grocers. 
NARMD National Association of Retail Meat Dealers. 
NAWGA National-American Wholesale Grocers' Association (succeeded 
National Wholesale Grocers' Associationg 1933). 
NCSA National Chain Store Association (rormed 1928: dissolved 1933). 
NCSGA National Chain Store Grocers' Association (superseded by NCSAj 
1928). 
NFBA National Food Brokers' Association. 
NRDGA National Retail Dry Goods Association. 
NRHA National Retail Hardware Association. 
NWGA National Wholesale Grocers' Association (became NAWGAq 1933). 
RCIPA Retail Clerks' International Protective Association. 
RGA Retail Grocers' Association. 
RMA Retail Merchants' Association. 
UCT United Commercial Travelers of America. 
USWGA United States Wholesale Grocers' Association (succeeded AWGA, 
1933). 
1. 
PART ONE: The Chain Stores 
i. The Growth'of'thdý'Chain Stores 
There had been chain stores in America for many years before they 
were first branded as a "menace" and threatened by agitators seeking to 
curb their practices or put them out of business. The Great Atlantic & 
Pacific Tea Co. 9 the longest-lived if not the earliest-established chain 
store company in the United States, had its origins in 1859 and was 
trading under its modern name by 1869. The Kroger Grocery & Baking Co-9 
the second largest grocery chain in the 19201s. developed out of the Great 
Western Tea Co. established by B. H. Kroger in Cincinnati in 1882. In the 
variety field, the first successful Woolworth store was opened in 18799 
and several prominent companies, including the S. S. Kresge Co. and S. H. 
Kress 9 Co., made their first appearance in the 1880's and 1890's. 
1 
Early growth was nonetheless only very gradual ando when set against 
the rapid expansion of the nation's population and economys almost 
insignificant. Comprehensive statistics are lacking for the period before 
the 1920's - the rederal Reserve Board began the compilation of retail 
trade statistics only in 1919 and there was no Census of Distribution taken 
until 19290 a circumstance which itself reflects the lack of public interest 
in or concern about the condition of retail distribution in earlier times. 
Howevero according to estimates made by the rederal Trade Commission 
1. "The Early History of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. " by R-J- 
Bullock, Harvard Business Reviewq vol. 11 (1933)9 pp. 289-98; Paul H. 
Nystrom, Economics of Retailings New Yorkq 2nd edn. 1930, vol. I pp* 215-24. 
General accounts of the development of chains in all lines can be found 
in G. M. Lebhars Chain Stores in America* N. Y. $ various editions; John P. 
Nichols, The Chain Store Tells its Story$ N. Y., 1940; Tom Mahoney & 
Leonard Stone, The Great'Mercharits: A66-ricalit'roremost RetailInstitutions 
an the People Who'Made Them Great, N. Y-g various editions; Walter J. 
Wa-Fw'ard & Percival White, 'Chain'Stores: Their'Managerhent and'Operation, N. Y.. 
various editions; William Jo Baxters'Chain'Store Distribution and Management, 
N-Y-s 1928. 
2. 
(estimates which the Commission described as being "merely approximations" 
and probably somewhat understate the early extent of chain store 
development)q there were .' 
in 26 principal lines of merchandising 
still only 3,300 units of chains of four or more stores in 1900. This 
compares with an estimated 950386 such units in these lines in 1929. During 
the first decade of the new century a powerful expansionist trend set ing 
there being 156800 chain stores in these 26 lines by 1914.2 The chains 
were nevertheless still far from being a matter of public controversy or 
even of sustained trade attention or apprehension. Only two chains 
commanded much notice in those early years,, the F. W. Woolworth Co. and 
the United Cigar Stores Co., and they did so as conspicuous individual 
businesses rather than as representatives of a new "system" of merchandising. 
3 
Anti-chain campaigners in the 1930's rarely recalled$ or seemed to 
be aware ofg these early chain store developments. It was a recurrent 
theme of their rhetoric that the chains were a peculiar abomination of 
the post-war worldg an unnatural imposition on a hitherto stable and 
orderly system of distribution in which manufacturer sold to wholesalers 
wholesaler to retailer and retailer to consumerg each at a "fair" profit 
and without undue competitive aggression. And, most certainlys the trend 
2. rTC9 Chain Store Inquiry,, Growth and Development of Chain Stores . 
pp. 66-67. See AT)T)endix Table I. ror full citation for reports of the 
Chain Store Inquiry, see biblio-graphy. 
3. Woolworth's success was symbolised by the opening of the Woolworth 
buildings "The Cathedral of Commercel' in New York in 1913, at that time 
the world's tallest building. See John K. Winklerg Five and Ten: The 
Fabulous Life of r. w. Woolworths rreeports N. Y. $ 1970 reprint* pp. 183- 
201. George Whelan opened his second store only in 19010 but by 1914 
his United Cigar Stores Co. had well over ljOOO units. As company vice- 
president H. S. Collins recalled, "We had plenty of opposition. The 
independents fought us tooth and nail - not because we were a chain but 
because we were supposed to be the outlet for the tobacco trust. In those 
trust-busting dayss it was the easiest thing in the world to raise a hue 
and cry against anything connected with 'the interests"' ("Our First 
Twenty-rive Years" in Chain Store Age% May 1926). See also U. S. v. 
American Tobacco Co. 221 U. S. 106 (1911), 
3, 
of growth in chain store numbers was such that it produced a colossal 
increase in the post-war period even though what happened then was really 
only a continuation of what had gone before. In rough terms, chain store 
nurbers increased in geometrical progressions tripling each decade from 
1900 to 1930. The result was that more than 660000 stores were added in 
the period from the end of the war (1918) to the Wall Street Crash (1929)9 
corpared with only 29,200 in existence in 1918 after a period of 60 years 
development. The average size of chain units also increased markedly in 
the post-war period as the older types of chains such as the groceries 
began to carry wider ranges of merchandise and as new big-store chains 
like Sears, Roebuck entered the field, with the result that the rate of 
increase in sales was even more rapid. One good estimates cited in a 
Senate resolution requesting the rederal Trade Commission to conduct an 
inquiry into the reasons behind the growth of the chainss was that chains 
did 4% of U. S. retail sales in 1921 and 16% in 1927. By 1929, chains of 
four or more stores did more than 20% of U. S. retail sales. What is more, 
because of a sharp increase in the number of mergers of chain store 
companies in the last few years of the decade the large chains grew faster 
than the industry as a wholes some of the very biggest chain store 
companies in existence as of 1929 having formed or achieved any prominence 
only in the course of the previous few years. 
4 
Had this rate of progress been sustainedl the chains woulds of courses 
have long ago assumed responsibility for all the retailing in America; 
instead, after further definite advance in the early 1930tsl the overall 
chain store share of retail sales became stable for the rest of the 1930's 
and most of the 1940ts, before resuming a gradual trend to increase 
thereafter. As G. M. Lebhar, the founder of the magazine Chain Store Aze,, 
4. Appendix Tables 19 Il; 'Sen. Res. 2240 70th Cong. Ist Sess. 9 May 56 1928. (Known as the Brookhart reso-l'utionY. 
LI, 
later observed, "The rapid and spectacular progress the chains made 
between 1920 and 1930 carried them to a certain point, but that apparently 
was as far as they were destined to go". The consequence was that the 
"chain store question" - "if chain stores keep expanding at their present 
rates how long will it be before the independent merchant is wiped out 
entirely? ". - ceased to have any meaning. 
5 Not only did the chain store 
industry climb to undreamed-of heights in the 19201ss it accomplished its 
feats amid an unprecedented glare of publicity. The chains themselves 
contributed to this. In pre-war timess many chains, their owners 
instinctively preferring to keep their operations in the dark in order to 
avoid trade antagonisms did not publish details of their sales or nurber 
of stores. This older attitude - whichg in view of events in the 1930's 
was perhaps the more prudent - gave way in the 1920's to a boastful and 
publicity-oriented approach. Perhaps the passing of control in many chains 
from the cautious grip of their original ownerss nearly all of whom had 
begun as single store owners and well knew the mind of independent 
merchants$ to a new generation of corporation meng more interested in 
exciting Wall street and the stockholders than in the reactions of the 
independentss played a part in this; undoubtedly toog the general public 
euphoria in the 1920's about the triumphs of American big businesslinduced 
a relaxation of the older caution. In 19200 a dozen eastern grocery 
chains founded the first chain store associations the National Chain Store 
Grocers' Association; as the decade continued new magazinesp notably 
G. M. Lebhar's Chain Store Age (1925)g sprang up to foster the new chain 
store self-consciousness and cement its identity; then, in 19289 the 
leading chains in all liness except the A& Ps joined together to form 
S. In the preface to'Chain St, ores in America$ op. cit. 
5. 
the National Chain Stores' Association. Chain store men freely offered 
their opinion that the chains represented a "mass distribution" to answer 
the "mass production" found in manufacturing industry, and they elevated 
their co=ercial success to the level of a major'contribution to the 
greater wellbeing of society as a whole. 
6 Business and general circulation 
magazines joined in the chorus of approbation and some commentators felt 
quite convincedg in view of the apparently foolproof logic of the 
efficiency of chain store inethodsp that "the independent retailer as a real 
factor in present-day distribution is about to pass into the oblivion of 
business history" and that any protest raised by the doomed independents 
"will be swept aside as they are either eliminated or absorbed into the 
7 
mechanism" , 
The advance of the chains in the 1920's was led by the older types of 
chains which had first pioneered the methods of chain operation. By 1929g 
the F. W. Woolworth Co. had 19825 storesp these being found in every town 
above 80000 population as well as in some of less and producing a total of 
$303 m sales. This being a type of merchandising actually originated by 
the chainsg there were few independents in the fields and a handful of big 
companies were dominant. So important was the element of mass buying in 
variety chain operation - often involving exclusive purchasing arrangements 
with manufacturers - that it was difficult for independents to establish 
themselvess and profitability tended to increase in direct proportion to 
company size. 
8 It was the grocery chainsp however, which were the 
1 
6. A. H. Morrills"The Development and Effect of Chain Stores"t in Ezra 0. 
Buehler, 'Debatd Handbook'ozi the'Chain Stord'Qu6ttiong Univ. of Xansasp 1930g 
pp. 145-51; R. W. Lyonss "The Social and Eco; omic As ects of Chain Stores" 
in American Economic Reviewq March 19310 vol. XXI, No. 1, supplement pp-26-32. 
7. J-T. A. Ely, "Tomorrow's Retailing - Will the Chain Store Do It All? " in 
Magazine of Btsinesss November 1927j pp. 552-4 ff; George Soulef "Farewell 
to the Shopkeeper" I 'New-Rdpublics April 4.19286 pp. 210-212. 
B. Charles r. Phillipso "A History of the r. w. Woolworth Company" in 
Harvard Businet: §'Rdviewq Vol. 13 (1935), pp. 225-36. 
6. 
undisputed leaders of the chain store industry by the 1920's. As late 
as 19129 the A&P had only 400 stores and its largest rivals but 200 
stores each. From about 1913, ýthe chains began to turn to a new type 
of "economy store" in which traditional features of grocery store operation 
such as credits deliverys premiums and elaborate fixtures were eliminated 
in favour of strict cash and carry principless narrow ranges of fast-noving 
rierchandise and austere store conditions. Everything seemed to work in 
favour of this new approach. Wartime inflation induced a new price- 
consciousness on the part of consumers, thus encouraging a new and daring 
emphasis on low prices. The new prominence of nationally-advertised 
brandso which were pushing out the old undifferentiated and often unpackaged 
stapless also proved of the greatest importances for such goods were 
"pro-sold" household names of guaranteed quality and the customer could 
compare the price at which the ch&in store sold them directly with the 
prices prevailing in independent stores. No longer did cheap prices in 
the food trade imply cheap and possibly adulterated goods. Many grocers 
until well into the 1920's retained a somewhat pathetic belief that the 
success of the Ileconory stores" represented a more crazes a transient 
aberration on the part of the consuming public. The American people were$ 
they believedp too fond of service and too interested in-making dollars rather 
than in saving cents to persist for long in their infatuation with the 
chains. Certainlyl the chains did not retain the pristine rigours of the 
early "economy stores" during the 19201s. but rather drifted in the 
direction of "trading up" by making their stores more attractive and 
widening the range of merchandise sold. (The leading chains began from 
the inid-1920's to open so-called combination stores, selling fresh meat, 
in addition to the regular lines of dry groceries). But cash and carry had 
7. 
established its popularityl and the enormous increase in automobile 
ownership most American families owned a motor vehicle by the end of 
the 1920's served only to cement that popularity by raking cash and 
carry physically more convenient to the customer. More and more independent 
grocers reluctantly moved over to cash and carry policies as they 
contemplated with dismay the success of the chains. 
9 
The grocery chains were the focal point of the whole chain store 
question$ their stores being the most numerous, their competitors being 
many and organised, and the competitive struggle in food retailing being 
the most intense. The A&P, building on its wartime success$ increased 
from 39799 stores in 1918 to 14,034 by 1925, in which year sales were 
$440m; it then added relatively few stores (operating between 159000 and 
160000 through the period from 1927 to 1934) but increased the size of 
its stores$ thereby raising sales to $16054m in 1929. This Colossus of Americar 
retailing wass uniquely among leading chain companiesg run almost as a family 
firm by the two Hartford brothersg John and Georgeq who had full effective 
ownership and control and often stood in isolation against the general 
consensus of chain store opinion. The A& P's principal rivals were 
essentially sectional in scope. Krogerg the giant of the Midwests rose from 
799 stores in 1920 to 5,575 in 1929, with the help of some acquisitions 
of smaller chainsg with 1929 sales of $287m. Ranked by storess Kroger 
came second to the A&P among chains of all types; ranked by sales, it 
came fourth behind A&P. Woolworth and Searss Roebuck (including catalogue 
sales). Safeway Stores Inc. 9 formed by a series of multiple mergers of 
small chains under the auspices of the New York investment bankers Merrillg 
Lynch & Co. in the late 1920's, was dominant in the western states; the 
9. R. J. Bullocks "The History of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company 
Since 187811 in, Harvatd'13ti9ine8I'Review Vol. 12 (1933) pp. 59-69. M. A. 
Adelman, 'A'g P-. 1 A, StuTy-ýIrn -pricd-; c; -87F7Bohavior * and'Ptiblid 'Policy I Cambridge, Mass., 1959 pp. 24-27. 
B. 
American Stores Co., formed by merger in 1916, had 2,644 stores densely 
packed into a smallýarea of eastern Pennsylvania and adjoining states; 
rirst National Stores Inc-s formed by the merger of three Boston chains 
in 1925, had over 20000 stores throughout New Englands and the National 
Tea Co., hemmed in by Kroger to the south and Safeway to the wests operated 
in a territory stretching northwards and westwards from Chicago. 
Although independent grocers played the leading role in the political 
fight against the chains, they received assistance from many non-food 
merchants, a situation which reflected the luxuriant diversification of 
chain store merchandising in the 1920's. In the drug store field, there 
were as few as 25 stores in chains of two or more stores in the whole 
United States in 19OOg and although the Louis K. Liggett Co. and Walgreen 
both originated in the first decade of the new centuryb as late as 1920 
there were still estimated to be only lj563 stores in chains of three or 
more stores. Greater development was retarded by the difficulty of 
standardising methodss the need to employ trained pharmacistso the high 
capital costsp the complexity of operation, and the huge diversity of 
pharmaceutical stocks which compelled even the large chain retailer to 
make considerable use of wholesalers. Nearly all the drug chain stores 
at that time were found in a few large cities: the United Drug Co-s for 
exampleg operated Liggett stores in the big citiesg extending its influence 
to the smaller towns through the llsOOO Rexall agenciesq independent 
druggists who carried brands manufactured by United Drug. But by 19291 
although still with a heavily big city concentrationg total drug chain 
numbers had increased sharply to 249 chains of four or more storesp with 
an aggregate of 31513, stores which did 18.8% of total drug store sales. 
Peculiar significance attached to this upsurge because of the extremely 
high degree of trade organisation among independent retail druggists who 
9. 
were, in relation to their nurbers, the best o, rganised of all retail groups. 
Several factors tended to deter the development of militant political activity 
against the chains in the drug trade, including the lack of enthusiasm of 
wholesalers whol unlike those in the grocery trades efijoyed appreciable sales 
to the chainso the anomalous situation that some independent retail druggists 
were agencies of chain store companies like Walgreen or were stockholders in 
the United Drug Cool which operated Liggett'sp and the fact that the chains 
were grographically rather patchy in extent. The trade preoccupation with 
resale price maintenance also acted as a diversion. Nonetheless, when the 
independent retail druggists did begin to join in the fight in the 1930's they 
brought to it a discipline not usually found from other retailers, 
10 
The 1920's also brought notable chain growth in the apparel% dry goods, 
general merchandise and department store fieldst lines in which chain store 
operation had hitherto been considered difficult because of the problems of 
adapting cash and carrys high turnovers unskilled mass retailing techniques 
to the very different requirements of selling "shopping goods". Much of the 
advance in these fields was in fact achieved by modifying ideas about the 
"chain store method" introduced by the variety chainst though the chains did 
tend to concentrate at the lower-price end of the market I leaving the higher- 
quality or more specialised merchandise to the independents. Most of the 
companies in these lines were individually relatively modest in comparison to 
the grocery or variety chains, but there were three outstanding department 
store chains by the end of the decade. The J. C. Penney Co., with small town 
origins in Wyoming in 19029 increased from 34 stores in 1912 to 1452 by 1930p 
the conpany operating in every state and having 85% of its units in towns of 
less than 250000 population, Searso Roebuck and Montgomery Wardl the great 
10. Baxter, op. cit. 0 pp. 76-109; Hayward & Whitel op-cit. (1928 edn. 
) pp. 
505-518; rortuneb "500 Corner Drugstores; Walgreen Co. "$ September 19356 
pp. 71-80 ff; Samuel Merwing Risd'and Fkht: ALaines N. Y. j 1935, interestingly 
relates the curious origins of-'te Liggett chain as an outgrowth of the 
retailers' cooperative organisationg the United Drug Co-9 which Liggett 
himself created. 
10. 
Chicago catalogue housest first opened retail stores in 1925 and 1926 
respectively, in good measure because chains like J. C. Penney were eating into 
a rural market which was in any case declining relative to the national economy 
as a whole. Both companies opened several hundred stores in the last few 
years of the decade 0 Sears mainly in large cities and Ward mainly in small 
towns and mediuv-sized cities of up to about 75,000 population. 
11 
A virtual fever for anything in chains gripped financial promoters 
and the stock buying public in the 19201s. Not just chain storesq but 
chain restaurants$ chain filling stationso chain soft drink standsp chain 
hotels and chain banks proliferated. A mode of business organisation 
hitherto confined largely to the grocerys variety and cigar store fields 
influenced every type of retailing and service trades thus heightening 
awareness of the "chain store menace" and widening the circle of potential 
enemies of the chains. At the same time, the chains reached deep into 
geographical areas which they had little affected before the warg the South 
and the West and the small towns generally. chains reporting to the rTC 
9perated 42.6% of their stores in the three eastern states of New York, 
New Jersey and Pennsylvania in 1913; by 1928, that proportion had fallen 
to 30.8%. The rTC's data relating to the rate of growth in the different 
sections of the country showed a distinct trend for the area of most 
rapid development to slip steadily westwardsg although even in the old 
chain store areas of the northeast expansion was still extremely rapid in 
the post-war years. 
12 Syrbolicallys perhapsp the three leading chains of 
the pre-war period all established their first store in New York State$ 
Woolworth in Utica, United Cigar in Syracuse and the A&P in New York 
City; in contrastg some of the new giants of the 1920's such as Penney 
11. Boris Emet & John E. Jeuck j 'Catalopeg 'and'Counterg -w A, Hist(5xv of Sears, Roebuck arid'CoToany, Chicagoo 19655 pp, 313-236 338-530 
12. rTCj 
, 
Chain Store Inquirys State Distribution of Chain Stores 
esp. p. 4. 
ii. 
and Safeway had their beginnings west of the Mississippi. Everywhere 9 
the chains enjoyed a higher proportion of the retail trade in the large 
cities than they did in the small towns, but by 1929 there was no obvious 
tendency for the chain store sales ratios to be lower in the large cities 
of the South and West than in similarly-sized cities in the Northeast. 
New York City, popularly regarded by merchants elsewhere in the country as 
being a city "lost" to the chainsp actually had a lower proportion of its 
retail sales made through chain outlets than'did many cities in the 
Midwest, its strong neighbourhood loyalties holding back the chains even 
in the grocery trade where they had been in operation for 70 years. 
13 
The impact of the chain store on the small town was a principal source 
of public anxiety about the "chain store menace" and the rTC9 as part of 
the chain store inquiry ordered by the Senates devoted a special report to 
the subject. The Commission studied 30 small townsg widely distributed 
around the country and nearly all of which had between 21000 and 50000 
population. The first known appearance of a chain store - and the 
Commission adopted the catholic definition that two stores under common 
ownership constituted a chain - in any of the 30 towns was not until 1904. 
From then until 1931 an aggregate of 246 chain-stores was openeds only 24 
of them before 1918 and with the number of openings reaching a peak in 
1928-1929. In 1926 there were 910 independent and 115 chain stores in the 
towns; in 19319 there were 840 independents and 218 chain storess an 
increase of 89.6% in the number of chain stores and a decline of 7.79o in 
the number of independents. The nurber of independents trading in the 
same lines as the chains fell by 72 (15.7%) during this period whereas 
the number in non-competing lines actually increased by 2 (0.4%). The 
13. Compare the reports by city in the 1930 Census of Distribution 
(ýRetail 'DiigttibiAt ion. vol. I Part. I, ). 7-he lq30 Census cjqLa refer /o 19Z9. 
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total of 218 chain stores in. 1931 was made up principally by 97 stores 
in the grocery field, 42 varietyi 26 dry goods and apparel and 15 
department stores. Typically these were'units of large chains$ whereas 
the smaller nurbers of stores in the drugs furniture* jewelleryg 
wallpaper and paint, ready to wear apparel and hardware lines were units 
of small chains. 
14 
As long as the chains stayed rnainly in the cities 0 being carried along 
on the tides of immigration and urbanisation, they provoked, little 
concerted hostility. The rather gradual pace of early development also 
served to give independent merchants some chance to reconcile themselves 
and adapt their methods to meet the challenge. But the invasion of the 
small towns in the rural sections was accomplished by chains which were 
already at the height of their powers$ inspiring immense panic among 
merchants whog unlike their city brethren, commonly had little conception 
of modern store management and were unused to the ways of vigorous 
competition. The small town merchant found himself under a double threat 
from the new chain stores in his own home town and from the attractions 
of the specialised stores in the larger-cities which, thanks to the 
automobile and the breakdown of old credit ties in the farm states with 
the spread of a cash economyg were accessible to an ever-increasing public. 
No longer was the mail order catalogue or the occasional peddler. the only 
14. FTC, Chain Store Inquiry, The Chain Store in the Small Towný-g 
Tables 6,150 33 and 35. The 1930 Census found that therg"-were 399725 
chain stores (units of four or more store chains) in all places of 
less than lOjOOO population combined; excluding filling stationso that 
figure was 29,880. Of these no less than 135355 were grocery chain 
stores. Furthermore% the stores in the grocery field tended to be 
operated by extremely large companies. The FTC found that in 1929 the 
A&P, Xroger and Safeway combined had 6b420 stores in towns of less 
than IODOOO population. These figures go some way to explaining the 
prominence of grocers in leading the wave of small town opposition to 
the chains which swellea up in the late 1920's. (1930 Census of 
Distribution, Rdtail'biftpibution, Vol. I Pt. Is Table 235 P. 976; 
Table 24, p. 977; FTC, Chain Store InqUT! Y*, rKai'Pdo6rt, p. 6). 
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"foreign" menace. By the late 1920'sg many families in the rural 
sections thought nothing of travelling 100 or 150 miles to find. the 
prices and the range and style of goods that the larger urban centres 
could provide. This magnetic effect of the big trading centres actually 
led to falls in sales for some small town merchants even in the generally 
prosperous 19201s. 
is 
Students of the chain store problem detected in this a fundamental 
shift in the character of American small town life. Philadelphia and 
Chicago could no doubt accommodate the chain stores as a purely business 
mechanism with no great effect upon their social structureb but could 
the smaller cities and towns! The chains were viewed as the harbingers 
of a new uniform and nationalised culture being carried forward by chain 
newspapersp chain radio, Hollywood movies, and sometimes vaguely 
associated with such disturbances to morality as women who smoked and 
"gin and jazz". Some of the sense of emotional and intellectual confusion 
and loss which informed the great literature of the period also found a 
place in the humbler outpourings of many of those who saw in the chain 
store a symbol of the loss of the old simplicities of Main Street life 
before the war. Imprecise and elusive as such sentiments were) chain 
store men disregarded them at their peril for harnessed to political action 
by agitators at the end of the 1920's they proved an energetic fuel. 
16 
15. President's Conference on Unemployment Rdeent*Economic ChangeýýL 
f rf Vol. 1. pp-331-341; Sales'Management) January 216 1928b Mall Town 
Merchants reel the Chain Store Lash"; Bureau of roreign and Domestic 
Commerces Domestic Commerce Series, No. 19 (1927) Commercial SurýýZ 
of the Southeast by John M. Hagers pp-175-181. The number of motor 
vehicles in the United States increased from 102S8,062 in 1913 to 2665239779 
by 1930, in which year the population was 1226775,046. The highest ratios 
of vehicle registrations to population were generally found in western farm 
states. In the Souths the section where ratios were lowesto the increase 
in automobile registrations was faster than elsewhere in the nation during 
the 1920's. 
16. See particularlys Charles Wesley Woods The*Passing, of Normalcys N. Y., 
1929; Samuel Crowther* "Cash and Carry%'Wýrld'S_W rk* July 1930 pp. 42-6; 
and the many essays of Jesse Rainsford Spra-gue-sincluding "The Chain-Store 
Mind" in Harper's Monthly, rebruary 1929 pp. 356-66; "The Chain Store in 
Your Town" in Saturday Evening Post,, Sept. 291,1923s p. 12 ff-; The Making 
14. 
At the beginning of the 19201sl independent merchants in much of the 
country, and especially in the South and to the west of the Mississippi 
were still only half-alert to the "chain store menace". At trade 
conventions$ rebolutions vore commonly condemned the old enemy of the, 
catalogue houses than the chain stores; indeed, even minor irritants such 
as peddlers and consumer cooperatives were often deemed more worthy of, 
denunciation. At national conventions$ even in the grocery trades complaint 
about the chains came most loudly from the delegates from the eastern statesq 
and their interests leaned more to cooperative buyingi group advertising 
schemes. price maintenance and trade association work than to the overtly 
political and agitational techniques used against the "maii order menace" 
elsewhere. But by the end of the 1920's the tables had been turned. The 
delegates from the eastern states were yet more worried about the chainsg 
but they were not in despair and some were confident that they had the 
measure of the chains. Those from the South and Westg in contrasts were 
in panic about the chain store offensive$ and in their panic some of them 
were ready to turn to any method to fight backs including a desperate 
appeal to public sentiment. 
Agitation against the chain stores developed before the depression-and 
although the first great wave of reaction and resistance reached its peak 
only after the Wall Street Crash that was perhaps little more than 
coincidence. The anti-chain fervour which swept through the South and the 
Midwest in the late 1920's was a direct reaction against the chains and was 
little affected by the broader political or economic conditions of the timet 
unless it was a provincial distaste for the excesses of Wall Street in that 
16. (Cont'd) ... of a'Merchants N. Y. and Londons 1928s and'High-Prdssiire: 
What it is doing tomy T and my Neighborss N. Y. 1938. 
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period. rrom 19300 however$ the broader problems of the times impinged ever 
more acutely on the shape of the anti-chain struggle. Thanks to the 
depression and the New Deal, anti-chain agitation fanned back from the 
interior states even into those parts of the east where the position of the 
chains had seemed secure. 
While the economy made its long and inexorable descent to the depths of 
early 1933 the chains proved able to make yet more gains at the expense of 
the independent sectorg partly as a continuation of the growth of the 1920's 
and partly because of the appeal of their generally more economical stores 
in hard times. In 1933b chains did 25.4% of U. S. retail sales compared with 
20.0% in 1929; furthermores the large sectional and national chains did 
disproportionately wellb taking 19.3% of retail sales even in 1935g when 
the beginnings of a reverse trend may have been under wayo compared with 
12.6% in 1929. Many of the leading chains in fact went through'the'trough 
of the depression relatively unscathedq closing a few stores and suffering 
reduced profitability at a time when whole sections of American business were 
thrown into bankruptcy. Particularly notable was the record of the variety 
chains$ the four largest'of which each operated more stores each year from 
1930 to 1933. In general$ the only large chains to be dragged into financial 
crisis were those which had unsuccessful subsidiary commitments* like 
United Cigars or were forceds like Liggetto to undergo receivership and 
reorganisation to escape from excessive rentals taken on in the 1920's scramble 
for favourable store locations. There were also independents who prospered 
throughout the depression but the independent sector as a whole suffered 
direly. Not only did it lose ground to the chains, the absolute falls in 
sales volume because of the depression were not reflected in any thinning of 
the ranks. Unsuccessful storekeepers had no incentive to give up their 
storess because they had no prospect of altermative employment; equallyg 
16. 
some of the unemployeds resorting to the traditional "safety valvelt - 
occupation of "Subsistence retailing"$ opened front-room stores or roadside 
standsl thus cutting into the business left for established dealers. In 
19336 with retail sales at only slightly more than half of their 1929 level$ 
there were almost as many independent retailers in the country as in 1929.17 
In 1933 there began the slow clirb from out of the depths of depressions 
a climb interrupted only by the severe recession of late 1937 and the 
first half of 19389 which restored the econonV approximately to its 1929 
condition by 1939. The Census statistics show that between 1933 and 1935, 
independent stores increased by 9% and sales by 36%`9 chain stores decreased 
by 10% and their sales increased by only 19%f and in all but four states 
(Colorado* Mainep Vermont and the District of Columbia) the chain store share 
of total retail sales was less in 1935 than in 1933. Such overall 
statistics do somewhat distort the real positiono because of sharp increases 
in the nurbers. of independent retailers in the filling station and eating 
and drinking places groups -outlets which were not thought of as properly 
being "stores" by most people - and in some fieldsq notably in the department 
store group, the chains were still advancing strongly. Neverthelesss the 
chain store advance along a wide front had clearly come to a halt and they 
had suffered definite reverses at some points. While at first the, low 
aggregate volume of retail sales rather detracted from the beneficial effects 
of this upon the independent sector* by 1936 and 1937 a distinctly optimistic 
tone became apparent in discussions of the current conditions in independent 
trade circles. Most importantly in political termss in the grocery and drug 
fields the chains were no longer increasing their share of total sales. I 
179 See Appendix Tables; Joseph C. Palamountain6 'The 'Politic, 9'of 
Distribution, Carb-t Mass. $ 1955, pp. 8-15; also,, for a comment on the 
situation I-n one cityl Robert S. and Helen M. Lynd, Middletown in 
Transition, N. Y., 1937j pp. 11-12. 
17. 
Although the political movement against the chains by that time had its 
own momentumb it was stealthily undermined in the late 1930's by the 
double effect of general national economic recovery and the arresting of 
the chain store advance at the expense of the independents -a directly 
opposite effect to what had occurred in the early 1930's, When set against 
the panic of the 1920's and the dire conditions of the early 1930'sp the 
trends of the late 1930's took on something of the appearance of a 
miraculous deliverance. 
18 
The braking of the chain store advance was caused partly by the problems 
of the chains themselves -- The mid and late 19 30 1s brought new tax burdens 
arising from such measures as the Social Security Act and the mounting- 
expenditures of local, state and federal governmentsq which tended to bear 
more heavily on large employers and corporations; unionisations too, little 
known in the chain store industry before 19339 became a considerable factor 
in raising costs and reducing operating flexibility after the 1935 Wagner 
Labor Relations Act. Chain store taxes; the curbs on buying advantages 
imposed by the Robinson-Patman Act; adverse consumer sentiment stirred by 
anti-chain agitation; the burden of carrying the numerous unprofitable 
stores which were the legacy of reckless expansion in doubtful locations 
in the boom days of the 1920's; the loss of a certain amount of exceptional 
business enjoyed from unusually price-aware consumers in the period 1930-33; 
the drying up of sources of capital to promote risk ventures after the 
Crash - all these complications contrived to various degrees to work against 
the chains. 
The independents also showed some capacity either to adopt new methods 
or to put their inherent strengths to good use. The essential advantages 
of chain store operating methods came down to the ability to perform a 
sequence of functions - purchasing, warehousingg advertisings displaying 
the goods and pricing them corgetitively - just a little bit more efficiently 
18. Appendix Tables; also 1935 Census of Businessg Retail Distributions 
V01- Is U. S. Su=arvo p. 1-23; 1939 Census Of Businessp Retail Trades Vol. I 
Pt-I. P. 3. 
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at every stage than the independent competition. But there was no patented 
secret to this. Countless thousands of merchants responded to the challenge 
of chain store distribution by pooling their buying with other retailers or 
providing wholesalers with more concentrated orderso by installing new 
lighting and modern fixtures in their stores$ by advertising more and by 
pricing competitively rather than relying on old-fashioned standard mark-ups. 
Such efforts varied from the private initiatives of individuals to the 
systematic imitation of chain store methods pursued by the big voluntary 
chains in the grocery field which, beginning only in about 19261 succeeded 
in establishing themselves as a major force in the nation's retailing in 
less than a decade. Instead of the casual relationships between wholesalers 
and retailers of earlier times, a majority of well-established grocers - the 
core of the trade associations - had some sort of affiliation with a voluntary 
chaing retailer cooperative or informal buying or advertising club by the 
mid-1930's. While few of the voluntaries or cooperatives could match the 
costs of the large corporate chains, they did help to close the gap and 
also assisted in bringing to the conduct of retail groceries, an appearance 
of modern efficiency that was perhaps as important as the substance of such 
efficiency in attracting the consumer. 
19 Whereas the grocery chains during 
19. Fully-developed retail grocery cooperatives operating their own 
wholesale warehouses 'were found mainly in the largest cities,, where some 
had been in operation since the late nineteenth century and rivalled the 
chains for efficiency$ but many more informal groups, pooling buying power 
for special purchases or conducting cooperative advertisingo sprang Up. -all 
over the country in the 1920's and 19301s. There were estimated to be 
256042 members of 161 retail grocery cooperatives as of 1939., However% 
this development had been far outstripped by that of the voluntary chains, 
which left the wholesaler-retailer relationship intact and simply tried 
instead to make it more effective. The largest of the voluntariess the 
Independent Grocers' Alliance (IGA), which was largely the creation of one 
man, J. Frank Grimesb originated only in 1926 but by 1930 linked 8s5OO retaileri 
and 44 wholesalers in 33 states; its overhead organisation in Chicago 
provided a purchasing service for 70% of the affiliated wholesalers' needs,, 
in the process obtaining quantity discounts and other allowances otherwise 
unavailable to the smaller wholesalers* and sent out merchandising counsellors 
to show the retailers how to remodel and improve their stores. A symbol of 
common identity was provided by the stores' IGA insignia and blue-and-ivory 
colours. All the voluntaries worked on basically similar lines$ with 
variations in the stress laid on different aspects of the voluntary method. 
19. 
most of the 1920ts faced only a mass of uncoordinated service storess 
by the mid-1930's they had to contend with powerful voluntary chains and 
many cash and carry independentsg while also being harried by the new 
19. (cont'd)... Voluntary chain growth began about 1925 and then 
rapidly gathered pace, continuing even through the depression years. 
After about 1933 the increase in numbers leve" ed off, and in 1939 there 
were an estimated 521 voluntaries with 81,081 rnemberss ranging from the 
huge organisations like the IGA and the Red 9 White to small groups run 
by individual wholesalers which were barely distinguishable from ordinary 
wholesaler-retailer trading relationships. In the early years* this 
growth if anything probably encouraged the spread of anti-chain 
agitation by raising the consciousness of the grocersb but the very 
success of the voluntaries ultimately proved a conservative influence. 
Other grocers, especially those in the retailer cooperativest often 
criticised the tendency of the voluntaries to mimic the chains - as 
in the provision of uniform store fronts - though in fact the indiscipline 
and stubborn insistance on doing as they pleased of the members proved 
a liability for the managers of the voluntaries in improving their 
competitiveness, and the attitude of the rank-and-file (as opposed to 
some of the executives) in the voluntaries towards the chain stores 
was often no different from that of other independent grocers. However 
the rift between small wholesalers and their customers and the big 
voluntaries on the question of buying advantages - an area in which the 
voluntaries were directly allied with the corporate chains - did develop 
into a source of acute division. Group purchasing schemes of various 
types also existed in non-grocery lines, but none possessed the distinct 
organisational and political identity taken on by the much more extensive 
voluntary and cooperative groups in the grocery field. (Seep Craig 
Davidson, Voluntary Chain Stores and How to'Run Themq N. Y. and Londons 
1930; Hector Lazo) Retailer'Cooperatives- How'to'Run Therns N. Y. 1937; 
rTC, Chain Store InquiKy§'CooperatiVe'GrOcery' ainst Coopera ivei'Drug 
and Hardware Chainss Prices and MarSings, Washinaon Grocery; Willard 
F. Mueller and LeoiT Gar-oian . Changes 'in 'the 'Market Structurp 'of 'Groce , 
ry 
Retailingg Madison$ 1961, pp. 37-43,105-14; C. T. Phillipss r"'Ehaint 
Voluntary Chain and Independent Grocery Store Pricesg 1930-193411 and 
"Chain,, Voluntary Chain and Independent Grocery Store Prices,, 1930" 
in Journal of 13usinesss vol. 8 (1935) pp. 143-9 and vol. 12 (1939) 
pp. 24-29, 
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price-cutting independent supermarket whicht unburdened by the weight 
of carrying numerous old style small storess Was often able to cut prices 
below those found in the chain stores. 
20 
More negative forces also assisted the independents. Even in the 
late 1920's some of the older types of chains faced the problem that they 
were running out of suitable locations: for a chain to expand the territory 
in which it operated could mean ruinous competition with a major rival; 
to operate more intensively within an existing trading area meant moving 
into the less favourable locations, where the local volume of trade was 
perhaps inadequate or where the chain would have its own stores competing 
with each other. By 19299 the grocery chains, for instance$ had reached 
a stage of a competitive "stand-off" with only two of the leading chains 
(typically the A&P and one other) operating in many of even the larger 
cities. This was a particular problem in the east, where the leading 
20. There were some successful chains of small self-service storess 
notably Piggly Wigglyq in the 19201sj but the modern type of supermarket 
was virtually unknown. Even self-service was found mostly in the area 
stretching from Texas to Californias where it made its principal appeal 
to an automobile trade. In 1932-39 "animal markets" - so-called because 
of the penchant of their operators for names such as "Big Bear", "Giant 
Tiger", "Bull Market" and "Great Leopard" and because of what the rest 
of the trade considered their bestial practices - appeared in eastern 
cities. Many of these supermarkets opened in abandoned warehouses, and 
they specialised in distress merchandise and on making a huge turnover 
at incredibly low margins. At first chain store men derided the "animal 
markets" as a purely depression phenomenon and in some placess especially 
New Jersey, joinea independents in putting pressure on wholesalers not 
to supply and the newspapers not to advertise them. Many of these price- 
wrecking markets were in fact secretly financed by wholesalers themselves$ 
and sore proved to be the basis of new chains, like rood rair in 
Pennsylvania. In the late 1930's the leading chains, led by the A& PS 
began rather hesitantly to open supermarkets, though not using the same 
desperate price-slaughtering tactics seen in 1932-3. This resulted in 
closures of many of the smaller stores operated by the big chains. In 
1940 there were estimated to be only 66171 supermarkets - 1,200 of them 
belonging to corporate chains - but these did $21b sales. (See M. M. 
Zimmerman, The Super Market: A Revollitiorl1n Distribution, N. Y. 9 19550 
esp. pp, 21-69 31-689 125). 
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I 
chains tended to be trapped in enclaves. 
21 Whereas every unsuccessful, 
poorly-run or marginal store had to be carried by the chain as a whole 
(and many companies suffered from a deep reluctance to close unprofitable 
stores$ for a variety of reasons including a'hope that they might one day 
Itcome good"s employee relationsb and fear that investors might think it a 
sign the company was on the rockst as well as big-firm inertia) each 
independent, being independents could throw himself into the fray and 
succeed or perish without loss to the independent sector as a, whole. Thus 
a continual process of the survival of the fittest was at work among the 
independents whereas the chains were impelled to fritter away their resources 
in caring for the weaklings among their stores. 
Not that independents survived only or even primarily by facing the 
chains head on. Many found secure places for themselves in corners where 
the chains could not easily reach: in catering to an ethnic trades or 
staying open at odd hours to catch evening rushes or factory gateso or in 
providing a personal service that the impersonal chain store was ill- 
equipped to match. Particularly in "shopping goods" lines$ independents 
were able to maintain a niche for themselves by stocking ranges of merchandise 
not usually carried in chain stores: indeed in some fields, such as women's 
apparelg it could prove a positive advantage to be totally dissimilar to the 
cash and carry stores and to emphasize the prestige, and service of-the store 
without worrying about prices. Likewise, the small family stores, without 
outside labour and usually with minimal overheadss proved able to survive 
and provide a modest living for their owners while doing a volume of sales 
21. In 1942p in 82% of the 211 largest American cities for which data 
were available only 1 or 2 of the top 20 food chains had stores. Not 
one of these cities had more than 4 of the nation's top 20 food chains 
operating in it. (Mueller and Garoianj op. cit. $ Table 12p p. 31). 
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on which no chain store could operate. Thus independents survived both by 
copying the chains and by making their appeal entirely opposite to that of 
the chains. The very diversity and individuality which in the 1920ts seemed 
to many casual observers to be the likely undoing of the independents in 
the face of the advance of uniforms streamlined big business actually proved 
to be the key to the independents' survival. 
22 
The first instinct of established distributors when faced by the , 
emergence of a.. new type of distribution has always been to brand it as 
"illegitimate". The big city department stores in the 1890'sl the mail 
order houses in the years before the rirst World War, the "Big Bears" and 
"Giant Tigers" of the depressions and the discount houses of the 1950's and 
1960's all attracted widespread condemnation by the trade as being 
fundamentally unsound and destructives before eventually attaining 
respectability as they matured and the trade got used to them. In that 
respects the opposition to chain stores may be seen as having its inception 
in a conventional reflex response. 
Equally, while the trade has always shown a distinct preference for 
trying to frustrate the new forms of distribution by "private" trade 
disciplines and sanctionsq such as boycotts of those manufacturers who 
foster the intruders$ more public and politically-orientated means have been 
used from time to time. The trade-at-home agitation which developed against 
the chain stores in the Midwest and the South in the late 1920's had a 
direct precedent in the anti-mail order agitation which flared up intermittently 
in those same parts of the country from the 1890's onwards. "Shears and 
Sawbuck" and "Monkey Ward" were then denounced by chambers of commerces 
22. Perhaps the most extensive consideration of the factors at work in 
favour of the survival of a strong independent sector may be found in 
Theodore N. Beckman and Herman C. Nolen$'Tho'Chaiii'Store'Probleth: A 
Critical'Analysiss New York and Londons 1938. 
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Chautauqua lecturerst small town newspapers and merchants' associations 
for their tendency to drain away local resources to Chicago and destroy 
local opportunity, a theme which - with New York generally substituted 
for Chicago - formed the core of the later case against the chain stores. 
Catalogues were burned on public bonfires by charbers of commerce; rumours 
were circulated among the populace that Richard Sears and Alvah Roebuck were 
Negroes; sometimes merchants who doubled as county postmasters refused to 
order catalogue goods until merchandise bought in the home town stores on 
credit had been paid for. 
23 
Similarlyp merchants had a long history of demanding legislation to 
restrict various recognised "evils" such as coupons and trading stamps and 
peddler selling. Premiums and trading stamps were subjected to special 
taxes and prohibitions by many states in the years before the First World 
war when such merchandising devices were common; peddlers were persistently 
harrassed by an endless succession of special taxes and other discouragements. 
Even in the 19301sl when the chain store was overwhelmingly the major 
grievance of the days merchants did not neglect to demand curbs on peddlers. 
One particularly effective type of deterrent, the so-called Green River 
(Wyoming) ordinance which prohibited peddlers from going onto private 
premises without having first been invited to do so by the occupants$ Was 
enacted by over 400 cities in the years 1935-9. License taxes were used by 
numerous municipalities to hinder itinerant vendorss bread and laundry vans 
coming in from other towns and other forms of "outside" enterprise. The 
autarkic tendencies encouraged by the depression, combined with a trend 
for the courts to take a broad view of the regulatory powers of municipalities 
23. Louis E. Asher and Edith Healp 'Serid'NO MoheYv Chicago* 1942s pp. 
105-112,127; Eymnet and Jeuckq 'CatAloVds_'azid COunterst pp. 150-68; 
Thomas D. Clarks'Pills, Petticoat; arid'Ploi4s: THe-Southern Country Store 
Normans Okla., 1964, pp. 72-3. 
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in the 1930's, produced a deluge of petty regulations which some-feared 
would ultimately$ if uncheckeds restrict interstate commerce and break 
down the interdependence of the national econory as a whole. 
24 
Consumer cooperatives were also regarded with suspicion by many 
independent merchantst though in this case the possibilities for legislative 
curbs were always considered limited. Many cooperative stores were 
established in the rural states in the periods of agrarian unrest in the 
late nineteenth century, but too close an association with transient 
movements of political protest proved the undoing of most of them. The 
inflation at the time of the World War evoked a fresh burst of interest, 
and around 1920 merchants in various parts of the country were somewhat 
perturbed by developments. Howeverp the depression of 1920-1 brought 
down most of these cooperatives and the whole issue then subsided before 
undergoing something of a revival in the tnid-1930's. In 1936g the 
enthusiasm of certain New Dealers for cooperatives received apparent 
Presidential approval when Roosevelt dispatched a commission to study the 
so-called"middleway" of consumer cooperation as experienced in Scandinavia 
and elsewhere in Europe, and some leading business figures - including 
chain store men hoping to distract the small merchants from the anti-chain 
battle - began to murmur about this new threat to the American system of 
business. But the temporary stir proved only a superficial affair, and 
many merchants were in any case openly scathing about the possibility of 
a mode of distribution they associated with economic backwardness and an 
alien way of life having any lasting success in America even if artificially 
imposed by ideologically motivated politicians or bureaucrats. 
25 
24. R. Cassadyq "Municipal Trade Barriers"s 'Harvard 'Business Rdviews Vol. 19 
(1941) pp. 364-76; articles in , Law 'and 'CoTit6mpoFar. -y-Troblems s Vol. 8 
(1941) pp. 318-33s 359-75. 
25. Solon J. Ducks'The'Grgýdr, M6vem6pts 1963s Univ. of Nebraska Press edn. 0 
pp. 238-78; Nystrom, 'Economics . of'Rdtr3rlings Vol,. Is pp, 275-90; Samuel 1. 
Rosenmang ed. s*Th6, Public PaRersarid'Aadresges'of 
rranklin'D. Rooseve_1tj New 
York, 1938s Vol. V (1936)9 pp. 226-8 (30ra"Press Conference). 
25. 
What distinguished the chain store challenge from that of the other 
forms of disturbance to the "normal" channels of distribution was its 
intensity, its tbiquity and its widely-hailed irresistibility. The impact 
of department stores in the late nineteenth century had caused a flutter 
in a few big cities but it had scarcely affected the general run of everyday 
retailing. Likewise$ the "mail order menacells disturbing as it was to 
country merchantss was limited by the obvious fact that people could not do 
more than a small part of their shopping by post. Catalogue sales were 
probably at a peako as a proportion of total retail salesp around 1914, but 
their share then began to declineg principally perhaps because the 
unprecedented mobility brought by motor transport vastly extended the 
trading areas of cities and brought modern store merchandising within the 
reach of even the most isolated country areas.. In 1929* catalogue sales 
in the entire United States amounted to only $515m - 1.05% of total retail 
sales. Furthermores the mail order problem was one which scarcely concerned 
merchants outside the rural sections and so it provided a weak base on 
which to form a political movement. Despite the long persistence of anti- 
mail order agitation its only legislative consequence was some 'ineffectual 
changes in the U. S. parcel post system in 1912.26 
Peddlers were considered more of a nuisance than a full-fledged "menace". 
Municipalities were rather easily persuaded to put special taxes on them 
because the peddler made no investment or other tangible contribution to 
the well-being of the town; but this was not a vital matter to most 
merchantss and life could no doubt have been made considerably more difficult 
for peddlers had the other merchants campaigned against them more vigorously- 
26. Nystrom, Economicd of Retailbgg Vol. Is pp. 194-59 208-11. 
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House to house selling accounted for only a fraction of one per cent of 
all retail sales even in the depressionb when numbers of unemployed men 
were tempted to try their hand at this form of enterprise. The gross 
inefficiency and consequent high 'margins involved in direct selling 
necessarily doomed it to a very minor role in the overall distributive 
picture. Similarly, the activities of consumer cooperatives were a source 
of only mild annoyance to other twrchants. In the cities, such cooperatives 
were almost unknowng the trade unions never sponsoring or encouraging the 
movement. During the depression, cooperative groups appeared in some urban 
areass especially in Los Angeles and a few other cities elsewhere in the 
western third of the country$ and these attracted a great deal of publicityp 
some of their members seeing in such cooperation the beginnings of a new 
economic order. Howevers most merchants more realistically assessed such 
cooperation as being a passing phase - and as involving people who in any 
case were short of money and so were not attractive customers - and so 
consumei; cooperation attracted almost no concerted trade opposition. Even 
in the rural areas of the upper Mississippi 'Valley - the traditional 
stronghold of cooperation - the extent of consumer cooperative activity was 
distinctly limited. Many groups were attached to the farmers' cooperative 
marketing associations and retailed to their members only a restricted range 
of merchandise$ such as petroleum and feedstuffs, specifically related to 
farm operation; they had little impact on the general run of retailers. 
Where tension existed it tended to have a cultural or political rather than 
simply economic origin. Thus in Minnesotas the state where full-scale 
consumer cooperatives 'on the European model were perhaps most common, those 
merchants who objected to them did so because they suspected the mainly 
Finnish patrons of the cooperatives as "foreigners" and "radicals". But 
even in Minnesota, 'merchants' attitudes tended to vary according to 
individual political and social outlook and there was no collective or 
27. 
organised hostility to the cooperatives by the 1930's. The cooperatives 
had a loyal clientele but their very reputation as institutions founded 
by "foreigners" indicated the difficulty they had in establishing an 
effective appeal as an alternative "American" system of distribution. In 
Minnesota the cooperatives never really gained a foothold in the larger 
cities like Minneapolis and Duluth. By selling at prevailing retail prices 
and distributing any surplus as dividends - the Rochdale principle - the 
cooperatives perhaps reduced their appeal to the public as a whole but 
they certainly also mollified the independent inerchantsl who contrasted 
such behaviour with the lamentable tendency of the chains to sell at lower 
prices. rurthermores as advocates of the consumers' cooperatives were 
often also opponents of the chains, merchants had every cause to tone down 
or even put aside any objections they had to the cooperatives in order to 
ensure support for action against the much greater threat posed by the 
chains. Overallg therefore,, the predominant attitude of merchants' 
organisations to consumer cooperatives even in the upper Mississippi valley 
by the 1930's was one of grudging acceptance. In most other parts of the 
countryq the cooperatives were too few or small to even attract notice* 
In 1936, when national public attention to cooperation was perhaps at a 
peak because of the interest being displayed by some of the New Dealerso 
there were only about 39600 consumer cooperatives in the whole countrys 
with 677DOOO members. The aggregate of $182m retail sales was less than 
the sales volume that year of several individual chain store companies. 
27 
27. Twentieth Century rund, 'Does Distrib%itiorI'Cost'Too'Much? j N. Y. 19399 
pp. 89-94; Monthly Labor, 'Rei wo May 1938g pp. 1068-846 "bperations of 
Retail Cooperatives% 1936"; Leonard C. Yercher et al-s'CongurAdts' 
Cooperatives in the North Central Statess (ed. Roland S. Vaile)q 
Minneapolis, 1941b esp. pp. 33-40. 
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The chains were a problem of an entirely different magnitude to any 
of the various "menaces" that had gone before. They affected virtually 
every type of merchant in city and country alike$ and they did not just 
nibble at the edge of the cake but seized a huge slice for themselves. 
Indeeds it seemed for a time to many merchants that the chains would ultimately 
leave nothing but the crumbs. It is not surprisitigs therefore, that the 
movement of opposition that developed against the chains far exceeded anything 
seen hitherto from independent merchants. Certainlyp many elements in the 
character of the independent trade continued to work against an effective 
political engagement: the traditional disorganisation of the smaller 
retailers; the ambivalent attitudes of wholesalers anxious not to offend 
the chains because of the residuum of business still obtained from them; 
the lack of cross-trade contact except at the merely parochial Main Street 
level; the dominance of more successfuls larger and often more conservative 
merchants in many trade associations; the distaste of some merchants for any 
association with political demagoguery-, the belief that difficulties with 
the chains would be more efficaciously handled by quiet persuasion or internal 
trade discipline; the hope that the chain store problem would disappear of 
its own accord$ or would never become too bad in some particular trade or 
town. Merchants in the past$ for all their feuding with unwanted types of 
competition, had never succeeded in bringing their grievances to the status 
of a major issue in the political life of the nation as a whole$ and they 
did not succeed in the 1930fs in standing that past record on its head. 
Neverthelessg the intensity of feeling against the chains, in combination 
with the exceptionally favourable political environment, of the 1930'st did 
provide an unequalled opportunity for that record to be modified. ror the 
first - and thus far the last - time, America's independent distributors 
made a definite impression, especially in the South and Wests on the broader 
public consciousness of the age. 
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ii. The Antittust'Laws and the Chairi'Stores. 
When independent merchants began during the 1920's to cast about 
for some way of attacking the chainsp they found little of use to them 
in the antitrust laws. The independents wished to see the number of 
stores owned by chains reducedg but it was the doctrine of the courts that 
I'mere size is no offense". Only chains guiltyýof abuse of their sizes or 
of unlawful methods in attaining such sizes were even in theory at risk 
from the antitrust laws. What is more, antitrust enforcement in practice 
was far from vigorous in the 19201sj and the tendency during the decade 
was for enforcement to become progressively slacker. First under Harding 
and Coolidge "normalcy" and then under the policies of harmonious 
cooperation with business favoured by Hooverg the Department of Justice and 
the Federal Trade Commissions the latter the more reluctantlys moved away 
from the "harrassment" of business9 especially of big business which by the 
late 1920's was in a position of great political and ideological ascendancy 
after a decade of economic triumphs. The statesq meanwhiles virtually 
abandoned any pretence of enforcing the great body of antitrust law, some 
of it quite fearsomeon papers thrown up during the trust-busting days of 
an earlier generation. 
1 Broadly speaking. no industry of average morality 
and conduct had anything to fear from the antitrust laws; and an industry 
such as the chain stores which actually won praise for lowering costs and 
helping the consumer had even more cause to feel invulnerable. Most chain 
store men in the 1920's seem to have thought of the antitrust laws as little 
more than a curious anachronisms of little practical significance to the 
conduct of business and not the slightest danger to the continued expansion 
of the chains., 
1. rTCg Chain'Store Inquiry, rinal'Reportg pp. 78j 82-3; 'ColuTrbia Law 
Reviews vol. 32 ( )j pp. 347-66; Merle Fainsod et als'Government and 
the Arnerican Economy, N. Y. $ 3rd edn. 0 1959, p. 445. 
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Certainly, independents regarded it as a great breakthrough whenj in 
May 1928s the Senate adopted a resolution drawn up by John Cunningham (the 
Secretary of the Iowa Retail Merchants' Association and a leading figure 
in the National Association of Retail Grocers) and introduced by Senator 
Smith W. Brookhart of Iowal instructing the rederal Trade Commission to 
undertake a full inquiry into the nature of chain store distribution. The 
resolution asked the Commission to make any legislative recommendations it 
saw fit and drew its attention to such questions as the extent to which 
consolidations of chains might have been made in violation of the antitrust 
laws, the extent of monopoly concentration of controls any evidence of 
unfair methods of competition or of agreements9 conspiracies or combinations 
in restraint of trades and the effect and lawfulness of quantity price 
differentials granted by manufacturers to chains and not to their other 
customers. Howeverg the-resolution also allowed for the inquiry to bring 
to the fore the economic advantages of chain store distribution and chain 
store men confidently asserted that they had nothing to hide, expressing 
doubt only about the value of making sweeping investigations into the 
practices of entire industries instead of into alleged malpractices by 
specific companies. The adoption of the Brookhart resolution by the Senate 
may best be seen as one of a nurber of similar instructions given to the 
rTC to conduct "investigations" as a way of deferring immediate 
consideration or action by Congress itself. The rTC had not sought the 
resolutions and some of the Commissioners were known to be displeased about 
being handed this new burden. In the events the inquiry which unfolded 
over the next seven years proved an inconclusive affairs some of the reports 
produced having no conceivable relationship to any possible breaches of 
the antitrust laws or even to the sources of chain'store success, and the 
enormous significance which the eventual key legislative recommendation - 
that Congress should amend Section 2 of the Clayton Act - came to haves arose 
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more from a coincidence with other political events than from any 
convincing Justification for it produced by the Commission. From the 
start of the investigations the Commission's economists showed a clear 
determination$ which was reinforced by the political complexion of the 
Commissions which had a Republican majority of Commissioners after 19256 
to avoid any sort of muckraking at the chains' expense. Thus the inquiry 
produced little of the sort of one-sided criticism of the chains that 
independent merchants hoped to have to hand as ammunition in their political 
battles, and the reports contained few unfavourable comments about the 
chains which were not immediately balanced by some more friendly observation. 
On the wholes the chains emerged from the rTCIs investigation into their 
methods wich a much cleaner slate than most industries subjected to 
similar investigations althoughg ironically, the anti-chain movement was 
so strong by the time the rinal Report of the inquiry was made at the end 
of 1934 that this did the chains little good. 
2 
A frequent charge made by the critics of the chains in the late 1920's 
was that the wave of consolidations was tending towards the creation of 
monopolies in each line of distribution; indeed$ in the loose rhetoric of 
politics the word "monopoly" was bandied around rather freely in connection 
with the larger chain systems. As not every merger attempted in the 1920's 
met with absolutely no resistance from the FTC and the Department of 
Justice such an argument was notýentirely futile. Howevers several vital 
considerations ensured that no action was taken. In the first places a 
common interpretation of the position taken by the U. S. Supreme Court in 
the U*S. Steel and International Harvester cases was thatq as the FTC 
2. S. Res. 2246 70th Cong. lst Sess-'l 'NewYorklimess May 139 1928; 
Chain Store Review, July 1928 p. 12; Lebhar, Chain Stores in America 
(1963)l ppe 162-5; Thomas C. Blaisdellf 'TheTdderal 'Trade 'Co-yn`m`17p=son 
N. Y. * 1932s p. 260. 
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expressed its "if there should develop one gigantic all-inclusive chain- 
store system for each line of distributions its status as a lawful 
monopoly could be attacked only to the extent it had violated the law as 
a means of attaining monopoly and exercised its monopolistic power contrary 
3 to law" . Whether or not this was really the position of the U. S. Supreme 
Court, the fact that the rTC and many others thought that it was of itself 
created psychological and practical barriexsto antitrust actions, The 
presumption was that mergers were innocent until proved guilty and that a 
great deal of serious abuse - not just incidental misdemeanours - had to 
be involved before that guilt was shown. 
That the largest of the chains in each of the major lines of 
distribution were not significantly involved in merger activity also 
militated against actions for there was no suggestion that the giants were 
absorbing their major rivals so as to form some sort of "trust". The A9P 
accomplished its entire growth to more than l5lOOO stores with the help of 
but one small acquisition of another chain; Woolworth made no acquisitions 
after 1912; Searss Roebuck opened brand new stores when it went into the 
chain store field. Similarly$ none of the "super-mergers" which were much 
discussed and seriously contemplated in the late 1920's - such as the 
combining of Safeway$ Kroger and other big grocery chains to form a 
nationally-operating rival to the A& Ps or the fusing of Penney,, Montgomery 
Ward and Searsg Roebuck - was actually consummated. The typical verger 
was brought about largely with the aim of securing territorial expansion 
quickly rather than to eliminate an existing competitor. The fact that 
absorption of this sort also obviated the possibility of potentially 
destructive inter-chain competition was usuallyg though not always. incidental 
3. FTCj Chain Store Inquiry. TindLl'Rdp6rtq pp. 19-201, U-S-'V-'U-S- Steel 
Corp., 251 U. S. 417 (1920); U, S. v. Interriation&l'Harvester'Co., 274 U. S 
I 693 (1927). 
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4 to this primary purpose. As the aggregate nurber of chains in existence 
increased rapidly during the 19201sj it was clear that$ the mergers 
notwithstanding$ the base of the pyramid was becoming broader as 'well as 
its height rising. 
5 Here was not the beginning of some gigantic chain 
store trust. With a great wave of mergers flowing through the late 1920's 
in a wide range of industries - utilities, banks, servicesq dairies, 
amusements s food manufacturing and many others - the situation in the chain 
store field lacked a distinctive element of danger of imminent monopoly 
which could have separated it out as requiring special and urgent attention* 
Anti-chain agitation had reached such levels by 1930 that some sort of 
action might have been precipitated had the merger trend continuedg but 
the Wall street crash in fact marked the end of the period of most frantic 
activity and the whole merger issue subsided thereafter. The rTC 
subsequently recorded its view that nearly all the mergers accomplished by 
chains had in any case been substantially invulnerable to direct attack 
because of a technical defect in Section 7 of the Clayton Act9 and the 
decision of the U. S. Supreme Court in the International Shoe Co. case in 
1930 also suggests that any proceedings would have been fraught with 
difficulties. In the absence of a suitable amendment to Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act - something which was not granted until'the Celler-Kefauver Act 
of 1950 - the Commission took the view that its hands were well and truly 
tied. 6 
4. FTC, Chain Store Inquiry, rital'Rep pp. 7712. A notable exception 
(Final Reportq p. 10) was Safew3y-Is acquisition of MacMarr Stores Inc. in 
1 310 which eliminated its major competitor in several states in the Mountain 
and Pacific Coast regions. 
5. FTC, Chain Store Inquiry, Growth and Development of Chain Stores 
Table 32, p. 57, The rate of formation of new chains did, howeverg fall off 
sharply in most lines in the last few years of the 19201s. 
6. Section 7 made it unlawful to acquire the capital stock of a corporation 
where the effect "may be to substantially lessen competition" but did not 
prohibit the acquisition of assets - the almost invariable method used in 
chain store mergers. Acquisition of assets wass for examples the method in 
the Safeway takeover of MacMarr Stores noted aboves and in the Final Report 
0a0 
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Chain store mergers also lacked a feature found in many of the 
landmark antitrust cases: a tendency to bring about "vertical" as well 
as "horizontal" monopoly. Vertical integration was) for example, at issue 
in the American Tobacco cases where control was supposedly exerted from 
plantation to cigar stores and in the Standard Oil case where the product 
was controlled from oil well to ultimate consumer. It was also a principal 
element in the suit brought against the "big five" meat packerss the 1920 
consent decree into which the packers entered in order to escape prosecution 
disbarring them from holding any interest in public stockyard companies, 
terminal railroadsq market newspapers or public cold storage plantss from 
engaging in the business of manufacturingg selling or transporting any of a 
wide range of specified foodstuffsg principally fisho vegetables$ fruit and 
dry groceries; and from selling meat at retail. 
7 Howevers no chain store 
company exerted the type of control the packers had built up for themselveso 
the chains being in most cases simply retail concerns (with their own 
wholesale warehouses), and the 1920's mergers were aimed almost entirely at 
expanding those retailing activities. The ramified interests of the A&P 
were sometimes compared to those of the packers (not least by the packers 
themselves' which sought modification of the 1920 consent decree partly on 
the ground that they were being denied the advantages of vertical 
integration being allowed to the big food retailing chains which did some 
of their own manufacturing) but their range and extent was actually 
6. (cont'd). (at Pp. 20-21) the rTC strongly implied that it would have 
opposed that merger had it not been for this technical problem. Seeg 
rinal Reýortb pp. 20-219 94-6; rTC, v. Western Meat Coa, 272 Uss. 554 (1926); 
International Shoe Co. V. rTC, 280 U. S. 2-9-1 (1930); George W, Sto ing and 
Myron W. Watkinss Monopoly and Pree Enterprises N. Y. 1951l pp, 40-41; 
Carl Eis, "The 1919-1930 Merger Movement in Amýrican Industry" in Jnl- of 
Law and Economicsq vol. 126 (1969)0 pp. 267-96. 
7. U. S. v. American Tobacco Co. 1 221 U S. 106 (1911); Standard Oil Co. of 
New Jersey v. U. S., 221*U*'S. 1 (1911). ror the packers' consent decree and 
extended litigation through tSe 1920's and into the early 1930's which arose 
from the attempt of the packerso ultimately unsuccessful, to secure a 
modification of the degree, see summary in'Uo'S6-v-'Swift &'Co. fit al.. 286 
U. S. 106 (1932). Alsog Blaisdellp op. cit-6 Pp- 183-208. 
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comparatively modest. Although the A&P increased the total of its 
manufacturing plants from 8 in 1920 to 70 by 1930l nearly all this 
increase was recorded in the first half of the decades and between 
1925 and 1930 the proportion of A& P's own manufactures to its total 
sales actually fell 3%. Overall, the A&P manufactured only a similar 
proportion of its sales to that found in manufacturing grocery and meat 
chains in general. Ultimately more productive of trouble to the A&P 
was its subsidiary the Atlantic Commission Co. (ACCO)s which bought 
fruit and vegetables for A& P's own account and also for resale to the 
trade in generals but relatively little was heard about the activities of 
ACCO in anti-chain controversy until the late 1930'se8 As a rulep those 
chains selling a wide assortment of goods - foodo variety, department 
store and drug chains - did little manufacturing. The inadequate sales 
volume provided by their own stores for any particular product,,, the 
difficulty of promoting a private brand in the face of strong nationally- 
advertised brands; the low return on capital investment in manufacturing 
as compared to opening retail stores; the weight of tradition; the lack 
of expertise in manufacturingg and the desire to pick and choose between 
suppliers all contributed to a reluctance to undertake this sort of 
integration. A common reason in earlier times for manufacturing - the 
difficulty of obtaining adequate supply from manufacturers under pressure 
from wholesalers not to sell direct - also ceased to be a consideration 
for those chains sufficiently large to undertake their own manufacturing. 
This was especially true of Montgomery Ward and Sears$ Roebucks the much- 
8. rTC6 Chain Store Inquiry, Chain Store Manufacturing a pp, So 14s 93; 
A. C. Hoffmans Large-Scale Organization in the rood Industries (TNEC 
Monographs No. 35) Washingtono D. C. s 1940s pp. 11-23o, Willard F. Mueller 
and Leon Garoians Changes'in*the'Markdt Strudture of Grocery Retailing, 
Madison, Wis., 1961, Table 49, pe 172. ACCO was dissolved under the terms 
of a consent decrees entered in 1954% which brought to a conclusion a 
sequence of litigation in which the Government sought to break up the 
A&P. The rest of the A&P was left intact under the decree. Sees 
Lebbars'Chain Stord8'inlmdrica (1963) pp. 372-3. 
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hated catalogue houses, which both ran down their manufacturing operations 
in the post-war years as the last vestige of manufacturer resistance was 
broken down. Most of the integrated manufacturing and retailing chains 
were actually relatively small corpanies in specialist lines of business, 
such as confectionery, sewing machines and electric lampst with the shoe 
industry most notable in this respect. Howeverf the leading shoe chaing 
the Melville Shoe Co. was purely a retailing business. 
9 
Perhaps the most notorious habit of the old trusts had been that of 
waging price wars in which a stubborn competitor was rooted out or brought to 
terms by the large combine cutting its prices locally below cost and subsidising 
these losses by profits taken from areas where a monopoly had already been 
achieved. During the 1920's complaints began to spring up that some of the 
chains were reviving this old evil$ operating "fighting stores", most of the 
complaints on this score coming from the grocery trade. These charges led 
the National Association of Retail Grocers to conduct a study of the prices 
being charged by the A&P stores in different cities$ and the discovery 
of substantial variations was a major influence in persuading the 
Association's rather conservative officers to support the demands of the 
militants among the memberships led by John Cunningham of Iowap that it 
should seek a-rederal Trade Co=ission investigation into chain store 
practices. 
10 However, little of consequence was ever done in response to 
such charges. A majority of states had laws prohibiting discrimination in 
price between localities where made with an intent to create a monopoly or 
destroy competitions but these laws, a legacy of the trust-busting days of 
a generation earlier, were moribund. rew independent merchants even knew 
9. FTC, Chain Store Inquiry, & Chain Store Manufacturing and summary of 
this in MalkReport pp. 12-14; Paul H. Nystroms tdonomids'6f'R6tgilinA. 
Vol. Is p-198. 
10. See the 'inside story' of the Brookhart resolutions told by John 
Cunningham in'Interstate Groders-January 26s 1935, 
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of their existences and in the few states where they did submit 
circumstantial evidence of price discrimination to district attorneys 
they usually received a cool response-" Innumerable obstacles stood in 
the way of enforcement of these laws. Nearly all of them permitted 
discrimination reflecting differences in cost of transport or differences 
in grade, quality or quantityg aswell as discrimination made "in good 
faith to meet competition". Such permitted differences may have been just 
about quantifiable in the case of an industry with a simple range of 
products and relatively stable costso but they virtually defied analysis 
in the case of retail distribution. Equally, how could "intent" be proved$ 
and whose "intent" was relevant in. a chain store company where everyone 
from the headquarters in New York to the local manager on Main Street had 
some influence on prices in the stores? Now could "predatory" price 
cutting be distinguished from the ordinary, often dailys fluctuations and 
local variations inevitable in retail merchandising - especially with 
foodstuffs? And how could the use of loss leaders as a form of 
advertising be distinguished from an overall policy of holding prices down 
in one store? The mere fact that a competitor had been eliminated was 
proof of nothing in the field of retail distribution where the rate of 
business turnover was extremely high and where the unsuccessful often 
blamed unfair competition for a discomfiture which more dispassionate observers 
were inclined to attribute to incompetenceg bad management or simple bad 
luck. 12 
11. FTC, Chain Store Inqui , rinal Reports p. 51, states that "ThirtY-one States hiVei-a-Fild-iscrimination laws but so far as is known to the Commission 
there have been no cases prosecuted under them against chain stores". The 
Final Report was made in late 1934. 
12. ror provisions of state laws sees FTCs, rinal Reports pp. 82-4. A good 
illustration of the problem may be seen from the case of H. S. Riddle, a 
Topeka grocer who filed charges with the Attormey-Ceneral of Kansas in 1926 
accusing a nearby A&P store of cutting prices below those found in the 
other A&P stores in Topeka for the purpose of putting him out of business. 
This affair caused quite a stir, the Secretary of the NCSGA and the editor of 
Chain'Stord'Age issuing dire warnings to chain operators about the dangers 
Z; f ind ing in such tactics. But a few months laterg Riddle was still in 
business and the A&P store had closed up, a sure indication that its price- 
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Not surprisinglys. state law officers* used to dealing with crimes of 
a more readily identifiable natures preferred not to venture into these 
deep and treacherous waters of law and economics. The one body with the 
appropriate expertise and resources in this area was the rederal Trade 
Commission, which was empowered to prevent locality price discrimination 
under both Section 5 of the rederal Trade Commission Acts prohibiting unfair 
methods of competition, and Section 2 of the Clayton Acts which had been 
framed to stop the use of "fighting markets" in the wake of the. Standard 
Oil and American Tobacco cases. 
13 Howevers the Commission had not issued 
a single order relating to locality price discrimination against any chain 
store company by the time of the appearance of the rinal Report of the 
chain store inquiry in 1934. In thd'rinal'Reports the Commission came to the 
conclusions for which it actually produced little evidences that the ability 
to vary prices between localities was "one of the chief elements in the 
growth of chain store systems". Yet the Commission also showed a distinct 
12. (cont1d). cutting had been nothing more than a last-ditch attempt to 
attract trade. (Interstate'Grocer 
,j 
October 23g 1926; April 91 1927; 
Chain Store Ageg December 19269 "Predatory Price-Cutting! '). It may be noted 
that many of the merchants who were most vocal in accusing the chains of 
waging local price wars themselves seemed to have little difficulty in 
remaining in business and even boasted of how they had put neighbouring chain 
stores out of business. 
13. Section 2 of the Clayton Act read: "It shall be unlawful for any person 
engaged in commerce ... to discriminate in price between different purchasers 
of commodities.;. where the effect of such discrimination may be to 
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of 
commerce: Provided) That nothing herein contained shall prevent discrimination 
in price between purchasers of commodities on account of differences in the 
grade, quality, or quantity of the commodity sold, or that makes only due 
allowance for difference in the cost of selling or transportations or 
discrimination in price in the same or different communities made in good 
faith to meet competition: 'And providod, furthers That nothing herein contained 
shall prevent persons engaged in selling goodss waress or merchandise in 
commerce from selecting their own customers in bona fide transactions and 
not in restraint of trade". 
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preference for blaming such variations on "decentralization and difficulty 
of supervision" and on ordinary competitive response to local price 
conditions rather than on any deep strategic purpose. Noting the exemption 
allowed by the "meeting competition" proviso to Section 26 the Commission 
concluded that there was "no evidence which would establish that price 
discrimination has not been in good faith to meet competition and there is 
good ground to conclude that in many cases it has been for that purpose"s 
14 
This verdict was not the end of the matter. Subsequent to the Final 
Report, % several states enacted unfair practice laws which included anti- 
locality discrimination provisions, and a few casess none of any great 
consequences were brought against chain store companies$ mostly in western 
states. Section 3 of the federal Robinson-Patman Act of 19360 the Borah- 
Van Nuys amendments also forbade local price cutting "for the purpose of 
destroying competition or eliminating a competitor". 
15 Thens in 19450 the 
charge made by the Department of Justice that the A&P had over a period 
of many years run its stores in'certain cities and areas at a loss to drive 
out competitors became the centrepiece of a major antitrust proceeding - 
the first general antitrust case ever brought against a chain store company. 
Whatever view is taken about the evidence advanced by the Government in 
14. Corwin D. Edwardsl The'Price'Discrimination'Lawl, Washington D. C. 6 
1959s p. 8; MCI Chain Store*InquiEyiTipaI_Iýe2ort9 p. 51; in the letter 
of submittal incorporatea7337-7-Fe report on Chain Store--Price Policies 6 
the FTC noted that I'Discussion of this question by officials of leading 
chain organizations indicates that it is quite a usual practice among them 
to cut prices locally not only to meet, but to go below, the prices of their 
competitors ... it is interesting to note that, although perhaps aware of 
their existencep chain-store officials in discussing their price policiesý 
make little or no mention of State or rederal laws against price 
discrimination as influencing or limiting such policies". Generally speakingg 
these legal questions were a matter of indifference to most practical chain 
store men and perhaps only of academic concerml before the late 1930's, even 
to company attorneys, 
15. See below , pp. 313 s 329 s n. 11. 
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support of this charge -a plausible interpretation is that the A&P 
was forced to sustain losses-in these localities'becduse of particularly 
aggressive local competition, rather than engineered the losses to drive 
out its rivals - the fact that the-Justice Department could bring such a 
case in the 19401s, using evidence culled from the company's records for 
the 1920's and 19301s. indicates that similar action could have been taken 
earlier had the will been there. Indeed, by common consents it was 
accepted that price wars were far more common in the 19201sq when the 
chains were growing fast and jockeying for local advantages than in later 
years when policies of "live and let live" were to the fore. 
16 
It was actually the independent sector which suffered the greater 
inconvenience from'such enforcement of the antitrust laws as occurred in 
the 1920's. In the early years of the decadeg the rTC and the Department 
of Justice were both quite active in breaking up corbinations of' 
16. 'U'S. v. Great'Atlantic'g Padifid*To-a'Co. ''67*rddý'Supl5. '626 640-21 
664-71% 678, The 1954 consent decree which closeT-the A&P1 gation 
enjoined the A&P from operating any Division at a loss "for the 
purpose of or with the intent of destroying or eliminating competition... 
The purpose or intent prohibited in this section shall not, be presumed merely 
by reason of the operation of a Division at a loss". It has often been 
argued that such price wars would have been pointless anyhow because* 
entry into retailing being so easy, the elimination of one competitor 
would merely have been followed by the appearance of anothers and so on 
indefinitely. Thus M. A. Adelman (A-*&, P: -A-Stu4y,, in'Priqe-Cost Behavior 
and Public Policy p. 14) declares ot the Department oF Justice charge 
3-gainst the A&P that "... such a campaign would have been foolish and 
useless... because it would have been impossible to claim the pay-off". 
This argument is flawed. There was, of course$ an almost limitless supply 
of small grocerss but there were few companies which could compete head 
on with the A&P on a price basis. The obvious reason why, for examples 
the A&P withdrew from operating in wide areas of the western states in 
the 1930's was that it could not sustain an effective presence in the face 
of Safeway. One of the difficulties faced by the chains was that they 
competed with each other more directly than they competed with the less 
efficient independents. That is why even though the chains typically took 
less than half the grocery business in any city* a pattern existed whereby 
only one or two, at most three, of the leading chains operated in any one 
city. Any chain interloper faced an immediate attack by the preexisting 
chains, which would otherwise exist alongside the local independents 
without recourse to price wars. 
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6 competitors to restrain tradeb and such combinations existed almost, 
exclusively in the independent sector. As the rTC observeds with only 
a little exaggeration, "Practically no one has even alleged the existince 
of any contracts between, or corbinations ofb competing chains to fix 
prices, control production, divide territory% or otherwise seek to restrain 
17 
competition by united action" . Occasional "gentlemen's agreements" not 
to invade each other's territories fell far short of a pattern of activity 
likely to offend under the antitrust laws. Quite apart from the fact that 
the chains as a whole were still in the 1920's in a youthful and buoyant 
phase and enamoured of, the joys of free competition, they had little 
opportunity or incentive to combine to restrain trade for they were unable 
to control the market. If they had stopped price competition$ divided 
territories and fixed sales quotas they could have achieved nothing but 
the revitalisation of their independent competitors& In contrast$ 
independents, especially wholesalers, instinctively resorted to boycotting 
schemes when chains began to undermine their position. Such schemes were 
easy meat for the rTC and the Department of Justice, for the courtso, 
clinging to common law concepts of conspiracys were hostile to activities 
performed by corbinations of individuals which would have been considered 
lawful if performed by the one giant company. Especially notable was a 
series of actions brought against wholesale grocery associations in the 
South and West in the early and mid-1920's by both the Justice Department 
and the rTC, actions which helped to break down the first line of defence 
against the grocery chain onslaught in those sections. In a typical casep 
the rTC was upheld by the court in its order to the Arkansas Wholesale 
Grocers' Association to cease and desist from circulating bulletins to 
wholesalers urging then to boycott manufacturers who sold. direct to the 
rTC, 'ChAiii'Stpil-d iii(liary, P. 23. 
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chains., The fact that the association' s. bulletins, referred warmly to a 
trade magazine produced'by one Robert G. Duncan which carried a "list of 
undesirables" - manufacturers who sold to chains at wholesale prices - was 
accepted by the court as evidence of a conspiracy to hinder and restrain 
interstate commerce, in violation of Section 5 of the rederal Trade 
Commission Act, even though the Wholesale Grocers' Association forcefully 
maintained that it had "at most resorted, merely to suggestion". Wholesale 
grocers in the South and West complained bitterly that they were being 
prevented by such prosecutions from even raking representations to 
manufacturers at a time when their existence was being put in Jeopardyf 
though cynical retailers noted that the wholesalers were happy enough to do 
business with the chains when they could get it, regardlessýof the harm 
this did to their other retailer customers. Whereas in the early 1920's 
they resorted to the weapons of boycott and trade restraints in the late 
1920'ss frustrated by the courts and the unwillingness of manufacturers to 
heed their demandsq these wholesalers shifted to a political attack on the 
chainss with the American Wholesale Grocers' Association - made up mainly 
of Southern wholesalers - playing a spearhead role in this. The political 
attack, although ultimately far more dangerous for the chains - trade 
boycotts rarely working well for longs even without the intervention of 
the courts - wass of courses perfectly lawful under the antitrust laws. 
18 
18. Arkansas Wholesale Grocer9t Assn v FTC, 18 red. (2d) 866 (C. C. A. p 
8tho 1927). Cert, Deniedb 257 U. 'SO-533 (1927), Similarly, ' Pago, WGA 
v. rTC, 227 red. 657 (1922); U&, S4- outherttalif. j WGA. jj-d-(2nd) 
944 (19255-; and Orders of thJCo=ission against St. Louis Wt)ýj 7FTC 1 
U1923); Wisconsin WGA, 7 rTC 489 (1924); Missouri-Yansas WG. Aj 9 FTC 
153 (1925); North Dakota WGA, 9 rTC 266 (1925)0 Wisconsin WGA 10 rTC 
409 (1926); New Orleans WGA§ 11 rTC 415 (1927). See, Joseph C. 
Palamountainj The Politics pf'bi6tributions Carb., Mass., 19551, pp. 85-7; 
G. M. Lebhars, C7haiti-Stores'in'America, 19630 pp. 119-22; Ralph Cassady 
and Wylie Joness The Charigin , CoR-et itivd , Sttildtutd 'in 'the 'Who 16 gale 
Groceýy Tradd: A'Case'StUdy'of'tho Loe, 'Arigoles'Mark-et-s UnIv. of Cali 
Press, 1949, p. 9. 
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Combination to fix prices, an activity often intimately related to 
efforts to control of the channels of distribution$ was also consistently 
condemned by the courts, the rule being that the "reasonableness" of the 
prices so fixed was immaterial. 
19 Naturally, covbinations among independent 
wholesalers and retailers to 'maintain or raise prices were of little 
concern to the chains$ for the higher the independents raised their prices, 
the more likely were the chains to gain'business. More significant was the 
inability of manufacturers to maintain a system of fixed minimum resale 
prices to be observed by all their distributors. In 19116 after some years- 
of uncertainty as to the status of the practicet the U. S. Supreme Court 
ruled that the maintenance of resale prices through contracts constituted 
an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act. 
Subsequent decisions served only to, draw in the net more tightly on the 
would-be price-fixer. A manufacturer was free to name a resale price and to 
refuse to sell to those who failed to abide by itj but he could not use 
his distributors or even keep his own records to keep a check on the 
price-cutters. Only through a definite agency arrangement could he control 
19. rainsod et als op. cit., pp. 472-3. Notes howevers the judgment 
of a District Court in'U. S. vý'S6tithdm*Cal3'fortiaVGA, 7 red. 'Ond) 
944 (1925) where the Court rejected the idea that any sort of 
co ination to fix prices was inevitably a violation of the Sherman 
Act, sympathising with schemes whereby dealerso where one was cutting 
prices to the detriment of allo combined "in'defence of their very 
existence in the trade" to "fix a price ... which shall return to them 
a reasonable profit over a just and fair handling cost". This was in 
line with a provision in the state antitrust laws allowing combinations 
for the pursuit of "reasonable profit", a provision seemingly paralleled 
only in Colorado, with even the Colorado exemption being ruled invalid 
by the U. S. Supreme Court in Cline Vý rrink'Dairy Co#O' 274 U. S&' 447 
(1927). 
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prices all the way to the consumer. 
20 
Sometimes manufacturers were i1rged to attempt resale price maihtenance 
just by exercising the right to refuse to sell, but it was generally accepted 
that without a system of contractss scrutiny and collaborative action 
nothing much could be done, a price-cutting distributor always being able 
to get his hands on "bootleg! ' supplies. Such price maintenance as occurred 
relied on a tacit common acceptance of it by all distributors and broke 
down immediately when any individual dealer or group of dealers decided to 
break ranks. What is more , manufacturers themselves had an ever diminishing 
enthusiasm for resale price maintenance, even if they sometimes pretended 
otherwise to their independent distributors. The old-fashioned idea that 
the reputation and "goodwill" of a product would be devalued by being 
retailed in cut-price stores had begun to lose ground once the image of the 
low-price store shifted from that of a fly-by-night "gyp" operation to that 
of the modern and thoroughly reputable chain store,. The risk to the 
manufacturer in allowing or encouraging unrestrained price-cutting of his 
product was actually the possibility of adverse reaction from the retailers$ 
as expressed in demands for extra discounts to enable them to compete with 
the price-cutters or in informal boycotts of his product. More serious stillp 
20.. Dr. Miles'Medical Coý, v*''Park, &, Sons*Co. D*220'UýS. '373 (1911); 
U. S. v. Colgate'& C2. %'250-'U 0 S. ' 300 (1919y', 
-''UýS. '-V. ''X-. '-'Tc-hradertt, Sons 
Tnc. 
g 252 U. S. 85 (1920); --, rTC'V. '-Bdedh-ý-Ntit*P-8Lc=ng C" " 257*U&'S6' 441 0 71-922); U. S. V. General Electrie Co. b'272'U. S. 476 (1926). Some 
; -fthe 
statess notably Californias were more fl-e-xible in allowing resale price 
maintenance in purely intrastate commerces though it was hard for 
effective price maintenance to exist beyond the reach of the federal 
jurisdiction. The rTC was always keen on breaking up price maintenance 
schemes$ partly because it considered them economically undesirable and 
partly because this was one of the few areas of antitrust enforcement 
in which the courts gave the Commission consistent support. The unusually 
relaxed situation in California kept alive a considerable interest in that 
state in price maintenance in the 19201s, with the consequence that when 
the prevailing political climate became favourable to price control laws 
in the 1930'so the trade in California led nationally in seeking 
appropriate legislation. 
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perhaps j was the danger that distributors would try to substitute their 
own price-protected private brands and. nany wholesalers and chain stores 
did in fact extend their range of private brand tnerchandise during the 
1920ts precisely because, although harder to sellb it was more profitable 
than the nationally-advertised brands which formed a natural target for 
loss leader selling. In the rhetoric of trade protest in the 1920's, it 
was the chain stores who were cast in the role of the villain of the 
piece, "baiting" gullible consumers with loss leaders and making their 
inflated profits on unfamiliar Itblind" merchandise, but in fact selling 
goods at a loss for promotional purposes was something done at times by 
most retailerso including many of those who belonged to the very trade 
associations which constantly demanded the leghlisation of resale price,,, 
maintenance. Even in the 1920's, when a laissez-faire attitude prevailedq 
many chain executives formally disavowed the use of loss leaders and their 
actual pricing policies were perhaps not all that different from those 
which would have been adopted under full-scale price maintenance; no 
manufacturer wasq after allg likely to try to fix a resale price so high 
that major distributors were reluctant to stock it. 
21 However, the chains 
were also unanimous - or believed to be unanimouss for they rarely took 
open positions on the subject- at this time in wishing to keep control 
over their retail prices entirely in their own hands. Some independents - 
21. Nystrom noted in 1930 (Tho'EdoriorAidg'6f'Rdtlilinsz, vol. 1. pp. 258-9) 
that "it has been frequently remarked that breaks or cuts in suggested 
resale prices during, recent years have been more frequently made by 
independent stores than by either. chain stores or department stores". The 
rTC found (Chaiii'Store Inquia, Chain Store Leaders and Loss Leaders'-p 
p. 4s only one chain executive in any line who was willing to speak up 
for the use of loss leaders as a good business practice, though many 
chains used them. In the 1930'st chain store men, in public at leastp 
consistently condemned the use of loss leaders and sometimes blamed 
independents for wrecking stable price levels. 
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moreo indeed, than trade association executivesp whose every instinct was 
to set themselves up as managers of price-fixing schemes$ cared to admit 
also took this view. In such circumstances$ few 'manufacturers in free 
competition with producers of rival tatiotally-aavertised or private brands 
could afford to have their own prices stranded high and dry above the 
market level. Realistic leaders of the independent trade accepted this$ but 
they did feel that price maintenances even if incapable of leading to an 
abolition of price competition$ might at least put an end to the more 
predatory type of loss leader sellitgg by whomsoever it was practicedg 
thus creating a price floor above which distributors would be free to 
compete on the basis of their own genuine efficiency. 
Undoubtedly the most inflamed controversiesin the 1920's flared up as 
a result of the conviction of independents that manufacturerso not content 
with selling direct to large chains were further fostering their growths 
either as a result of a conscious choice that this was the form of 
distribution of the future or because of intimidations by showering them 
with extra price concessions, Quantity discounts which were unobtainable 
by small wholesalers; so-called "advertising allowances" which were 
actually used by the chains to advertise themselves or simply to swell 
their coffers; brokerage commissions compelled by over-mighty chain buyers 
who demanded that manufacturers dispose with the services of the independent 
brokers - these were the stuff of more innuendo, more double-crossing* 
more intrigue and more angry calls for boycotts than every other aspect of 
chain store operating methods put together. The complaints of the 
wholesalers took on a moralistic tinge because* at roots they believed that 
it was really an abomination for the manufacturers to sell direct to the 
chains at all; the grievances of retailers were aggravated because they 
tended to compute the size of these extra discounts to the chains by 
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comparing their own retail prices with chain store retail prices$ 
ignoring the extra costs added to distribution by the relative inefficiency 
22 
of the wholesaler-retailer system once the goods had left the manufacturer. 
In the early 1920's,, in line with its policy at that time of acting 
vigorously to ensure a free flow of goods through the channels of 
distribution, the rTC sought to use Section 2 of the Clayton Act against 
this "buying end" price discrimination. In thd'MdhTien, casep the 
Commission's order required the Mennen Co. to sell to retail cooperatives 
at wholesale discounts when they bought in wholesale quantities. In the 
Natiorial'Bigetit case, where the manufacturer's custom was to deliver to 
each store separately$ the order required the company either to base its 
discounts to chain stores on the quantity delivered to each stores without 
reference to the overall purchases of the chain, or. alternatively, to 
allow independent grocers to pool their purchases to get the quantity 
discounts obtained by the chains on the basis of their large aggregate 
purchases. In both these casesl the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit delivered crushing rebuffs to the Commission. In the first places 
the Court took the views based on its understanding that Section 2 had been 
incorporated in the Clayton Act by Congress solely with the intent of 
curbing locality price discrimination$ that the Section had no applicability 
unless it had an effect to lessen competition between sellerso not between 
22. The term "quantity, discount" as used below refers to both volume 
discounts (granted on the basis of an aggregate of sales over a period 
of time) and quantity discounts -made on the basis of a single large 
order. "Advertising allowance" refers to any payment, in money or kind, 
made actually or ostensibly by a seller to a retailer in order that he 
should give his product special display, advertising mention$ tell his 
clerks to "push" its etc. Brokerage commissions wore almost entirely 
a food trade issue, independent food brokers existing to contact buyers 
on behalf of sellers$ especially packers of fruits, vegetablesl etc. 
Actu&l trade usage of these terms was never as precise as that of the 
economics textbooks. The term "rebates" was often used by independents 
to describe such allowances, at least when only the chains got themt 
because of its overtones of trust methods. 
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their customers. In. neither the', Mdnhen nor the*BiqqUt case was there 
any evidence that this had been, the effect, and the ruling clearly 
& 23 seriously limited the usefulness of Section 2. 
In the second place, the Court emphatically upheld the right of 
sellers to make reasonable classifications based on trade status and to 
adopt whatever differentials they saw fit between such classifications 
provided that there was no discrimination, except as authorised by the 
provisos to Section 2. within the classifications. Thus in the'Mennen 
cases the Court argued that the fact that the retailers had established 
a cooperative for purchasing had not thereby converted them into 
wholesalerss because the character of the purchaser did not depend upon the 
method of his buying but upon the method of his selling, The Mennen Co. 
"did not discriminate as between retailers but sold to all retailers on 
one and the same scale of prices. And it did not discriminate as between 
wholesalers but sold to all wholesalers on one and the same scale of 
0 j, 24 prices . This doctrine was by no means unreasonable - most distributiong 
after all, depending upon the maintenance of an orderly graduation of 
function from producers middleman, retailer to ultimate consumer - and 
on the rTC's theory the whole of established business practice would have 
been turned upside downs something which had never been contemplated by 
Congress in framing Section 2 even if, literally construeds it contained 
no protection for trade differentials. Furthermore, the Court did not 
insist that the seller was compelled to adopt this mode of classification$ 
but rather allowed for considerable flexibility. Indeed, in the'Bi8cuit 
23. Menteii'C6. ''v. 'rTCý'288'rdd. '774 (C. C. A., 2nds 1923)p Cert. Denied 
262 ý. S. 759, TJ-9-2--3); *'NAtiorial'Bitcilit'C6. ''V. '*rTCý'299'rdd. '733 (C. C. A. 11 
2nd, 1924)s Cert. Deniedq 266 U. S. 613 (1924). See alsog J- Miller* 
Unfair'Cbmj%tition, Camb.. 'Mass. s 1941, pp. 133-134; Thomas C. 131aisdell, TheTederal 'Tradd pp. 63-67. 
24. Mennen Co., v. ''rTC, *288'rdd--774q at p. 781. 
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case, Just one year laterp it disregarded its own theory of what a 
wholesaler was by. sustaining the right of the manufacturer to sell to 
the chain store at lower prices than other retailers even though a chain 
was, in the character of its sellings quite clearly a retailer. In the 
Biscuit case, the Court maintained that the extra discounts to the chains 
could be justified by the large volume taken by the chain overall and by 
its ability as a single business entity to promote the products even 
though the FTC had found that it cost the Biscuit Co. to more to sell to 
the independent stores than it did to each unit of the chain. What the 
decisions in these two cases boiled down to was a statement by the Court 
that the granting of price differentialss in the absence of some substantial 
restraint of competition between sellersl should be left to the discretion 
of the manufacturers. The U. S. Supreme Court declined to review these 
cases - thereby in effects if not strictly in laws confirming the 
judgments - and the rTC gave up the fight. The Commission might well have 
explored other lines of attack. ror examples a case involving a 
discrimination as between a wholesaler and a chain store could have been 
brought to test out the limitst and reveal some of the implicit confusions 
of the judicial attitude towards the reasonableness of trade differentials. 
Similarly, the grattitig. of secret rebates might have been attacked with 
Section 5 of the rederal Trade Commission Act as an unfair trade practice, 
The Commission could also have tested what differentials were permissible 
within a classification based on quantity differences; but none of these 
things was done. In 19296 as a result of a private suit, the U. S. Supreme 
Court decided that Section 2 should be construed so as to apply to a lessening 
of competition between buyers as well as between sellers, 
25 but the rTC did 
2S. ' 'Van *CarhD'C6. ' Vý 'AtidlýidcUi 'Cali 'Co. $ '278'U. S. *245 (1929) s 
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not seize the opportunityv its attention havi. ng. been by this time 
diverted to the task of encouraging industries'. to disavow-unfair 
rebates through the self-denying ordinances of-trade practice conference 
procedure. In 1933, the Commission issued a complaint against the 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., but the Goodyear case was not finally decided 
until 1939, three years after the old Section 2 had been rewritten by 
the Robinson-Patman Act. It is clears therefore, that during the period 
of greatest chain store growth manufacturers were free to extend to chain 
stores whatever discounts they pleased. 
The independent sector was not always the victim of this state of 
affairs. The'Menten and Biscuit cases notwithstandings well established 
retailer buying groups were often quite successful in persuading 
manufacturers to extend them wholesale discounts or otherwise favourable 
terms* 26 Similarly, the weight of convention also sometimes ensured that 
manufacturers treated wholesalers more favourably than the quantity they 
purchased and their ability to provide service really warranted. In lines 
where chains were weaks wholesalers were able to ensure the persistence 
of discount structures which barred chains from the full advantages of 
direct buying. Neverthelessg the general view of independents was that 
the chains were getting limitless extra discounts and allowances and that 
these were the fuel upon which the engine of chain store expansion relied. 
So complex, variable and shrouded in secrecy - and so subject to deliberate 
obfuscation by the parties involved - were these buying concessions that 
opinion and prejudices not solid facts always determined the shape of 
26. The rTC found'(Chdir! 'St6td*Xzi(jIIiryj Cooperative Grocery Chains 
p-95) that only one-quarter of retailer cooperatives (in the grocery 
field) as of 1930 were having any difficulty in obtaining wholesale 
discounts from-ranufacturers, and that such difficulties as occurred 
were associated with a relatively few ranufacturers. rollowing the 
controversy surrounding the Biscuit case litigation, the National 
Biscuit Co. itself e'xtended the mximtm 171% discount given to the 
chains to rnerlers of the IGA and some retail-owtied wholesale houses. 
(Interstate Grocer, March 10,1928). 
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discussion. The FTC zade some effort to-get to the bottom of this murky 
subject which was, significantly, the one area of its chain store inquiry 
in which it -met with substantial obstructionism - but without coming to 
any definite conclusions. The discounts reported to it by manufacturers 
in the grocery, drug and tobacco fields indicated that the chains' buying 
advantage was an appreciable element in their lower selling prices without 
being of obviously decisive importances but the Commission was evidently 
not entirely happy with this data and in vaguely 
that while "no exact-measurement" of the relative effect of this factor 
was possible "it can be saido however. that lower selling prices are a 
very substantial$ if not the chief) factor in the growth of chain-store 
merchandising and that lower buying prices than are available to 
independents are a most substantiaig if tot the chiefs factor in these 
lower selling prices". Elsewhere in thd'P. 6p6rts the Commission went so far 
as to refer to the 1920's as "a period when chain stores were enjoying an 
extensive growth based largely upon special price concessions from 
manufacturers". Nothing in its data justified that conclusions which was 
certainly exaggerateds but the fact that the Commission could slip into 
such overstatement may make it seem less remarkable that many passionate 
opponents of the chain stores believed that this was the inner secret at 
the heart of their success. 
27 
27. See the several reports of the Chain Store Inquiry into Special 
Discounts and Allowances and the summary of. these in the, 
, 
rinallzoportq 
pp. 53-63s go. For forceful criticism of the apparently exaggerated 
emphasis placed on special discounts and allowances as a factor in 
chain store success in the course of thd, riiiai*Pdvortv see Hoffman$ 
op. cit., pp. 104-7 and Charles r. Phillipsg The Federal Trade Commission's 
Chain Store Investigation: A Hotel' i%A, Jo=al'6f'Mgkdting, January 1938 
pp. 190-2 and "The Robinson-Patman Anti-Price Discrimin n Lawl's 
Harvard'13tg-ipdpt'Rdview-, vol. 15 (1936), pp. 62-75. Such criticism, it 
may be noteU-, -relied on the rTC's own datas thus trusting to the Commission's 
judgment and competence in one respect but not in another. Perhaps the 
Commission's scepticism about its own Chain Store Inquiry data was 
encouraged by the findings of its investigation of the arrangements made 
in 1926 between the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. and Searsb Roebuck whereby Sears 
000 
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Virtually every aspect of antitrust interpretation and enforcement 
in the 2920's was unfavourable to the independent trade. On the one hand, 
the chains were allowed to merge, receive lower buying prices and set 
their retail pricesý=re'6r less as the pleabed- on the other hand, yS 
counter-activities'by the independents were always open to attack. Small 
business complained that it found itself in a peculiarly invidious position. 
27. (cont1d). obtained "Allstatell, private brand tyres on a very 
advantageous "cost plus" basis which enabled it in the course of a few 
years to become the. ldaditig tyre retailer in the country. According to 
the historians of Sears, Roebucks the company's small "class C11 stores$ 
which concentrated on hardware and auto supplies, were "Generally 
profitable fTom the outset, largely because the "Allstate" automobile 
tYres they sold wore priced about 20-25 per cent below other tyres of 
comparable quality". In 1926,120,000 independent dealers did about 
90% of the tyro renewal business in the United States; ten years laterb 
there were only 60,000 independents left, with less than 60% of the 
business. Searss Roebucks Montgomery Ward and filling station chains 
were doing a quarter of the renewal sales with their private brandsl 
with quickly growing auto accessory chains also becoming a force, and 
Goodyears Goodrich and rirestone had themselves set tip their own retail 
chains in direct competition with independent dealers carrying their 
tyres. This conditions and the constant price cuts forced by the chain 
private brands9 led to the-appearance of the National Association of 
Independent Tire Dealers in the mid-1930's as a factor in the political 
battle against the chains. Between 1926 and 1936 Sears was considered 
to hold the price initiative in the tyre business because of the 
"Allstate" contracts conditions easing after 1936 when$ following 
enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act, the "Allstate" contract was 
cancelled. (Seeb Order of the Commissiong 22 rTC 232 (1936); Emmet 
& Jeucks Catalogtes and Counters, p. 35lg 617-20; Stocking & Watkins$ 
Monopoly and'Free'Enterprise,, Fp-. 364-6; Millers*Urifair'Cotpetitions 
pp, 136-9; Clair Wilcox, Competition and'Monop6iy7, "31_nAm_or_r_ 
(, TNEC MonogEaphs No. 21), Washington D. C. f 19415- pp, 49-50; Lloyd G. 
Reynoldss "Competition in the Rubber Tire Industry" in'Ameridan 
Economic'Review. Vol. 28'(1938) pp. 459-68; -l939'C6h8Us-E-fBus jessw 
Retail TradeVoi. -19*Part'l. p. 7- See also below, pp. 278-83. C6n--ditions 
in the tyre industry were abnormally acute$ but it would be the merest 
speculation to suggest what importance the low prices obtained from 
manufacturers onprivate brands or inerchandise not sold to other, 
distributors hadYthe success of variety chains, department store chains, 
etc., lines of tr'nade which the rTC did not study in its Chain Store 
Inquiry precisely because the proportion of directly comparable merchandise 
was too low and indirect comparison too'imprecise. ror a discussion of 
the imprecision, variability and arbiguity implicit in any estimate of 
price discrimination$ see pp. 122-130. 
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Farmers were allowedp in the conduct of. cooperative marketi . 
ng$ to act 
substantially without. restraint from the antitrust laws thanks to the 
1922 Capper-Volstead Act and the CooperativeMarketing Act of 1926, and 
their combinations were actually fostered by many states. Similarly, 
as Paul Nystrom, Professor of Marketing at Columbia University and later 
president of the Limited Price Variety Stores' Association, put it in 
19309 the "destructive price-cutter is to the regular, established 
retailer what the scab is to the trade unionist", but whereas labour was 
permitted to form unions and strike for higher wages and run boycotts 
against unsatisfactory employers, retailers were not lawfully able to 
combine to boycott unfair manufacturers or demand extra discounts or to 
raise prices to the consumer. 
28 It was not as if small business was in 
the same position in this regard as big btisinessp for one giant company* 
thanks to the fiction of the corporate forms was able to combine and 
coordinate the activities of thousands of stores under its control in 
perfect freedom. 
There was throughout the 1920's a minority judicial viewpoints most 
prominently represented by Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, to the 
effect that the activities of small business should be judged according 
to a "rule of reason"s just as those of U. S. Steel and International 
Harvester and other giant combines were, and not merely condemned out of 
hand as unlawful combinations in restraint of trade. Thus, in the period 
before his elevation to the benchs Brandeis was a prominent advocate of 
legalised price maintenance, which he identifiid with the preservation 
of a healtlysmall business, and from the betchs through a series of 
dissents, he pressed the idea that the actions of trade groups In respect of 
28. - Tdotiomidg -(5f -Rdtailing, vol. Ii, p. 471. 
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the circulation of market informations price lists and the like should 
be judged on their merits in individual cases. 
29 The judiciary as a 
wholeg howeverg clung tenaciously to the view that once it started off 
down that road it could not begin to acknowledge the existence of 
permissible and perhaps even laudable corbinations of this type without 
thereby becoming erbroiled in endless political and economic controversy. 
30 
It was not Brandeis but Herbert Hoovers first as Secretary of Co=erce 
and then as Presidents who served to bring about the first modifications 
in this situation. Hoovers unlike Brandeisg was no trust-busters and his 
election to the Presidency in 1928 ensured that there was no possibility 
of any strong action to break up the big chains or impede their mergers. 
On the other hands Hoover was a bbliever not just in getting the rTC and 
the Department of Justice "off the back" of business - the attitude of 
conservative Republicans - but in a positive philosophys with a mildly 
progressive tinges of using government to foster a spirit of business 
self-examination and self-regulation. The new philosophy was that readjustment 
of policies within entire industries by a process of constructive cooperation 
would be more beneficial both to industry and the public than the old-style 
method of singling out a few individual companies for attacks and that 
this more relaxed approach would assist the constructive forces within each 
industry and isolate the truly unscrupulous or predatory. This philosophy 
found expression in the holding of numerous trade practice conferences 
between the rTC and various industries after 1925p a conference for the 
grocery trade being held in 1928. The times were not yet ripe for any 
29. Alpheus T6 Masong Brandeis: A rree Man's Lifes N. Y. p 1956s pp- 424-8; Dissent in American Cc umn and Lumber Co. ý,., U. S. g 257 U6S. 377 (1921). The first federal price maintenance bill, the Stevens bill 
first introduced in 1914p was drawn up under his direction. 
30. U. S. v. Trenton Potteries Co. g 273 U. S. 392 (1927); but see note 
19 above. 
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overt abandonment of the old antitrust shibboleths, and the rules drawn 
up under the auspices of the rTC in such conferences tended to keep 
rather closely to bland restatements of existing law in addition to various 
high-sounding but often vacuous expressions of industry intent to avoid 
various practices which it and the rTC believed were undesirable without 
necessarily being illegal. 
31 Nevertheless s even these hesitant first steps 
to a new industrial order stirred considerable excitement. In the grocery 
trade practice conferences for instance, the contending factions within 
the trade found themselves obliged to openly examine their respective 
attitudes to various trade practicess in a collaborative setting, for the 
first time, and although the conference was too peripheral an event to 
distract the majority of independent grocers from anti-chain activities* 
and was also distrusted as a form of collaboration with the enemy by some 
of the most militant, it did provide the more conservative leaders of the 
independent trade with some ground to argue that there was a better way to 
meet the menace of chain malpractices than trying to whip up political 
agitation against them. In this subtly different climate, interest in the 
possibilities of legalised resale price maintenance also began to stirs 
hearings being held on a price maintenance bill by Congress in 1926 for 
the first time since 19176 Senator Arthur Capper of Mansas and Congressman 
Clyde Xelly(Pennsylvania) then reintroducing their bills to an increasingly 
considerate reception$ each year thereafter. Undoubtedly these climatic 
trends also proved beneficial to the spread of retail cooperatives and 
voluntary chains towards the close of the decades for it meant that the 
widespread practice in these groups of members meeting together to fix the 
31. Blaisdellq The Federal Trade'Commitsions pp. 75-94; Miller$ Utfair 
Competitiong pp. 267-82; G. CUllom Davis, 71-he Transformation of the 
Federal Trade Commissiong 1914-1929"9, MississipTýi'Vallpy-Historical Review 
Vol. XLIX (1962)b pp. 437-55. 
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prices of the week's bargain "specials" went unchallenged by the FTC 
or the Department of Justice. Although the aim of such pricefixing was 
to reduce prices and make the independents more competitive, it wasq on 
the interpretation of the law favoured by the U. S. Supreme Courts of 
extremely doubtful legality. 
32 
The trade practice conference procedurewas sharply downgraded by 
the rederal Trade Commission in 1930g in a feeble capitulation to criticism 
from sections of the Congress and the Department of Justice that it had 
allowed self-regulation to develop into price-fixing and market-rigging. 
33 
Similarly, although the House passed a severely amended version of the 
bill in 1931, Congress failed to act on the Capper-Kelly bill. The result 
was that between 1930 and 1932, as prices fell and millions lost their 
jobs, little or no action was taken to build on the earlier ventures into 
"cooperative competition". The desperate conditions of the depression 
made industrial self-regulation an impossibility in industries such as the 
retail trade with many competitors of varied size and interests) and 
increasingly suggestions came, even from organisations like the U. S. 
Charber of Commerces that government would have to modify the antitrust 
laws and enforce some scheme of industrial discipline if the downward 
spiral was ever to be arrested. 
The answer came in the National Industrial Recovery Acts the core of 
the rirst New Deal of 1933. ror nearly two yearsp from the Summer of 
1933 to the Spring of 1935s the antitrust laws weres in effects put in a 
state of suspension while business and governments with token representation 
from consumers and labours joined to formulate codes of fair practice for 
.4 
32. This point is noted by the rTC itselfs in'rital'Reports p. 20. 
33. Blaisdell, The rederal Trade Commissions p. 96. 
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each industrys codes which were not just bland restatements of existing 
law or airy expressions of industry sentiment as the trade practice 
conference rules had been$ but detailed and draconian prescriptions backed 
up by a vast if creaking machinery of enforcement. Many of the activities 
hitherto condemned and punished as combinations in restraint of trade were 
now condoneds indeed required$ by Governments and in the new language of 
politics and business alike it was the "chisellers"s "ruinous competition" 
and "rugged individualism" which were held to be the cause of the nation's 
blight. All the inhibitions built into the rTC's trade practice conference 
procedures were cast aside, as indeed was the rTC itself. Trade associations 
ascended to hitherto unimagined heights of power as their officers 
constituted themselves into localpstate and national code authorities$ often 
with very loose supervision by the National Recovery Administration, raised 
levies from the trade to pay for their works and issued a stream of decrees 
as to what practices were or were not henceforth to be allowed. 
The National Industrial Recovery Act was not specifically the result of 
conditions in the retail trades let alone of the conflicts between chains 
and independents. On the contrary, retailing was a forgotten industry in 
the early New Deals its problems passing almost unnoticed amid the attention 
given to the banks, agriculture and manufacturing industry. A strong body 
of opinion within the NRA believed that the extension of the codes to the 
distributive trades was futile and dangerousg both because retailing was 
carried on through so many outlets and was therefore impossible to supervises 
and becauses as an area of the econotV with only a minor component of 
interstate commercet such extension was vulnerable constitutionally. Howevers 
the NRA was a monster which no one could control: every industryq and every 
minor branch of an industry demanded its own codes and the supply increased 
irresistibly to meet that demand. Within retailing and wholesaling$ dozens 
of codes and sub-codes were adoptedg some of them mutually contradictory or 
patently designed to help one small group at the expense of another. 
The NRA from the first had a split personality. On the one hand, a 
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strong element of compulsions even intimidations featured in its activities, 
an aspect symbolised by the use of the Blue Eagle$ those permitted to display 
this erblem having the status of approved members of a sort of gigantic 
national "white list". on the other hands after the initial period of 
hysteria with its Blue Eagle parades and mood of a national emergency$ this 
element of compulsion gave way to a more subdued process of fostering 
business compliance through cooperation. Increasingly disturbed by the 
difficulty of achieving compliance through the courts and by Congressional 
and business criticism of the arbitrariness of many of the codes it had 
permittedl and racked by internal differences over fundamental questions of 
purpose. the NRA progressively settled back into an attitude of merely 
monitoring the cooperative activities of business. Thus although in many 
industries small coteries worked assiduously to use the machinery of the NRA 
to do damage to those of their competitors against whom they had a grudge's 
in general the NRA codes proved effective only where they were backed up by 
a wide consensus within the industr7.34 
In so far as independent merchants looked to the NRA as a way of using 
the power of Government to cripple the chains they were bound to be 
disappointedp though in the excitement of the hour they were slow to realise 
it and some insisted on making the attempt. Of particular importance for 
later history was the struggle which developed in the grocery trade between 
the smaller wholesalers and retailers and the big buyers. The militant 
34., Leverett S. Lyons et-al. s'The*National*IZecover-j Adininistrat-iont--An Analysisand Appraisal, Washington D. C., 19359 pp. 238-242, Fu-th Prince 
Mack, Controlling'RetAllers: A Study-of Cooperation'and Control'in the 
Retaif Trade with special'referende to the NRAj N. Y. 1936 (1968 reprin-t)s 
passim. Charles F, Rooss'NRA Economid'Planning, s Bloomingtonb Ind-s 1937s (New York, 1971, Reprint) pp. 78-81' 
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United States Wholesale Grocers Association (the former American Wholesale 
Grocers' Association) led an alliance which included the National rood 
Brokers' Association and large sections of the retail grocery trade-in an 
effort to wrest from the", NRA severe restrictions on the discounts* allowances 
and brokerage commissions available to the big buyers. Their extreme demands 
were unacceptable to the big voluntary chains, which were consequently drawn 
into a new and uneasy alliance with the corporate chainss and the economic 
struggle was further exacerbated by bitter factional rivalries* notably 
between the two major wholesale associationsg the United States and the 
National-American. This whole conflict was about the fundamental character 
and future of the grocery trade - whether the old small wholesaler-retailer 
system or the new chain systemsl voluntary and corporatep should prevail - 
and this was a question that could not possibly be resolved by, the NRA. 
The issues undecideds the struggle then spilled over into the campaign for 
what became the Robinson-Patman Act. 
35 
I 
Relationships between chains and independents tended to be more harmonious 
in formulating attitudes towards retail price control. This was outstandingly 
true of the drug tradeb where the large chainso headed by Liggett and Walgreens 
35. See belows pp . 289-91. In 1933 . at the very beginning of the NRAs the American Wholesale Grocers' Association (mainly Southern) and the National 
Wholesale Grocers' Association (mainly Northern) attempted a mergers 
apparently because of fears that the NRA might otherwise not recognise 
either as the voice of the wholesale grocery trades The merger almost 
immediately fe" apart$ amid accusations from AWGA president J. H. McLaurin 
that the National's officers had "sold out" to the chains, especially on 
the question of the retention of brokerage and advertising allowances. 
Following thisg McLaurin reestablished the American Association under the 
new name of the United States Wholesale Grocers' Association, the National 
adopting the title of the National-American. Both associations had 
substantially the same merberships as before the attempted merger, but 
they emerged with the ideological differences between them considerably 
sharpened. (Interstate Grocers June 240 August 190 September 9f October 
21s 1933; February 17, March 24,1934). 
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had agreed in 1932 to cooperate with the National Association of 
Retail Druggists in its campaign for the Capper-Kelly price maintenance 
bill. 36 With the coming of the National Industrial Recovery Act the 
Capper-Kelly bill was shelveds and the corbined forces of the drug trade 
36. NARD'Journals June 16s 1932. There seem to have been several factors 
behind Me drug chains' change of position: (1) the underlying tendencys 
seen repeatedly in distributions for erstwhile "upstart" elements, once 
they achieve a certain maturity, to follow policies which increasingly 
converge with those pursued by the. older-established groups in the field. 
This tendency was accelerated by the peculiar psychology of the 
depression, with its, general business revulsion against unrestrained 
competition. (2) The disturbance caused by a small but irritating fringe 
of "pineboards", price-cutting independents and local chains, which sprang 
up in the depression and did not carry the overheads of expensive store 
fixtures, high rent locations and unprofitable outlets which burdened the 
larger chains. Drug chains were also affected by loss leader sales of 
drug store merchandise in grocerys varietys department stores etc. (3) 
Comparison with the immense success of the Boot's Pure Drug Co. in Englandp 
which had grown to a greater size than any U. S. drug chain under conditions 
of strict resale price maintenance. A holding companyq Drug Inc-p 
controlled both Boot's and Liggett's until 1932. (4) The relatively 
small and cohesive nature of the drug trades and the considerable degree 
of interlocking of ownership, made a system of thorough price maintenance 
seem far more feasible than in most other trades. (5) The strength of 
the NARD and its state and local organisations. The seahi-professional 
status of pharmacyo the homogeneity of the independent sector and the 
restrictions on entry imposed by the pharmacy laws encouraged the idea 
that resale price maintenance would be effectively observed by the over- 
whelming majority of the independent retailers. The restrictions on entry 
removed the obstacle to price maintenance found in other lines that any 
enhancement, of prices tended to bring in an influx of new distributorst 
thus reducing the volume of business available to each. This discipline 
in the independent sector meant that the chainso which because of their 
size could not disregard fixed prices without attracting notice, could 
follow maintained prices secure in the knowledge that the independents 
would follow suit. (6) Only in the drug trade s apart perhaps from the 
tobacco trade. did the independents consistently and loudly ask the chains 
to support price maintenance. 
See, Ewald T. Grether Prico*Coritrol'Under'Fair Trade'Legislations N-Y-p 
1939; Palamountains 
ýhý--Politi"cs'of, big-tributions pp. 90-106; National 
Recovery Administrations DMision o? Re_v1 riction of Retail Price 
Cutting with Emphasis on the Drug Industry" (Work-Materials No. 57's 
1936); U. S. Congressp House Judiciary Committ-eeg subette. 9 Hearings on.... 
Resale Price Maintenance$ 75th Cong. 6 lst Sess., January 19376-p'p. 
-2 
(Statement of F. J. Z-Fir-ffiths exec. secy. National Association of Chain 
Drug Stores). 
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sought the legalisation of price maintenance from the NRA. This the 
NRA was unwilling to grantq but it did ultimately approve a "loss 
limitation" provision which prohibited sales below manufacturer's wholesale 
list price in dozen lots. This was less than the trade had hoped for -a 
typical minimum retail margin of 15%, as opposed to the NARD's historic 
demand for 33 1/3% - but it was a crucial breakthrough. 
37 Meanwhile in 
Californiag long the stronghold of price maintenance sentiment and where 
the courts had traditionally been sympathetic* the independent and chain 
druggists combined their efforts to give effect to the first (in 1933) of 
a new wave of resale price maintenance - what the trade called "fair 
trade" - laws. Between 1935 and 1939t 43 more states passed "fair trade" 
laws, the greatest rush coming in 1937 after the U. S. Supreme, -Court in 
December, 1936 performed a stunning about-turn and upheld the California 
and Illinois fair trade lawsp including their vital provisions binding non- 
signers. In 1937 Congress was also persuaded to pass the Miller-Tydings 
bill exempting the use of price maintenance in interstate commerce from 
attack under the Sherman and rederal Trade Commission Acts. 
38 
These fair trade laws were all fundamentally similar in contentg being 
based either on the California model, which had been drawn up by the retail 
druggists$ or on a slightly revised model bill produced by the National 
Association of Retail Druggistso or being a synthesis of these two. Two 
limiting provisions in the laws required that all price maintained items 
37. Millerg'Unfilir'Competitions pp. 240-1; Roos, N*, R., A. Economic 
Planning_b pp. 269-270; NARD'Journal, August 179 Se-pt-RE-er 7b 1933; 
June 21b 1934. 
38. rederal Trade Comissionb 'Report *on'R"alo -Price 'Mainteilanceb 
Washington D. C. b 1945b pp. Xxvi - xxviii-b 67-87. 'Old'D6arborn 
Distributing Co. * 'v. 'Seagrarft-ýDis-tillers 'C *1 299 U. S. 183 (1936). 
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should be in "fair and open competition with commodities of the same 
general class produced by others" and that legality was not conferred 
on agreements "between producerso or between wholesalersp or between 
retailers as to resale prices". These limitations proved invaluable in 
steering fair trade through the courtsg the U. S. Supreme Court itself 
approving the legislation with much comment about the supposed safeguards 
provided and on the theory that manufacturers should be allowed to protect 
the "goodwill" of their product. 13ut from a practical business point of 
view such limitations were meaningless. The real demand for price 
maintenance came not from manufacturers desirous of protecting the "goodwill" 
of their products but from the distributorsq and from the first price 
maintenance was spread in the drug trade by distributors coming to agreements 
to boycott the goods of manufacturers who failed to name a resale price 
(or named a price which was too low) ors altermativelyg giving special 
promotion to those products which were satisfactorily priced. In one 
particularly celebrated case$ the Pepsodent Co. was brought to heel in 
California in 1935 by a statewide boycott which kept its products out of 
every drug store except for a small fringe of cut-raterst a partial boycott 
in sympathy also spreading to other states. Until about 1938s when concern 
began to develop in the trade about the increasingly close attention being 
paid to its activities by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade 
Commission (which was an impotent body during the NRA period and for a year 
or two thereafter before reviving as the decade went by) there was not even 
any particular effort made to disguise the element of "horizontal 
corbination" between dealers to "encourage" manufacturers to toe the lineq 
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and within about three years most drug items and also many sundries sold 
in drug stores were under resale price maintenance. 
39 
These fair trade laws were enacted by domino effects usually with 
little debates simply because their supposed purpose to stop unfair loss 
leaders sounded vaguely satisfactory to most legislators and because they 
saw no reason to deny what the legislators in every other state were granting. 
This domino effect reached its climax when the U. S. Congress enacted the 
Miller-Tydings amendments despite the opposition of the Roosevelt 
administrations largely under the sway of the argument that it was not itself 
expressing an opinion on price maintenance but was merely enabling the 
several states to give full, expression to their own legislative wishes. The 
widespread view at the time that "chiselling" had been a major cause of the 
depression and that there was such a thing as a "just price" provided the 
favourable political psychology and the National Association of Retail 
Druggistsg which ran the whole campaign through its state organisations, 
demonstrated immense ability and discipline in capitalising upon it. 
40 The 
failure of the chains to oppose this movement also ensured that there was no 
focus of opposition, at least until about 1937 when farm and consumer groups 
began to stir. Active support for the fair trade bills came from the drug 
and tobacco chainso and most chains in other lines adopted an attitude of 
neutrality or indifference. Trade opposition in fact came almost exclusively 
from the department stores" organisation, the National Retail Dry Goods' 
Association (NRDGA)tand even this body was somewhat split on the issuel such 
a prominent department store operator as John Wanamaker in Philadelphia 
39. rTCq Report on Resale Prio-d'Mainteriancel (, l945)j-! pp. 92-102§ 166-249. 
Gretherg Price Control Urider, reilrr, Trgde'Legiglcltions pp. 90-105g 347-51; 
Corwin D. Edwardso Maintaining'Competitions N-Y-s 19499 p. 72. Only one 
state (Wisconsin) pr: o-vided for any review of prices by a state agency so 
that "unfair and unreasonable" contracts could be nullified. 
40. Palamountainb The'Politics 'of "Distribution, ppe 235-253. 
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strongly endorsing the legislation. One company, R. H. Macy & Co. 9 which 
for years had fought the other New York department stores tooth-and-nail 
and boasted that it would under sell anyones stood'alone in waging an 
unflagging campaign through advertising$ pamphletso and at legislative 
hearings against price-fixing in all its forms, but not even in New York 
State was Macy strong enough to block the movements4l Among the leading 
chains, Sears$ Roebuck was the only ostentatious opponent of the fair trade 
lawss but it was unable to carry Montgomery Ward or the Mail Order 
Association, which had no official positions in this attitude. Furthermores 
Sears' opposition was clearly intended mainly as a publicity stunts to 
advertise its lower price private brand drug linesg rather than as a serious 
intervention in the legislative process. 
42 
Price maintenance was looked upon as being mainly a drug trade affair 
and therefore of little concern to other chains. Most chain store men 
seem also to have reasoned that price maintenanceg if it was to be tried in 
other linesb would operate merely to create price floorsb thus curbing the 
"chisellers" without artificially inflating prices or preventing the lower- 
cost distributors from passing on the advantage of their economies to the 
consumer. The only significant use of fair trade other than in the drug 
trade developed in specialist lines like liquorb electrical goodsb the 
book trade and tobacco products (except cigarettes) where the retailers for 
whom these products were the core of their trade were united as to its 
value and had suffered from retailers in other linesb chain and independentb 
41. House Judiciary Ctte -. 'Hearings -on ý. ýResa16 'Price 'Maintenance g 75th 
Cong. Ist Sess-0 January 1937, pp. 124-816 200; "Why Unit-ed Cigar Opposes 
Price Cutting"s Chain. Store A&eq August 1935; "As We See It"s Chain Store 
Aaeo Decerber 1935; lobaccoleaf. May 11# 1935g p. 3. 
42. House Judiciary Ctte-9 Hdaririgr., OriýýýR6sale, Price, Maintenances 75th 
Cong., Ist Sess-6 January 1937, pp. 113--7; Senate Judiciary Ctteeog 
Hearings Oný.,. Rezale, Prldd'Maizit6nance, 75th Cong. p Ist Sess. 9 March 40 19379 
pp& 18-27. 
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using their products as loss leaders when they themselves had to sell them 
at a profit in order to survive. Arotind 1937 there was considerable interest 
in resale price 'maintenance in most trades* but this soon subsided because 
of a general belief that price maintenance was not practicable. 
43 
An altermative line of development from the NRA came in the enactment 
of state legislation prohibiting below-cost selling by wholesalers or 
retailers. In all, 25 states had enacted general sales-below-cost laws by 
May Ig 1940, and two other states, Michigan and Louisianas had laws covering 
limited ranges of merchandise only. In 12 statesq all of them in the South 
or west of the Mississippi, the areas where the antitrust tradition was 
strongests the laws were of a type generally known as "unfair practices 
acts'19 regulating not only sales below cost but price discrimination. The 
anti-discrimination provisionsq which in general were little usedg perpetuated 
the old idea of preventing the use of price wars to drive out competitors and 
were at least in part an anti-chain gesture. In 15 stateso these being 
geographically more widely distributed and including four of the New England 
states, New Jersey and Pennsylvania* the laws were of a type known as "unfair 
sales acts" and were designed only to prevent sales below cost. The 
connection of this latter variant of anti-loss leader legislation with past 
state antitrust laws was remote: indeedo the thrust of the lawsq however 
we" camouflaged'in the language usedo was arguably exactly opposite to the 
antitrust tradition. 
44 
43. Resale price maintenance is thought to have reached its peak about 1950- 
1952 , then declining in the face of adverse court decisions striking out the 
essential provision binding non-signersp the systematic defiance of the new 
discount houses and the general business laissez-faire rood of the 195ols. ror 
general discussions of the limited applicability of resale price maintenance$ 
see rTCx 'Rep6rt'ori Rdgale'Prico Nairitetance (1945); Gretheri 'Prid6'C61itrol 
Under Fair Trade'Leqisl and S. C. Hollanderg essay on United States* pps 
67-1009 in B. S. Yameyj ed. 6 Resale Price Maintenance s London 1966. 
44. : FTC9 Report'on Resale'Pride-Mairitenance (1945)9 pp. 87-91. The terms 
"unfair sales" an-J "unfair practices" laws were not always clearly distinguished 
and this type of legislation was also commonly given other tames such as 
"loss limitation"s "fair sales"s "sales below cost" laws etc. Many merchants 
and also many legislators had only the haziest notion of the distinction 
between such legislation and fair trade (resale price maintenance) laws, both 
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Certainlys in the 19201's, the rTC had frequently condemned the use of 
sales below cost where made for a predatory or a deceptive Purpose and had 
worked such condemnations into most of-the rules adopted under trade practice 
conference procedure. However, the courts at that time were emphatic that 
sales below costq considered in isolation and when occurring in the ordinary 
course of business$ were perfectly lawful; only when set within the context 
of a broader "fraudulent scheme of oppression" were they unlawful. 
45 
. In 
practice, retailers priced their goods exactly as they pleased and the 
possibility that they might be restrained in certain situations was only of 
theoretical interest. Under the NRA the position altered totally. The NRA 
codes usually had price control as a principal feature. Thus$ in the grocery 
codes$ retailers were supposed to add on a mark-up of at least 6% to the 
invoice or replacement cost (whichever was lower) of their goods, and 
wholesalers to add on 2%. In the general retail codes which covered dry 
goods,, furniturej hardware, etc. the minimum retail mark-up was fixed at 
10%. The NRA sales-below-cost provisions disregarded the issue of the purpose 
behind sales below the stipulated mark-upse, they were blanket prohibitions. 
The emphasis had altered fundamentallyo for no longer was the evil purpose 
of the price-cutter seen as being of primary importance. What mattered was 
to stabilise business as awhole and to save it from the supposedly ruinous 
effects of the unrestrained price-cutting to which all were being driven by 
the depression conditions regardless of their most sincere determination to 
try to avoid such cutting. Moreover$ the NRA prohibitions did not exist at 
44. (cont'd).. 6 being passed amid general expressions of sentiment about the 
need to stop ruinous price cutting; the unfair sales laws tended to produce 
rather more Political resistance because they rather more obviously involved 
price-fixing, especially where the mark-up was specified in the statute$ even 
though unfair sales law mark-ups actually provided only a price floors below 
the gross margin of any permanent distributors whereas resale price maintenance 
had every potential for raising prices and probably did to some extent in 
the drug trade. 
45. Searsj Roebuck Co. V. rTC9''258 red. 307 (c. c. A., 7th 1919); Sinclair 
Refining Co. v. ' MCý 76 'red. '68_G___(C. C. A-*s7ths 1921) ; Millers Uri-f-arr 
Competition, p. 228. 
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the level of a theoretical abstractions but were given widespread and 
routine effect through the code authoritiess which at local enforcement level 
were staffed entirely by the representatives of the trade itself. Under the 
NRAD the trade for the first time had a chance to practice a degree of price 
control in the opens and the experience built up with the code authorities 
provided a foundation for the subsequent enforcement of the "loss limitation" 
laws. 46 
In deference to the older antitrust traditions the state below-cost laws 
enacted from 1935 onwards usually included language formally limiting the 
prohibition to sales below cost where made with an "intent" or "purpose" to 
damage a competitor or deceive customers. Indeeds in some states the courts 
obliged the legislature to reenact the laws originally passed with such a 
limitation included. Howevers the actual operation of such laws to a marked 
degree represented a continuation of the NRA code authority methods and the 
courtss which could have demanded the strictest construction of the language 
regarding intent and no doubt would have done had any such legislation come 
before them in the 1920'ss generally accepted the mere fact that a sale had 
been made below cost as presumptive evidence of intents requiring the person 
charged to prove his innocence - an almost impossible task. In some statess 
the definition of cost - typically the cost of goods to the dealer plus a 
mark-up - was built into the statute; in otherss the trade itself was 
empowered to conduct surveys to determine the minimum "cost of doing business" 
for each particular industry in each trading area and these surveys were 
accepted as "competent evidence" in injunction suits. the courts thereby 
being enabled to avoid having to face the essential ambiguity and perhaps 
meaninglessness of the very concept of "below cost selling". Thus was the 
46. Macks Controlling 'Retailers j pp. IS8-606 189-980 261-2; Herbert F. 
Taggart6 Winimum Prices Under the NRA , (Michigan 8xisinegt Studiest 
Vol. 7j No. 3 (1936). 
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trade handed something it had been denied even under the NRA; the power to 
fix its own minimum mark-ups, without any form of supervision by or 
interaction with government as had happened under the NRAI and to-have them 
enforced through the courts. In only two states before 1940 - New Jersey 
(1938) and Michigan (1939) - did the courts unequivocally condemn the basic 
concept of such legislation as allowing price-fixing by private interests; 
elsewhere the courts permitted it by calling it something else. As generally 
used and understood by the trades the laws became blanket prohibitions on 
sales below a fixed mark-up, and the essential limitations on the use or abuse 
of the laws were those imposed by the practicalities of competition and the 
desire to avoid adverse political criticism. 
47 Not until 1941) when the 
Department of Justices under the leadership of Thurman Arnolds the head of 
the Antitrust Division, brought a notable series of cases against'the 
enforcement bureaus set up in Various states, principally by the grocery' 
trades did this trend to permit price-fixing receive a serious setback. Most 
of these cases were settled by the enforcement bureaus and other defendants 
submitting to consent decrees which dissolved the bureauss thus severely 
impeding enforcement in those states and intimidating the trade in other 
states. Howevers the Antitrust Division shied away from attacking the laws 
themselves - arguing merely that price-fixing had gone beyond the letter 
of the laws to the point where arbitrary regular price listso backed up by 
threats of prosecutions were being substituted for truthful cost surveys 
and the structures though shaken, did not topple. Indeeds several more 
states enacted similar legislation during the 1940'so thus perpetuating 
into times when prices were in any case generally high and stable the 
47. rTC6 Report'on Resale Prico, Maizitenanc2ýj pp.. 114-23. 'Yale'Law'Journal, 
Vol . 57 (1948)' pp. 391-425% "Sales Below Cost Prohibitions: 
ýF_rivate'frice 
Fixing Under State Law". 
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artificial price supports brought in as protective measures in the years 
of depression. 
48 
Many trades made some use of these "loss limitation" laws$ the laws 
effectively being permissive and of no significance in those trades where 
the trade itself took no action to ensure enforcement. Quite of-ten unfair 
sales provisions were used to supplement the fair trade laws, retailers and 
wholesalers using the mark-up provisions for protection on those products 
for which manufacturers refused to name a resale price. In generals the 
margins provided by sales below cost provisions were lower than those 
obtained under resale price maintenance contractsp but as they applied to 
all merchandise they helped to prevent a situation where non-price-maintained 
items were used for price-cutting. This was a valuable consideration in 
persuading manufacturers, who always feared that consumers would buy the 
non-price-maintained products of their competitorsq that it would be "safe" 
to fix a resale price. But although no one group was so overwhelmingly 
influential in securing enactment of the sales-below-cost laws as were the 
druggists in spreading the cause of resale price maintenances the grocery 
trade was very much the principal force behind these laws. In generals the 
chainsq badly shaken by the depredations of price-wrecking supermarkets and 
the reckless cutting of smaller independents (many of whom committed 
commercial suicide in the process, but always had replacements ready to take 
up where they had left off) and anxious to find areas of agreement with their 
politically powerful independent competitors by the mid-1930'sb proved good 
supporters of these laws, provided they did not go to extremes. Hationallye 
48. U, S. v. Massachusetts Food Council; U. S. V. Retail Lumbermen's Assn.; 
U. S* v. Connecticut rood Council; U. S. v. --Rhode 
Island Food ýCouncýil* 
U. S. v. Maine rood Council$ in Commerce Clearing House, Trade Cases$ 
1940-3's pp. 611-206 646,659; **UýS. ''v., rdod'and*GrOdery'Bilteaup''43'Fed. 
Supp. 966 (S. D. Cal. 1942); 'Food, ocery Bureau'of'SO' CcIlif. ' V. -U-S-9 
139 Fed. '(2zid) 973 (S. D. Callf. 7942); -Califorhia Retail'Groderal'and 
Merchants' Assn. v. U. S., 139 rod. -Orid)=787C. C*: V-ý 9th, 1943)0 Cert. 
benied, 322 U. S. 72-9-(1944). 
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the rood and Grocery Chain Stores of America cooperated in setting up a 
"National rood and Grocery Conference Committee" which included all major 
interests in the trade except the extremist United States Wholesale Grocers' 
Association. The Conference Committee dithered for more than 18 months after 
the death of the NRA in Mays 1935 - an interval in which the United States 
Wholesale Grocers' Association proved able to hold the political initiative - 
before producing a model bills this rather anticlimactically proposing the 
reintroduction of the old NRA retail grocery code 6% mark-up as well as some 
bland provisions declaring the use of unearned secret rebates to destroy 
competition to be an unfair trade practice. The Conference Committee 
subsequently produced various other rather similar model bills and never 
really established a grip on the legislative situation; neverthelessp its 
influences or the influence of its merbers acting separatelyl was seen in 
the fact that in those states where a mark-up was fixed in the statute the 
NRA grocery code of 6% retail and 2% wholesale was commonly used. 
49 The 
model for the actual implementation of the legislation was, as with resale 
price maintenances provided by Californiag which enacted the first Sales 
Below Cost Act in 1933 (which never had much effect because the NRA took 
its place) and followed this up with the 1935 Unfair Practices Act. The 
Act was of the type which provided for the trade to conduct its own cost 
surveys, and the grocery trade in the state quickly set up enforcement 
bureaus which were based on the recently abandoned NRA code authorities and 
these set the mark-up at the same level as under the NRA. Typical of such 
enforcement bureaus was the Food Trades Institute in San rranciscop which 
49. Interstate Merchants December 5s 1936; October 30s 1937" In some 
statesq department store interests opposed sales-below-cost legislations 
though the NRDGA officially considered it acceptable and certainly 
preferable to resale price maintenance. Otherwise there was no significant 
trade opposition to below-cost bills in the legislatureS. 
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fixed the mark-up at 6%. this rising to 8% in 1938 and 10% in 1939 because of 
increasing costs. The Institutes although sponsored by the San rrancisco 
and California Retail Grocers' Associations had as its largest single 
financial contributor Safeway Stores Inc,, b by far the most important chain 
in the state, which was also the most active single instigator of complaints 
which were almost always directed against indepOindent cut-rate supermarkets 
tinder the Act. As of 1940, no suit had been brought against a chain store 
company by the rood Trades Institute, Similar conditions prevailed 
elsewhere in the state. The willingness of the chains to cooperate was 
crucial to the effective implementation of such legislations for to work it 
required a consensus in order to isolate the rogue elements thus allowing 
operation to proceed mostly by "gentlemen's agreement" with only occasional 
suits against persistent violators. In view of the lack of interest of 
district attorneys in prosecuting cut-rate storest and the potential 
dangers of a public outcry against price-fixing, this harmony - and even 
secrecy - was vital. The potentially more divisive provisions of the Act - 
those prohibiting price discrimination - were generally left unused. 
50 
There were certainly limits to chain store cooperation. In Coloradol 
in 1940, Safeway withdrew from the so-called rood Distributors' Association 
when it raised the retail mark-up from 9% to 12%. creating a corbined retail 
and wholesale mark-up of 14%. Safeway seems partly to have been worried 
that the price-fixing was getting out of hand - the mark-up was practically 
at the full gross margin of many supermarkets-and partly afraid of falling 
victim to the Department of Justice. This last increase proved to be the 
straw that broke the camel's back for a local companys the Save-A-Nickel 
Markets - which appealed directly to Thurman Arnold for relief and was 
50. FTC, 'Rep6ft 'on Regald 'Ptied 'Mairitdnarices (1945) pp. 854-63; Grethers 
Price Control Undet'rair Trade 're-gitialLionb p. 125-131. 
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rewarded by the indictment of the rood Distributors I Association and many 
of the leading factors in the trade in the states including Safeway-51 
Elsewheres the A& Ps which was not a member of the food chain association 
and rarely cooperated with the rest of the trade on anything much, sometimes 
proved of a baulky disposition. In Minnesotas it successfully challenged 
in the courts a law fixing a 10% minimum retail margins claimingo to good 
public relations effects that it could sell many lines of merchandise in 
its new supermarkets at a much lower mark-up and still make a profit. In 
several states it refused to cooperate with enforcement agencies with dubious 
claims to legality. On the other hands the A&P proved to be a pillar of 
the Food Councils set up to enforce the unfair sales laws passed in the New 
England states; an official was treasurer of the Maryland rood Council; 
and in Philadelphia the company participated for several years after 1935 
in the work of rood Distributors' Associations a body which carried on the 
"spirit" and some of the provisions of the NRA codes even without protection 
of state legislation as well as acting to oppose "radical" legislation like 
chain store taxes. Within the A& Ps a division of opinion existed between 
the company's attorneys, who constantly feared that such involvements might 
one day lead to legal disaster and that the A&P would be singled out for 
special condemnation because it was the largest chain in the country, and 
the local officials who sometimes found such cooperation advantageous both 
in a business sense and in their political relationships with the 
independents. The A&P proved most cooperative in the eastern states 
where its clear policy was to cement relationships with the dominant 
independent interests in those areas and so break up the alliance between 
51. Intorqtatd-M6rchanto November 30s 1940; ''Mc5ddrri'Mordhazit-and, Gtodd= 
Worlds December 21s 1940. 
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them and the more militantly anti-chain grocers of the South and West. 
52 
In generals the implementation of such legislation proved a relatively 
painless way for the chains to improve relations with the independent trade. 
Laws to set price floors below the cost of doing business of the lowest 
cost operators could never be fully satisfactory to high-margin independent 
distributors; but to many trade associations they represented an attractive 
alternative to bitters exhausting, costly and often'futile struggles to 
enact punitive anti-chain legislation. This became an especially important 
consideration after 1936 as more and more independents came to accept that 
it was neither necessary nor possible to drive the chains out of business 
and that the best tactic was to make sure that the opportunity was taken to 
stabilise conditions in the trade so that everyone could make a profit. Thus 
the passage of such legislation tended to reinfoice the other tendencies - 
the revival of the economy and the end of the chain inroads into the 
independent sector - which undermined extremist attacks on the chains. The 
legislatures passed sales below cost laws in the belief that they would 
52,. Great A9P Tea Coo 
- 
v. 'Ervin, '23 Tdd_ý_'S-Uppý 70 (D. C. Minn. $ 193 8)10 
U. S. v. Great'Atlantic & PacifiC'Tda Co. 6'67'Fed. Supp. 626 (E, D. Ill-i 
1946), pp. 671-3. It was a curious feature of the case presented by the 
Department of Justice in the 1945 A&P trial that it made much of the 
fact that the stores in New England and Philadelphia were run at a loss 
throughout the period 1934-40 as a prime example of the use of "price 
warstfo while at the same time accusing the A&P of joining in price 
fixing in the Philadelphia rood Distributors Association and the New 
England rood Councils. The two charges are 2idmittedly not totally 
incompatible: the typical 6% retail mark-up under the unfair sales laws 
was less than half the gross margin of an A&P supermarket and about 
one-third of the gross margin of one of the old type small stores$ thus 
making it possible to sell all merchandise above the price floor and 
still make a loss. However$ the common sense inference - and one which 
is borne out by the general tenor of comment in the'New-Erigiand'Groeer 
and the'PennsZlVanid Grocer over a period of several years - is that the 
A&P was taking losses-717those areas principally because it was finding 
it difficult to competep just as it was prepared to cooperate in fixing 
price floors$ despite the legal riskss because it was under great political 
and economic pressure from other distributors. Certainlyg the independent 
trade in those areas did not see in the AA P's losses an indication of 
the use of predatory strength, for relations were far better between the 
company and the independents than in many of the parts of the country 
where A9P was operating profitably. 
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thereby help the independent distributorso and although not proposed as 
anti-chain measuress anti-chain sentiment 'was often not far below the 
surface when the politicians gave their reasons for trying to stop "cut- 
throat competition". However, as Corwin Uwards of the Department of 
Justice pointed out to the 1941 Convention of the National Association of 
Retail Grocers -a body in uproar over the Justice Department's campaign 
against the enforcement bureaus - it was in fact the chains which had paid 
the bulk of the money to finance the work of the bureaus and "in so doing 
some of them have averted the enactment of state chain store taxes which 
threatened their existence". The political consequences were peii. haps more 
considerable than the economic. In this respect$ as in the drug trade over 
resale price maintenance, the chains 'were able to go some way towards 
establishing themselves as "insiders" and dispelling the idea that they and 
the independents must forever be at war. 
53 
Such cooperation would have been unthinkable in the 19201s: it took 
the depressiong the economic fighthack by the independents and the political 
menace of anti-chain legislation to knock the arrogance out of the chains 
and make them amenable. Equallys such cooperation would have been quite 
impossible under the antitrust laws as they were understood in the 1920's. 
In the matter of trade practicesq there were really two quite distinct 
eras: before 1933 and after 1933. Before 19330 despite the flicker of hope 
stimulated by such things as the trade practice conferences and the Capper- 
Kelly bill, the independents considered themselves to be lost in a 
competitive jungle. Frightened by the apparently irresistible onrush of 
the chains and unable to exercise any sort of control over competitive 
conditions in the tradeg they turned to 'weapons of indiscriminate destruction 
53. Intdrrtatd Merchantb June 21,1941. 
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like the chain store tax to try to solve their problems. But after the 
National Industrial Recovery Act a new world opened up. It became possible 
to do things which were hitherto unlawful and the discovery was made that 
the chains were no longer so unreasonable as had previously been supposed. 
Old-style trust-busting never became an element in the fight against 
the chains. In the 1920's the mood of "normalcy1f and cooperation with 
business ensured that there would be no attempts to break up the chains; in 
the 1930'ss when business proved quite effective in busting itself without 
any help from the politicians or the courts. the aim of government was to 
preserve and stabilise business. Although there were trust-busters among 
the New Dealersp their attitudes were dismissed by most in the administration, 
at least until 1938g as a sort of self-indulgent idealism appropriate only 
to prosperous times. Not one figure of any significance in the Roosevelt 
administration ever advanced the proposition that the chains should be broken 
up - if such a thing had been possible - by means of the antitrust laws. 
Although the antimonopolists became more influential in Washington after 
1938 - an influence given practical expression by Thurman Arnold - it is 
interesting to note that the first major engagement of the eager new Justice 
Department in the retailing field came when it tried to break up the sales- 
below-cost enforcement agencies. It was only after this - and perhaps 
stung by criticism that it was hitting small business by its actions - that 
the Department in 1942 launched its attack on the A&P. The only 
important attempt in the 1930's to use the antitrust laws against the chains 
occurred in the Robinson-Patman Act. Otherwises the principal impact of 
the antitrust laws on the chain store problem came not through their 
enforcement or strengthening but through their suspension in 1933 and their 
effective rewriting by the price-fixing laws. The main weapon used to 
attack the chains directly the chain store tax - was a legislative device 
entirely unrelated to anything in the antitrust laws. 
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PART TWO. The Appeal To Community Sentiment: Trade-at-Home 
I 
Agitation, 1927-1932. 
i. The Beginning of Local Agitation. 
Independent merchants, especially those in the smaller cities of the 
South and Midwest, had a long tradition of exploiting, or trying to exploit, 
sentiments of home town loyalty among the public at large in order to repel 
the challenge of outside competitors, whether of the catalogue or itinerant 
vendor variety. Inevitably,, the surge of chain stores through the interior 
heartlands of the United States in the 1920s provoked a similar appeal to 
community sentiment to repudiate the new "menace". 
The first significant trade-at-home campaigns occurred in 1926. 
In March of that year, 500 retailers, wholesalers and sympathisers gathered 
in Petersburg, Virginia under the auspices of the chamber of commerce, for 
"the first mass meeting ever held for the purpose of carrying the fight 
against the chain stores". A large war chest was raised to finance anti- 
chain publicity and one chain store manager was moved to send an 11S. O. S. 11 
to Chain Store Age advising that "it has become very bitter and they are 
using every means to boycott all chain stores". The chamber of commerce in 
Jacksonville, Illinois, soon followed this lead, sponsoring a campaign of 
advertising in the local newspaper. The advertisements were prepared by 
George Schultej the editor and publisher of ý, be'Interstate Grocer, the 
best-selling grocery trade paper in the territory between the Appalachians 
and the Rockies. The Interstate Grocer was already conspicuous for the 
intensity of its opposition to chain stores, but for Schulte the Jacksonville 
campaign was a watershed, his "declaration of war0l. This war, Schulte 
announced, was to be "waged ceaselessly and indefinitely. No quarter will 
be asked and none will be given". He proved as good as his word, for 
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(; he Interstate Grocer quickly began to fulfill the role of "clearing 
house" for news of anti-chain activities around the country, and Schulte 
himself remained at the forefront of the fight until it died away in the 
1940's. 
The Jacksonville advertisements set the pattern for the future. 
Mail order and peddlers were condemned in passing - most of the arguments 
proffered being interchangeable - but the main focus was the chain stores. 
The independent merchant was portrayed as a worthy follow who paid his 
taxes, supported local charities, extended credit to those who had fallen 
on hard times and, if this were not enough, actually had competitive 
prices, if allowance were made for the extra service provided. The central 
theme was, however, the devastation supposedly caused by the chains in 
pumping money out of Jacksonville: they took all the "cream", leaving 
only the "skimmed milk". a diet which would make for a "weakly city". 
New York, it was suggested, was the nation's largest city precisely because 
it was the nation's money centre; Jacksonville, therefore, would prosper 
and grow just as much as it hung on to its money. If the chains were 
allowed to gobble up all the businessq "Jacksonville would be dead,, there 
would be no work for anyone except at starvation wages, newspapers would 
decline in value and there would be no amusement of any kind. 7be younger 
generation would have nothing to look forward to,, while to the older people 
life would be a humdrum affaiV1. In contrast, if the people spent their 
money with the home-owned stores, it would "revolve". from farmer to 
doctor, to carpenter, to lumber dealer, to druggist, to plasterer to 
dentist, and so on, each retaining a small percentage of profit. In short,, 
1. Interstate Grx)cer, March 13, May 22,1926; Chain Store Age, 
April 1926o 
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the principal argument was one of undiluted mercantilism, a philosophy 
with deep roots in the traditions of the isolated, self-contained small 
communities built up by the pioneers and which still commonly surfaced 
regardless of the obvious historical fact that the country's prosperity 
had grown in step with the expansion of trade between cities and sections. 
Neither was it a philosophy destined for imminent extinction, for if its 
appeal weakened in the 1920's with the growing "nationalisation" of social 
and economic life, it would revive with redoubled vigour in the hard times 
of the 1930's. 
2 
Chain'Store Age commented that the Jacksonville and Petersburg 
campaigns represented the "strategic error of abusing the enemy", and 
that although they were causing "some concern" on the part of chain store 
managers, such "campaigns of vilification" would achieve no more than had 
similar offensives against house to house peddlers in the past. Even 
Schulte admitted, after three months of advertising in Jacksonvilles that 
the results had been "nothing startling! ' in terms of winning back chain 
store customers. Many merchants were frankly uncertain how the public 
would react to anti-chain store propaganda and were inclined to fears as 
the favoured expression had it, that "every knock is a boost". 
3 
Nbvertheless, ', the number of cities experiencing trade-at-home 
agitation increased slowly but surely in the years 1927-9. Although 
chambers of commerce had sponsored the Petersburg and Jacksonville campaigns, 
very few chambers,, even in the small towns, were willing to be drawn head 
. first into attacks on the chains, and anti-chain enthusiasts were usually 
2. The advertisements, as they appeared in the Jacksonville Daily Journal,, 
were printed in the Interstate Grocer in 26 consecutive weekly issues M 
May 15,1926. 
3. Chain Store Age, July 1926; Interstate GroceE, August 28,1926; 
National Grocers' Bulletin, June 1926, "To Fight Chains with Publicity". 
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driven to create entirely new organisations in which different lines of 
business could pool their resources to fight the common foe. "Allied 
businessmen's associations". "independent merchant associations", 
"community builders" and similarly styled groups cropped up in scattered 
towns and cities at points from Pennsylvania westwards and southwards. 
Typical of these organisations were the "Home-Owned Stores" 
movements which appeared in numerous towns in the Midwest, especially in 
Illinois and Michigan. The initial promotion came from wholesale grocery 
associations seeking to respond to the demands of their retailers that 
they "do something"; the wholesalers paid for advertising copy designed 
to "sell" the home-owned store ideal while, in return, the retailers 
smartened up their stores. As local campaigns developed, a wide range of 
business interests were often drawn in. In Kalamazoo, Michigan, which 
was regarded as a model canpaign, local leadership was provided by an 
insurance man whose merchant clients were finding it hard to pay their 
premiums, and who had finally been provoked into action when, while 
collecting for the community fund, he had been "turned down cold" by the 
chain stores. Costs of sponsorship in Kalamazoo were shared by wholesalers 
dealing in groceriesq hardware, candy, tobacco, fruit and meat,, as well as 
three bakeries, three biscuit companies, four banks and a sausage 
manufacturer. More than 90% of local stores were said to have affiliated, 
Newspaper advertising, contests for the best letters on the virtues of 
"trading at home". and talks to clubs and lodges were used to put the 
message over to the general public, while experts were drafted into town 
to help the merchants to improve their stores. 
4 
4. Sales Management, July 21,19289 pp. 137-89 1649 "Six Chain Stores 
Throw Up The Sponge"; Interstate Grocer., July 30,, 1927. 
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In Kalamazoo, the emphasis was placed on "positive" arguments in 
favour of the home-owned stores, to the exclusion of "negative" derogatory 
statements about the chains. Such tactics broadened the spectrum of 
merchants willing to be involved, but they were too tame to appeal to the 
most militant. Throughout the country, nurbers of merchants, especially 
in the grocery trade, came to feel that war against the chains could not 
be conducted without risk and by entirely antiseptic methods. Despite the 
contrary advice of many trade leadersj retailers proved ready to distribute to 
customers, or insert in their windowss pamphlets in which the vices of the 
chains were dwelled upon in lurid fashion. The American Wholesale Grocerst 
Association was especially active in the production of such pamphlets, in 
1928 and 1929 publishing Sons and Daughters For Sale-, 'A Business Builded 
on Bunk-, The Chain Store,, The Catalogue House'and the Taxpaye and 
What Every_Woman Wants To Know About'Grocery'Shopping". Two million copies 
of the last-named pamphlet, which warned shoppers against adding machine 
frauds, short weights and price baits, were distributed in the first 18 
mnths. Locally, anti-chain enthusiasts experimented with methods to reach 
public opinion. In Portsmouth, Ohio, merchants lectured farmers who drove 
into town on Sears, Roebuck tyres; in Berlin, Pennsylvania merchants 
produced one of the very first anti-chain pamphlet-newspapers, the "Town 
and Rural Booster"; in Homestead in the same state, the independent 
merchants' association staged "educational dinners" for each of the 
religious denominations in the city, the congregations being treated to a 
meal and community singing, interspersed with homilies on the virtues of 
trading at home. These local campaigns were too scattered,, too short, -lived 
to make much difference to the chain stores but through 1929 militant 
independents expressed a growing confidence that they were beginning to 
shape into a coherent offensive. As George Schulte expressed it in the 
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August, "All of these movements are just feathers showing how the wind 
is blowing ... while these movements are independent, it is not too much 
to expect that the time is coming when there will be a joining of the 
anti-chain store forces". 
5 
Chain store men were not oblivious to this trend. Through the late 
1920's a progressive wing of the industry, most prominently represented 
by such men as E. C. Sams, the president of the J. C. Penney Co., Godfrey M. 
Lebhýr, the editor of Chain Store Age, and W. T. Grant,, urged the importance 
of a process of community integration as an insurance against political 
attack. The formation of the NCSA - which was, in effect, the recognition 
by the leading chains that they had a public relations problem and that 
acceptability could no longer be assured merely by providing lower prices - 
hurTied forward the process of community integration. The 1928 NCSA 
convention, the first, adopted a "code of ethics" which pledged support 
for all "worthy local civic enterprises". It was, a charber of commerce 
manager commented, "the day the chain-store business grew up". 
6A double- 
edged strategy quickly developed. The NCSA fought every anti-chain 
legislative proposal as aggressively as possible, while at the same time 
turning a benign and conciliatory face towards the local communities. 
Particular emphasis was placed by the merber chains on the desirability of 
strengthening ties with chambers of commerce, which because of their 
prestige and representative character were potentially much more dangerous 
adversaries than ad hoc anti-chain groups like "community builders" and 
"independent merchants' associations". Hitherto some chains had taken a 
somewhat petulant attitude towards local chambers, refusing to have anything 
to do with them if they offered a word of criticism; and, undoubtedly, 
5. Interstate Grocers November 3,1928; April 20, July 27, August 24, 
1929; N. Y. Journal of Commerce December 7.1929. 
6. Samuel B. Botsford, "The Chain Store Comes of Age" 0 Nationts Business, 
April 1929,, p. 70. The A&P, the one national chain not in th NCSA, also 
notified the commercial secretaries' association that it would henceforth 
support local chambers and community projects with more vigour than it had 
shown in the past. Interstate Grocers September 15,1928. 
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some chanber of commerce work - such as the raising of subscription funds 
to bribe factories to come to town, sometimes to the loss of other towns 
where the chain also had stores - could be extremely tiresome to the chain 
store man. 
7 But if the big chains could not be enthusiastic over every 
aspect of chanber of commerce work,, they were content to tolerate a little 
inconvenience for the sake of "keeping in". By July 1930, according to a 
survey by the National Association of Commercial Organisations' Secretaries, 
all but one menber of the NCSA supported local chambers. 
8 
7. The position of some prominent chains immediately before the formation 
of the NCSA can be seen in "The Chain Store And Your Community"s'Nation's 
Businesso May 1928, pp. 179 116-8. F. H. Massmann, vice-president of the 
National Tea Co. stated that his company had memberships in the associations 
of commerce in Chicago, Des Moines, Minneapolis and Milwaukee, but not in 
the smaller cities where local charbers were "dominated by men antagonistic 
to our organisation". Michael O'Keefe, president of the First National 
Stores, Inc. believed that to provide lower prices was of itself a sufficient 
demonstration of being "community-minded", a position similar to that taken 
by the Walgreen Drug Co. The president of the Regal Shoe Co.,, Boston,, had no 
wish to encourage "clubitis" among the managers: "They want to join every 
organisation in the city - dues chargeable to expenses". See also, Chain 
Store Review, February 1929, p. 62, "Chain Stores Tell What They Thi7nk About 
Charbers of Commerce". In general, grocery chains, with multitudes of small$ 
low profit stores, and also with multitudes of enemies, had been most inclined 
to turn their backs on local business communities; department store chains 
like Penney or Ward, with fewer and larger, and usually much more profitable 
stores represented the opposite extreme. In the grocery field it was 
Safeway, the fast-growing western giant, which led the way for the big chains 
in community integration. For criticisms of civic groups by a chain executive 
known for his advocacy of the community-integration approach, see J. C. Penney,, 
"The Community and The Chain Store". in Saturday Evening Post, February 229 
1930, p. 11. Penney criticised the br g of factory owners to come to town, 
the raising of funds by professional promoters working on a percentage basis 
and the occasionally preposterous demands made of chains - up to $300,000 in 
one locality in the case of the Penney Co. He also noted that the short- 
comings of the chains "sometimes supplies a convenient excuse for not 
subscribing on the part of those merchants who never had the intention of 
giving anything! '. 
8. Godfrey M. Lebhar, How To Meet Unfair Charges Against Chain Stores , 
N. Y. 2nd, 1936, edn. pp. 36-8. For the shift of policy made by one chain, the 
Melville Shoe Corp., see Ray Dovell "Chain Stores Can Be Good Citizens". 
Nation's Business June 1931. The organisation allocated 0.1% of gross 
receipts to it--scivic and charity budget, and managers were active in chamber 
of commerce work, helping boy scouts, running baseball teams etc. Particular 
stress was placed on such activity in the company's Thom McAn stores, which 
were mainly in smaller cities. 
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Chain stor-e men became increasingly boastful about their new-found 
concern for the good old home town. In March, 1929, the NCSA brought out 
the first issue of a monthly propaganda organ, 'Chain*Store Progress,, which 
laid great emphasis on the willingness of the chains to help the towns in 
which they located. 'Chain Store Progress was sent free and unsolicited to 
"opinion-formers" such as editorsp teachers, bankers, politicians and civic 
leaders, circulation reaching as high as 65,000 monthly by 1931, in which 
year it was abandoned. "Community-building! ' was the theme of the second 
NCSA convention, in September, 19299 where there was much concerm as to how 
long it would be before, as G. M. Lebhar expressed it, "the public begins to pric 
up its ears in sympathetic attention" to the cries of the small retailers. 
Delegates were sufficiently troubled by an exhibition of hostile press 
clippings staged by NCSA executive vice-president R. W. Lyons to set up a 
$250,000 advertising fund to counter adverse propaganda, and sore of the 
chain store men also wanted to make a commitment to the allocation of a fixed 
1/3 of 1% of gross receipts for the benefit of the communities in which 
their stores were located. Thus the elite, the top few dozen, mainly very 
large chains which made up the NCSA, were hard at work trying to compensate 
for past neglect. Within weeks of the NCSA convention, howeverg events took 
a dramatic and unexpectedly sudden turn for the worse. 
9 
9. 'Proceedings of the (2nd Annual) NCSA Convention, SepteTfber 23-5 9 1929; 
Chain StoTe Reviewq November 1929, p. 41; PriFt'-ers' Inkq October 3p 1929; 
TF=Chn[s Will Now Court Public Opinion In Earnest". 
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ii. W. K. 'Henderson. 
In October, 1929, the hitherto scattered and rather lonely bands of 
anti-chain agitators gained a leader. W. K. "Old Man" Henderson, the owner 
of radio station KWKH, Shreveport, discovered the "chain store menace". and 
through the winter of 1929-30 devoted his station to the broadcast of anti- 
chain propaganda. The broadcasts released a tidal wave of sentiment: 
Henderson was deluged with money and gifts, thousands flocked to join his 
anti-chain army,, the Merchant Minute Men, and hundreds of local anti-chain 
organisations sprang up to carry on the crusade. 
William Kennon Henderson Jr. was a wealthy Shreveport businessman* 
for whom broadcasting was a hobby. In 1919, on his father's death, he 
inherited the family business, becoming president of the W. K. Henderson Iron 
Works and Supply Co., one of the largest businesses in the city. He also 
owned the Henderson Land, Tirber and Investment Co. and telephone lines to, 
and oil and natural gas wells on, his country estate at Kennonwood, 18 miles 
north of Shreveport. Henderson was a partner in Shreveportts first radio 
station, WGAQ, and in 1925 the call letters were changed to KWKH, Henderson 
having become the principal partner. Subsequently, Henderson became the 
sole owner of the station, and the main studios were moved out to Kennonwood. 
By day, Henderson attended to his business interests in town, and in the 
evenings he devoted himself to broadcasting. As sole owner of KWKH9 he 
conducted the broadcasting exactly as he pleased. Henderson pioneered the 
playing of recorded music, but the main attraction was his racy and 
opinionated commentaries on contemporary issues, which were introduced by 
variations on his celebrated invocation, "Hello World, don't go aways now, 
doggone your buttons! " Henderson was frequently a fiery performer, 
littering his monologues with "hells" and "dams", and he proudly referred 
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to the Kennonwood studio as being "asbestos -lined" because of it. Each 
night he flavoured his programmes with excerpts from the hundreds of 
telegrams received over the Western Union teleprinter in the studio, and 
often stayed on the air until the telegrams and phone calls began to dry 
up or he tired. 
1 
Henderson threw hirmelf into several causes in the late 1920's. 
He ridiculed the Prohibition laws by rattling a glass of liquid and ice 
close to the microphone and advising his listeners that the glass contained 
something stronger than water. In 1928 he was fervent in his advice to 
the South that it should vote for Al Smith and not desert the Democratic 
standard. Henderson was also one of Huey Long's most energetic supporters 
and extended Long considerable financial support, free air time, and the 
use of equipment for his touring sound trucks in his successful 1928 
campaign to become Governor of Louisiana. But the broadcaster was perhaps 
best known for his feud with the Federal Radio Commission, the body set up 
under the Radio Act of 1927 to regulate the chaotic condition of the 
airwaves. The Commission's powers were vague and untested, and Henderson 
fought it at every turn. In 1927,, the FRC ordered Henderson to operate 
with no more than 1 kilowatt of power and when Henderson proved defiant, 
often using as much as 3,, 000 watts, the Comission recommended to the 
Justice Department that he be prosecuted for "illegal operation", the 
first such recommendation ever made by the Commission. The Justice 
Department failed to take any'such action, however, and Henderson maintained 
a vigorous assault on the FRC over the airwaves, calling the Commissioners 
1. Considerable biographical detail about W. K. Henderson was provided by 
correspondence with Mr. Stedman Gunning, who was Henderson's engineers 
announcer and general assistant at KWKH from 1926, and continued to work 
at the station until his retirement in 1978. C. Joseph Pusateri, "The 
Stormy Career of A Radio Maverick, W. K. Henderson of KWKH11 in Louisiana 
Studies, Winter 1976s pp. 389-407, is especially useful on Henderson's 
deall-n-gs with the Federal Radio Commission. 'Th6, Shrevepott Times$ Septenber 
21,1975, "The Friendly Giant Is 50". puts the Henderson years at KWKH in 
a 50-year perspective. 
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"parasites" and 11sapheads" who were "denying the South free speech by 
denying the Southerm stations power when they want it". According to 
Henderson, the FRC was in league with the fast-growing eastern radio 
chains, the NBC and Colunbia systems, and his private interests meshed 
in with an upsurge of sectional sentiment on the matter. In March, 1928 
Congress adopted an amendment to the Radio Act, whereby each section of 
the country was entitled to "equality" of broadcasting provision, a 
requirement which, when put into practice by the FRC gave the South eight 
highly desirable cleared channels - one of which was given to Henderson 
on a shared time basis (the evening broadcasting hours were divided between 
KWKH and a New Orleans station, WWL). Thus the South had as many cleared 
channels as either the Northeast or Midwest, the country having been split 
into five sections each with eight cleared channels. In addition, the 
FRC authorised increases in the power of KWKH, Henderson being permitted 
5,000 watts by 1929. This wattage and the cleared channel meant that 
reception for KWKH was very good in winter over large areas of the United 
States, only the west coast and the northeastern states, and a few 
localities with special reception problems, being out of reach at that time 
of year (in summer the area of satisfactory reception shrank considerably 
because of interference problems). Thus, while Henderson ran KWKH as a 
hobby and as a purely personal mouthpiece, he possessed a powerful station 
and enjoyed the right to reach into the homes of millions without any 
noticeable restraint on what he said, and without any compulsion to provide 
"equal tire" or balance in the interests of those he attacked. 
2 
2. "History of KWKH", 'Shreveport'Times, January 29, -1978; Pusaterit 
pp. 393-4; Stedman Gunning. 
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If there were any doubts about Henderson's popularity and influence, 
they were laid to rest by the way in which, in the early months of 1929, 
he defeated a license challenge made by William G. Skelly, an oil man and 
owner of KVOO, Tulsa. Skelly urged that KWKH was "used largely for 
personal attacks" and that the citizens of Oklahoma deserved to be freed 
from "obscenity, slang and vulgarity over the air" by the reallocation of 
the KWKH wavelength to KVOO. Skelly's appeal met with sympathy within the 
FRC. At hearings in Washington, Orestes H. Caldwell, one of the 
Commissioners, dramatically accused Henderson of having killed the first 
chairman of the FRC, Admiral W. H. G. Bullard, with his lies and slanders. 
But the Commission had also to consider the very clear evidence of a great 
weight of support for Henderson, whose railroad car en route to Washington 
had been greeted by brass bands and cheering crowds at each important 
station, and who produced 163,000 affidavits from listeners, blanks for 
which had been published in Southern newspapers, testifying that KWKH was 
their "favorite station". Henderson also enjoyed the energetic backing of 
Governor Huey Long and the Louisiana congressional delegation, and the 
majority of the Commissioners, whatever their private feelings, decided 
that the KVOO appeal must be denied. Henderson, by this success, confirmed 
his reputation as a Southern hero who actually won his battles. 
3 
Henderson was aptly styled a "Moses by accident". 
4 for he had no 
previous connection with the opposition to chain stores when he abruptly 
took up the cause in October, 1929. Neither did he have a reputation as 
a protagonist of the independent merchants. He apparently knew little of 
3. Pusateri, pp. 395-8. 
4. In "Chains Face First Real right As South's Politicians Seize Issue", 
Business Week, March 5.19309 p. 21. 
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their problem , for he obtained his own supplies from the commissary 
maintained an the Kennonwood estate for the benefit of the employees; 
5 
furthermore , he had come in for criticism from independent merchants for 
his prectice of merchandising over the air such items as "Hello World" 
coffee - which at one dollar a pound was said to be the most expensive 
in America, Henderson justifying the price by reference to the "souvenir" 
portrait of himelf which appeared on the cans. Even when he became the 
great leader of the independents he kept up this activity and extended 
the range and volume of merchandise sold, which included insurance policies, 
a talking radio clock, a "Life of W. K. Henderson", "Lucky" ivory 
elephants, bibles, patent medicines, pecan trees, real estate and oil 
wells. 
6 
Henderson learned about the "chain store menace" from Philip Lieber, 
the president of the First Federal Mutual Building and Loan Corporation 
of Shreveport, who had experienced difficulty in securing repayments on 
loans made to local merchants. Lieber himself initiated anti-chain 
broadcasting over KWKH. The chain store invasion was, he thought, comparable 
to an eruption from Mount Vesuviusý "the slow but irresistible advance of 
the stream of molten rock, the lava, stopped neither by nature nor by man, 
but advancing, creeping, pushing everything before it, inexorably destroying 
everything in its path" until "nothing but poverty and hopelessness 
remained". The independents had pioneered the cities and towns of America, 
wrested civilisation out of a wilderness, but now those cities and towns 
were being turned into mere trading posts for the "New York gang" of chain 
stores, power trusts, insurance alliances and manufacturers' corbinationsg 
5. Stedman Gunning. 
6. Interstate Gr6cer, March 30,1929; Pusateri, p. 398. 
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destroying opportunity for the young, creating "routine-trained" workers 
capable only of doing what the "central power" directed, and ultimately 
impoverishing the people. Lieber put the issue squarely to the KWKH 
audience: 
"Are the United States of America to resolve into a 
feudal system of 125,000,, 000 souls with a couple of 
hundred overlords and all the rest of us. eternally 
consigned to a condition of peasantry, whose chief 
duty will be to bring to the laps of these Molochs 
of business the fruits of our unremitting labor? 
The answer is in the minds and the solution in the 
hands of our people themselves". 7 
Lieber's question brought forth a huge, and perhaps unexpected, 
response as KWKH was deluged with thousands of letters and telegrams both 
for and against the chain stores, but mostly against. Henderson eagerly 
seized the opportunity to launch a new and exhilarating crusade. "American 
people, wake up! ", he urged. "We can whip these chain stores. We can 
whip the whole cock-eyed world when we are right ... I know the chain store 
game. I'll be your leader. I'll whip hell out of them if you will support 
me. We can drive them out in thirty days if you people will stay out of 
their stores". As the campaign developed, the normal office staff of three 
or four had to be increased to fifty to handle the volume of mail; readers 
of Radio Digest voted KWKH "the most popular radio station in the South". 
Henderson invited trade leaders to speak over the air: to George Schulte 
KWKH was the "missing link" between his newspaper and the general publics 
and he made several trips to Shreveport to consult with Henderson and to 
broadcast. Politicians, too, participated in the radio crusade, notable 
speakers over KWKH including Governor Flem Sampson of Kentucky, Charles C. 
McCall, the attorney-general of Alabama and Govermor Huey Long, who made 
7. Philip Lieber, "The Menace of the Chain-Store Systed' . 'Congmarional 
Record, vol. 72, pt. 3. Ust Cong. 2d Sess-9 pp. 2479-2481. 
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the most of the opportunity to reach a large audience throughout the 
South with news of his highway improvement programme and war on illiteracy, 
as well as with extravagant attacks on the chains which, he warned, "need 
not look to Louisiana to locate their stores", 
B 
Dramatic exposures of chain practices, entertainment laced with 
vitriol, provided a principal element in Henderson's broadcasting. Much 
of his commentary consisted of excerpts from letters and telegramsp to 
which he added quips and drolleries in his Southerm drawl; the listeners 
were encouraged to keep a close watch on the chains in their home towns 
and to serve as Henderson's eyes and ears. "You common people", as he 
called his listeners, were instructed to stay out of chain stores, except 
for purposes of spying on them. This injunction was backed up by a 
constant stream of allegations that the chain stores systematically "gouged" 
their customers, a stream fed by the listeners themselves. "I saw a chain 
store man short change a blind man today", read one telegram; affidavits 
were received from three grocery chain store managers in Louisville in 
which they admitted giving short weights and blamed it on the pressure to 
balance the inventory. In some townsg children teased harrassed chain 
store clerks that "you'd better watch out or Old Man Henderson will get 
you". Charges which many independents had not dared to put before the 
public were now given the stamp of approval by an "outsider" and borne 
nightly into the homes of thousands. 
9 
Henderson also intimated that there was a sinister conspiracy 
between the chains and big manufacturers, whereby the latter provided 
the chains with nationally advertised brands in fractionally smaller 
containers, or with slightly less contents, which the chains were able to 
8.. 'Inter8tat6'Gr6cer, December 7,219 289 1929; January 4. March 8 
1930; Pusateri, p. 401-, 'Louiria'lI'PrO9ress, March 27,1930. 
9. Interstate'Gr6cer, Decenber 14,289 1929. 
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pass off as the same size and quantity sold in the independent stores. 
Thus a can of Van Campts pork and beans obtained from a chain store 
contained llb net weight, but one from an independent grocer weighed 
llb li oz.; a can of Del Monte peas from a chain store was only three- 
quarters full; the Quaker Oats Co. manufactured a6 oz. package of 
"Crackels" but the independents only got a7 oz. size. Henderson kept 
the offending items at the Kennonwood studios for inspection, and visitors 
confirmed the charges. "I have in my hand", Huey Long told listeners, 
"two bars of soap of the same brandq one of which weighs less than the 
other, the smaller cake having been purchased at a chain store". Long 
was convinced that the chains had been "convicted of almost everything" 
and that they were as much good to Louisiana as yellow fever or cholera. 
Several prominent manufacturers accused by Henderson eventually bestirred 
themselves to issue denials that there was anything wrong with their 
practices. Thus the Quaker Oats Co. denied flatly that it packed "Crackels" 
in different size packages for chain stores or any other distributor; 
the Procter & Garrible Distributing Co. made a similar assertion, attributing 
any variations in the weight of its soaps to evaporation of moisture; 
the Van Camp Products Co. and the Gold Dust Corporation explained variations 
as being due to some independent retailers carrying discontinued package 
sizes on their shelves longer than their chain competitors, because of a 
slower stock turn. It is doubtful, however, whether the rather belated 
denials of the manufacturers were heard, or believed, by as wide a public 
as had been reached by Henderson's original charges. 
10 
10. Interstate Grocers December 28,1929; January 11, February 8. August 30, 
December 13,1930; Chain Store Progress, "The Truth About Package Weights". 
May 1930 p. 39 7. The Better Business Bureaus of Indianapolis and Columbus, 
Ohio, conducted their own investigations into Henderson's charges and 
considered them unfounded. However, these investigations were made several 
months after Henderson first broached the issue, and a few errant manufacturers 
had altered their distribution policies to make sure independents had access 
to the smaller packages. See Chain Store Progress9 "Better Business Bureaus 
Exonerate Chains". December 1930, pp. 10 29 7. The packaging of special small 
packages for use by variety chains was quite commons especially in toiletries, 
and was not curtailed. 
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The charges of short weighing and adding machine frauds were the 
most damaging made by Henderson, for they alarmed those who might have 
resisted the more philosophical side of the anti-chain argument. Henderson 
taunted the chains to test his charges: "We have a fine court house down 
here in Shreveport", he told his listeners. "They know where I live. We 
have a good sheriff. Let them bring a suit against me. I am ready for 
them and will prove my case as I have the evidence against them". 
11 Chain 
store men tried to give the impression that they felt it beneath their 
dignity to engage in combat with the broadcaster, but that was not the 
essence of their prcblem. 
Any trial in Shreveport would have been turned by Henderson into 
an anti-chain carnival, with consequent adverse publicity for the chains 
regardless of the formal verdict. Furthermore., it is quite likely that 
Henderson could have won in such a trial, for his boast about having the 
evidence was not an idle one. His short weight charges, when they came 
down to specifics, were usually based on affidavits and on newspaper and 
trade press clippings sent in by his supporters. What was questionable was$ 
rather, the generalisations, about the "chain store systed' which Henderson 
made. According to chain store men individual cases of abuse - even when 
they added up to hundreds of prosecutions for short weight over the country 
as a whole - proved absolutely nothing except that individual chain clerks 
and managers were fallible or, occasionally, crooked. 
12 According to 
Henderson and his trade advisers, the prosecutions were just the tip of an 
iceberg, and short weighing arose not from the personal shortcomings Of 
chain store employees, but was inherent in the system. Such evidence as 
11. Interstatd*Grocerg January 4.1930. 
12. One mmual for chain employees advised that the cormect response to 
allegations of short weights was that "isolated instances of this kind prove 
absolutely nothing! '. Lebhar, How To Meet Unfair Charges Against Chain 
Stores . pe 4. 
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there was, or would likely have been produced had Henderson been brought 
to trial, was elusive and ambiguous. There was no clear, objective and self- 
evident truth. Grocery chains did not rely on short weights to succeed, 
neither did their executives require their employees to be given instruction 
in short weighing as vital knowledge to the business. Nevertheless, many 
managers most certainly believed that they had to make so-called "stock 
gains" or "overages" and many superintendents also encouraged them in that 
idea. Insofar as grocery chain executives accepted stock gains on a routine 
basis, they also accepted that their clerks were engaging in a small amount 
of short weighing. Most probably, executives assured that if the employees 
were not kept under pressure from the inventory,, they would dabble in fraud 
at the companyts expense, and so it was better that the company should gain; 
and it is in any case doubtful whether stock gains were markedly more 
common in chain than in independent stores. But the question was a 
delicate one, and there can be no real surprise that chain store men 
preferred to issue only the blandest disclaimers , without putting themselves 
in a position where unpleasant facts might be brought out under the spotlight 
of public scrutinyý13 As a strategy it worked, for although Henderson succeeded 
13. There is little unbiased contemporary literature on this subject. Edward 
G. Ernst and Emil M. Hartl (in The'NatiOnq Nov. 12,1930 p. 518) reported that 
"We succeeded ... in getting a fe-w-of-7-M-emanagers to talk, after they were 
sure their names would not be made known. Several asserted dogmatically that 
'no man can work for a chain grocery store and be honest' ... Every item is 
billed to the individual store at selling price only, and no manager knows 
anything about the cost price. When the superintendent makes his rounds he 
allows credit for spoilage of fresh fruits and vegetables, but none for 
shrinkage of staples sold in bulk and measured out by the managers or their 
help ... Butter comes in tubs containing 64 pounds bulk; it is impossible for 
any man to weigh out more than 62 pounds. A 100-pound sack of sugar when 
weighed out into small lots loses at least 2 pounds. Beans will shrink an 
ounce per pound in a week's time ... these little losses count up, and the 
manager is twenty or thirty dollars behind". Ernst and Hartl suggested that 
the method I'most often used" by managers to balance the inventory was simply 
to sell some of the merchandise at a slightly higher price than billed, a 
practice which cannot be considered fraudulent or deceptive from the point of 
view of the customer. However, some managersq these writers found, also 
resorted to short weighing and adding machine frauds. Ernst and Hartl 
concluded that such practices accounted for only a "very small percentage" of 
grocery price advantage, and they had heard no such allegations about other 
types of chains to explain their success. A study prompted by Henderson's 
... 2 
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in generating a brief scare . his efforts did not lead to a more enduring 
scepticism about the chains. Many independent trade leaders were also 
anxious to play down the short weights controversy, vaguely supposing that 
such allegations were unethical and also trembling lest someone decided to 
turn the same weapon against the independents. Short weight charges were 
made persistently against the chains during the 1930's. but their position 
in the rhetoric of opposition to chain stores shrank considerably after 
1930. It also happened that militant opponents of the chains were of the 
view that short weighing in chains decreased in the 19301s; in 1938,, George 
Schulte, who had pioneered the exposure of chain malpractices, was willing 
to concede that "short weights have not been so prevalent in recent years". 
Schulte attributed this change to the discovery of new ways by the chains to 
"take advantage of the people" and also to the adverse consequences of exposure. 
13 (cont'd). broadcasts (M. D. Taylor, "A Study of Weight In Chain and 
Independent Grocery Stores in Durham, North Carolina! ' . 'Harvard *Business Review, vol. 9. July 1931, pp. 443-455) found that "chain stores in Durham 
are giving more, accurate weights on bulk commodities than independents", 
with both chains and independents giving both under and over weights. The 
FTC (Final Report of the Chain-Store'Injjýjý, pp. 46-9) found that consumers 
were 17somewhat" more likely t get short weight in the grocery chain store 
and "appreciably more likely" to get excess weight in the independent store 
in the purchase of bulk commodities (the Commission studied beans, prunesq 
crackers and sugar). In four cities very intensively shopped by the FTC 
the "aggregate net shortage in weight on total purchases from the chain 
stores was 0.321 of I per cent, while the actual net overage on purchases 
from independent stores ... was 0.096 of 1 percent ... While the size of the 
shortage for chains may seem insignificant to many, it would amount to 3.41 
percent on the investment in these commodities, figured on the basis of the 
average stock turm of grocery and meat chains of 10.61 times per annuld'. 
However,, the chains had a smaller proportion of shortweights on preweighed 
items than did the independents, and also more often gave exact weight. The 
FTC clearly placed little reliance on this data, which in any case only concerne, 
bulk goods, a small part of grocery sales. Short changing, adding machine 
frauds, substitution of inferior merchandise etc. were not investigated by the 
Commission, and no study was made of non-grocery chains. The Commission failed 
to confront the widespread view that the grocery chain system was inherently 
inclined to produce frauds against the consumer because the managers otherwise 
could not balance their inventories. 
14. Interstate Merdiant . December 10,1938. 
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The "settling down" of the grocery chains after the scramble of the 1920's 
must also have played a part, with the adoption of more disciplined and 
considered policies than prevailed in the 1920's when a high-pressure 
mentality at the top, and influxes of raw recruits at middle and lower 
levels all straining to "get results" produced some unsavoury trading methods. 
In the 1930's executives woke up to the fact that the chains, to secure 
their futures, would have to impose restraints on some of those methods, to 
appease both their competitors and public opinion. A desire to keep short 
weighing under control was naturally one of those restraints - as evidence 
from the 1945 A&P trial would suggest. 
15 
15. In the A&P trial, the internal records of the A&P were produced 
to show how, before about 1930, stock gains as high as 3% net (i. e. real 
gains after absorption of stock losses through shrinkage, spoilage, 
stealage and waste) were accepted without condemnation of store managers. 
The records, which covered 1927-41, showed stock gains at a peak in 1927, 
when the aggregate net gain was $5,567,524, compared to a retail operating profi 
of only $1,, 555,861. According to the Government, the "headquarters group" 
became concerned about prosecutions of its employees for short weights and 
in 1930-5 tried to reduce "excessive" gains. Stock gains of $4,2149626 net 
in 1929 were cut back to $1,974,000 net in 1931. In late 1935, the A&P 
was exposed to intense adverse publicity as a result of a series of trials 
in Washington D. C. in which managers were found guilty of giving short weights 
on chickens (see below, P-412). and John Hartford ordered the elimination 
of stock gains of more than 29a (later lowered to M, though in fact stores 
continued to show higher gains without their managers being disciplined and 
a rising trend was seen 1935-7, until the advent of supermarketsg which 
reduced opportunities to make gains while at the same time increasing losses 
through stealage. The Covernment argued that stock gains of more than 1/2 
of 1% were illegitimate, that the headquarters group knew this, and that by 
continuing to accept higher stock gains they demonstrated to lower level 
employees that warnings against short weighing etc. were to be disregarded. 
The practice of billing goods, except meat, at retail prices, and the 
failure to make due allowance for inevitable losses were seen as having 
"indelibly established" the idea of the necessity of making stock gains in 
the minds of managers so that requests or warnings to the contrary were "like 
water off a duck's back". In its defence, the A&P contended that stock 
gains could arise from a number of perfectly legitimate causess including sale 
of merchandise at a higher price than billed, and urged the sincerity of the 
efforts made by the company to prevent abuses. The evidence produced actually 
indicated that the different levels in the coTrpany's hierarchy were not 
really sure either what subordinates were doing or what superiors wanted,, a 
confusion found in other aspects of the A& P's affairs, as, no doubt, in 
other large chains. The boundary between "reasonable" and "excessive" 
stock gains was not a clear one and the higher echelons seemed to feel that 
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Such efforts as the chains did make to silence Henderson misfired 
badly. In November, 1929, the FRC announced the receipt of many protests 
from chains complaining of the effect Henderson was having on business; 
a letter from the NCSA seized in particular on the intemperance of his 
language, calling it an "unwarranted abuse of the power which inheres in a 
license to broadcast". Henderson's language subsequently also attracted 
the ire of U. S. Senator Clarence Dill of Washington, who thought it a 
"disgrace to this country". According to Dill, the FRC had ample powers to 
regulate Henderson in accordance with the criteria of "public interest, 
necessity or convenience" laid down by the 1927 Radio Act., and he also 
pointed out that the Act prohibited the use of "obscene, indecent, or 
profane language by means of radio communication". providing for a penalty 
of up to $59000 in fines and five years in prison for violators. From the 
floor of the Senate,, Dill demanded that the FRC should either revoke or 
suspend Henderson's license, or else should call upon the federal district 
attorney to enforce the penal provisions of the law against the broadcaster. 
16 
15. (cont'd). if they repudiated all stock gains, the men would become 
negligent about losing stock or would pocket gains for themselves. The 
evidence was sufficiently anbiguous for Judge Lindley, who found against 
the A&P on many other points, to conclude that "I cannot convince myself 
that the evidence is conclusive that stock gains were intentional or other 
than what might happen from a number of reasonable causes". However, 0 the 
evidence also seers clearly to indicate that very high stock gains were 
prevalent in the A&P in the 1920's. and that it took public antagonism 
to bring about some degree of restraint. There is no reason to suppose 
the A&P was unique among grocery chains in that respect. 
Exhibits and testimony in A&P trial relating to stock gains are in 
Interstate Merchant, May 5. June 30, October 13, November 3.1945; April 
6. October 59 1946. 
16. Interstate Grocerg November 23,1929; *Congrestiorial'Redord, vol. 72 
p. 1108 T71st Cong. 2d. Sess. ) Radio Act of 1927,47'USCA Sec. 109,113. 
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Henderson capitalised on the publicity afforded by Dill's attack. 
He refused to concede that his language was unacceptable,, pointing out 
that "there is hardly a minister in the country that does not use the 
word hell frequently". The "Old Man" challenged "Senator Pill" to come 
off the floor of the Senate and "fight it out", and his supporters wired 
in their advice to "pickle Dill". The controversy put the FRC itself 
in something of a pickle. FRC chairman Ira Robinson admitted that he was 
not sure whether Henderson's "hells" and "dams" were in violation of the 
law, and the issue raised delicate problem of censorship. The Radio Act 
condemned certain types of language, and established guidelines of "public 
interest, necessity or convenience" but it also expressly forbade 
censorship, and it was not easy to see how those different requirements 
could be reconciled, especially in a case such as that of KWKH where 
excesses of language occurred in the context of the airing of opinions, 
any curb upon which would have been regarded by some as political censor-ship. 
Furtherwore, having been trounced by Henderson before, the Commission had 
no desire for a further tangle at a time when the broadcaster had never 
been more popular. Not surprisingly,, the Commission equivocated, though 
Chairman Ira Robinson did drop a hint that he had in mind the possibility 
of shifting Henderson to a regional channel "so that he might be heard by 
those desiring to listen without offending others at a distance who have 
protested against him! '. 
17 
Henderson relished the notoriety, but expediency dictated a 
strategic withdrawal. As he had ambitions to be granted more wattage and 
undivided time for KWKH, he had a strong incentive not to make life too 
difficult for the FRC; furthermore, many of his own supporters were of 
the opinion that, as George Schulte expressed it, "he could possibly tone 
........... 
17. Pusateri, pp. 400-40l; -jrjtergtatd'Grocer, January 11,1930; 
New'York Times, January 11,, 1930. 
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his remarks down somewhat without hurting the justice of his cause". 
Henderson accordingly let it be known that he would in future desist from 
the use of "hell" and "dam" in order to preserve harmony in his radio 
audience, and although lapses frequently occurred Henderson did indeed 
underate his behaviour, to the relief of all concerned except those chain 
store men who had hoped to see him put off the air altogether. The rRC 
responded with the "mildest possible reprimand" by issuing only a 30 day 
prcbationary license, this later being renewed without difficulty. Senator 
Dill, a progressive who had been acutely eTrbarrassed by allegations that 
in this case he was siding with Wall Street, withdrew from the fray with 
the claim that he had "really done a service to those who want to permit 
Mr. Henderson to fight the chain store movement... because if he had not 
been stopped using language violating the law he would undoubtedly have 
been taken off the aiVI. The most obvious consequence of the affair was 
that the newspapers gave publicity to KWKH,, thus inflating the audience 
with legions of the curious. 
18 
Henderson thrived on attempts to hit back at him, and it indeed 
suited his purpose to appear as the target of conspiracies to silence him, 
for it persuaded his followers that he really had the chains in a panic. 
He charged that "chain-controlled" radio stations were trying to drown his 
voice by interfering with his 850 kilocycles wavelength, with two Chicago 
stations, WENR', owned by the Insull utility interestss and WLS, formerly 
owned by, and still closely associated with Sears, Roebuck, being 
especially singled out for condemnation. Listeners were also advised of 
an attempt by Montgomery Ward to buy him off by asking to take advertising 
time, an offer which, according to Henderson, he had contemptuously spurned. 
18. Interstat6'Grdder, January 18,25, l930; -N6w*Ydrk'Times,, January 17, 
259 1930. 
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Those who criticised Henderson for seeking to make money out of the cause 
were reminded that the chains were willing to pay Henderson far more just 
to be quiet. As a Memphis wholesaler told the KWKH audience, "They would 
buy him a private yacht, a chateau in France and build him a monument high 
as the Woolworth Building if they could stop this squirrel saying "Hello 
World". 19 
The advisability of saying nothing was perhaps most clearly demonstrated 
to chain store men by Henderson's mauling of a fellow Southerner, chain 
magnate Clarence Saunders. Saunders was himself an extravagant personality, 
reckless,, boastful and unguarded. A one time puddler in a foundry, he had 
created America's first self-service grocery chain, the Piggly Wiggly,, and 
had built himself a famous "Pink Palace" in Memphis, before losing his 
fortune through an ill-judged attempt to corner the market in Piggly Wiggly 
stock in New York in 1923. The way in which Saunders had been tied up and 
then stripped by the "Wall street slickers" had been one of the talking 
points of the day in the South. Recovering from disaster, Saunders had 
developed a second large chain, the "Clarence Saunders - Sole Owner of My 
Own Name" grocery stores, known for its flamboyant advertising, and 
Saunders was determined that Henderson should not spoil his success. In 
full-page advertisements in Southern newspapers he warned that the 
broadcaster's "slobbering mouth" would unleash the "red terror of Russia" 
and derided his creed as being to "stop all progress and let grass grow 
in the streets that the home cow may there graze". In reply, Henderson 
offered his listeners impressions of "Clawrence", whom he mimicked in a 
"high-pitched effeminate voice". To Saunders, Henderson's behaviour 
19. Interstate'Grocer, January 18, March 8,1930; Wholescille'Groder'News. 
March 1930. 
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proved him a "shiny-eyed rat" with . 
"glittering eyes and a gnawing mouth" 
who "gnaws at night on the characters of responsible companies and not 
only does not offer to pay for his gnawing on other people's property, 
but asks to collect a toll for his dirty mouthings". Obviously resentful 
of Henderson's mimickry, Saunders demanded that "when you answer, do it 
like a man instead of in your sly rattish way... Talk with coherence, 
instead of spitting and spluttering so much". Saunders warmed that "You 
said that if I were near you'd spit in my face. Now, listen to me, Rat 
Henderson, whenever you think you are skunk enough to try this let your 
spit spew on my face and there'll be a skunk hide that will show that 
something has happened to it". 
20 
So well known did these exchanges becore that the Kentucky 
legislature invited the pair to stage a joint debate before it, an offer 
Saunders was willing to take up but which Henderson declined. Those chain 
store men who preferred to shelter behind the screen of corporate anonymity 
and assume an air of studied indifference had their analysis of the likely 
results of a counter-attack confirmed when, in July 1930, the Saunders 
chain went into receivership. The failure of the chain could be traced 
back, in part, to excessive price-cutting and overblown advertisingg but 
Saunders himself put the entire blame onto Henderson's broadcasts. 
21 
20. Interstate Grocer, February 23,1924; February 22, March 1,, 1930; 
Retail -Ledger, First April Issue, "News From The Front In the War Against 
The Chains"; Harry Schacter, "War On The Chain Store,, The Nation, 
. May 71 Ila 0, pP 54-+ -5+5. 
21. Interstate Grocer, March 8. July 19,1930. 
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iii. Extent of *the '19 30 'Agitation 
From the earliest days of his campaign, merchants sent in unsolicited 
donations to Henderson as a contribution to the expenses of KWKH and to 
encourage him to keep up the good work. After sore weeks, at the 
suggestion of Philip Lieber, Henderson announced the formation of the 
"Merchant Minute Men", admission to which was to be secured by the payment 
of twelve dollars, and bonded agents were put on the road to collect 
subscriptions. The new organisation attracted a fervent support. As one 
butcher at an "Old-fashioned revival meeting" in Kansas City expressed it, 
"He has brought old customers back to me. I thought I had lost them for 
ever. And then they came ins one by one, and said they were converted". 
That one meeting produced $1,132 in Minute Men subscriptions. All manner 
of dealers showed interest, and George Schulte excitedly reported that 
"hardware dealers, druggists, automobile agencies, banks, cleaning 
establishments, restaurants and all sorts of merchants are affiliating 
with the fighting, the brunt of which has been done by the retail grocers 
in the past". In the most aroused towns, Henderson's agents could recruit 
most of the merchants on Main street; in Nevada, Missouri,, a town of 8,000 
inhabitants, 102 joined the MMM, including the mayor, bankers, blacksmiths, 
cattle dealerst bookkeepers, hotel owners and the chief of police. To 
celebrate the success, a local restaurant served "Hello World" coffee. 
1 
Most of the recruitment occurred in the early months of 1930, a time 
when money poured into the Kennonwood studios at such a rate that it was 
reputedly stored in barrels before being transported to the bank. By the 
end of 1930, according to the findings of a Federal Radio Commission 
examiner, Henderson had collected $373,500 from 35,000 Merchant Minute Men, 
1. Butchers'Advocate, rebruary 19,1930, P-13; Interstate Gmcer,, 
January 18 . March 15,, 19 30. 
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who were found in 4,000 towns; about 60% of the money had come by mail 
in response to the radio appeals, and the remainder from the labours of 
the bonded agents. Henderson also enjoyed the profits of his retailing 
ventures such as "Hello World" coffee and, according to Schulte, received 
outright gifts of $50,000 in the six months from December 1929, as well 
as being flooded with gifts of ham , Navajo blankets, cakes and other 
presents at Christmas, 1929. Furthermore,, some losses occurred,, as there 
were numerous unauthorized Minute Men canvassers in the field,, and even 
whole breakaway groups such as the Ohio Minute Men, siphoning off money 
which would otherwise have gone to Shreveport. Such huge sums may be set 
beside the annual budget of the National Association of Retail Grocers,, 
which ran to $100,000, only $7,000 or $8,000 of which came from retailers, 
the rest being scraped together by sending the begging bowl to jobbers 
and manufacturers, and from the profits of trade shows and other commercial 
activities. 
2 
Many independents thought the tide had turned. Wall street had 
crashed and now, it seemed, all the chain stores spawned by the financiers 
in the boom days of the twenties were about to come crashing down too. 
Trade papers euphorically asserted that "consumers literally by the 
thousands are coming into the home-owned stores stating that they are 
through with the chain stores", 
3 
and to some, Henderson's deeds took on 
heroic dimensions: 
"Listen, my children, and you shall hear 
of the second coming of Paul Revere 
For back in the year of 'Twenty-Nine 
The Chain Store Gang were called to time 
2. Elisabeth Salassi, "'Hello'Wdrld",, 'Shr, 6vopbrt*Magazine, April 1950 
p. 17; Pusateri pp. 401-2; -Int6tstate Merchant, January 23,, 1937. 
3. Grocers' Commercial Bulletin, February 1930, p. 8. 
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"They were a tribe who would sit and wait 
Till all the frostin' was decked on the cake 
Down they would sit in the handiest seat 
Throw out their chests and commence to eat 
Into the heart of our town they would chew, 
Gobbling resources built for you, 
Ruining loyalty, credit and pride, 
On they went in their greedy stride 
Till down at Shreveport, way down South, 
A true American opened his mouth, 
Over the air his voice yelled out, 
Stop People! Think what itts all about 
Hello World! Don't go away, 
This is Old Man Henderson speaking today, 
Up and ready to speak of the harm, 
Done your progressive city and farm 
Not on a horse with a saddled seat, 
No clatter of hoofs on a village street, 
No lantern aloft in a belfry tower, 
But over the air rode the Man of the Hour. " 4 
All over the Southern and central states there sprang up "citizens' 
protective leagues", "loyalty leagues",, "better business associations", 
"community builders", "home defense leagues". "welfare associations" 
and "civic defense leagues". Ephemeral anti-chain newspapers proliferated, 
with titles such as Chained' . -Break'The 'Chains Weekly , Truth . The 
Anti-Chain World'. 'Hello World and* Chain'Storo Menace,. 
5 Henderson's 
disciples roamed the land. In the Carolinas, the Rev. B. F. "Cyclone Mack" 
McLendon entertained revival meetings with his assaults on the "fat-jowledo 
pig-eyed millionaires" and declared that "if I had a glue factory in hell, 
and they brought down a chain store thief, I would throw him back, for 
well I know there could not be enough deodorizer to disinfect him". In 
Portland, Oregon, Robert G. Duncan, the self-styled "Oregon wildcat", 
made radio broadcasts against the chains with so little caution as to what 
4. Part of a "Modem ballad", 'The Coming of Paul Revere, contributed 
toLterstate Grocer, March 15,1930 by a Kansas City dry goods dealer. 
S. See below, pp. 473-4. 
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he was saying that the owner of the station soon had his license revoked 
by the FRC and Duncan was himself arrested by federal marshalls. 
6 In 
Grand Rapids, Winfield H. Caslow, "The Main Street Crusader". an ex- 
chairmaker and publisher of neighbourhood weeklies, who already had an 
anti-chain novel to his credit, set himself up as the Henderson of central 
Michigan with broadcasts over Radio WASH. Caslow's broadcasts challenged 
chain managers to go into business for themselves; asked children to 
shame their parents if they entered chains, and for parents to ask teachers 
to forbid children to buy chain store candy; chain operators were warned 
that "we found the stones your clerks put in the potatoes". One owner 
of a small local grocery chain accused of such malpractices came penitent 
to the microphone, "where he made public apoloEy ... tearfu"y reading a 
statement supposed to have been drawn up by the "crusader" himself"s 
7 
In numerous towns, independents mounted vigorous attacks on deceptive 
prectices by chain stores. In Detroit, the Independent Merchants, 
Association used shoppers to check on chain weights, and broadcast their 
6. N. Y. Journal of'Commerce, June 7.1930; Inter9tate'Grocer, April 19* 
June 7. November 22,1930. For other mentio f Duncan, see p-42 - above. Duncan was brought to trial and sentenced to six months in jail, and 
fined $500, under the penal provisions of the Radio Act. In denying his 
appeal against conviction, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
found Duncan guilty of the use of "profane" language in expressions such 
as "I'll put on the mantle of the Lord and call down the curse of God 
on you, that's what I'll do". The Court made the test of profanity the 
imputation of Divine condemnation, and distinguished this from mere 
oaths like "Go to hell". It also found that Duncan's use of phrases 
such as "sewer rat". "grave robber", "grafting thief". and worse$ about 
named chain men and public officials did not constitute "indecent" or 
"obscene" language, because it did not "arouse lewd or lascivious thoughts". 
Had such criteria been applied to Henderson's broadcasts, it seem 
certain that he would have been acquitted, for his turn of phrase was 
more temperate, and he did not suggest God was against the chains, only 
that W. K. Henderson was. See, Duncan v. United States, 48 r. (2d) 128; 
Certiorari denied 283 U. S. 863. 
7. Advertising 9 Selling, April 16,, 1930, "All Quiet On The Western 
Froiý7711--., --Virnfield H. Caslow, The Scb-squ. adýa'riovel , Grand Rapids, 1928. 
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findings over a local station. In Jacksonville, Floridas the Loyalty 
League held an exhibition of light weight cigarettes obtained from a 
chain store,, hundreds of citizens attending. The Kentucky Senate, 
responding to Henderson's allegations, passed a bill requiring all 
advertisements of packaged goods to include a statement of net weight. 
The bill was lost in committee in the House following opposition from 
newspapers and advertisers,, but the legislature passed a chain tax law 
instead. Weights and measures officials were pressured to "get afterýl 
the chains, and occasionally responded. In Piqua, Ohio, a judge, while 
fining a Kroger manager $10 for short weighing, criticised the motivation 
behind the prosecution which he traced back to a "certain gentleman in 
Louisiana, who has been attempting to boycott the chain stores". "The 
Court is no place to settle a trade war", declared the judge. 
8 
Eastern journals testified to the intensity of the agitation sweeping 
wide areas of the country. A report from Georgia in the New York Times 
noted that the state was aroused by two great stirringst "the beginning of 
the labor campaign to unionize the textile workers of this section and 
the efforts of independent merchants to break the shackles that they think 
are being welded for them by the chain stores". In The'Nation, Harry 
Schacter declared that "A new battle on evolution is raging in the South" 
and called the "chain-store menace" the "question most talked of below 
the Ohio". The Philadelphia Retail Ledger detected a striking resemblance 
to the Klu Klux Klan,, which had waxed great in, the same sectionsJust 
, 
seven years earlier; Printers' Ink, in contrast,. thought the agitation 
comparable to the populist uprisingof the 1890s,, and thought. the new 
8. Retail Ledger 
,, 
First May issue, "Detroit Independents Stage 'Educational' 
Dri inst Chains"; -Tcbacco Leaf, May 31,1930 p. 24; ' N. Y. *Jotirnal of 
Commerce April 5,, 1930;, ', 'Interstite'Grocer,, March a 19 30. 
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agitators had an appeal similar in its potency to that of I'Sockless 
Jerry" Simpson and Hazy Ellen Lease. 
9 
By May 1930, the NCSA had a record of anti-chain bodies active in 328 
towns and cities, with 13 radio stations and 43 publications, including 
trade journals, regular newspapers and ephemeral anti-chain news sheets 
also involved. All sources agreed that the smaller towns were the most 
affected; they divided as to whether the South was the liveliest section 
or was equalled by the Midwest. George Schulte, who travelled on a 
speaking tour in the early weeks of 1930, addressed large meetings in 
towns from Minnesota to Alabama, and found similar enthusiasm everywhere. 
A survey in Business Week, in early March 1930, supplied a breakdown of 
260 anti-chain organisations at work in 35 states, including 81 units of 
the Merchant Minute Men. 110 of these organisations were found in 15 
Southern states, led by North Carolina (24), Georgia (19), and Texas (13). 
119 organisations were located in 12 Midwestern states, led by Illinois 
(17) and Wisconsin (14). In contrast, only 4 such organisations were 
located in the six New England states, and only 3 in the Pacific coast 
states. While the Business Week survey was far from comprehensive as to 
the nurber of such movements, it did accurately suggest the geographical 
distribution. 10 
Henderson exempted from his condemnation both voluntary chains and 
purely local chains of five or less stores. Nevertheless,, some zealots 
attacked any but the simon-pure single store independent, and the general 
public necessarily had difficulty in distinguishing the different types 
of chains. In the hotbeds of agitation, local chains sought to emphasise 
that they had nothing to do with Wall street. Thus in Tulsaq the Sipes' 
9. Neq'York 'Times, Februaxy 2.1930; Schacter War Ot'The'Chairi Stores, 
p. 544; 'Retail Ledger. First March Issueg editorial; 'Printers, Ink, 
Februaxy 20,19 30, p. 3. 
10. Commerce & Finance, "And Now, The Anti-Chain Store Menace". June 4, 
19309 p. 1099; 'Intdrst.! t6'Gtoqer. April 59 1930; Btisiness Week, April 
90 1930, p. 24. 
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Self-Serving Stores, with seven markets in the city and more elsewhere in 
Oklahoma,, advertised itself as "A 100% Tulsa Home Owned Institution. We 
buy here! We sell here! We live here! We invite you to tune in KWKH ... It 
Elsewhere, retailers in partnership -chains obliterated reference to their 
partners who ran stores in different towns; voluntary chains, which 
hitherto had played up the chain store image, in some cases made a rapid 
"ludicrous about face" and sought instead to emphasise the aspect of 
individual ownership. Although this "about face" made no difference to 
the basic operating methods of the voluntaries, it left a legacy inasmuch 
as from this tire on those who ran such chains much preferTed the 
expression "voluntary groups" to "voluntary chains". Even some corporate 
chain store men seemed to have their doubts about the name they had striven 
so hard to hammer into the public consciousness: J. C. Penney reflected 
that "the word 'chain' is very unfortunate, for it brings up the thought 
of bondage. The British tern 'multi-store' is much happier". 
11 
iv. Division'atd Opposition 
Henderson's success attracted into the field of anti-chain agitation 
many alert promoters who made up in extravagance of rhetoric and adeptness 
in raising funds for what they lacked in knowledge about the chain store 
question. Even the most militant opponents of the chains expressed alarm 
at the way the crusade had run out of control. George Schulte was disturbed 
by the profusion of anti-chain newspapers bearing "flaring headlines in 
red which take on the appearance of an anarchistic tinge"; there were 
"leeches thick as flies", raising money for anti-chain organisations which 
had only a paper existence, and fighting each other to get the merchant's 
11. Nevt York Times, April 27,1930; 'Tulsa'Daily'World, February 14,1930; 
Davidson, Voluntary Chain Stores'and How To Run Them, pp. 81,32; Saturday 
Evening Post, J. C. Penney,, "The Co=unity and the Chain Store" Feb. 22,1930 
10. 
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dollar. Schulte's view by the late March of 1930 was that "it has got 
to the point now where the success of the novement is at stake due to 
the bleeding process which is being attempted. "' 
There were some willing to find justification for the excesses. 
Moritaville Flowers, a Pasadena orange grower and professional publicist 
who delivered a season of anti-chain broadcasts over stations in the 
Pacific Northwest, admitted that the "guerrilla warfare" had been 
undisciplined and adversely reported. However, 
"... this kind of warfare has always characterized 
the beginnings of a great revolution against an 
established evil, to which men have long submitted, 
but such methods are soon raised to a higher place. 
The American Revolution began in disguised mobs, 
in shootings on the Boston Common, in inspired murder 
of Colonials at the hands of Indians. And the 
Civil War began by bloody affairs in Missouri and 
Kansas, and by John Brown's raid at Harper's Ferry. 
But these outlawed efforts, calling the attention 
of the people to the principles involved, merely 
stir the public spirit and the public mind to 
investigate the causes at issue, and when they have 
found, under the turmoil, great principles of right 
assailed and in danger, the people have then taken 
up the battles and have fought thp out on facts in 
the interest of the public good". 
Such a sanguine interpretation was not shared by most nervous trade 
executives. Instead they saw the image of the independent trade falling 
into disrepute. The whole strategy of stirring anti-chain feeling, not 
just the fringe of unreliable and unscrupulous pronoters, came under 
vigorous attack from prominent figures in independent retail circles, 
sore of whom could only see in the rank-and-file support for the agitators 
a conclusive demonstration that, as H. P. Sheets, the managing director of 
the NRHA, put it, "We have all inherited something of those belligerent 
traits which dominated our distant ancestors". The most damaging attacks 
1. Commerce and'Finance, "The Anti-Chain Store Racket". March 19,19309 
pp. 580r-1; Interstate Grocer, March 22,1930. 
2. Montaville Flowers, 'America Chained, 'a Discussion of "What's Wrong 
With The'Chairi'Store". TMontaville Flowers Publicists Ltd. 9 Pasadena, 
California, 1931), P. 18. 
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on the agitators came from C. H. Janssen, the secretary of the NARG. 
In an editorial widely reprinted in jour, nals hostile to the anti-chain 
cause, Janssen roundly condemed the "literally thousands of individuals 
interesting themselves in anti-chain store campaigns purely for the money 
they can make out of it for themselves", and pointedly included 
Henderson's Merchant Minute Men amongst those to be condemed. Janssen 
was willing to concede a grudging approval for strictly local civic-boosting 
movements where control was vested in the organised trade, and which avoided 
"extravagant criticism and condemnation of rival business concerms", but 
his real hopes lay elsewhere, in the cultivation of better relations with 
the chains through trade practice conference procedure and in the "new 
trade association" idea of business self-regulation. 
3 
Janssen's attitude was greatly resented by wide sections of the 
grocery trade, and at the annual convention of the NARG in June 1930 an 
uprising of the rank and file led by John Cunninghams the Iowa secretaryg 
resulted in the adoption of a motion pledging commitment to a "more 
aggressive policy" against the chains. 
4 Similarly, in the hardware 
association, H. P. Sheets' attitude to "name calling! ' was not even shared 
by the National Secretary Rivers Peterson. 
5 However, in trades where fear 
3. Hardware Retailer March 1930, editorial; 'National Grocerý2 Bulletin, 
March 1930 editorial: "Shall We Encourage Fight Promotion For Private Profit? " 
and "In Support of Locally Owned Stores". 
4. President E. S. Berthiaume warned the convention that "One can ill conduct 
both a war and a constructive program at the same time", but the prevailing 
mood was that,, as one delegate expressed it, "the time has come when people 
with jelly backbones won't get anywhere ... You want to hit them (the chains) 
a wallop, and once in a while hit them right between the eyes". Some of 
the state grocery associations, including those of Maryland and Missouri, 
two of the half dozen most influential, had enrolled in the MMM en masse. 
At the opposite extreme,, the California president declared opposition to 
"radicalism in all its forms". In practice, the "more aggressive policy" 
meant little, for the convention did not say what that policy should be and 
the National Board made no perceptible shift. See, National Grocers' 
Bulletin, 1930 Convention Issue, pp. 23-49 102-9. 
5. Hardware Retailer, "Just Chat",, October 1930. 
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of the chains was less strong, and where the rank and file of small 
merchants were less influential, conservative leadership set the tone 
of trade association response. The NRDGA, dominated by the big department 
stores, conde7rmed the agitation as "unethical" and declared unequivocal 
opposition to political anti-chain activity. Around the country, retail 
merchants' associations, which were normally controlled by the larger type 
of downtown stores, worked to undermine the efforts of the agitators. 
Thus in Raleigh, North Carolinag the secretary of the retail merchants' 
association boasted of success in "curbing all anti-chain movements": 
"fanatical merchants" had attempted to hold meetings, but their efforts 
had been subverted by the planting in the meetings of "level-headed 
conservative merchants" who "immediately took to the floor0l and persuaded 
the majority that "cleanliness and service should be paramount,, rather than 
unscrupulous attacks on chain stores". In cities where the anti-chain 
forces were especially well organised, such as Tulsa, where 185 grocers 
and 33 druggists joined the Minute Men, the retail merchants' association 
was forced into a neutral position. However, only in some smaller cities 
and towns, in the most agitated sections, was there sufficient breadth of 
support for the agitators to draw general, all-trade retailers' associations 
into a position suggesting endorsement. 
6 
With retailers themselves divided, it was not surprising that 
organisations representing all types of business interests showed the 
greatest reluctance to become involved in anti-chain propaganda work. The 
Business Week survey of 260 anti-chain organisations reported only 5 
chambers of commerce as being involved. In the very small nunber of cities 
where local charbers endorsed or sponsored anti-chain groups, the usual 
reason was fear that the merchants would otherwise bolt the chamber and 
6. New York Times, June 8. l93O; -R6tai1*Ledger, First April Issue, 1q3D, 
"Retail Secretaries' Opinions of Merchant Minute Men". 
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establish rival organisations. In most small towns, chanbers of commerce 
tried to sit on the fence and to avoid an irreversible confrontation with 
either the chain or independent merchant members. Belated and ineffective 
as the chains' community integration strategy was proved in many respects* 
the neutralisation of the charbers of commerce was revealed as remarkably 
thorough. By 1930, the chains were entrenched in the charbers in even the 
smallest towns, and their presence reinforced the disposition of these 
bodies to look upon the agitators, some of whose attitudes smacked of 
anti-business radicalism, with the most thorough scepticism. 
The chains had individual bitter enemies in every line of business, 
and in some towns those individual enemies could be numerous. However,, 
few classes of businessmen, other than those engaged in retail and wholesale 
distribution, had a unifying general interest in opposing the chains. 
Owners of small town hotels complained that their business had been damaged 
because the chains reduced the nuTrbers of travelling salesmen; insurance 
agents were frequently identified in the thick of local agitation. 
8 
Many small town bankers also had a sense of grievance about the way in 
which chains maintained negligible local deposits and sent out the bulk 
7. Business Week, April go 1930, p. 24. Flowers, 'Arwrica'Chcained, 
pp. 146-159. In the thirty small towns studied by the FTC in 1931, 
chain stores reported an aggregate of 128 menberships in service clubs, 
72 of these being in charbers of commerce and the remainder in such 
bodies as Kiwanis, business bureaus, merchants' associations, Lions 
clubs, Rotary clubs etc. (FTC Chain Stores, The Chain Store In The 
Small Town, pp. 60-63) 
8. FTC, Chain Stores, 'The Chain Store In The Small Town, p. 71; 
C-W. Woýd The Passing of Normalcy, p. 215 noted that for the most 
hostile stories about the chains "it is best to go to some local fire- 
insurance office ... The chain stores arrange for their insurance on 
a national plan, whereas the owner of one store is likely to insure 
through some local agent or broker. The chain stores also are 
standardized, and the risk of fire brought to a minimum, making the 
insurance rates generally the very lowest obtainable". 
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of their receipts to be banked in headquarters cities. 
9 But support 
for the anti-chain cause from these sources tended to be uneven and 
contributed little extra weight to the independent merchants. At the 
same time, the chains had some natural allies. Real estate owners 
tended to be strongly favourable towards the chains, for the 1920s 
scramble for locations had in many towns led to the doubling and tripling 
of Main street rentals and broken up long standing "gentlemen's agreements" 
among the local merchants that they would not bid against each other or 
above certain limits. 
10 Similarly, newspapers were bound to the side of 
the chains by the heavy volume of chain store advertising. Throughout 
the country, independents complained týat the newspapers, to avoid 
difficulties with their advertisers, sirply pretended that no agitation 
was going on. Only three daily newspapers of any prominence were recorded 
as actively backing the anti-chain canpaign, and even most small weeklies 
also tried to avoid taking a position. With both chanbers of commerce and 
9. Craig Hazlewood, the president of the American Bankers' Association, 
warned the 1929 NCSA convention that there were many complaints from small 
town bankers about the difficulty of making a profit on chain store 
accounts. "The banker's good will should be courted ... Like the minister 
and judge, he occupies an important place among his fellow 
, 
citizens. His 
advice is asked on many problems ... By establishing cordial relations with 
him, the chain store operator goes far in the direction of obtaining a 
hearing in communities where he is only too apt to need friends... " 
Following this, the NCSA and the ABA formed a committee to study the 
problem, which recommended the maintenance of adequate deposits in small 
town banks. See, Convention Speeches, 1929'NCSA Cnvn..; American Bankers' 
Assn Journal, "Chain Stores And Banks Get Together". January 1930, p. 665; 
Chain Stoi; W-Review April 1930, pp. 15-16. In its survey of 30 small 
towns, the FTC found that "a distinct majority of the bankers clearly 
expressing themselves on the question believe that chain-store deposit 
accounts are satisfactory. The opinions divide about equally between 
those that say chain accounts are more satisfactory than independent 
merchants' accounts and those that express a preference for the latter". 
(FTC, The Chain Store It The Small Town, pp. 59-60 and see also the 
miscellaneous comments of bankers at pp'. 74-84). 
10. Nystrom, 'Ec6ndmic! g of'Mtailing, 1930, vol. 2, pp. 171-2. 
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newspapers either opposing or ignoring them, anti-chain agitators were 
denied the chance to achieve an image of respectability, and operated 
mainly on the margins of organised business society. 
11 
Of course, all local businessmen favoured a degree of "civic 
boosting" and working up of feelings of home town loyalty. Business clubs 
thrived on such activity. Peddlers and mail order companies which lured 
away the consumer's dollar brought no advantage to any local businessman,, 
and received general condemnation. But the chain stores were a different 
matter. The chains located on Main street: they rented property, they 
hired clerks, they advertised in the newspaper, they enrolled their 
managers in business clubs and contributed, however reluctantly, to the 
community fund. From the point of view of businessmen not in competition 
with the chains, their presence was far from being an unmitigated disaster. 
Furthermore, such businessmen inevitably had to ask themselves what was 
the alternative to accepting the evolutionary process in distribution. If 
all the chain stores could be driven out of town, would not prices then 
rise, and consumers be encouraged to shop elsewhere? In the age of the 
automobile, no town could hope to insulate itself from the outside world 
and force trade to be conducted just as it had been a generation earlier. 
Small towns throughout the rural sections were engaged in a constant 
struggle with rival small towns and with more distant big cities to hold 
their home trade, and to extend their trading areas. Although grocery 
chains made little difference in that struggle, chains of the Penney, Ward 
11. The three anti-chain dailies were thd'Johtstowft Democrat, the Tulsa 
Daily World and the'Raleigh News &'Observer. The editor and publisrer 
of the last-named was Josephus Daniels,, former Secretary of the Navy in 
the Wilson administration and one of the South's most prominent liberals. 
For a description of the "non-partisan" position taken by Georgia 
newspapers, see J. J. Ellis, "The War On The Chain Store" in Nation's 
Business, December 1930, pp. 929 94. Georgia independents, 2renied a cess 
to the press, circulated their own anti-chain paper "Truth", published 
in Dýcatur, Most independent merchants, particularly small merchants in 
lines worst hit by the chains, did little or no newspaper advertising, 
whereas the FTC found an average per store expenditure on newspaper 
advertising by 1,030 chains of $683. (FTC, Chain Storesj, Final Report, 
p. 46). 
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or even Woolworth type, gave the towns in which they located a valuable 
magnet which drew in consumers from the farms and from less favoured 
towns. Even some merchants appreciated that, and their opinions tended 
to be divided as to whether the arrival of a prestigious chain store of 
the Montgomery Ward type was or was not, on balance, harmful. 
12 As for 
those businessmen who were in any case not trying to compete with the 
chain stores, they could only regard with some enthusiasm any agency which 
increased the number of people coming into town and lent to its reputation 
for being upý-to-date and having the stores that were found in the cities. 
Their interest lay more in the direction of encouraging the chains to keep 
their profits in the town than in attempting to drive them out. 
Often disappointed by the attitude of their fellow businessmen, 
militant merchants looked to labour for sympathetic consideration. Sometimes 
they were rewardedý. As early as 1927, the Illinois and Iowa State 
Federations of Labor adopted resolutions condemning secret rebates to 
chain stores and, in the case of Illinois, asking union men to give 
preference to home owned stores. Henderson's campaign inspired considerable 
labour sympathy. In his own Louisiana, the State Federation of Labor, in 
annual convention, declared chain stores to be symptomatic of a trend to 
monopoly and that they reduced employment, and resolved "to call on all 
workers-to do every lawful thing discouraging the chain system of 
merchandising, and to do every lawful act which will have the effect of 
12. Inter-town rivalry found expression in "trade trips" or "fellowship 
trips" where merchants drove in convoy through the countryside distributing 
advertising and free gifts, trying to capture territory surrounding other 
towns. See, Walter Burr, Small Towns: ' An Estimate 6f'their Trade and 
Culture, N. Y. 19299 pp. 143-4. For the welcome given to Montgomery ward 
stores for this reason, see George B. Everitt, "How The Chain Store Helps 
The Independent"9'Nation's Business, October 1929. Many merchants had their 
best ever sales, in "spin-off" trading, the day Ward came to town. This 
factor was particularly strong in westerm states, where ownership of 
automobiles was most extensive, and where families thought nothing of 
travelling 100 or 150 miles to patronise their favourite stores. See,, 
President's Conference on Unemploynents Recent Economic Changes- vol. I, 
pp. 331-41 for changes in trading areas. This trend was especially 
pronounced in fashion goods, and but little apparent in grocery shopping. 
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encouraging individual enterprise". Union men were. generally considered 
to be open to arguTmnts about the need for " re cipro city" and building 
home town employnent even if they often patronised chain stores. 
is 
There were some serious limitations to labour support, however. 
Officers of unions in the retail field inclined to a policy of strict 
neutrality in conflicts between chains and independents. The secretary- 
treasurer of the Retail Clerks? International Protective Association, 
C. C. Coulter, while regularly denouncing the excessive hours and low wages 
prevalent in chains, and their use of spies to root out unionism, 
nonetheless insisted that wages and conditions should be the "sole ground 
of contention against the chains". Likewise, Patrick Gorman, the president 
of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of America, the 
leading union in the grocery chain field, espoused a "live and let live" 
philosophy towards the evolution of the chains, never once opposing their 
expansion, and demonstrating stern disapproval to those locals which 
discriminated against the chain stores in any way. 
14 Although at the 
start of the 1930s most chains were antagonistic to unionisation, union 
leaders had some hope that large-scale retailing might lead to large-scale 
retail unions by a process of 11organising the employer". an impossibility 
when retailing was conducted by a multitude of small stores. Even in 
1930, the unions had enough of a foot in the door in labour strongholds 
and in some of the progressive chains like Grant and Penney, for such a 
possibility to seem more than an idle illusion. To some extent,, this 
strategy put the retail field unions at cross purposes to the philosophical 
outlook found in some other unions. 
13. 'Inter-state 'Grocer, October 15 9 1927; Louisiana State Fed. of 
Labor, 
Proceedings of'Annual-Convention, 1930, p. 44. 
14. See Coulter's editorials ili, Retail*Cl6i'k! "Izitd=ational Advocate, 
"Chain Store Profits and Wages" (July 1928)s "The Spy System Spreads" 
(January/February 1930), "Official" (May/June 1930), "Chain Systems 
Dictate Terms of Employment" (SepteTrber/October 1930); Nilton E. Hanna 
and Joseph Belsky' 'Pidkdt'aiid'thd'P6ri-ý'The "Pat" Gorman 'Story (1960) 
p. 153. 
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In 1932,, the AF of L convention adopted a resolution moved by Pat 
Gorman calling for the unionisation of chain store workers. Such a 
resolution, in reference to virtually any other industry, would have 
been accepted without hesitation, but not all the delegates were happy 
about the idea of organising the chain store., Andrew Furuseth, the 
seamen's leader, expressed the view that not unionisation but antitrust 
prosecution and federal taxation was needed, because if government did 
that "they could not only minimize but in my opinion completely destroy 
a system which inevitably leads to much worse conditions than we have 
now". Furuseth feared that unionisation "will simply make the chain 
stores more secure, because it is a method through which they will have 
the sympathy of labor behind them if they are wise enough to comply 
with the resolution". 
15 
The impact of such union support as existed on behalf of the anti- 
chain cause was limited by the fact that most workers were not union men. 
After a decade of organisational decay,, by 1930 only 10.2% of the non- 
agricultural workforce was in unions, mainly in construction,, coalg 
railroads, printing, clothing and street railways. 
16 There were many 
pockets of union strength dotted about the Midwest, but the South was 
largely unorganised. In practice, few American workers read labour 
journals or attended union meetings where the chain store controversy 
might be discussed, and anti-chain campaigners often found the 
unorganised worker more apathetic to the idea of reciprocity and building 
home industries than his union counterpart. Furthermore, however many 
resolutions were passed by union men, it was their wives who did most 
15. American Federation of Labor' *Prod6edingp 'of 'Anntlal Convention, 
1932, p. 209. 
16. Irving Bernstein, 'The '1#6c! n'Y6aft` 'A'Higt6ty, of, tho 'Ameri can 'Worker. 
1920"339 1966 edn. p. 84. 
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of the shopping,, and the fate of trade-at-home agitation was determined 
not by hands raised in meetings but by the nuirber of feet crossing the 
thresholds of chain stores. The shift to a pattern of shopping by women 
a generation earlier men had done much more, if not most, shopping 
17 
divorced the role of producer, a role which encouraged a stress on 
preserving jobs and building home businesses, from that of consumer, 
where price and purely shopping considerations became paramount. The 
consequences of that divorce were well noted by a 1931 survey in San 
Francisco and Oakland where "the interviewers commented that the general 
anti-chain arguments often seemed to be traceable to the opposition of 
the husband who was a meTrber of a trade union. Also, quite commonly, 
wives of these husbands remarked that they patronized the chains 
anyway". 
18 
Even sympathetic labour voices were discouraged by some of the 
activities of anti-chain campaigners. A corplete cycle of hopeful 
greeting and pained disillusion sometimes occurred in but a few weeks. 
In St. Paul, the organ of local labour at first hailed the agitation as 
a sign that "at last" the merchants had "awakened"; there was a belief 
that a "circle of exchange" of St. Paul-made goods through St. Paul-owned 
stores could be created, and a hope of united action by merchants and 
union men against the open shop organisation, the Citizens' Alliance, 
which was itself allied with the National Tea Co. and the Piggly Wiggly 
stores. However, a sour note was soon heard: the agitation was throwing 
up too many "professional racketeers"; merchants were coming to believe 
they deserved patronage without improving their stores and prices; 
17. Nystrom'Ecotomicg 'of'Rdtailing, 19309 vol. I. pp. 26-7. 
18. Cbmmc5nvtealth ' Club 'of 'Cali f6tftia 9, 'Txsc-dI8ddti0ns$ Vol. -XXVI, No. 4. 
July 14,19319 pp. 181-241, '"Chains 'V. * ' Indeperiderit 'Stores",, p. 208. 
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St. Paul anti-chain canpaigners failed to condemn chain banks, had 
their literature printed in Minneapolis or were anti-union. Ultimately, 
the Trades and Labor Assembly felt compelled to cease active endorsement 
of the agitation when the Barrow Garment Manufacturing Co., which 
employed several hundred union men in the city on work for a chain system, 
warned that the turmoil was costing it business and would lead to:, loss of 
jobs. 19 
It was W. K. Henderson himself who caused the most scepticism about 
the direction and character of the anti-chain campaign. In April, The 
Progressive., the newspaper of the Wisconsin La Follettes, exposed the 
Henderson Iron Works as an open shop, revealing that Henderson was hostile 
to what he termed "dirty union bums", and that he had played a prominent 
part in breaking a 1922 railroad shop strike by repairing locomotives in 
his workshops with non-union labour. Elsewhere, William A. Odom, who had 
once tried to organise the works, reviled "Hog Henderson" as "one of the 
biggest slave-drivers and union-haters in America", and accused him of 
having led the open shop movement in Shreveport after the war, thus 
setting the union men and the home merchants against each other and letting 
in the chain stores. "Yes, that is the same dirty hog who is fooling you 
to make you believe that with your help and his hot air, and greed for 
more money, he will destroy the very thing that he imported in there". 
These charges were given wide circulation, and some of Henderson's 
dismayed supporters applied pressure on him to mend his ways. As a 
result, an agreement was hastily drawn up allowing the unions entry to 
the iron works, and Henderson himself abruptly became a forceful champion 
of the rights of organised labour. Many were satisfied by this adjustmentp 
The Progressive, having been belaboured by some of its readers for its 
tactless handling of the subject, was pleased to praise the "valuable 
19. ' 'MiTiT! er; 6td'Urii6ri 'Adv6date, February 6,2 13; March 13,209 27; 
April 10,17. s 1930. 
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public servicell done by Henderson on the chain store issue and thought 
that he could "accomplish great things for the common good". F. D. 
Laudemann of the International Association of Machinists, who had played 
a major part in negotiating the admittance of the unions to the iron 
works, became a prominent supporter of the Minute Men movement. Nevertheless$ 
the affair left a residue of suspicion and reserve,, and diminished 
Henderson's standing as a fearless foe of Wall Street. 
20 
In parts of the Midwest, attempts were made to forge alliances 
between independent merchantss labour and farners, on the assumption that 
the chain store issue had at last brought the merchants into the anti- 
monopoly anti-Wall street camp. Some politicians zealously proselytised 
for this new fusion of interests. In Wisconsin, Philip La Follette was 
elected as a progressive Republican govermor in the 1930 elections on such 
a platform. In Minnesota, Floyd Olson, the gubernatorial candidate of the 
revived Farmer-Labor Party, swept to a handsome victory in a campaign 
emphasising an attack on concentration of wealth, chain banks and chain 
stores. In Iowa, the formation of a Farner-Labox-Independent Retail 
Merchant Council was attempted, the officers of the Council being the 
president of the Iowa R. G. A., the vice-president of the Iowa Farmers' 
Union and the past president of the Sioux City Trades and Labor Assembly. 
The Council proposed to seek cost of production for the farmer, just 
compensation for labour and legislative action against the chain stores 
for the merchant. 
21 
Midwestern politicians could be quite starry-eyed about the prospects 
for such alliances. Senator Brobkhart of Iowa,, a hero to the small 
merchants because of the senate resolution in his name which had created 
20. Thd Pr6gr6sgive, April 26, May 31,1930; ' 
Journal, May 1930 pp. 293-6, June 1930, p. 343. 
21. *Minndgotd Uhi6ri'AdV6data April 241,1930; George H. Mayer, 'Tho'P61itical 
Career of F16yd'B. ' 'Olson, St. Paul, 1951, pp. 48-56; ' ', Irit6t8tatd'Gr0cer,, 
October 25,1930. 
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the FTC's chain store investigation, urged the 1928 NARG convention 
to join with farmers and labour to fight against the exactions of 
mnopoly. 
"You can not win alone... You must join with 
your customers for the control of corporations, 
of transportation, of excess profits, of credit 
and of marketing. Cooperation is the word. 
When I say cooperation I do not use that word 
in a flimsy and uncertain sense. I mean the 
genuine old Rochdale system. There are no 
substitutes and no short cuts. Some time I 
will be glad to present it to you with details 
for its operation..... " 
So well was this speech received - delegates voted support for the 
Senator's bill to permit cooperative national banking, as a reward for 
his services - that Brookhart delivered substantially the same speech to 
the 1929 convention of the National Association of Retail Druggists, 
where it was again warmly applauded. But did Brookhart or the delegates 
really know what they were advocating? Brookhart advised the druggists 
to read the, PdojjloI9'Ydat'Book, the bible of consumer cooperation, and 
he spoke with enthusiasm of a visit he had made to see English cooperatives 
at work. Yet he also suggested that "there are at present over 50,000 
stores in the United States organized somewhat under the cooperative plan 
which I have suggested to yoO and advised that "you get in touch at once 
with all these cooperative organizations and bring them together in a 
great national federation". How existing retail cooperatives, which 
reinforced the principle of individual ownership and private profit, could 
be reconciled with the Itgenuine old Rochdale system" where the shopkeeper 
was merely a manager and the consumers took the profits, was not 
explained. ' 
22 It'w4shdt beyond the wit of government in the Midwest to 
22. 'Natiorial Grocers' '1928 'CoiiVerition 'Proceedings,, pp 531, 
158-160; ' 'NARD'J6ilinial, October 3,1929. 
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encourage retail cooperatives one step removed from the purely commercial, 
but the ultimate incompatibility remained. 
23 
It proved a constant 
dilemma for progressive politicians in Wisconsin and Minnesota, where 
they held power at times in the 1930s, how to balance their commitments 
to fostering consumer cooperatives with their rhetoric in favour of the 
independent merchant. Most usually, they sought to mollify independents 
troubled by state encouragement for consumer cooperatives by showing a 
commitment to harrassing the chains by strenuous trade practice and tax 
legislation. 
Farmer-labour politics, which in 1930 were mostly conducted on the 
progressive flank of Midwestern Republicanism, were held together by 
the cement of historical tradition and sentimental. mythology, despite 
the many tensions arising from the conflicting interests of wage earners 
and rural property owners. But there was no such cement to hold together 
a farmer-labour-merchant alliance. On the contrary., the farmers and 
merchants had a long tradition of bad relations, stemming from the deep- 
seated rural prejudice against "middlemen". In the great movements of 
farm revolt, the merchant had taken his place among those condemned, and 
if less resented in the abstract than the trusts and the railroads, in 
practice he had taken the brunt of anti-middlemen expression, because it 
23. The "Central Wisconsin Food Stores Cooperative" of 5Q independent 
groceries in the Madison area was set up in 1930 as a "partial state 
function ... under the supervision of the Department of Agriculture and 
Markets". This followed on from the Department's work in organising 
marketing cooperatives for farmers. The grocers retained their 
independence and the profits of business, the cooperative functioning 
essentially like any other retailer cooperative, and it was in no sense 
on the Rochdale plan. Even so, the state sponsorship would have been 
considered creeping socialism in most states, and was unique to 
Wisconsin. (Modern Merchant & Grocery World'. July 18,1931). 
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was he who was in contact with the farmer. 
24 During the years of the 
Granger movement in the 1870s, Montgomery Ward made its first strides 
by advertising as the "original Grange supply house" which cut out the 
middleman, and extended special tern to Granges. The favour of the 
farm population for the catalogue houses in the following decades 
effectively short-circuited the sporadic attempts of merchants to agitate 
feeling against the catalogue, and the catalogues proclaimed the mail 
order method as being the farmers' liberation from the "tyranny of the 
country merchants. 
25 It was likewise the farmers rather than urban 
labour which had given the main support for consumer cooperatives, with 
hundreds of stores being formed in great waves in the late nineteenth 
century. Although few of these stores had lasted long, an element in the 
rural population retained a persistent enthusiasm for running its own 
stores, and every upsurge of economic discontent led to a parallel upsurge 
in cooperatives. While such cooperatives were, by 1930, of slight 
24. That contact could be unpleasantly intimate. Upper stories of Southern 
comtry stores were often occupied by lodges, Granges etc. "Frequently 
a merchant entered into a peculiar arrangement whereby he would build the 
lower section of the store, the fraternities the upper, and they jointly 
financed the roof.... Patrons of Husbandry and Grangers used the lodge 
hall to lanbaste the merchant below for his impoverishing trade practices. 
Often these irate agrarian organizations adopted resolutions creating 
trading contracts which forced storekeepers to cut their profits and meet 
many of the cotton farmers' terms of credits". (Clark, Pills, Petticoats 
and Plows: The Southern Country Store, p. 20). Storekeepers who fbredosed 
on mortgages when farmers' crops failed and they could not pay their bills 
for goods bought under the lien system were, of course, especially 
disliked: although most merchants went to great lengths to avoid 
foreclosing, some became considerable landowners in that way. Storekeepers 
were expressly excluded, as "obnoxious to the Constitution', ', from the 
Farmers' Alliance, which also denied menbership to bankers, bank employees, 
railroad employees, lawyers, brokers, real-estate dealers, cotton buyers 
and salesmen, and warehouse owners. (C. Vann Woodward, Origins of The 
New South, 1877-1913, p. 193). 
25. Emmet and Jeuck . Catal6gile8 and'WiMters pp. 20-21; Asher and 
Heal, Seiid'N6'M6riey, p. 72. 
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importance in the United States as a whole,, they. were found in. greatest 
concentration precisely in those areas of the upper Midwest where 
prevailing political attitudes were most inclined to favour the idea of 
rerchant-labour-farmer alliances, and their presence was a daily reminder 
of the unreality of such an idea when brought down from the soaring 
heights of political oratory to the mundane truths of economics and 
sociology. 
26 
Certainly, much of the red-hot antagonism of earlier decades had 
died away by 1930. Farm leaders did not spend their time denouncing 
the country merchants, and consumer cooperatives were relatively few and 
provided only modest competition for the independent dealers. Relations 
had become less strained because of the spread of the cash economy,, which 
broke up the oppressive and woefully costly systems whereby farmers 
pledged crops or land to buy supplies on credit, and which also encouraged 
the spread of the chains, thus giving an extra element of choice and price 
coupetition. Nevertheless, few farmers were prepared to do anything to 
see the independents re-establish their old supremacy however much they 
might mistrust the intentions of the Wall street chains. Radically- 
minded farmers could not. shrug off the traditional antipathy towards the 
merchants and the "middlemen" who stood behind them,, and business-minded 
farmers could see substantial benefits in securing access to distant 
urban markets through chain store distribution. 
Most farm journals recognised that there was a "chain store question", 
but they also recognised that it had two sides. Rather than taking a 
definite position, journals opened their columns to expressions of the 
26. See pp. 24s 26-27. 
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rival points of view. Me Intergtatd'Gr6der, with its network of 
contacts throughout the farm states, could record only one farm paper 
as having come out "flat-footed" against the chains, and a survey by 
the Farm Journal,, which had one and a half million readers, indicated 
that mst farmers were indifferent to the chain store issue, and that 
those who had definite opinions tended to favour the chains. 
28 Anti- 
chain agitation was greatest in the rural sections of the United States,, 
but within those sections it was very much a phenomenon of the towns 
and cities, which lay beleaguered in a sea of rustic indifference. 
Probably many farmers, especially poor farmers in the South, very few 
of whom owned radios or had regular contact with the towns, really had 
much idea that there was actually a great fight against the chain stores 
going on. 
29 
27. See,, e. g. Bureau Farmer, July 1930, pp. 4-5i "What Chains Offer 
The Farmer" by J. C. Penney, and "What The Chain Store Costs Farmer" 
by J. H. McLaurin. 
28. Interstate Grocer, June 28,1930. The Farm'Journal surveyo quoted 
in Chain Store Review, August 1930, p. 64, produced 952 letters from 
readers, of which 71-6 were favourable to the chains, 197 unfavourable 
and 39 neutral. Interestingly, two-thixxls of the replies came from womens 
which suggests the primacy of "consumer" over "producer" considerations. 
Among the points cited in favour of the chains was "no favoritism in 
serving customers". a reflection of the belief of some farm families 
that the merchants looked down on them. Letters critical of the chains 
stressed general points about community-draining rather than grievances 
specific to farmers. 
29. In 1930 ownership of radio sets ranged from 63.3% of households in 
New Jersey to 5.4% in Mississippi. Within each state, the rural districts 
had the lowest ownership: thus in Alabama, 26.7% of households in 
Birmingham had sets, but only 1.4% in one rural county. (President's 
Research Committee on Social Trends, Recent Social Trends in the United 
States vol. I. p. 211). 
125. 
The failure to mobilise farm sentiment points to the fundamental 
weakness of trade-at-home agitation. To succeed, it required a very 
high, and sustained, level of popular support. When the merchants 
shifted their main attack to legislation, they needed to win just once - 
or rather, twice: first-in the legislature, and then in the courts. 
Once a chain tax was on the statute book, its enforcement then became a 
mere matter of administrative routine, and no further expenditure of 
effort was required by the merchants. Trade-at-home campaigning, in 
contrast, required that the people be convinced again every day of the 
year, and the revivalist nature of the 1930 agitation militated against 
such a long drawn out process. As the NCSA noted, with relief, local 
campaigns rarely lasted =re than 90 days, and everywhere, as the summer 
heat increased, activity dropped off by May and June. Furthermoreq even 
at its height, the pattern of agitation was somewhat patchy, so that it 
was found that "in one town the fight may have reached a fever heats yet 
in the very next county they are doing nothing about it". In such 
circumstances chain store men were able to sit back and wait for local 
drives to run out of steam. 
30 
Unable to win over unanimous voluntary support, independents tried 
some mild methods of coercion. Attempts to turn public feeling against 
chain patrons were made in some particularly "hot" localities: citizens 
were asked to sign pledges declaring they would not enter chain storess 
and those who persisted in doing so were "named" in pamphlets or newspapers. 
"In some localities, local bodies even place pickets in front of chain 
stores attempting to shame people who trade there. They succeed to some 
extent and now and then influence as many as half of those proposing to 
enter to buy elsewhere". Very rarely,, yet more drastic methods were used. 
30. Progrd8siVd 'Gt6der April 19301, p. 82; 'Chairi 'Stcjre 'M View. July 1930 p. 14. 
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In Sanford, North Carolina, the mayor warned city employees not to 
enter chain stores and that "if they don't know they shouldn't they're 
too ignorant to hold their jobs anyway, and after this God help them 
if they do it again". In one Michigan town, a schoolteacher was denied 
renewal of her contract because she had been seen in a chain store. 
Elsewhere, wives of prominent citizens received letters from anonymous 
"friends" who sought to "advise" them against entering chains. But 
even many of those who considered it right to abuse the chains thought 
attempts to stigmatise or bully chain store customers were unethical and 
likely to lead to a hostile reaction. In general, attempts to "educate" 
public opinion did not go beyond the stage of making arguments,, just as 
attempts to close the chain stores did not go beyond trying to win back 
their customers. The small towns of the South did not resort to the 
ultimate sanctions of community discipline. No hooded men gathered 
outside the homes of chain store managers to burn fiery crosses; customers 
were not tarred and feathered on their return from shopping expeditions; 
chain stores did not have their windows broken or their doors daubed with 
painted slogans. Strong feelings were released., but they did not well up 
from the morbid depths of the psyche. 
31 
31. Progressive Grocer, March 1930, p. 60; 'Interqtate'Grocer, March 1, 
1930. Ernst and Hartl, "Chains Versus Independents. IV. The Fighting 
Independents" in The Nation, December 3,1930. s p. 606. Probably the most drastic action t against a chain store in 1930 occurred in St. 
Clairsville, Ohio. In earlier years, the local A&P had repeatedly 
failed to observe the proclamations of the city authorities requesting 
that all stores should close on Armistice Day; in 1930, a platoon of 
war veterans, led by the commander of the Belmont County American Legion, 
marched on the store wearing steel helmets and carrying rifles, and sent 
customers fleeing with a tear gas attack. After upsetting some displays 
and a fruit stand, the veterans posted a sign stating "Closed for the 
Day'l. Less significant, perhaps, than the attack itself - which was an 
isolated incident - was the community reaction. Customers in the store 
at the tire, who included the president of the St. Clairsville lst 
National Bank, declined to take any action or even to condemn the veterans 
who had driven them out into the street with eyes streaming. The veterans 
claimed that they had public support, and the A&P perhaps thought so too, 
for it filed no charges, although the culprits were all known. (Associated 
Press, in'M6ddrri 'Mdtchdftt 'Atd'Gt6ddxY'W6tldq November 22,1930; see 
also Iritetsstate'Gt6cer, November 159 22,1930). 
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Thus while a public sentiment developed, albeit briefly, that 
being seen in a chain store was just a little shameful, even in the 
"hottest" areas there was no consensus that a self-respecting person 
should not enter a chain store. The sin was regarded as a minor 
transgression, at worst, and no deep, dark, silent, implicit unity of 
purpose bound the people of the South or anywhere else on this matter. 
Many who felt that they "ought" to patronise the independent store 
nevertheless carried on going to the chain store because they liked its 
prices, and their struggles with their troubled consciences were usually 
perfunctory. There were, in addition, many others who made no secret of 
their belief that the chain stores had brought a lot of advantages. 
Thus, in the thirty small towns studied by the FTC, 180 people offered 
opinions unfavourable to chain stores, but no less than 162 gave favourable 
opinions. 
32 And, of course, consumers were capable of harbouring quite 
intense animosities to certain aspects of chain operation, without those 
animosities keeping them out of the stores. Probably rather few chain 
store customers, for instance, would have approved of the granting by 
manufacturers of secret rebates to chains when these denied the 
independents a fair chance to compete; likewise, those who crowded the 
aisles of the chain stores were quite capable of siding with the clerks 
and managers against the company, on the ground that they were local men 
32. FTC, Chain'Stbres. The Chain Stord'In'The Small'Town, pp. 56-9. 
Most of ýIýeT-opinions uuýfavourable to the chains emphg3r-sed the harm 
to the community; in contrast, only four statements directly 
criticised independents as being harmful to the community. Clearly, 
most people distinguished between materialistic considerationslon 
which the chains were praised, and moral or ideological consideratiore. 
which encouraged support for the independents. 
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who were badly oppressed by the "foreign" owners. 
33 When it came to 
trade-at-home boycotting their feelings and reservations were uniirportant: 
what mattered was simply whether or not they continued to spend their 
rjoney in the chain store. 
The high excitement of the merchants in the early part of 1930 
was fuelled by expectations that, as Henderson had expressed it, "we 
can drive them out in thirty days if you people will stay out of their 
stores". Many hoped, as Schulte predicted, that "it should not be too 
long now until tangible evidence will be appearing of wholesale closing 
of branches of chain stores", and local anti-chain groups competed to 
win "scalps" in the form of boarded-up chain stores. When independents 
began to realise that the chains were not in a state of collapse, they 
tended to relapse into pessimism and apathy, and real, if modest successes- 
a few new customers for the home stores,, a marginal neighbourhood chain 
store pushed over into the red ink columm - were forgotten. The very 
revivalist temper that whipped up feelings to such a frenzy in the early 
days ensured that disappointment would follow, and follow it soon did. 
By the end of June, with agitation rapidly dwindling, a worried Schulte, 
his initial hopes dashed, could only warn that "no mill wheel can be 
turned with water that has already gone over the dam". 
34 
That the agitators did have some effect was generally believed. 
H. M. Foster, a trade commentator who was usually well-informed about 
chain thinking, reported that it was "admitted by chain store men, that 
33. A dramatic illustration of this came in a store of the American 
Stores grocery chain in Annapolis, Md. in 1935, when a superintendent 
walked in on a busy Saturday night and abruptly, and publicly, told 
the manager and clerk they were dismissed because "Annapolis men don't 
produce". and were to be replaced by men from Baltimore. Several 
customers at once grabbed the superintendent, and he fell to the floor 
under a barrage of blows. The police rescued the hapless overseer 
from a hostile crowd which fast grew to several hundred and, his car 
tyres having been slashed by the mob, escorted him to the railroad 
station, from which he made his escape. The incident arose from 
dissatisfaction over the arbitrary "checking out" of chain store 
employees in the city. (jrjtdrstatd, Gt6derq August 31,, 1935). 
34. Interstate Grocer,, February 220 June 28,1930. 
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sales in the chain stores in the Middle West and South have fallen off 
a good deal lately, and the decline is attributed to Mr. Henderson". 
R. W. Lyons . while claiming that anti-chain propaganda would eventually 
work to the advantage of the chains by advertising them, also stated 
that sales "in some localities, have fallen off, occasionally as a 
result of the radio attacks, but generally as a result of business 
depression". There were also plentiful accounts of observed falls in 
chain patronage in some highly aroused towns. 
35 
But the chains did not come crashing down, and their sales reports 
did not suggest that such an eventuality was imminent. In February, 
1930, which was just about the peak month for anti-chain activity, S. H. 
Kress & Co., the leading Southern variety chain, achieved sales 6.5% 
in excess of those in February, 1929, with only 6.2% more stores. Such 
a performance compared favourably with that of the W. T. Grant Co., the 
New England variety chain, whose stores were well clear of the agitation, 
which increased sales by only 11.2% with 26.7% more stores. Whatever 
the local problems of the variety chains (the major type of chains in 
the small towns other than the groceries) overall their expansion continued 
quite steadily through the months of the Henderson agitation. Between 
October 1929 and July 1930, Woolworth made a net increase of 48 stores* 
(to a total of 1,871), Kresge of 77 stores (to a total of 645) and Kress 
of 11 (to 211). In each case, the total of stores operated was the same 
or higher in each successive month. In the department store fields 
Montgomery Ward found itself in heavy weather, its sales in February 1930 
being 1.3% below those in the same month in 1929. Howevers the principal 
cause of this malaise lay in the weaknesses of a management unused to 
running retail stores, rather than in the agitation. The J. C. Penney Co. - 
35. 'N. Y. 'Journal April 59 19 30; R. W. Lyons, "Are The Radio 
Attacks Hurting The Chain Stores? " 9 'AdVdttisirig'&'Sdlling,, June lls 19302 p. 88. 
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while admittedly less disliked - which was the established leading 
chain in the field, had February sales'19.4%'up on those in February, 
1929, and the 1,115 stores in operation in both periods showed an 
increase of 7.45%. 
36 
Particular attention was focussed on the sales of the big grocery 
chains. Henderson notwithstandings the two biggest groceries in 
Louisiana, the A&P and the H. G. Hill Stores, both increased the nurber 
of their units in the state in the early part of 1930. In the country 
as a whole, a sharp sectional patterm was apparent. In the first six 
months of 1930, Kroger and the National Tea Co., in the Midwest and 
border South, had sales 5.7% and 4.22%. respectively, below those in the 
same period in 1929. The A&P, with stores nearly everywhere, increased 
sales by 8.13%. and the First National Stores, in tranquil New England, 
increased sales by 19.3%. But the exact meaning of these figures was far 
from clear. Kroger and National Tea were plagued by management problems, 
which were met, in the case of Kroger, by a top-level purge in 1930, and 
in the National Tea persisted for several years: in contrast, First 
National was considered to be most effectively managed. To some extents 
the two big Midwestern chains were by 1930 suffering the consequences 
of over-expansion in the 1920s when many marginal stores were added. 
More importantly, the inpact of the depression also showed a marked 
sectional variation, with the South and interior states affected before 
the west and east coasts. Thus department store sales in the first six 
months of 1930 were 5% below the same period in 1929 in the country as 
a whole, but they were 8% lower in Minneapolis, 13% lower in Birmingham 
and 18% lower in Detroit. In contrast, sales were up by 1% in Boston 
36. of 'CtA-rdrit 'Biigiridss , April 1930, p. 44; ' '1931 
Siop lement 'tc5 'Survey 'of 'C-Urrent''Biltiridss , Table 82, p. 161; ' 'New 
York Times, March 5.79 1930. 
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and by 15% in New York. In that context, the varying experience of 
the grocery chains was to be expected, even if the exact influence 
of the various factors could not be apportioned. Independents welcoming 
new customers in the South and Midwest themselves noticed that not a 
few of those who offered themselves as new customers seemed to be . 
interested primarily in securing a source of credit because they had 
lost their jobs or feared they would. As the depression deepened, 
independents actually had cause to regret the appearance of some of 
these converts. 
37 
v. The Eclipse of W. K. Henderson 
Heavily preoccupied with the mounting difficulties of his iron 
works, which had passed into receivership, and disinclined to waste 
his energies during the radio "off-season" when reception was poor and 
audiences small, Henderson did little anti-chain broadcasting through 
the summer of 1930. He did, however, find time to launch the "Hello 
World" Trading Stamp Corporation, in conjunction with the president of 
the St. Louis Cardinals baseball club and a trading stamp promoter. 
The stamps were made available only to members of the MMM and, according 
to Henderson, were intended to help finance KWKH, but the scheme 
provoked a storm of protest from organised retailers. Trade associations 
had actively opposed trading stamp schemes for decades, securing 
restrictive legislation in many states, on the ground that they obliged 
the retailer to surrender part of his legitimate profit, encouraged 
37. Business Week,, May 7.19309 p. 15; 'Iriter-. tate'Grocer, July 19, 
August 16,1930; New York Times., August 109 1930; ' Retail'Ledgerg 
First August Issue, 1930. The A&P was so pleased with its 
performance that it acceded to a request by the Department of Commerce 
that its sales figures, hitherto normally shrouded in mystery, should 
be published to prove to the public that the depression was not really 
so bad as rumour would have it. 
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consumers to believe that those not giving stamps were overcharging, 
and involved retailers in giving away merchandise which other retailers 
sold to make a living. Only a tiny minority of merchants who regarded 
trading stamps simply as a sales promotion device, still used them: 
even the United, Cigar Stores,, the most renowned chain exponent of 
premium schemes in the past,, had given up,, and Henderson's critics 
were determined that trading stamps should not gain a new lease of life 
in the guise of an anti-chain promotion. The California R. G. A. recalled 
that it had led the opposition to Henderson at the NARG convention 
because "we feared that Henderson would fall into the hands of the Wall 
Street crowd and exploit the individual retailer for selfish profit". 
Now that fear had been confirmed, and "Henderson, once hailed as the 
Messiah of the Independent Retailer, now appears cast in the role of 
a Judas Iscariot who would betray his friends, the retailers, for a 
Bank Load of Silver". For his part, the NARG secretary, C. H. Janssen 
could only demand, "Upon what mat doth this our Caesar feed, that he 
is grown so great? "' 
At first, Henderson seemed inclined to carry on, but the opposition 
of even his most loyal supporters, and the reluctance of rank and file 
merchants to enter the scheme, led soon enough to a change of heart., and 
he disassociated himself from the promoting company. While some loyalists 
like George Schulte were then prepared to laud the way in which Henderson 
"when convinced he is wrong does not hesitate to change his coursel's 
the broadcaster had stirred up suspicion and resentment by his folly. 
1. Printers"Inks August 7.1930, "Henderson and Retailers Split on 
Trading Stamp Issue"; ''Retail Grocers, "Advocate (San Francisco) August 
299 1930; National Grocers' Bulletin, September 1930, "Trading Stamp 
Schemes". 
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Mere was more of an inclination to heed the warnings of C. H. Janssen 
that "the Retail Grocer cannot safely place his trust in an individual 
or organizations just because he or it professes to have received a 
call to leadership". 
In an endeavour to re-establish his crumbling position, Henderson 
announced that he would hold the first convention of the Merchant Minute 
Men, which anyone could attend. At the same time,, he made it clear that 
his interest in the cause was flagging, and his invitation was a rather 
surly one: "I've been fighting your battles for the last year", he told 
his listeners, "and if you're so cowardly and yellow that you won't 
come down here to this big meeting, I'll tell you right now that I won't 
let you mke a goat out of me any longer. I'll tell you right where to 
11 3 90 , 
The convention itself, which was held in late October, proved a 
fair success, drawing an attendance of one thousand, mostly retailers 
and wholesalers, but with a sprinkling from most walks of lifes who 
came from thirty states. At the convention, the movement was renamed 
the "Modern Minute Men of America",, the word "merchant" being dropped 
so as to signify that anyone could join. A board of directors was 
created, headed by Henderson himself, who was elected president "by 
acclamation". and plans were laid to create a new structure of meTrbership 
fees, 75% of which were to go towards the expenses of KWKH and central 
organisation, and the remainder to a proposed network of state Minute 
Men organisations. Apart from dealing with these practical matters$ the 
conventioneers enjoyed some rousing oratory. The Mayor of Shreveport 
2. N. Y. Journal of'CoTmerce, Septeuber 279 1930; *Interstate, Grocerg ' Septenber 20, October 4.19 , i'N. Ational'Gttddxgt'BU! letin, 
OctobeF 1930, 
"Whom Can We Trust? ". Henderson later announced that "It is human to err. 
I made a mistake and openly acknowledged it ... I hope it will be my last 
error - something I have my doubts about. Men who made no mistakes never 
accoriplished much". *(N. Y. J6urnal'6f'Cqmmetce, December 6.1930). 
3. Retail Ledger, First Novenber Issueq 1930. "Henderson Tires of Being 
A Goat, But -11. 
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welcomed them with the sentiment that "you are here to conbat an evil, 
a great menace"s and vigorous addresses were heard from well known 
opponents of the chains like John Cunningham,, George Schulte and Fred 
Mann, the owner of the Hann department store, Devil's Lake,, North 
Dakota, who was a merber of the board of the U. S. Charber of Commerce 
and the best known operator of a small department store in the country. 
An address was also heard from F. D. Laudemann, the man who had negotiated 
the agreement with Henderson to let the unions into the iron works, and 
Governor Huey Long delivered a characteristic speech, in which he 
declared the chain system a "slavery more devastating than in 1861". 
Less satisfying to the delegates were the contributions of Henderson, 
who proved a wretched speaker when not sniping in short bursts from 
behind his microphone, and of former Governor Charles Brough of Arkansas 
who spoke of his belief that boycotting could never put the chain stores 
out of business,, and declared that the chains gave honest weights and 
that he sometimes patronised them himself. Despite a heated backstage 
conference, the former Governor could not be induced to withdraw these 
obnoxious remarks. 
The convention also passed a lot of resolutions. The rRC was 
urged to give KWKH more power and an undivided channel; local tax 
officials were asked to be more vigilant in checking on reports made 
by chains of the value of stock and fixtures for property tax assessments; 
the Congress was requested to amend the Sherman act so as to eliminate 
the "rule of reason" read into it by the Supreme Court in the Standard 
Oil case. Other resolutions called for the "maintenance of the 
American standard of living" -a gesture to progressive and labour 
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opinion - and praised George Schulte for having "lighted the lamp which 
Mr. W. K. Henderson has held aloft" and Philip Lieber for his "intellectual 
leader-ship" .4 
At Shreveport were drawn together many of those who had, in their 
own home districts . developed and led the burgeoning anti-chain cause. 
But the assenbly did not open the gateway to an era of national organisation. 
It celebrated the triumphs of the previous year, rather than laid a 
substantial foundation for the future. Very few state organisations were 
formed to carry forward the work of the Minute Men. In Ohio, a packed 
inaugural rally responded so well to the speech of Henry McFerren, one 
of the MMM vice-presidents, and a blind man, that there were "plenty of 
tears in his audience and when he was through they almost tore the place 
down". In Louisiana, the Minute Men were organised by an elderly 
attorney from Tulsa, Colonel L. M. Mott, who had decided to devote his 
retirement to the fight against the chain stores. In South Dakota, a 
start was made with a meeting of two thousand in Sioux ralls. But 
elsewhere little happened. Schulte blared the habitual lethargy of the 
merchants, their tendency to wait on leaders to do it all for themg and 
the business depression which gave them other preoccupations. 
5 
4. This account of the convention is based on: InUPstatO'Grooeri 
October 25s 1930; 'N. Y. Journal'of Commerce, November 8.1930;, Maia-na 
Progress, October 30,1930; ''Neg*Orleans'Tinid: §-Picayune, October 23s 241, 
1930. The principal officers appointed were: Presidents Henderson; 
three Vice-Presidents, Fred Manns department store owner, Fred Marty, 
St. Louis grocer, and Henry McFerrens Tiffins Ohio, manufacturer; 
Treasurer, M. W. Cavanaugh, a Henderson aide and previously secretary of 
the Missouri-Kansas W. G. A. The rest of the board comprised three 
retail grocerss one wholesale grocer, two small manufacturers, one 
clothier, one bankers one coal dealer, one baker, and Philip Lieber. 
The difficulties of consistency were seen when one speaker "stated that 
he had observed many of the delegates in chain stores ... Another brought 
out the fact that delegates were stopping at a chain hotel and one 
stated that he moved his room when he found it out". 
5. Interstate Grocerg Decenber 6,139 20,1930; Nev: 'Orleana'Tims- 
Pi rune, Decerber 4.1930. 
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Henderson had apparently lost most of his interest in the chain 
store fight, and the merchants much of their interest in him. His 
image, already tarnished, suffered further damage when an FRC 
examiner's report was made public, which recomnended that his application 
for further power for KWKH be denied because of his bad language and 
because of his precarious and unsatisfactory financial condition. 
Henderson had, it was stated, diverted $151,800 of $373,500 received 
in Minute Men subscriptions to pay off the creditors of the iron works, 
and the examiner detected a "strong indication" that KWKH was "being 
used by an ingenious man for the purpose of soliciting funds for his 
personal aggrandizement and the settlement of his obligations". 
6 
Probably very few of his supporters were either scandalised or particularly 
surprised by the revelation. Most of the money had been sent to him as 
a reward for the broadcastings for Henderson to pay the expenses of KWKH 
and otherwise use as he saw fit. George Schulte had perhaps expressed 
their general attitude when he wrote that "We do not care whether 
Henderson makes a million or ten million out of it ... he deserves whatever 
he gets ... as nobody attempted to do what he has and none would have 
been interested unless he had taken the initiative". There was much 
more criticism amongst his supporters of the trading stamp scheme than 
of his appropriation of Minute Men money to subsidise his other business 
interests. Nevertheless, they could only be disappointed that Henderson, 
having made so much money out of them, rather lost his fire and his 
commitment once the funds ceased to flow. In the winter of 1930-311, 
Henderson in fact devoted most of his broadcasting time to other matters, 
including an attempt to raise money from railroad employees to finance 
6. Pusateri,, p. 403; 'Interstate 'Grc5cer, February 14,1931. 
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a fight against trucks and buses, and the plight of the South's 
cotton growers. Those who had flocked to the standard of the Minute 
Men in early 1930 came to the conclusion that their erstwhile leader 
was a spent force. Not surprisingly, when in late 1931, with his 
business affairs in ruin because of the depression, Henderson delivered 
himself of a pathetic plea for the merchants to "come back to this 
station" and send him money, there was little response. Through 1931 
and 1932 there were just occasional anti-chain broadcasts over KWKH, 
the most dramatic of which were those made by the Reverend G. L. K. 
Smith, then a little known preacher in Shreveport, who began his rise 
to fame with his performances over Henderson's station before continuing 
it on the coat-tails of Huey Long. 
7 
None of Henderson's money-making schemes seemed to work any mole. 
For eighteen months in 1931 and 1932, the staff of KWKH received only 
room and board, living at Kennonwood. Finally, the broadcaster's 
license came under challenge again and Henderson was no longer in a 
position to resist. His financial condition, the diversion of the 
Minute Men money, and his loss of the patronage of, the now Senator, 
Huey Longs with whom he had had a "falling out", all made the revocation 
of the license, without compensation, seem inevitable. To forestall 
this possibility and to pay his creditors, Henderson sold out for 
$50,000 to another company, headed by Shreveport oil man Samuel D. Hunter, 
in the spring of 1933. Although not quite the last had been heard of 
Henderson, the loss of his station was effectively the end of any 
possibility of a comeback. Ironically, after a further sales in 1935 
KWKH became the 100th affiliate of the CBS radio chain which Henderson 
had so often condemned. 
8 
7. Interttate'Gr6der, Februaxy 22,, November 15,1930; DeceTrber 12, 
19 31; March 5s 19 32. 
8. Pusateri, pp. 403-5; Stedman Gunning. 
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vi. 'The Decay, bf 'Trade-at-home agitation. 
The Minute Men novement was an affair of the spirit, a figment 
of a collective imagination. It was held together by the voice 
emanating from Radio KWKH, and when that voice fell to a whisper the 
Minute Men movement ceased to function,, without ever having assumed 
solid organisational form. Nothing arose to replace it,, and although 
local trade-at-home agitation persisted through 1931 and 1932, the 
level of activity was far lower than in 1930. 
Expectations also tended to become less utopian. Independents 
realised that mere sound and fury would not bring down the chains, and 
they adopted more conservative, long-range policies with an abandonment 
of the more extreme forms of denunciation. A model for the more cautious 
approach was the Wichita Independent Business Men's associations founded 
in May, 1931, which based its work on the theory that "Without public 
sentiment nothing can succeed; with public sentiment nothing can fail". 
Restrained policies attracted a wide range of independent interests; 
a clerks' auxiliary was formed; the public was reached by an unrelenting 
programme of pamphlets and lectures. To the delight of the association, 
the last A&P store in Wichita closed its doors in 1933.1 In some 
cities, the depression turned anti-chain associations into merchants' 
self-defence bodies. Thus the Syracuses N. Y., Civic Defense League 
care to the rescue of the grocers, the main part of its membership, when 
in 1932 the city threatened to open a commissary for direct distribution 
of relief to the unemployed because of the inefficiency of the existing 
system of relief orders made on grocery stores. The League raised 
determined oppositions and succeeded in negotiating an agreement with 
the city whereby the system of orders was maintained on a cost plus basis 
1. Modern 'Merdharit I'Grocery *World, April 29,1933. 
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(with a margin of 15%). The city probably gained from the arrangement - 
commissaries rarely worked well - and the scheme was credited with 
having saved large nuribers of grocers from ruin. 
2 In other towns, anti- 
chain bodies, in conjunction with regular trade associations, turned 
their energies to the fight to ensure that the independents got their 
share of relief orders and that everything did not go to the chains, 
which were often favoured by emergency relief committees because of 
their lower margins and the ease of dealing with them centrally. 
Independents in badly-depressed areas- who were carrying countless old 
customers on indefinite credit- saw no reason why the chains, which only 
sold for cash, should benefit from whatever profit there was in relief 
orders. 
3 
Most of the outside promoters and agitators who latched onto the 
chain store fight in 1930 deserted the field, or turned their attention 
to raising funds to "put over" chain tax laws. The deepening depression, 
and the scepticism of many merchants arising from the collapse of the 
Henderson agitation, meant that the pickings were no longer rich, and 
2. N. Y. Jourmal'of Commerce., April 169 239 1932; 'Moderri 'Merchant 
Grocery Worlds September 15,1934. 
3. For a description of the burden of unpaid accounts on small shopkeepers 
in one city, see Mauritz A. Hallgren, "Mass Misery in Philadelphia", The 
Nation, March 9,1932, s pp. 275-7. For a graphic general survey9 see the 
numerous local reports in American rederationist, January 19310 pp. 103- 
118. Typical comments: "Conditions in general are becoming more acute... 
Independent merchants are quite liberal in extending credit to well- 
meaning tradesmen. No chain stores extend credit for the necessaries of 
life". (Sioux Falls). "It is hard to get small loans unless high interest 
is paid. The home stores give credit" (Jacksonville, Ill. ). "The unemployed 
have virtually no way to meet their needs... The small corner groceries 
are really the only ones that give credit for the necessaries" (South 
Williamsport, Pa. ). "While small loans can be secured at a high rate of 
interest, yet I believe the small neighborhood stores are by far the best 
to the idle workers ... 11 (Youngstown, Ohio). "Home-owned stores are the 
only merchants that will extend credit" (Muskogee, Oakla. ). Trade journals 
repeatedly warned retailers against extending excessive credit, but to no 
avail. Those unfortunate enough to be situated in badly-depressed areas 
either had to give credit, or lose customers. Either course could end 
in ruin - or, rather, a sequence of unpaid bills stretching back to the 
jobber and his suppliers. 
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freelance agitators had to take on other interests to make a living. 
Thus Winfield Caslow, the "Main Street Crusader". while remaining 
available for anti-chain speaking engagements, also set himself up as a radio 
personality in Chicago, ran for Congress as a "New Deal" candidate from 
Grand Rapids in 1932, doing very well against the incumbent Republican Carl 
Mapes, and thens in 1933,, promoted a giant "depression money" scrip scheme 
back in Chicago, a scheme which eventually collapsed amid accusations of 
financial irregularities on Caslow's part. 
4 Most of the anti-chain 
newspapers which had sprung up in early 1930 folded up within weeks, 
rather than months, and their promoters disappeared as completely as did 
their newspapers. Rather few new such ventures were initiated in the next 
two or three years. Frederick Hardy, seeking anti-chain materials in 
1932-339 wrote to "all the known sources of anti-chain agitation". "Some 
did not reply at all; some sent literature which had been published from 
three to five years previously; and some wrote that their activities had 
ceased and their organization disbanded, because of lack of "moral and 
financial support from independent merchants"', I Henderson's reply put him 
in the last group. The only anti-chain literature that Hardy found which 
had been published since 1930 was a pamphlet "discovered accidentally 
upon a newsstand marked twenty-five cents, but sold for fifteen". Hardy 
overlooked some "sources of anti-chain agitation", notably the'Inter8tate 
Grocer, but his general inpression of a breakdown in the effort to take 
the chain store battle to the people was correct. 
5 
Radio broadcasting likewise petered out, and what there was took 
place over low-powered local stations. Perhaps the only radio campaign 
4. Grand Rapidg'Press, November 23,1934. 
5. rrederick K. Hardy,, The Special Taxation of Chain Stores_5 unpublished 
Ph. D. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1934 pp. 119-21. ror examples of 
anti-chain literature at this time , see the bibliography below. 
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of any great significance was that waged by a Catholic priest, rather 
James R. Cox, over a Pittsburgh station in the winter of 1931-2, under 
the sponsorship of the Independent Retail Merchants' Association of 
Allegheny County. Cox's warnings against the chains were given added 
weight by his popularity in the city. His church, Old St. Patrick's. 
was the focus of charitable relief for Pittsburgh's unerployed, and 
Cox himself was elected "Mayor of Shantytown" by the inhabitants of 
the city's "Hooverville". In early January, 1932, the independent 
merchants' association helped the priest to organise an orderly and 
patriotic "march on Washington" designed to represent to the federal 
government the urgency of the need for relief and jobs. On January 6. 
the "army", estimated to nunber 15,000, arTived in Washington by car, 
truck and foot, and Father Cox presented petitions to Congressmen and 
to President Hoover. On his return to Pittsburgh, Father Cox told a 
rally of 55,000 at the Pittsburgh University stadium that he had begun 
"a movement which shall determine whether our government shall be the 
voice of Wall Street or Main Street" and announced plans to form a 
; 3obless Party, with himself as its presidential candidate, if relief 
was not quickly provided. 
6 
Cox had high hopes for his Jobless Party. He warned that it was 
"either my party or communism", and forecast that a convention planned 
for St. Louis in August would attract one million. In fact, only a few 
hundred, most wearing the blue shirt uniform of the party, made the 
trip to St. Louis. Plans to fuse the Jobless Party with the Liberty 
Party, which was headed by William H. Harvey, the 80-year old veteran 
of populist causes and the author of. Coin't. Financial School, also 
came to nothing. Harvey and Cox could not agree which of them should 
6. Interstate Groderg November 1+,, 1931, January 2,, 1932; 'NevvYcrk 
Time7s-, January 69 70 175 1932; Bernsteing'Thd Lean'Years, p. 432; 
'Hardware Retailer, April 19329 p. 82. 
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be the presidential candidate, and the Liberty Party faithful, who 
had been expecting a joint convention, instead gathered in a field 
about a mile away from the speedway grandstand which accommodated 
the relly of the "Blueshirts". Running separately, both Cox and 
Harvey failed farcically. Harvey got only a token vote in the 
presidential election (53,425) and Cox, who ran out of money and 
failed in health and so had to abandon active campaigning, received 
only 704 votes, the lowest of any candidate that year. Both the Liberty 
and Jobless parties condemned chain stores - the Liberty Party platform 
denouncing the "national octopus" for depressing farm prices - but in 
neither case was the chain store question given particular prominence, 
the main issues being public works, the veterans' bonus, prohibitions 
the 30-hour week, farm relief, the banking system and unemployment 
insurance. The concern of these fringe parties about the chain stores 
made no impact on the campaign waged by the major party candidatess 
Hoover and Roosevelt, but it did indicate that the chain store was on 
the political agenda of the disaffected, albeit only in the fine print. 
7 
The dwindling away of campaigns to turn public opinion against 
the chains did not indicate that independent merchants felt any less 
strongly. On the contrary, the depression intensified antagonism. 
Neither was the decline wholly, or even largely, due to disillusiong 
shortage of funds, or the organisational collapse and decay shown by 
virtually every type of body during these years,, from labour unions to 
the U. S. Congxess itself. Rather, independents turned theirattentions 
towards a legislative attack, in the form of chain tax laws. As of 
1930, the independents had no good legislative stick with which to beat 
the chains, for although several states had passed chain tax laws, the 
7. New'Y6rk'Tires,, April 3,18; July 17, August 15,17, October 13, 
DeceTrber 25,1932; ' 'Irit6r9tat6 Gt6derq August 6,, 1932. 
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courts had invalidated them. Indeed, many independents believed they 
would get nowhere with legislation until they had won the "educational" 
debate. But in May, 1931, the U. S. Supreme Court transforned the 
situation by upholding an Indiana chain tax statute, and independents, 
having lost much of their faith in headlong assaults on the chains 
through trade-at-home agitation., moved to test this new line of attack. 
Hundreds of chain tax bills were introduced into state legislatures in 
the following two years. 
The strategy of the NCSA demonstrated a parallel shift. In the 
period before May, 1931, the association relied on a continued long- 
range attempt to build a favourable public opinion. Symptomatic of 
this approach was the zeal shown by the NCSA in trying to influence the 
minds of the' political and civic leaders of the future by distributing 
vast nurbers of "debate handbooks" to schools and colleges. The 
independents in most cities failed to rake an adequate reply and$ not 
surprisingly, students taking the pro-chain side won 80% of the 5,000 
debates on the "chain store question" held in schools and colleges in 
the academic year 1930-31. In addition, the pro-chain side won 9 of 
the 11 state high school debating championships where this was the topic. 
8 
This was, no doubt, an approach of some relevance to countering trade- 
at-home feeling, and as an insurance for the future, but it was of little 
use to stop an immediate legislative threat. After the Supreme Court 
decision, the chains had to come to grips with case-hardened politicians, 
who cared more about votes than about the elegance of debating argument. 
Thus the emphasis was hastily moved from "education" to lobbying. 
B. Chain Store 'Pr6gresss July 1931, p. 2. 
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Trade-at-home agitation satisfied the desire of frustrated 
independents for action, and it released aggression built uly' during 
the 1920's. On balance,, however, it probably did mom to raise the 
norale of independents than to frighten chain store ren. In the 
years 1927-1930, militant leaders like George Schulte had the greatest 
hopes that this sort of agitation would rout the chains, and although 
the events of 1930 proved that it would not, the whole assault on the 
chains had been launched, and legislative strategies evolved, before 
that discovery was made. If this preliminary agitational barrage did 
not exactly soften up the chain store enemys it did at least encourage 
the independents to core out of the trenches in which they had cowered 
for most of the 1920's. and grapple with their foes. It also 
persuaded politicians, who had the sounds of battle ringing in their 
ears, that they had been suzmoned to do their duty. 
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PART 3. The Legislative Attack: the development of the chain store 
tax, 1927-1935. 
i. 192018'Expeiýiments. 
The first chain tax bill was introduced in Missouri in 1923. The 
State legislature considered a bill sponsored by a short-lived federation 
of St. Louis retailers, the Association Opposed To Branch Stores, which 
proposed graduated license taxation of all chain stores, beginning with 
a fee of $500 on the second store of the chain. The bill also provided 
that no person, firm or corporation might operate more than ten stores 
in Missouri. 1 
The bill did not pass, and it was premature. Even many of its 
supporters admitted that it was politically impossible at that time, and 
that it would certainly have been ruled unconstitutional in the courts. 
2 
1. Intergtate'Grocer, Feb. 10,, 179 1923; 'Nev: York Times, March 18, 
1923. Hardy, -Tho'Sp6cial'Taxation'of Chai-nFStores p. 128 refers to 
a Delaware statute of 1917, imposing a flat fee of $10, and a small 
levy on inventory, on branch stores of companies having their principal 
place of business outside the state. This was so mild that it was not 
contested in the courts. Hardy also,, p. 180, notes that Cedar Rapids* 
Iowa, in 1918 attempted to include chain stores under an ordinance 
requiring a license fee of $10 per day from itinerant vendors. The 
Iowa Supreme Court ruled the attempt unconstitutional, on the ground 
that chain stores were not itinerant vendors. State v. Cater, 184 
Iowa 667,169 N. W. 43. In 1923, the Missouri bill was spoken of as 
the first anti-chain bill, and it was certainly the first to arise from 
the activity of an anti-chain organisation. For general details of 
chain tax statutes: Maurice W. Lee, Anti-Chain Store Tax Legislation-s 
University of Chicago, Studies in Business Administration vol. 9 no. 4. 
1939; Nichols,, The Cha-En Store Tells Its Storyý pp. 127-186; C. F. 
Phillips, "State Discriminatory Chain Store Taxation ::. Harvard Bus. Rev. 
vol. 14, April 1936, pp. 349-359; Alfred G. Buehler ýrZi_-Chal-nStore 
Taxation". Jnl. of Business, vol. 4. October 1931, pp. 349-369; FTC,, 
Final Report of the'Chain-store Inquiry, pp. 78-82; Yale Law Journal 
vol. 40, pp. 431-441; Col. Law Rev vol. 31, pp. 145-154; Harvard 
Law Rev. vol. 44, pp. 456-460. See Appendix Table "State Aný_tT-_C_h`a1'n 
Store Tax Legislation". p . 456 , for bills introduced by year. 
2. Interstate Grocer, Nov. 4,1922; February 24,1923. 
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For nearly four years more, only the most desultory interest was 
shown in the idea that the chains could be attacked by legislation. 
Chain tax bills were considered by the legislatures of Virginia and 
Mississippi, but were not enacted. Two or three cities also contemplated 
proposals for municipal chain tax ordinances. Ashland, Ky. adopted a 
chain tax, but subsequently repealed it, apparently after pressure from 
the NCSGA. Danville, Ky. passed an ordinance which required a license 
fee of $50 from each cash and carry grocery store, and of only $12 from 
the regular service grocery: in effect, if not in form, an anti-chain 
measure. The ordinance was, however, invalidated by the Kentucky Court 
of Appeals, which found in the "mere details" of credit and delivery no 
sufficient distinction to sustain a separate classification for taxing 
3 
purposes. 
Any greater interest in the idea of anti-chain legislation was 
inhibited by the general belief that the courts would prove an 
insurmountable obstacle. The closest direct precedents were not 
encouraging. At the turn of the century, Missouri had attempted to 
meet the competitive "menace" of the fast-growing big city department 
store by imposing license taxation. A law was enacted which imposed a 
license fee of $500 on each of a number of specified departments 9 in 
excess of one, in stores employing more than 15 people,,, in cities of 
over 50,000 population. However, the law had been ruled unconstitutional 
on the ground that the classification attempted was arbitrary and 
unreasonable. A similar fate had befallen a parallel Chicago ordinance. 
As the courts were considered to have become, if anything, less receptive 
to legislation of this general character and intent over the intervening 
years, the auguries were not good. At least until 1930, chain store men, 
3. Interstate Grocer, March 22,1924; rebruary 5,1927; 'Nat. Grocerst 
Bulletin,, April 1925, "Taxing Chains in Kentucky"; gity of Danville V. 
Quaker Maid Inc. 43 A. L. R. 590. 
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and most lawyers, expressed a strong conviction that the courts would 
not tolerate any form of anti-chain legislation and that in the 14th 
Amendment lay the guarantee of security for the chains. 
4 
This attitude was little less prevalent among independents. Even 
the few convinced advocates of anti-chain legislation saw it essentially 
as a long-term strategy and, moreover, as one inferior in likely 
consequences to the effort to whip up trade-at-home feeling in the 
public at large. In the early years - certainly before 1931 - the 
legislative attack was very much the second string to the anti-chain 
bow. Furthermore, militants also saw it as logically secondary. They 
did not expect that the legislatures would pass, and the courts approve, 
anti-chain legislation until such time as public opinion had been 
aroused to the "menace" of the chains. 
In that respect, the fate of the anti-department store laws was 
not so discouraging. The campaign against department stores had been 
but weakly and briefly prosecuted, and it had produced only the two 
pieces of tax legislation. The example held in mind by chain tax 
advocates was, rather, that of the long, hard and ultimately successful 
effort to secure constitutional legislation to curb, by license fees, 
the use of coupons, premiums and trading stamps. 
5 
In 1916, the U. S. Supreme Court had upheld Washington State and 
Florida anti-coupon and trading stamp laws,, even though the license fees 
involved were clearly designed to regulate and prohibit rather than to 
raise revenue. 
6 In so doing, the Court had reversed a long sequence of 
decisions in other courts in which such laws had been held violative of 
4. Columbia'Law'Rev. vol. 31, P. 145; State v. Ashbrook 154 Mo-375,55 
S. W. 627 (1900ý-. 
5. Interstate'Grocer, March 10,1923; April 27,1927. 
6. Washington imposed a $6,000 license fee on each merchant using coupons 
or trading stamps; in Florida he was required to pay a license tax of 
$750 for himself, and for every person or firm who redeemed the coupons. 
Rast v. Van Deman &'Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342 and Tanner v. Little. 240 U. S. 
369. Both decided March 6.1916. 
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the equal protection of the laws afforded by the 14th Amendment,, and 
instead deferred to the insistent pressure of the legislatures in favour 
of such legislation, which had found expression in the adoption of 
anti-coupon laws in 26 states in the years 1888-1915. In deciding these 
cases the Supreme Court had bent over backwards to accommodate the 
legislatures. Most other courts had found in the coupon and trading stamp 
schemes merely a form of legitimate advertising, involving no lottery or 
deception or anything else inimical to public health, morals or safety; 
the Supreme Court, in contrast, scarcely able to deny that such was, on 
the surface, so, had stretched the public welfare argument almost to 
breaking point by offering hazy speculations that such schemes might "by 
an appeal to cupidity lure to improvidence" and that, although not 
lotteries, they could be seen as having the "seduction and evil of such". 
7bus, the Court had deftly observed that "it can be argued" that the 
reasoning of the other courts had been based on consideration of the 
"mere mechanism of the schemes alone and does not give enough force to 
their influence upon conduct and habit, not enough to their insidious 
potentialities. As to all of which not courts but legislatures may be 
the best judges and, it may be, the conclusive judges". 
7 
In the early years of the chain tax effort, the trading stamp 
victory was often cited as evidence that persistent pressure could pay 
off. The legislatures had been moved by the demands of the trade; and 
the courts, eventually, by the demands of the legislatures, The root 
of that whole controversy was the belief of the great majority of 
merchants that coupon and trading stamp schemes forced them to give up 
part of their profit, to the advantage only of the manufacturers and the 
customers. However, as finally approved by the Supreme Court,, such 
legislation took all the trappings of measures intended to serve some 
great purpose of public morality. In view of that, it was at least 
7.240 U. S. 363-3659 375. 
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conceivable that one day the Supreme Court might be moved, in the face 
of a similar legislative insistence, to discover that the chain stores 
also had "insidious potentialities" deserving of punishment and 
regulation. In the mid and late 1920ts the chains, and big business in 
general, were enjoying a period of moral and political ascendancy: in 
the short term, their position seemed impregnable. Nevertheless, the 
opponents of the chain store were well aware that,, if the future was to 
be anything like the past, there was likely eventually to be a reaction 
and a revival of feeling against the "trusts" which would work to their 
advantage, first in the legislatures and finally, perhaps, in the courts. 
Their belief was that by arousing a broader agitation against the chains 
they could pave the way for an effective legislative attack; and that if 
many, and varied, anti-chain bills were offered around the country, a few 
could get passed, and even if the courts rejected them all, at least the 
ball would be rolling. 
It was in 1927, in step with the burgeoning trade-at-home movement, 
that the drive for anti-chain legislation really began. In late 1926, 
NGSGA general counsel Clark McKercher had been able to assure the chain 
convention that "strike legislation in states and cities seems to have 
gone out of style". In the previous year, their independent grocer 
competitors had, in most states, shown more interest in legislation to 
curb peddlers than in any struggle with a giant adversary. However$ the 
new year brought anti-chain bills in at least a dozen state legislatures$ 
and the enactment of the first anti-chain laws. The NCSGA, the only 
chain organisations was unable to meet the pressure, and frantic calls 
went out for non-member grocery chains and chains in other lines to 
provide assistance in the lobbies and before legislative committees. 
iso. 
7bis unpleasant and unpredicted experience. provided a considerable 
impetus towards the formation of the NCSA the following year. 
8 
In 1927, North Carolina and Georgia passed chain tax laws. The 
North Carolina statute required payment of a license fee of $50 for 
each store of a chain operating more than five stores; Georgia imposed 
a tax of $250 on each store in excess of five. 
9 As with all chain tax 
statutes there was, of course, no attempt to levy a tax on stores beyond 
the borders of the taxing state; and, as with all chain tax statutes 
before 1934 (Louisiana), and nearly all thereafter, the liability for 
taxation was determined solely on the basis of operations within the 
taxing state. Thus a chain with fewer than six stores in North Carolina 
was not liable under its chain tax, however many stores it might have 
elsewhere. 
Several states in 1927, among them Kansas (where the retail, grocers' 
association produced the model bill), Iowa, Wisconsin and Arkansas, 
considered bills which sought to prohibit altogether the operation of 
more than five stores under common ownership in the state. 
10 Such bills 
reflected the belief that a man should be allowed full freedom to own a 
handful of stores, but that five was "enough for anybody". In Maryland, 
a bill inspired by the Kansas model was actually enacted into law, but 
with application only to Allegany county, which contained only a few 
dozen chain stores. The bill, a last-minute substitution for a statewide 
measure, was sponsored by John G. Lynn, a wholesale grocer in Cumberland, 
the seat of Allegany county: it passed rapidly, with little scrutiny 
from the legislature as a whole, thanks to the unanimous backing, of the 
Allegany county delegation. Whether a statewide measure could have passed 
8. Chain'Store 'Age_, Nov. 1926, Proceedings of 6th NCSGA Convention; 
Chai7n Store Age, October 1927, NCSGA Convention Proceedings, report of 
Clark McKercher. 
9. Laws of North Carolina, 1927, ch. 80; Laws of Georgia, 1927, p. 89. 
10. Chain Store Age,, June 1927 describes bills; Interstate Grocer, 
February 26,1927. 
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may be doubted, but Maryland grocers hoped that the Allegany county 
measure could be extended to the rest of the state if it survived the 
courts. Unfortunately for their plans, the statute was so confused 
in its phrasing that it stood no chance in the courts. Although the 
intention had been to prohibit chains of more than five stores in 
Allegany county, a taxing provision had been tacked on, apparently as 
a sort of back-up provision, and this made the statute incomprehensible, 
the stores in excess of five apparently being not only prohibited but 
taxed $500 as well. 
This garbled enactment was actually the first state anti-chain law 
ever passed, and it was the first to produce a court opinion, handed 
down in April, 1928. The preceding trial before Judge Albert A. Doub 
in Allegany county circuit court provoked great interest. A battery of 
attormeys from leading national chains were on hand to support the case 
of the plaintiff, Keystone Stores Co., a Pittsburgh grocery chain operating 
nine stores in Allegany county. On the other side, the presentation of 
evidence by the local independents was assisted by George Schulte and 
R. H. Rowe, the secretary of AWGA. 7bere was no real expectation that the 
law would be upheld, if only because it was unclear in its terms, but the 
verdict of the Court came as a sweeping victory for the chains. In the 
common practices of the chains referred to by the independentso such as the 
use of loss leaders, the receipt of extra quantity discountso cash and 
carry, and the export of funds to remote headquarters cities, Judge Doub 
found nothing of "essential characteristics ... distinguishing them from 
independent stores in such a way that they can be made a basis for a 
11. Maryland Laws of 1927,, ch. 554. For some conflicting descriptions 
of the meaning of the law: Col. Law Rev. vol. 31, p. 146; Buehler,, 
"Anti-Chain Store Taxation"', p. 350; National 'GrOcýerld'BUlldtin,, 1927 
Convention edn. p. 78. 'Intetostate GrLcer, April 16,1927 gives the 
history of the law. 
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separate legal classification". The judge warmly praised the chains, 
and declined to see them as an appropriate object for the regulation 
contemplated by the statute. "Nothing in the record even remotely tends 
to show any relation of this act to protection of the general public in 
health, morals, good order, security, or general welfare". On the 
contrary, the chains provided clean and sanitary stores, made rapid stock 
turns which kept goods fresh, did not delude the consumer by extending 
him credit for goods he could not afford, paid regular rentals, gave 
steady euployment, and sold at lower prices. The judge could see why 
owners of coupeting stores might wish to see the chains put under 
restriction, but no reason why the public interest required nny such 
action. "Looking at the community as a whole ... (the chain stores)... 
are more likely to give to the farmer, truckman and consumer part of the 
middleman's profit and so to become a blessing to society and the public 
generally". In all, the chains had "perhaps become essential to the 
efficient distribution of merchandise to the general public". 
12 
The North Carolina and Georgia tax laws also fell in the courts. 
I 
In both cases the basic objection of the courts was that there was no 
"real and substantial difference" between the ownership of more than 
five stores and less than five stores which could justify a separate 
classification for taxation purposes. 
13 
Judicial disapproval was also laid upon another anti-chain act of 
1927, affecting only drug chains. Pennsylvania passed a law which 
12. Keystone GroceEX & Tea Co. v. Huster, Circuit Ct. of Allegany Cty., 
April 21,1928. The decision was unreported, but can be found in full 
in Chain*Stores In The LaO'Cdtirts . N. Y. 1939 (limited circulation, T- 
coTrq1le-dbyv ýE. W. Simns for the Institute of Distribution) at pp. 1-17. 
See also'Wall Street Journal, April 27,1928., Int6rstate'Grocerq Feb. 
25,1928 gives a detailed a unt of the trial. No appeal was made. 
13. See Great A&P Tea Co. v. Dou%zhton. 196 N. C. 145,144 S. E. 7019 (1928). 
The same fate befell a 1928 South Carolina statute taxing stores in 
excess of 5. 
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required that only a licensed pharmacist could own a drug store, and 
that, in the case of associations and corporations, all the menbers and 
stockholders had to be licensed pharmacists. Exception was made to 
allow the continued operation of drug stores which were in existence at 
the time of passage of the act and whose owners were not pharmacists. 
The law was essentially just another variation on the pharmacy laws, 
whereby the drug trade was kept as far as possible as a closed and self- 
regulating profession, but it was a variation with a decidedly anti-chain 
twist. The law was challenged in the courts by the Liggett Co., many of 
whose stockholders - as indeed Liggett himself - were not licensed 
pharmacists. 
14 
The statute was upheld in Federal District Court, on the theory that 
the regulation of a profession involved principles different from those 
applicable to an ordinary trade or occupation. The Court considered that 
the legislature may have been motivated by the thought that a corporate 
owner, in purchasing drugs, "might give a greater regard to the price than 
to the quality" and accepted this as a reasonable concern. The reasoning 
of the Court was not, however, based on any evidence of adverse 
consequences to the public welfare arising from the fact that owners of 
drug chains were not pharmacists. Instead the Court seemed influenced by a 
rather dubious historical parallel: 
A nunber of years ago the business of selling liquor 
was wholly in the hands of those who sold it. 
Innkeepers and tavern keepers stood high in the respect 
of their neighbors. The practice grew up of brewers 
and distillers taking over the ownership of places where 
intoxicating liquors were sold. The saloon, when 
ownership and management became separated, soon became 
a nuisance and a menace, so that its abolishment was 
demanded, and no one at any time would wish to witness 
its return. 15 
14. Pennsylvania statutes, Supplenent 19289 sec.. - 9377; Lebhar, 
, 
Chairi'Stor6: 9 'in 'Am6tica (1963), p. 136. 
15. Louis K. LigRett Co. v. Baldriýyeq 22 Fed (2d) 9939 996. Dist. Ct. 
E. D. Penna., Dec. 8,1927. 
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The United States Supreme Court then took the, case on appeal, and, 
in a decision handed down on Noventer 19,1928, ruled the law 
unconstitutional. Justice Sutherland, giving the opinion of the majority, 
showed himself as unimpressed by the argument of the lower court. The 
State's pharmacy laws already adequately safeguarded the public health, 
Sutherland found, because the actual conduct of a drug store had to be 
in the charge of a licensed pharmacist, and none but a licensed pharmacist 
could compound prescriptions. In the light of this, "mere stock ownership 
in a corporation, owning and operating a drug store, can have no real or 
substantial relation to the public health". No evidence to the contrary 
had been adduced. The statute therefore denied the equal protection of 
the laws guaranteed by the l4th Amendment, and constituted an arbitrary 
interference with the exercise of an ordinary property right. 
16 
Although Justice Holmes dissented, with Brandeis joining in his 
opinion, his argument did not effectively contradict the logic of the 
majority. Holmes declared that a "standing criticism of the use of 
corporations in business is that it causes such business to be owned by 
people who do not know any thing about it". but he did not explain how 
this condition had produced harm to the public in the case of drug chains* 
or how such a criticism applied with more force to drug chains than to, 
any other type of corporation. Could the state therefore use its police 
power in this way to curb any type of corporation, without any clear and 
explicit evidence of a danger to the public welfare? Such seemed to be 
the underlying logic of the dissent, and it conformed to the general 
attitude of Justice Holmes that the Court should not set itself up to 
arbitrate in social and economic controversies in such a way as to detract 
from the responsibilities and rights of the State legislatures. This 
16. LouiS_K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridget 278 U. S. 105 112-113. 
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rather old-fashioned view of the function of the Court was, in 1928, 
most emphatically not shared by the majority, who would clearly not 
tolerate any arbitrary restriction on chain store corporations where 
such restriction was justified only by vague reference to the police 
17 
power. 
Thus when the Courts were through with the anti-chain laws of 1927, 
chain executives had every reason to feel secure in the belief that 
independents were wasting their time and money in pressing for such 
legislation. Even if the politicians could be induced to pass such laws 
because the "boys back home" found the chains an obnoxious menace, it 
seemed impossible that the courts could be so stampeded. The various 
decisions seemed to mean that the chains could not be singled out for 
special taxation, because of the absence of a substantial difference 
from other retailers to justify separate classification, and that, in 
the view of the courts, the chains should not be singled out for 
regulation under the police power because they were not a menace to the 
public welfare. 
Despite these setbacks, the demand for anti-chain legislation 
continued to mount. Its character changed, however. The invalidation 
of the Pennsylvania drug store law killed off further efforts in that 
direction, and the anbitions of the druggists to capitalise on their 
special status as a profession to gain a type of protection from the 
chains denied to other retailers came to naught. Over the next few 
years, the organised drug trade in fact concentrated its political 
energies largely on the pursuit of resale price maintenance and of 
pharmacy laws to keep drug items confined to drug stores, chain or 
independent alike. Similarly, bills proposing the outright abolition 
17. Ibid. p. 114; ' 'Yal(ý 'Law, Jou=als vol. 40, p. 435. 
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of chain stores were generally abandoned as hopeless and utopian. 
Instead, most of the 142 anti-chain bills offered in 1929 and 1930 
proposed relatively nodest schedules of chain taxation, usually graduated 
according to nunber of stores; and the main weight of justification was 
shifted from the police power to the revenue power of the states. 
18 
The aim was to establish the principle that the chain could be made 
subject to special taxation, without becoming bogged down in debate as 
to whether the chains were a public menace. After 1928, the futile 
extremism of the early anti-chain legislative proposals gave way to years 
in which the principles, legislative appeal, and constitutionality of 
chain taxation were established step by step. 
ii. GradUatqd'Salog'TaXosý 1930`1933. 
Before the onset of the depression, sales taxes were little known 
in the United States, except for taxes levied against specific merchandise 
such as tobacco and gasoline. Only in West Virginia (from 1921) was a 
general tax on retail sales employed as a significant element in the 
overall tax structure. The sales tax was, indeed, commonly regarded as 
a peculiarly "bad" tax, being regressive in its impact on consumersq and 
was also thought of as likely to be hard to enforce. In addition, the 
federal nature of the United States carried with it problems not experienced 
in some other countries, for each state feared that if it imposed a sales 
tax its consumers would cross state lines to buy - either in persons or 
by making interstate mail order sales. The fiscal needs of the States 
in the 1920's were not so great as to outweigh these negative 
considerations, whereas necessity and expediency had compelled the 
18. Georgia, however, in 1929 reenacted its invalidated 1927 chain tax 
law, this time specifically framed as an application of the police power. 
Ga. Laws of 1929 p. 71. The State Supreme Court found the police power 
was not involved in chain store taxation and invalidated. (F. W. 
Woolworth Co. v. Harrison,, 171 Ga. 8919 156 S. E. 904). 
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imposition of sales taxes on a worldwide scale in the financial chaos 
of the years 1918-1923. The spread of sales taxes to a majority of the 
American states in the 1930's was similarly compelled by necessity and 
expediency. 
1 
This was, at least, certainly the case with the usual form of the 
sales tax, where the tax was applied at a uniform flat-rate on all retail 
sales. Following West Virginia (1921) and Georgia (1929) such taxes 
were in effect in 14 states by the end of 1933, among them New York, 
California and Illinois. Eleven of these sales taxes were made law in 
1933, the year in which all scruples were abandoned as the legislatures 
cast about for new revenues to meet the burdens of expenditure which 
failed to decline as fast as revenues. In general, the main advocates 
of the flat-rate sales taxes were those who had most to gain from any 
reduction in the pressure on the property tax: real estate interestss 
utilities, landowners. Support also came sometimes from those whose 
incomes were directly tied in td new revenue being found,, notably 
schoolteachers. Opposition came from labour unions, the more radical 
farm organisations, and above all, from retailers. Although these taxes 
were not - by the standards of a later day - unduly onerous (none in 1933 
was higher than 3%, and most were well below) many retailers had a great 
dread of the sales tax, believing it difficult to pass on to consumerss 
and that it would demoralise trade, and this attitude only relaxed slowlys 
as experience proved it largely unfounded. Leader-ship for retailer 
opposition to flat-rate sales taxes was usually provided by the department 
stores, but it was not an issue on which the big and the small retailer 
1. Carl Shoup, -The'Sales'Tax'InIhe American'States., N. Y. 1934, pp. 3-8. 
The problem of sales made in interstate commerce was met by "use" taxes, 
designed to equalise the tax as between goods sold in purely intrastate 
commerce and those sold by mail order etc. Such legislation was approved by 
the U. S. Supreme Court in 1937. (300 U. S. 577). However, unlike in many 
other countries, sales taxes were not applir-ed to sales by wholesalers or 
manufacturers, except at nominal rates: immobile "sitting ducks", extractive 
industries and utilities, were sometimes hit by sales taxes. 
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had much cause to disagree. The 1929 Georgia sales tax, the first of 
the wave, was notable for its exemption of the first $30,000 of sales, 
but small retailers were not normally so favoured in other states; in 
addition, small retailers, because of "economic friction" with the consumer - 
especially where they dealt in necessities - often had most trouble in 
passing the tax on. 
2 
Graduated sales taxes had a different genesis and motivation. Such 
taxes were actively sought by anti-chain small retailers, even where they 
involved a small burden on themselves, because of the graduated impact. 
N They were not favoured by the interestsusually found backing flat-rate 
sales taxes. Between 1930 and 1933 such taxes were passed in six states. 
By 1933, the graduated form of the tax was very much the minor alternative, 
whether measured in terms of number of states with such laws9 the revenues 
produced, or the size of the taxing states; in later years, crippled by 
court decisions, and the desire of states to maximise revenues, the 
graduated form disappeared. Howevers for a few years, the graduated sales 
tax did pose a considerable threat to the chains. It appealed to 
independents becauses unlike the license tax, it hurt all chains equally, 
and caught those such as Sears, Roebuck with few stores but large sales. 
It also appealed to chain tax advocates as it gave them an opportunity to 
hitch their cause, albeit rather insecurely, to the fast-accelerating 
sales tax bandwagon. The menace to the chains lay in the risk of 
legislatures seizing on the graduated form as an easy way of conferring 
popular appeal on a generally unpopular type of tax. 
From the first, the graduated sales tax involved anti-chain campaigners 
in strife which did their cause no good at all: internecine strife. 
Unlike the license tax, the graduated sales tax hit not just chains but 
2. Shoup, pp. 7-249 102-103; Buehler,, 'Anti -.; Chain, Store 'Taxation,, p. 362. 
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department stores and, to varying degreesgother large independent 
stores. Graduated sales tax bills in the mid-1930s got round this 
prx)blem by exerfpting the single store from its provisions, but this 
was not the case with most of the bills offered 1930-1933. Many 
reasons lay behind this: a belief that it would be unconstitutional 
to exempt single stores was sometimes heard; a degree of animosity 
towards the department stores; a conviction that the legislators 
could only be interested if the prospective revenues were inflated by 
payments from the individual stores. This circumstance made the 
graduated sales tax a source of far greater internal controversy within 
the ranks of the retailers than the license tax ever was, and sometimes 
allowed the chains to hide behind the skirts of the department stores,, 
which were often politically well placed. and always sure of good 
treatment by the newspapers, which, in the cities, were absolutely 
reliant on their advertising. 
The first such tax passed in Kentucky in March 1930, at the height 
of the Henderson agitation, and it threw this split in the merchant ranks 
into sharp relief. Some sort of chain tax law was just about guaranteed 
passage in Kentucky that year. Governor rlem D. Sampson had called in his 
annual message for legislation to curb the chains which "like great 
octopuses, are reaching their long viper-like tentacles into every nook and 
cranny of our country to suck the life blood from our home people", and 
both he and his attorney-general made rousing broadcasts over KWKH. Sampson's 
fervour was no less great for his having apparently never said anything 
against the chains before the advent of W. K. Henderson, and his mood was 
shared by many in legislature. At first, the favoured anti-chain bill 
was for a graduated license tax, but, discouraged by an unfavourable 
ruling on the Indiana License tax made on February lst in Federal 
District Court, the sponsors switched to the sales tax approach. The 
new bill made a fairly easy progress through both House and Senate: in 
the House the roll was called amid cheerful cries of "Hello World, now 
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don't go away! ", and there were only four contrary votes. As signed 
into law, the sales tax ranged from 1/20 of 1% on sales of less than 
$400,000, to 1% on the excess of sales above $lm, the sales of chain 
stores under common ownership being aggregated in determining liability. 
3 
There was no doubt of the enthusiasm of many small retailers for 
the tax. An observer of their behaviour at a committee hearing recorded 
that "at times the gathering took on the appearance of a religious 
revival. When the speaker was in the midst of calling the chain all 
the names in the category a small merchant standing next to me kept 
yelling at the top of his lungs: "Get at lem boy, hit lem hard, Glory 
Hallelujah! "' Not only was the tax on the small retailer only 1/20 
that of the maximum tax on the big retailers, but also it was calculated 
that, when allowance had been made for credits for various existing 
license fees imposed on those selling cigarettes, soft drinks and various 
other items, nearly all small grocersq druggists and tcbacconists would 
pay nothing at all. Thus these small retailers had nothing to lose. 
In contrast,, the new tax was enacted in the face of intense 
opposition from large downtown stores and retailers in lines less troubled 
by the chains. Many associations joined the departrent-store dominated 
Kentucky Retailers'Association in condeming the tax, including the state 
associations of retail jewellers, hardwaremen, lurber dealers, and shoe 
dealers, and retail merchants'associations in all the larger cities. The 
pro-tax forces, except for the small town merchants, amounted mainly to 
the grocery associations and the Louisville Retail Hardware Association, 
and though numerous and vociferous were clearly not as representative of 
3. Interstate*Grocer, January 18,1930; ' LouisVille'Coullier-Journal 
February 20, March 5,1930; Kentucky Laws of 1930 ch. 149. 
4. Harry Schac ter "War On The Chain Store", The Nation, May 7,, 19301, 
p. 545; Louitvilld*CoUrldt--46uimal March 3,, 19 'Tobacco Leaf, March 
159 1930, p. 36. 
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the organised section of the trade across the whole retail spectrum. 
The Kentucky Retailers'Association indeed blamed the whole problem on 
the grocers : "A single trade group bent on harrassing the chain grocer"s 
which had been blinded by its anti-chain fanaticism into playing into 
the hands of revenue-hungry politicians. For their part, the small 
retailers showed no great love for the downtown stores, which they 
likewise felt were being manipulated by the chains. As a spokesman for 
small town merchants sarcastically suggested at a committee hearing, 
"If these big merchants don't like the tax let them get down in our class 
and wear the same tax we wear". 
5 
The big merchants feared that once the politicians had acquired 
the taste for sales taxation, they would not easily be dissuaded from 
gorging themselves at the retailers' expense. Events confirmed their 
fears. The graduated sales tax proved a poor revenue producer. Many 
retailers were legally excused all or significant payment, because of 
credits, and some others decided to excuse themselves. The rates of the 
tax were so low that they were difficult to assess or collect. rurther- 
more, defeating the object of the legislation, leading chains secured 
temporary injunctions, restraining any collection from them$ pending 
the outcome of litigation. As a result, in 1931, the yield was only 
$88,656, and the expense of collection amounted to $44,621. In view of 
this, in 1932 a new Governor, seeking revenue, recommended a flat rate 
and higher sales tax (2%) and only the most vigorous action of the 
5. Boot arid'Shoe'Recorder March 29,1930t p. 84; Louisville Courier- 
'Journal, 
February 25,269 28; March 1,2,3,193d'. - 
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state's retailers, this time taking a united positiong prevented such 
a tax from being iTrposed. 
6 
The Kentucky controversy encouraged critics of anti-chain legislation 
to speak up and warn that the whole process of some retailers seeking 
taxes on others could only lead to trouble for all. As one put its the 
Kentucky law had opened up a "Pandora's box, letting loose a boomerang! 's 
and this "boomerang! ' theory was given a wide currency. The NRDGA was 
especially active. It set up a National Anti-Sales Tax Council, under 
the direction of George Sheridan, the executive director of the Ohio 
Council of Retailers, and Sheridan travelled the country accusing anti- 
chain campaigners of having provided the politicians with an "entering 
wedge" for retail sales taxation in general. In 1931 and 1932, as more 
and more States considered sales taxes much,, mostly unjustifiedobloquy 
was heaped on the heads of anti-chain campaigners for supposedly having 
given the politicians the idea that retailers would be a good target. In 
the longer termq the task of opposing sales taxes encouraged the formation 
of statewide retail councils, like the Ohio Council of Retailers, which 
federated various retail groups under the leadership of the department 
stores, and in the late 1930s these state retailers' associations tended 
6. There were many, and varied reports of the yield. These figures are 
from Hardy, op. cit. pp. 150-151, who obtained them direct from the 
State government. According to the N. Y. Jnl. of Commerce, March 31,19311, 
only 17,000 of 559000 blanks sent by--th-e -State Auditor 7o retailers had 
been returned; of these, 5$000 claimed complete exemptiong and the average 
of tax admitted was only $3.75. "Unscrupulous storekeepers" were also said 
to be raising their prices, and telling their customers it was because of 
the tax, even though not paying any. The NCSA claimed that cost of 
collection exceeded revenue (Nation's Business, July 1931 p. 46). Chain 
Store Progress "Sales Tax Proceeds Inadequate". April 19319 p. 7. The low 
size of the yield was of importance, as it encouraged the idea that 
graduated sales taxes were poor revenue producers and hard to enforce, thus 
diverting the interest of the politicians to flat-rate taxes. See also 
Shoup, op. cit. pp. 159-164 for a description of the desperate efforts of 
Kentucky retailers to avoid the flat rate sales tax. Most large retailers 
thought the proposed 2% flat sales tax too high a price to pay for the 
repeal of the graduated tax, though the chains showed themselves as half- 
hearted in opposition to the flat tax. 
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to act as counterweights to the alliances and federations set up by 
militant small merchants. 
7 
Chain store men relished the opportunity to divide and rule, playing 
off the politicians against the independent retailers, and the retailers 
against each other. In Octcber,, 1930 R. W. Lyons explained the position 
of the NCSA as being that "We do not regard sales taxes as fundamentally 
bad in themselves and hence the association is taking no general stand 
against sales taxes". Lyons added that as many of the chains were 
foreign corporations in the various states in which they located, they 
"would not seek to interfere in any way in the enactment of purely 
domestic legislation with regard to taxes on sales or any other kind of 
tax! 1. with the - cbviously crucial - exception that they would "defend 
their rights" against "punitive" taxation aimed solely at chains. 
Thenceforthq chain lobbyists usually took up highly evasive and arbiguous 
positions, but always with the guiding principle in mind that where some 
sort of tax seemed inevitable. it was better to steer the politicians 
towards a general flat-rate sales tax. rather than see a graduated sales 
tax or license tax become law. Shoup considered that in at least one 
state the lack of assistance from the chains in opposing sales taxation 
was a critical factor in the imposition of a flat-rate sales tax. 
8 
In all, six states, including Kentucky, enacted some form of 
graduated sales taxation between 1930 and 1933. But although flat-rate 
sales taxes were adopted in all sections of the countrys and in such 
major states as New York, California and Illinois, the graduated form 
received favour only in the smaller and more rural states of Mississippi, 
Kentucky, Vermont, Minnesota, Wisconsin and New Mexicoo 
7. M. M. Zimmerman,, The Challenge'of Chain Store Distribution,, pp. 299-300. 
Retail Ledger, May 1931, p. 3; October 1931 p. 6; National'Rdtail'Clothier 
August 7.19309 p. 70. 
8. New York Timesq October 129 1930; Shoup* op. cit. p. 18,192; Chain 
Store Age, Gen. Merch. edn., March 19345 p. 87. 
9. The flat-rate taxes were in West Virginia (1921): Georgia (1929); 
Pennsylvania (1932); Arizona, California,, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, 
New Yorkq North Carolina, OAlahomaq South Dakota, Utah and Washington 
(1933). Such taxes were voted down by referenda in Arkansas$ North Dakota, 
Oregon (Shoup op. cit. p. 7) 
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The severity of these taxes varied considerably. Under the 
Mississippi graduated gross receipts tax of 1930 (replaced by a 2% flat 
sales tax in 1932), owners of more than five stores were assessed at the 
rate of 0.5%, other retailers at o. 25%. The Wisconsin graduated gross 
income tax of 1933 fixed a maximum of 0.65%, charged on the excess of 
chain sales over $lm. Minnesota in 1933 imposed a tax graduated up to 
1% on sales in excess of $lm. The New Mexico statute imposed an annual 
license fee graduated up to 2.5% of sales in excess of $400,, 000. The 
highest rate was that of the 1933 Vermont tax: from a bottom rate of 
1/8 of 1%. the graduation increased sharply to 4% on sales in excess of 
$2m. On its 1932 scale of operations, the A&P was thereby made liable 
to a tax of 4% on the 35% of its sales in excess of $2m., and 2.331% on 
its aggregate sales, compared to its 2.337% net profit. This was an 
aggregate tax of $71,150 on the 58 A&P stores in Vermont. Unlike the 
situation in Kentucky, no large department stores existed in Vermont to 
come into the higher tax brackets: only two companies, the A&P and 
]First National Stores, had sales in excess of $lm,, and these two grocery 
chains stood to pay 80% of all the tax collected under the statute. 
However, neither chain actually paid anything, as terporary injunctions 
restraining enforcement were secured, and in March, 1935, the Vermont 
Supreme Court, following the lead of the U. S. Supreme Court shortly 
before in invalidating the Kentucky statute, ruled the tax unconstitutional. 
10 
10. Laws of Mississippi, 1930 chap. 90; Wisconsin, Session Laws of 
1933, chap. 469; Laws of Minnesota, 1933, chap. 213; New Mexico, 
Laws of 1933 chap. 73. Public Laws of Vermontq 1933,, chap. 46. Great 
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Harvey 177 Atl. 423 (Vermont Supreme 
Court, March 14,1935). 
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The Vermont statute made retailers of less than $50,000 annual 
sales - 95% of the total - exempt from any payment; and the graduated 
sales tax laws of other states also provided considerable, if less 
generous, exemption for small retailers. Obviously, the wider the 
exemptions the more isolated became the position of the chains and big 
department stores butlargely because of a desire to increase the yield, 
all but one of these states did include the single store under the tax. 
The exception was Wisconsin, which applied the tax only against owners 
of two or more stores. 
The Wisconsin graduated gross income tax of 1933 was an unusually - 
perhaps uniquely - premeditated expression of public policy, as befitted 
the governmental style of that State. It was drawn up following a survey, 
conducted by the State Tax Commission at the request of Governor Phil La 
Follette, had found the existing property tax gave the chains an unfair 
advantage, and a complex of balancing credits allowed by the tax were 
designed to even up this differential and that between lines of trade 
with slow or fast-moving stock. The law was also intended to compensate 
the State for the injury caused by temporary technological unemployment 
and to cushion independents to some extent in the period of adjustment 
to chain competition. The maximum rate was set at less than 1% in the 
hope that such a split fraction would discourage the chains from trying 
to pass on the tax to the consumer. There was, however, no intention to 
put the chains out of business, the aim being "equality of opportunity" 
and not punitive taxation. 
11 
11. In contrast, proposals for flat-rate sales taxation in Wisconsin 
had been utterly rejected as a tax on the poor. The Tax Commission found 
these chain advantages under the property taxi (1) higher rates of stobk 
turn meant chains usually did greater annual sales in proportion to stock 
on hand on the day of assessment. "There may not be very much in such a 
store at any one time, but like snow in Montana, "a great deal passes 
through"" This factor also advantageds for example, filling stations as 
compared to lumber yards. (2) Merchandise assessed at cost, and chains paid 
less -for their goods. 
(3) Chain records held in headquarters cities, and 
inaccessible to local assessors. Prof. Harold Groves, then Tax Commissioners 
recommended that a chain tax could compensate this inequality; rrederick 
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The spread of the graduated sales tax was inhibited by one basic 
problem. While the license tax received U. S. Supreme Court approval in 
May,, 1931, it was not until 1935 that the Court decided a graduated sales 
tax. Although 1930-1933 no Court ruled a graduated sales tax unconstitutional, 
and many lawyers believed the Supreme Court was most likely to sustain 
such taxation, this was a troubling uncertainty: furthermore, in the 
absence of such approval, the chains were able to engage in long drawn out 
litigation during which collection of the tax from them: was suspended, and 
which put the state to a great deal of trouble and expense. This complicated 
situation compared unfavourably in the minds of most legislators with the 
operation of flat-rate sales taxes, which produced much larger revenues, 
and with lower costs of collection, and produced them immediately, without 
trouble with the courts. Especially in 1933, for most legislatures the 
need for revenue to meet an immediate emergency was the paramount concern, 
and graduated sales taxation did not meet that need as effectively as a 
sirple flat tax on all retail sales. 
12 
11. (cont1d). Hardy was the principal author of the resultant law. 
See Hardys op-cit. pp. 2289 235-2419 254-257; also Hardy in'BUl. ' of 
the National Tax Association, December 1933, vol. 19, pp. 16-72, r7lsconsin's 
We-w chain store tax and its relation to personal property taxation"; 
Harold M. Grovess Financing Government . N. Y. 1939 pp. 112-114. These 
general pointsq usually supplemented by allegations that chains moved 
stock out of one city and into another before assessment dayq were coMMOnly 
urged by independents to persuade legislatures that chain taxes were 
justifieds though the possible differential was usually far below the 
chain tax sought. Actual conditions probably varied greatly from city to 
city, and from one assessment to another. It might be supposed that local 
(sometimes elected) assessors would be more inclined to favour the locally- 
owned store; further, that the understating of value of stock and fixtures 
when self-assessments were made would be more easily done by the independent 
than by the politically vulnerable chain. For a study showing chains did 
not pay less property tax in proportion to sales, A. E. Fish, "Comparative 
Chain and Independent Store Taxation in Nine Western States"s Bul. of the 
National Tax Assn. June, 1939. The argument that chains paid less taxes 
was usually of purely rhetorical significance in chain tax controversies* 
and only in Wisconsin was a tax enacted after a proper study of actual 
conditions. 
12. Yale Law'Jnl. vol. 40, pp. 439-441 (January, 1931) forecast invalidation 
of license tMe-sand that the Kentucky law would survive the courts, setting 
the pattern for future anti-chain legislation. This view was not uncommn, 
and the belief that the graduated sales tax would be upheld by the Supreme 
Court was strengthened when in May, 1931 it upheld thes supposedly more shakyq 
license tax. However, passage of a graduated sales tax precluded the 
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Nevertheless, even after the Supreme Court upheld the principle of 
the license tax, many independents continued to believe that the sales 
tax approach - preferably with the single store exempt - would ultimately 
prove the more lethal anti-chain weapon. This expectation arose, in 
part, from the idea that as a tax on vblume was more equitable than a 
tax on stores in its treatment of different types of chains it was more 
likely to appeal to the courts as "just" when really high levels of 
taxation were involved. It was an expectation ultimately proved false, 
but it was not an unreasonable one. Perhaps as important, legislatures 
consistently seemed more favourably disposed towards high taxes on sales 
than on numbers of stores. A 2% sales tax was the equivalent of a 
$1., 000 license fee on most chain grocery stores, and the equivalent of a 
$2,000 or $3,000 fee on a Penney or Woolworth store, but legislatures 
looked upon the 2% levy as less extreme, if only by analogy with ordinary 
flat-rate sales taxation. This illusion even affected independents to 
some extent: the passage of the 1933 Vermont sales tax, with its maximum 
of 4%, caused little comment, even in New England, but it is certain that 
had Vermont instead demanded a license fee of $1,500 or $5,000 it would 
have created a sensation. In fact, no state ever imposed a license fee 
above $750, and although the overwhelming majority of chain tax statutes 
were of the store license variety, the highest taxes were all of the 
graduated sales type. 
12. (cont'd). 
operation of a revenue-yielding flat sales tax$ whereas several states 
had both license taxes and flat-rate sales taxes, thus conveniently 
and constitutionally satisfying the anti-chain and revenue requirements. 
No state tried a graduated and flat sales tax at the same time, and 
it would presumably have been unconstitutional. 
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iii. The Indiana Decision, May 18,, 1931. 
The enactment of the Indiana graduated license tax of 1929 created 
little stir at the time. The law was a modified version of a bill 
introduced in the Indiana legislature by H. Curtis Bennett, a travelling 
salesman for a Cincinnati coffee house, which had provoked little 
interest until abruptly picked up and rushed through by the administration 
in the last days of the session, as a stop-gap revenue measure. There 
was no canpaign on its behalf by Indiana independents, and R. W. Lyons, 
regretting this somewhat accidental passage, thought Indiana not a 
particularly anti-chain state. The schedule ranged from $3 on a single 
store to $25 on each store in excess of 20, which was clearly not a 
crippling exaction. However, the tax was serious enough for Lafayette 
Jackson, owner of the Standard Grocery Co., who was liable to pay $5,443 
on his chain of 225 small grocery stores.. which made annual sales something 
over $1mand Jackson took his problem to the courts. 
1 
On February lst, 1930, the tax was ruled unconstitutional by a 
Federal District Court. The Court found "no real and substantial 
difference" between the operators of chain and independent stores to 
justify their separate classification for occupational tax purposes. The 
Court noted the "theory of the defendants" to be that owners of chain 
stores took their money out of the community and in general proved themselves 
less valuable citizens than the owners of independent storesq and that 
they therefore belonged to a different class for occupational tax purposes. 
The court found, however, that "While that may be true as far as some 
owners of more than one store is concerned,, yet that it not the universal 
1. Interstate Grocer, March 23,, 1929; Sample_Case, January 1932 p. 8; 
Nic1: o__1s op. cit. p. 133; Chain Store Progress, April 1929, "Anti-Chain 
Store Legislation"; Indiana, Acts 19291, chap. 207. 
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rule, and is not sufficient, within itself, to sustain the classification 11 
It was particularly noted that the plaintiff in the case, Lafayette 
Jackson, was hiTmelf a citizen of and large taxpayer in, the city of 
Indianapolis, where all his stores were located. 
2 
The case then went on appeal to the U. S. Supreme Court which, on 
May 18,1931, reversed the decision of the lower court by a5 to 4 vote. 
The conservatives, Justices Butler, McReynolds, Van Devanter and Sutherland, 
all voted to affirm the decision of the lower court; the three liberals, 
Holmes,, Brandeis and Stone all voted to reverse it. 
3 Those seven votes 
were fairly predictable. What decided the issue was that Associate 
Justice Roberts and Chief Justice Hughes, who not infrequently held the 
balance on social and economic questions, thought the law was 
constitutional. 
In the District Court the State Tax Commission had defended the 
statute both as an exercise of the police power and as a revenue Treasure 
levying an ordinary occupation tax. Before the Supreme Court, the 
Commission stood only on the latter ground, and in giving the decision 
of the Court Justice Roberts likewise declined to consider the regulatory 
aspect, if any, of the tax. 
The well settled principles of the Court in considering such 
measures were outlined by Roberts. The equal protection of the laws did 
not require an "iron rule of equal taxation". 
2. Jackson v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, Dist. Ct. S. D. Indiana, 
38 Fed. (2d) 6529 658. 
3. State Board of Tax Commissioners of Indiana v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527. 
In the interval between the District Court and the U. S. 9-upreme Court 
decisions, the North Carolina Supreme Court had upheld that state's 1929 
chain tax requiring a license fee of $50 from each store in excess of one: 
the court found a "real and substantial difference" between the single 
store and the chain store. The same court - in an opinion written by the 
same judge - had previously struck down the predecessor 1927 law in 
which the $50 tax had been applied on each store in excess of five. Those 
two cases well illustrated the difference between the merchant and 
judicial conception of what chain stores were. See Gt. A. & P. 'Tea Co. v. 
Maxwell, 196 N. C. 43310 154 S. E. 838. 
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"The fact that a statute discriminates in favor 
of a certain class does not make it arbitrary, if 
the discrimination is founded upon a reasonable 
distinction... or if any state of facts reasonably 
can be conceived to sustain it... It is not the 
function of this Court in cases like the present 
to consider the propriety or justness of the tax, 
to seek for the motives or to criticize the public 
policy which prompted the adoption of the 
legislation. Our duty is to sustain the classif- 
ication adopted by the legislature if there are 
substantial differences between the occupations 
separately classified. Such differences need not 
be great". 
In the past, the Court had upheld a Montana statute which imposed 
a license tax on hand laundries, with steam laundries exempt. It had 
similarly upheld a North Carolina statute taxing meat packing houses 
and not competing wholesalers; a Chicago ordinance which classified 
movie theatres for license fees on the basis of their admission charges; 
an Alabama statute taxing mobile vendors of sewing machines and not 
fixed-site vendors,, and Florida and Washington laws taxing merchants who 
used coupons and trading stamps. Roberts found in the distinction between 
chain and independent stores equally sufficient differences to sustain a 
separate classification. 
4 
Such differences included, on the part of the chains, "quantity 
buying, which involves the application of the mass process to distribution"; 
cash buying; "skill in buying", - integrated warehousing; abundant capital; 
"a pricing and sales policy different from the individual storeq involving 
slightly lower prices"; greater turmover; unified advertising; standard 
displays for sales promotion; "superior management and method; 
concentration of management in the special lines of goods handled by the 
chain; special accounting methods; standardization of store managementq 
sales policies and goods sold". 
4.283 U. S. 533,537-541. These cases are cited, with others, at 538-541. 
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Roberts dismissed any. comparison with voluntary chains, with the 
observation that "series of independent units cannot, in the nature of 
things, be as efficiently and successfully integrated as a chain under 
a single ownership and management". Similarly,, as a department store 
was merely a "number of different sorts of shops under one roof" it 
could not achieve the mass buying and intensive, specialised merchandising 
of the diain store. 
What was striking about the case was not that 5 of the Court had 
agreed the law was unconstitutional, but that 4 had decided that it was 
not. The supposed principle of the Court was that it should sustain 
where any reasonable set of facts could be adduced to support a 
classification, even though other, equally cogent, arguments could be 
advanced to contradict it. Thus the legislature was to be given the 
benefit of the doubt unless the classification adopted was blatantly 
arbitrary. 
6 In the case of the chain stores the distinctions were actually 
self-proclaimed. There was a National Chain Store Association; magazines 
with titles such as "Chain Store Age"; textbooks which existed specifically 
to explain the methods of chain distribution. Chain executives themselves 
spoke of the new "science" of "mass distribution". Neither were the chain 
store men the only ones to perceive this distinction. In the year 
preceding the Indiana decision, in hundreds of towns merchants had banded 
together to denounce the "chain store menacells while legislatures had 
considered dozens of chain tax bills. Did not these evidences of the 
fact that real people made a "separate classification" count for anything? 
Did they not testify to a distinction at least as great as that, for 
Ibid. 534-536. 
6. E. g. 240 U. S. 3579 "It makes no difference that the facts may be 
disputed or their effect opposed by argument and opinion of serious 
strength". 
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example, between hand and-steam laundries? 
That four judges had apparently thought not naturally gave 
chain executives considerable comfort. Most of them seemed perfectly 
assured that, as the'New'York'Times advised, "confiscatory taxation 
would not be permitted by the courts". The prevailing belief was that. 
as the Court had only just produced a majority for a tax which went no 
higher than $25 it could be relied on to frustrate anything more severe. 
Many independents believed the same, and a curious idea spread, based 
on the inferences of 11conmn sense", that taxes of $200, or even $300, 
would be held constitutional, but taxes of $500 or $1,000 would not. 
7 
It is, of course, quite possible that had a tax of $500 or $1,000 
been the first to come before the Supreme Court the 5 to 4 vote would 
have gone the other way. The Court might well have decided that such a 
tax went beyond a revenue measure, and involved an attempt at regulation; 
and in so doing the Court might have decided that the chains had done 
nothing to require such regulation. The question would have been decided, 
presumably, by the judicial whim of Hughes or Roberts. It is also quite 
possible that had the Indiana law come before the Court immediatelyg in 
1929, before anti-chain agitation really come to the attention of the 
public, the vote would have gone the other way. Indeedg it is quite 
probable,, for the 1929 Court was differently constituted. It contained 
seven of the 1931 Court - Holmes, Brandeis, Stone,, McReynolds,, Butler,, 
Sutherland and Van Devanter. However, the other two places on the 1929 
Court were held by Chief Justice Taft and Associate Justice Sanfordq not 
Hughes and Roberts. Both were men of decidedly conservative inclinations, 
and would almost certainly have ruled the law unconstitutional. 
7. 'New 'York 'Times. May 20,1931. 
May 30,, 1931. 
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Neverthelesss once the Indiana statute was approved the odds on 
the Court approving a severe graduated license tax shortened very 
considerably. Once the Court had sustained the form of the tax, the 
precedents were very strong that it should then leave the severity of 
it to the discretion of the legislatures. The 11tommon sense" notion 
that the Court would apply some sort of "rule of reason" and frustrate 
punitive taxation was rooted in the recent history of the Court, but 
it was not as sound as most businessmen and many lawyers believed in 
1931. 
A clear enough warming was sounded in the minority dissents written 
by Justice Sutherland, the implication of which was rather overlooked. 
In the dissent, Sutherland vigorously attacked the separate classification 
of the chain stores. The only "so-called advantages" of chains, he 
maintained, were also enjoyed by all retailers with good management and 
large volume, including department stores and voluntary chains. Hence 
"the classification should fall because it is made to depend not upon 
size or value or character, amount of capital invested or income received, 
but upon the mere circumstance - wholly irrelevant so far as any of the 
advantages claired are concemed - that the business of one is carried on 
under many roofs, and that of the other under one only". 
8 
8.283 U. S. 545-548. For the view that Sutherland was right on this, c. r. 
Phillips, "An Economic Analysis of the Supreme Court's Decisions on Chain 
Store Taxation", Jnl. of Business, vol. 11, January 1938, pp. 51-69. Phillips 
argued that the advantages of chains were not graduated by size, and that 
the classification was for that reason invalid. In so doing,, he missed the 
legal point: the Court did not require a cast-iron rule of universal and 
smoothly graduated chain advantage, only a plausible case that the classif- 
ication was not merely arbitrary. Ironically, Phillips based much of his 
argument on reports of the FTC "Chain Store Inquiry". the very existence 
of which was premissed on there being discernible distinctions and 
advantages in favour of the chain store. It should also be observed that 
although Roberts and Sutherland had both framed the argument in terms of 
chain "advantages", the classification to be valid only really had to be 
based on discernible "differences" - as in the cases cited by Roberts at 
538-541. Such differences were surely patent. On the economic point, 
Phillips relied too much on the FTC's figures on operating expenses showing 
higher expenses for the larger chains in sore lines: these figures were 
meaningless because they failed to take account of the greater proportion of 
jobber expense absorbed in their own operations by the big chains. 
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Sutherland candidly recognised that the precedents tended to 
support the other side. In mitigations he urged that, 
"The decisions have depended not only upon the 
varying facts which constituted the background 
for the particular legislation under consideration, 
but also, to some extent, upon the point of view 
of the courts or judges who have been called upon 
to deal with the question. Some of the cases press 
to the limit fixed by the Constitution; and that 
fact ... admonishes us to use caution 
in applying 
them to other sets of substantially dissimilar 
circumstances, lest, by doing so, we pass into the 
forbidden territory which lies wholly beyond the 
verge". 
Clearly the reason for refusing to sustain the classification in 
this case was not so much the belief that it was unsound, but the 
recognition of where the approval of the Indiana law might lead the 
Court. Sutherland - more frankly perhaps than Roberts - faced up to 
the fact that the Indiana statute was not an isolated occurrences to be 
considered solely on its own merits. 
Thus , 
"It may be that here the maximum tax of $25 for 
each store, while relatively high, is not, if 
considered by itself, excessive; but to sustain 
it will open the door of opportunity to the state 
to increase the amount to an excessive extent. 
This Court frequently has said, and it can not be 
too often repeated in cases of this characters 
that the power to tax is the power to destroy; 
and this constitutes a reason why that power, 
however moderately exercised in given instances* 
should be jealously confined to the limits set by 
the Constitution ... In Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, a tax of ten per cent. imposed on the notes 
of state banks was upheld, although it 'drove out 
of existence every State bank of circulation 
within a year or two after its passage' ... in the face of this decision, and others which might be 
cited, there does not seem to be any sure comfort 
in the suggestion, sometimes mades that this Court 
may be expected to intervene whenever the tax 
reaches the point of destruction". 9 
9.283 U. S. 550-553. 
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It was not one easy step from the Indiana decision to a decision 
upholding destructive taxation. In theory, once the Court had approved 
the principle of a revenue law. it had no concern with how high the rates 
were pitched: that was solely the province of the legislature. In practice, 
when the Court in the past had approved taxes which seemed to involve the 
"power to destroy" it had normally justified its approval by reference to 
sore apparent iniquity requiring regulation, even if - as in the trading 
stamp cases - only "insidious potentialities" were involved. In at least 
one case, the Court had struck down a tax because it considered it a 
disguised form of regulation, and evidently disliked the regulation intended. 
Nevertheless, the "door of opportunity" to destructive taxation, if not wide 
open, was certainly ajar, and the ever growing nurribers of chain tax statutes 
around the country constituted a weighty reason why the Court would find it 
difficult to force the door shut again. 
10 
10. See,, for e. g. Alaska Fish Salting &_By Products Co. v. Smith (1921) 
255 U. S. 44, where , tice Holmes said, at 48, that "Even If -the tax should 
destroy a business it would not be made invalid or require compensation 
upon that ground alone. Those who enter upon a business take that risk". 
For the same point, 8*Wall, 548; and M Cray v. United States 195 U. S. 27. 
Contrast Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. 259 U. S. 20 where the Court 
invalidated a tax used to curb child_labýourm the ground that although 
a tax might sometimes legitimately include an element of regulation as an 
"incidental motivells "there comes a time in the extension of the penalizing 
features of the so-called tax when it loses its character as such and 
becomes a mere penalty with the characteristics of regulation and 
punishment". (p. 38). 
on October 26, the U. S. Supreme Court also affirmed the decision of 
the North Carolina Supreme Court in upholding that state's 1929 law (see 
note 3, above) 28+ U. S. 575. Thus the legislatures were free to enact both 
flat and graduated license taxes, and laws with or without the single store 
free of tax. Actuallys the flat rate license fee died outs principally 
because it was not desired to have the owner of just two stores pay as much 
on his second store as did the owner of many stores. Graduated license taxes 
including the single store proved imre common than those not so doing, if 
only because the Indiana law was the familiar model for those drawing up 
such bills. Independents preferred to see the single store exempt, but the 
fees on the single store were always low, and the question was not generally 
considered of any moment: the Indiana $3 on the single store was typical. 
Of course, such a fee brought no complaint from the department stores: in 
contrast, a graduated sales tax with the Kentucky rates would have cost the 
largest department store in Indianapolis well over $70,000 p. a., not $3. 
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iv. , 'The 'Spread'of 'the 'Graduated License'Taxý '1931-a933. 
Not all prominent trade association executives. greeted the Indiana 
decision with rapturous enthusiasm. Indeed, many showed apathy or even 
displeasure. The'NARD'J6urqal indicated no interest, and the NARD 
convention in the autumn passed no sort of chain tax resolutions: the 
preoccupations of the NARD remained totally bound up in its various 
price-fixing policies, and pharmacy laws, and the association made no 
commitment to chain taxation at its 1932 or 1933 conventions. Likewise, 
Rivers Peterson, the secretary of the NFHA, advised that chain taxes 
were no answer to the problem of hardwaremen, and the 1931 NEHA 
convention's only tax resolution was one opposing all increases in federal, 
state or local taxes. Even the 1931 NARG convention, despite some 
dissension, was persuaded by its conservative leaders to avoid adoption 
of any chain tax resolution, secretary-manager C. H. Janssen insisting that 
"the trade practice evils which are the root and cause of our discomfort 
are not cured, abated or quieted by such legislation, but on the other 
hand are excited to a greater activity". Thus none of the three largest 
retailer associations was induced to take up the task of organising the 
chain tax fight. The National Association of Retail Meat Dealers did back 
chain taxation, but its practical activity was limited. Among wholesale 
associations, only the American W. G. A. - which had helped chain tax efforts 
from the start - lent positive assistance, and even it had other priorities* 
10. (cont1d). Note also the Court at this time upheld a 1928 Virginia 
warehouse tax (284 U. S. 584) which was intended to equalise taxation 
as between wholesaler-retaller distribution and the chain operating 
its own warehouses. This decision was of no great consequence as the 
tax was not discriminatory. 
1. See convention proceedings for 1931 in'NARD Journal October 15,1931; 
Hardware Retailer July 1931; ' National Grocers'Bulletin, September, 1931, 
Cnvn. edn., esp. pp. 25,71. ''Butchers7'Advor-late, January 15,1932 p. 32. 
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The lack of enthusiasm demonstrated by the drowned heads of the 
big associations was nots however, shared by many of the rank-and-file, 
whole influence predominated in the state and local associations. The 
chain tax drive did suffer to some extent from a lack of coordination - 
there was never any sort of "model" bill, and legislatures often received 
conflicting bills from different sources - but its militancy was not 
sapped by the indifference of conservative leaders. Indeed, the scale 
of the movement to chain taxation in the aftermath of the Indiana decision 
illustrated graphically the extent to which the national associations 
were essentially paper bodies, whose policies carried little weight even 
with the leaders of the affiliated state and local associations,, let alone 
the rank-and-file. The Indiana decision greatly increased the prestige of 
the militants, for it conferred on the chain tax both practicality and 
respectability. The Supreme Court had, of course, disclaimed any concerm 
or intention to approve or disapprove the motive behind such legislation, 
but that was not how chain tax advocates saw it. They felt that they had 
been vindicated, and in a sense they were right. Chain taxation had been 
pictured, even by some independent leaders, not just as unconstitutional 
but as almost unethical and un-American. The majority of the Court had 
held otherwise, and if they had not approved the motive, neither had they 
condemed it as odious to all right-thinking citizens. Not only did the 
Supreme Court decision confer on chain taxation an aura of respectability; 
it made such taxation seem a more likely paying proposition to tax-hungry 
legislatures, although chain attormeys continued to contrive some ground 
for litigation with most chain tax statutes. As the chainss in many casess 
did good business while times were hard for most other taxpayers, they 
made a natural target. 525 chain tax bills were offered in state 
legislatures, 1931-1933. In the period between the Indiana decision and 
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the end of 1933,, 18 chain tax, statutes were enacted, and 13 new states 
adopted such legislation. 7be Supreme Court decision also ensured that 
the graduated license tax, rather than the graduated sales tax, was 
dominant: of these 18 chain taxes, 14 were of the graduated license 
variety, and one other a coubined license and sales tax. 
The movement spread geographically. Hitherto, the main success had 
been in the South. Furthermore, those laws enacted outside the South had 
proved little about the appeal of the anti-chain cause. The Pennsylvania 
drug store ownership law, originating in a concern for the special status 
of phamacy, had posed no risks for other chains, and the Indiana law 
had slipped through almost by accident. Chain taxes confined to the South 
were little threat to the overwhelming majority of chains, whose stores 
were either wholly or largely in other sections. The South was a far-flung 
outpost of empire for the big national chains, where their political 
position was most precarious, and their uneasy status as invaders most 
pronounced. 
2 It was also a section in which the prevailing business 
license system tended to weaken the argument of the chains that they were 
being singled out for cruel and unusual punishment. The South was not, 
however, a section in which the sprawling octopuses of the national chains 
could be dealt a mortal blow. 
2. The Census showed 59015 units of sectional and national chains in the 
five Southern states which adopted the chain tax before the Indiana decision 
(Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Kentucky and Mississippi). There 
were 66 such stores in Allegany County. These figures compare with - to 
cite key Midwest battlegrounds - 6,718 in Ohio, 3,044 in Missouri and 6,821 
in Illinois. (1930'C6nr; ur; of Distribution, vol. 1 pt. 1 pp. 69-70; Vol. 1 
pt. 2 p. 1037). 
3. In most of the U. S. business license taxes were used sparingly, and 
generally as an exercise of the police power, but in the South, which had 
inherited the French system, such taxes were imposed routinely for purely 
revenue purposes. There were many examples in Southern states of business 
taxes graduated according to floor space, number of employees, size of 
product, etc. Such taxation was commonly regressive and arbitrary. In that 
context, taxes based on the number of stores seemed less exceptional than 
in the North. See, Roscoe Arant, "Business Taxation in the Southern States"s 
The Tax'Maga2ine, July 1938 p. 403 ff., for many examples of such Southern 
business license taxes. Also Grovesq op. cit. pp. 274-275. 
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The new chain tax. states, outside the South, were Arizona, Idaho,, 
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Mexico,, Vermont, West Virginia 
and Wisconsin. Thus while spreading geographically, the chain tax had 
not been adopted in the major industrial states, Michigan excepted. 
Whatever the influence exerted by the interest of the legislatures in 
finding revenue, it had not proved of decisive importance. The flat-rate 
sales tax, in contrast, to be found in fewer states than the chain tax at 
the end of 1933, had been adopted impartially by the different sections, 
including New York, California and Illinois. The revenue consideration 
was only effective to tilt the balance where the independents were already 
strong, and anti-chain sentiment manifest. 
That is not to say that anti-chain campaigners did not put up a 
fight in every state. On the contrary, the independents bestirred therselves 
everywhereq even in the eastern power centresof the chains such as 
Massachusetts and New York. The retailers of Massachusettst generally 
regarded as apathetic and unorganisables astounded the editor of the New 
England Grocer and Tradesman by coming forward in their hundreds in the 
winter of 1931-1932 to attend rallies in Boston and other cities and pledge 
their support to chain tax proposals. An Allied Independent Merchants 
Association was formed to press a $250 chain tax bill. Although sceptical 
of. the good faith of the politician who introduced the bill in the 
legislature. and feeling the attempt was premature, the conservatively- 
inclined New'Erigland Grocer displayed what passed for passionate militancy 
in Massachusetts. 
"It is not very much unlike the Sino-Japanese situation. 
The independent has the nunbers and the public sympathy 
but the chains have the weapons of wealth, cunning, 
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training and perfect organization. Even so, 
we had a Boston Tea Party., a Lexington, a Paul 
Revere once upon a time and wonders may not have 
ceased and it is perhaps better to have tried 
even if the chances for success may seem small". 4 
The pro-tax alliance was a narrow one, however. When the case 
was taken before public hearings, the bulk of the support came from 
grocers, meat dealers, and a few tobacconists. In contrast, the chains 
in Massachusetts enjoyed the effective leadership of the treasurer of 
the ]First National Stores, Charles F. Adams. Adams contrived both to 
arouse the opposition of many charbers of commerce and consumer groups 
to the bill, which smoothed the path of the legislature to killing it, 
and to do so while still maintaining a conciliatory attitude to the 
conservative leaders of the independents. 
5 In 1932s Adams wooed the 
grocery associations with suggestions that more might be achieved by 
exploring common ground on price-cutting and other trade evils; when 
the NRA came in 1933, these coy overtures were succeeded by a marriage 
of convenience. Chain tax bills were introduced year after year 
thenceforth, often enjoying a lot of rank-and-file supports but without 
getting a full-hearted trade association backing. Seeing more profit in 
accepting the chains as a fact of life, to be cultivated rather than 
harrasseds the New'Erigl-Otd Grocer, after the 1932 failures clinbed back 
onto the fence, and never left it again. Although professing not to 
oppose any sort of chain taxation, in principles the New England Grocer 
never came across a bill in practice that it cared for, and indeed regularly 
sniped at their promoters as being sharp politicians wishing only to line 
6 
their pockets at the expense of the gullible merchants. 
4. New England GP6ddP'& Tradesman, November 270 December 18,1931; February 
269 1932; Tobadc61seaf,, November 21,, 1931 p. 38. The $250 bill was decided 
on after the first idea, a tax up to $2,7009 was rejected as unreasonable. 
5. New'England Grocer & Tradesman, March 4.1932; Chain Store Review, 
April 1-932 p. 139 29; Boston Daily 'Glcbe_, February 24., 1932. - 
6. New England Grocer & Tradesmans July 1.1932; April 1934 p. 13. 
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Much as in Massachusetts% New York independents were inspired 
by the Indiana, decision and the exertions of their brothers in the more 
militant sections. In the summer of 1931, led by the state meat dealers' 
association, many trade associations affiliated to a newly-formed "holding 
company" set up solely to demand a chain tax, the Independent Retail 
Merchants'Association. It was, according to the president of the IRMA, 
the "last stand of the independent business man". The bill, for 
taxation up to $1,000 per store, was drawn up by U. S. Congressman Emmanuel 
Celler, who was the attorney of the mat dealers' association and was 
sometimes referTed to as the "butchers' Congressman". According to Cellert 
the depression had made the tax necessary. In a radio broadcast, Celler 
complained that the chains were concentrating wealth, and that three- 
quarters of the $30m. profit made in one year by the A, & P had accrued to 
one man, John Hartford. "I would not have dared to give utterance to 
these observations three or four years ago". continued the Congressman, 
"for fear that I would be labelled as a radical. But today we are in the 
depths of economic chaos and chains are only making for the greater 
unequal distribution of wealth which renders it more difficult to rescue 
ourselves from our economic plight". 
7 
The IRMA bill in fact received no serious consideration at Albany. 
Furtherfore, the independents proved unable to mount any sort of concerted 
campaign. The different trades were unused to working together; the 
New York City retailers were jealous of the upstate Civic Defense League 
7. New'York 'Times,, July 21,305 31, October 20,1931; *New'York Retail 
Grocers$'Advocate January 6,1932. Associations sponsoring included N. Y. 
RetEl Druggists Assn., N. Y. Wholesale Grocers'Assn; N. Y. City Retail 
Jewelers'Assn., N. Y. Retail Grocers! Assn. 9 National Assn. of Retail Meat Dealers; Independent Retail Tobacconists'Assn. of America and the 
Syracuse Civic Defense League. 
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which played the most active role at Albany; sore believed that if they 
sought restrictions on chains the politicians would turn next against 
the independents. Fatalism and apathy were also apparent. "Sure,, the 
chains ought to be taxed", complained one meat dealer. "They ought to 
be taxed out of existence, but they won't bell. He forecast that the 
"big men" would eventually drive their country to revolution by their 
destruction of the middle class (meaning such as himself), but until 
this happened their money would ensure the defeat of any chain tax. Such 
men were not confident of their ability to remake the world. As another 
meat dealer resignedly commented, "you can bet that the bigger chains, 
who would have to pay the largest taxes, would find some way to evade the 
tax. The small independents with one,, two or three stores would be left 
holding the bag". 8 
The chains were not seriously threatened by tax bills in the big 
Eastern states. 7bey faced much greater danger in the large Midwestern 
states, where the issue was often finely balanced, and where there were 
many stores at risk. Chain lcbbying, and the disorganisation of the 
independents9 staved off any debacle in these key states. In Missouris 
in 1933, a bill passed the House by 125 votes to 3. but was then quietly 
buried in the Senate Committee on Private Corporationso known as the 
legislative "graveyard", where well-oiled lobbies and machine politicians 
kept a tight control. In Illinois, in 1931, the House passed a bill for 
a tax of $1,000 on each store in excess of three by the tremendous margin 
of 135 votes to nil. After the vote, Anthony Pintozzi, who had introduced 
the bill, was, in the disgusted words of Chain'Store Review, "cheered as 
B. N. Y. Retail'Groc6rgl Advocate, August 139 1932; 'Butchers' Advocate 
February 29,19329 p. 14. 
183. 
though hewere a college hero, dozens of his colleagues rushing 
forward in congratulation, and page boys hurWing bouquets of flowers 
from the anterooms". Such a tax was no light matter for some chains: 
the National Tea Co. had made an average net profit of only $738 on 
each of its 859 Illinois stores in 1930; Kroger had netted only 
$293.50 average on its 633 stores. But, despite the euphoria in the 
House, the bill was quietly shelved in a Senate committee. To discourage 
a repetition, the chains in early 1932 formed the Illinois Chain Stores 
Association, the first of the many State chain associations formed in 
the 1930s. 
9 
Midwestern advocates of chain taxation made their most considerable 
breakthrough in Michigan, the biggest state to adopt the chain tax up 
to 1933. The enactment of the 1933 graduated license tax., which taxed 
chains up to $250 on each store in excess of 25, followed several years 
of general anti-chain agitation in the states and in particular, two years 
of chain tax campaigning by Clyde V. Fenner. and his Home Defense League. 
Fenner, who came from Louisiana, first came to the fore broadcasting 
over KWKH in 1930; he soon moved to Michigan and set up the Home Defense 
Leagues which in the first 18 months reportedly recruited 69000 merbers. 
The League took on a variety of issues, campaigning to channel the unemployed 
welfare business through the hands of the independents and for local 
ordinances to curb the rash of roadside stands and booths on vacant lots 
which spread throughout the depressed cities of the state. 
10 Its 
main policy, however, was the chain tax. In 1931, the League set its 
sights on a graduated sales tax, and the ensuing conflict pitched the 
food dealers and small town retailers against the Detroit department 
9. Interstate Grocerg March 4.25; April 89 1933; Chain Store'Review,, 
January 1932 p. 7. March 1932 p. 2; Buehler, Atti-Chain Store Taxation, 
p. 351. 
10. Michigan'Laws_of 1933, Act 265; Business Week, October 7,1931 p. 13. 
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stores and the bigger downtown merchants generally. Many of the rural 
legislators were won over by the prospect that the sales tax could be 
used to relieve the pressure on the property tax, which was drawing howls 
from the farmers, but the Detroit legislators feared the effects on prices. 
The fight reached a climax when the bill suffered a narrow and unexpected 
defeat in the House, all but one of the Detroit delegation voting against 
it: amid uproar, Fenner rushed onto the floor of the chanber and "mingled" 
with House merbers who had voted against in a 11turnoil ... that bordered 
on physical violence". before being escorted from the floor by friends. 
Apprehensive legislators who had voted down the bill insisted on the 
insertion in the House Journal of special "explanations" of their action, 
including arguments that a sales tax would encourage "bootleg" sales 
across the state line, that it would stimulate mail order, and that it 
was unconstitutional. 
11 
In 1932, the Michigan Senate felt the issue to be so politically 
sensitive that it discussed the chain tax in a rare executive session$ 
behind closed doors. The bill went down that year amid charges that 
Fenner had demanded $109000 from Detroit department stores for an offer 
to abandon the graduated sales tax approach. Then, in the November 1932 
electionst the Democrats were swept in at Lansing for the first time in 
50 years,, and they brought a chain tax in their platform. In July 1933, 
a graduated license tax was enacted,, over Governor Comstock's veto,, amid 
11. The opponents of the bill were led by the J. L. Hudson Co., Detroit's 
leading department store, and included the Detroit Board of Commerce, 
Detroit R. M. A. 5 S. S. Kresge Co. (the largest Detroit-based chain), the 
Michigan Retail Clothiers and Furnishers' Assn. 9 Michigan Retail Hardware 
Assn., Michigan Retail rurniture Assn. and retail merchants' associations 
from the leading cities. The sponsors of the bill, James N. McBride 
(Burton) and Ate Dykstra (Grand Rapids) were also prominent advocates of 
a state income tax. -Detroit Free*Prdss, March 26,31; April 9.109 229 
239 1931; Detroit'Newss April 23, s 193 ; ''Retail Ledger, May 1931 p. 6; House JourTiý. JTAp-ril 22', 1931, No. 66,, pp. 855-858. 
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scenes of great jubilation from the meTrbers of the Home Defense League 
massed in the galleries. With the license tax method being used, the 
chains had lost the committed support of the department stores and other 
big retailers,, and by 1933 the state's need for revenue had become so 
great that the legislature was determined to have a chain tax regardless 
of any effect on prices. This time round the entire Detroit del6gation 
voted in favour of the chain tax. 
12 
v. Taxatiorl 
Little interest was shown in the idea of municipal chain taxation 
before the Indiana decision. As long as the courts continued to find 
state taxes unconstitutional, few imagined that cities, whose powers 
were somewhat vague, but in general less than those of the States, would 
be allowed to impose such taxes. Once the right to tax chains had been 
granted to the States by the Supreme Court, it became an open question 
whether cities might be permitted to follow suit. Potentially, this 
was a dangerous new front for the chains, for if it was difficult to 
police 48 state legislatures, it was clearly impossible to maintain an 
adequate vigilance over the affairs of several thousand towns and cities. 
12. Financial need compelled Michigan to adopt a 3% flat-rate sales 
tax at this session, and Governor Comstock claimeds somewhat implausibly, 
that the chain tax might endanger the constitutionality of the sales 
tax. Grocers' Commercial Bulletin May 1932, p. 14; Chain Store Reviews 
July 1932 p. 14; Interstate'Grocer: October 15,1932; ITetrolt Free 
Press, July 1ý, 18,19,1933. 
1. For details of municipal chain tax ordinances, see Hardy* The Special 
Taxation of'Chain'Stbres, pp. 180-188; Nicholsq op. cit. pp. 150-154; 
Lee, Anti-Chain Store Tak'Legislation, pp. 22-24; Beckmann and Nolen 
The Chain Store Problem, Appendix K (lists ordinances and provisions); 
Law and Contemporary Problems: Municipal Legislative Barriers to a Free 
Market, by J. A. McIntire and C. S. Phyne, vol. 8. September 1941 pp. 359 375; 
Harvard BusinessReview , vol. 19,1941, pp. 364-376, "Municipal Trade Barriers' by R. Cassady. 
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About a dozen cities had tried chain taxation by the end of 1933. 
Durham, N. C. led the way in July, 1931 with a municipal ordinance 
imposing a $50 license fee on the second, and each succeeding, store 
of a chain. The highest taxes were imposed by Hamtramck,, the self- 
governing Polish enclave of Detroit, which applied the tax only against 
chain grocery stores, with a top rate of $1,000 on each store in excess 
of three, and by Maplewood, Mo., with the same top rate, applicable to 
any type of chain store. The tax schedules adopted by the other cities 
were very diverse, 
2 
The taxing cities, though few in number, presented the NCSA with 
a considerable headache, for they were widely scattered, and some of 
them were in states where the chains had the situation in control as 
far as the state legislatures were concerned. Thus the enactment of 
such local taxes was hard to monitor or predict. In 1932 especiallys 
independents in states without chain tax laws pressed for municipal 
ordinances in those cities where they were well organised or where local 
conditions seemed favourable. The most striking success was in St. Louis$ 
the largest city to adopt chain taxation, where the independents secured 
a victory beyond them in the state legislature by pushing through a tax 
graduated up to $250 on each store in excess of 25. The Community 
Protective Association, which originated in the offices of the Interstate 
Grocer, roused public attention with the distribution of an anti-chain 
newspapers The Home'Defender, and impressed the Board of Aldermen with 
2. Interstate *Grocer,, August 15, October 31,1931; Noverfber 5,1932; 
Modern'Merchaht'and'Gr6cery World, December 5.1931. The cities were 
Portland, Ore.; urham, N. C.; Red Bank, N. J.; Knoxville, Tenn.; 
Fredericksburg,, Va.; Capitol Heights, Md.; Aberdeen,, Wash.; St. Louis$ 
Mo.; Maplewood,, Mo.; Hamtramck, Mi.; Spartanburg, S. C.; Charlotte, N. C. 
The Red Bank ordinance was quickly repealed by the city council. Tax 
rates adopted included: Fredericksburg, $250 on each store in excess of 
one plus a tax based on sales; Portland, $6 on 1 store,, up to $50 on 
each over 20; Red Bank, $50 on each store of chains operating more than 
five stores in New Jersey; Knoxvilles $25 on each store in excess of 
one; Aberdeen, a license of $100 for each store of non-residents who 
also owned one or more store outside Aberdeen. 
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documented allegations that the chains were understating the value of 
their stock and fixtures to avoid taxation and were failing to support 
the community fund. 
3 Although the chairsbeat down chain tax proposals 
in other major cities, they came under threat in 1932 in Cleveland, 
Syracuse, Pittsburgh, Milwaukee, Newark, Youngstown and Rochester, 
4 
The municipal tax idea was even mooted in New York City, the very citadel 
of the chainss where in early 1933 the Business Independence League was 
formed to seek a tax "on the ground that the chain stores send the money 
spent in them out of New York to be spent in cities where their manufacturing 
plants, warehouses and offices are located". 
5 
3. Interstate Grocer, February 270 April 9, May 28, June 4.119 1932. 
Business Week, June 21 22 19322 p. 9- Among the arguments advanced by independent 
businessmen in hearings before the Board of Aldermen were that: the 
property tax was burdensome; the chains sold below cost and got rebates; 
if the chains were not destroyed the independents would be, thus creating 
only two classes, with the chains in the upper class; the chains enslaved 
their clerks, and Walgreen sales girls had been forced to take shaving 
cream in lieu of wages; the grocers were carrying the unemployed on credits 
while the chains got all the cash; "not because of any acrimony but our 
backs are to the wall and to help pay the policemen who are placed in 
chain stores for their protection". 
4. The highest tax proposed was in Milwaukee, where the Common Council 
held hearings on a bill to tax chains up to $2,650 on each store in excess 
of nine. The promoter of the bill was "Dr. " Charles F. Gillman who$ with 
his wife, ran "World Vigilance, Inc. - United States Division", and 
solicited subscriptions from Milwaukee retailers at $16 a time. Gillman 
was typical of a type of freelance chain tax promoter, and had been pushing 
chain taxes since 1928, in which year he reportedly had offices in - Washington, New York and Chicago and was soliciting funds to put over an 
astronomical federal tax. (Hardware Retailer, August 19329 p. 48; Interstate 
Grocer, November 3,1928, June 18,1932). 
5. Chain tax bills, introduced by Alderman Walter Harts, were seriously 
considered by the Board of Aldermen in both 1933 and 1934. New York Tires 
April 199 1933; March 9, l4s 15,1934; Chain Store Age , Gen. Merch, edne June 1933 p. 75; N. Y. Retail Grocers' Advocate, June 24,1933. In 1933, 
the chairman of the board of the Business InU-eýendence Leagues grocer John 
Reimers, made a trip to the west coast where he found signs in the windows 
of independent stores warning consumers that the money spent in chain stores 
all went to New York. Evidently confused, Reimers could only conclude 
that "the chain is not spending money anywheres they hire their own crewss 
do not give a local carpenter, plumber or anybody else a chance to do sore 
work for them but hire sore cheap help to do their work". (N. Y. -Retail 
Groders"Adv6date, October 15,1933). 
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The municipal chain tax, despite considerable activity and interest 
in 1932 and 1933, never really became established as a principal weapon 
in the hands of the anti-chain campaigners. The diminished urgency for 
the cities to find new revenue to support unemployment relief projects 
from 1933 had something to do with the general decline of the city tax 
after that date. More importantlys independents felt the best hope lay 
in state taxes, because they affected more chain stores and because their 
constitutionality was more secure. The legal status of municipal chain 
tax ordinances was doubtful. In the first case brought to trial, the 
severe Hamtramck ordinance was ruled unconstitutional by a lower court 
in Decerber, 1932. The court could probably have found ample ground 
for invalidation in the fact that the tax applied only to grocery chainsq 
but instead it attacked the pretensions of Hamtramck to adopt any sort 
of chain tax, regardless of the rights of the states in such matters. 
The city council did not appeal. The Maplewood ordinance was similarly 
held unconstitutional, on the ground that it was confiscatory and beyond 
the power of the municipality. 
6 
Not all city ordinances were overruled in this way. The Supreme 
Court of South Carolina upheld the Spartanburg license taxq graduated 
according to chain gross income, on July 20,1933; similarly, the 
Portland license tax, having survived a referendum test in Noverrber, 19329 
also survived a court test, when in 1935 its constitutionality was upheld 
by the Oregon Supreme Court. In 1937, the Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals likewise sustained the Fredericksburg ordinance of 1932. In all 
6. 'Kroger 'City'of 'Harfitramck, Circuit Court for 
Wayne County, Deceirber 27,1932. Unreported, but text in'The Chain Stores 
' in tho'LaY4 *C6urts., pp. 469-470. For Haplewoods also unreportedg see Yale 
Law Jnl. vol. 449 p. 629, n. 37. The St. Louis tax underwent protracted 
litigat on, and was ultimately invalidated in 1937 by the Missouri Supreme 
Court. (Krdgdr'Grodery'& Baking Co. V. City (if St. Louis, 341 Mo. 62,106 
S. W. (2d) 435). 
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these cases where the tax was approved, the reasoning of the courts 
was essentially the same: the cities had merely carried out the 
pawer to tax conferred on them by the respective states in their 
charters, and they had adopted a taxing classification approved by 
numerous courts, including the U. S. Supreme Court. In such circurstances 
their ordinances had the same force and effect as a state law. These 
courts found no ground for invalidation in that the state either had a 
different sort of chain tax - as with Spartanburg and South Carolina. - 
or, as in the other two cases, that the state legislature had itself 
declined to enact chain tax legislation. Clearly, although hazardous, 
municipal chain taxation was not always a futile quest. 
7 Nevertheless, 
the general ingression prevailed that municipal chain taxation was 
built on insecure foundations, and this greatly reduced its attractiveness 
when compared to state measures. 
It also appeared certain that the courts would never allow the 
cities as much latitude in the adoption of punitive taxation as was 
permitted the states, because the powers of cities were essentially 
derivative from, and inferior to, those of the states. Thus while quite 
severe ordinances were proposed, and adopted, in a few cities in the late 
1930s, the main battleground proved to be the state legislatures$ with 
city taxation usually involving little more than petty harrassment. 
This was particularly so in the years 1934-1937, when the issue of 
destructive taxation was very much to the fore. In all, by the end of 
1938, only about 27 municipal chain tax ordinances had been enacted-s and 
7. 'Great A&P Tea'Cb. -V. -City of STsartanburg, 170 S. E. 273; 'Safeway 
Stores Inc. ' v. ' *CitY-'Of Portland 42 P. (2d) 162; ' City-of Fred sburv r 77-S-an-itary'Grocery Co. 110 A. L. R. 3295. See are the annotation,, at 
pp. 1202-1211, which discusses the rights of cities to make 
classifications different from those made by the state. 
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of these only 19 were still in effect. Of the 19 98 were in North 
Carolina, where the state chain tax law specifically authorised 
municipalities to impose their own chain taxation, this not to exceed 
$50 per store. Similar authorisation could presumably have been written 
into the tax laws of other states, but this wAs not done, and chain tax 
campaigners apparently never gave the possibility much attention. It 
should also be observed that nearly all the municipal ordinances in 
effect at the end of 1938 were in a few Southern states, where the 
tradition of city business license taxes undoubtedly favoured the chain 
tax. 8 No city chain tax case care before the U. S. Supreme Court, a 
favourable decision from which might well have stimulated great activity 
around the country. Fortunately for the chains, in the mid-1930s when 
independents were at the peak of political strength they had their 
anbitions directed at nothing less than state or federal legislation 
and rather overlooked the opportunities to impose local chain taxes 
which, while in each case of minor inportance to the big chains, could 
have accumulated into a very considerable burden. The interest in city 
taxation provoked by the 1931 Supreme Court approval of the state laws 
was thus short-circuited by the general tendency of anti-chain activity 
to move upwards and onwards from local agitation to state and then 
finally federal measures. 
8. Nichols, op. cit. pp. 154-155. The orginances were distributed 
thus: 8 in North Carolina, 3 in West Virginia, 2 each in South 
Carolina, Virginia and Georgia, and one each in Florida and Oregon. 
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vi. -Thd'Thfýat of ConfiscatorY'Taxation 
The spread of discriminatory taxation to ever more states in the 
years 1927-33 did not of itself threaten the future of the chains. By 
the end of 1933, many chain store, men seem to have become almost 
reconciled to the fact that some sort of extra burden would have to be 
carried, at least in the states of the South and the interior, and for 
the duration of the depression. What mattered was the level of taxation 
and, in general, existing chain store taxes were rather mild. At the 
end of 1933, only one state - Idaho - imposed a graduated license tax 
with a top per store rate in excess of $250. Although some of the 
graduated sales taxes were more oppressive, their enforcement was largely 
restrained owing to litigation, and their constitutionality had still to 
be decided by the U. S. Supreme Court. Naturally, any sort of chain tax 
was unbearable to those chains standing on the verge of bankruptcy, and 
locally-concentrated chains with large nurbers of small stores could be 
troubled by even quite moderate taxes. In the Indiana case, Lafayette 
Jackson had complained of a bill of $5,443 on his 225 little stores, 
which produced aggregate receipts of rather more than $lm. The rates 
of the Idaho law - $500 on each store of chains with more than 19 stores 
would have placed a total tax of $112,, 500 on such a chain, a colossal 
burden certain to have closed many of the stores. Nevertheless,, for 
most chains, and especially for the big national chains, the prevailing 
level of taxation was little more than an irritant. 
1 
1. The ability of chains to pay chain taxes is discussed in Lee, op. cit. 
pp. 40-51, Phillips State Discrimiriatory*Chain'St6id Taxation,, pp. 356-7. 
Net profits per store for some leading chains in 1932 were: Woolworth,, 
$9,051, Kresge, $758672 Penney,, $3,449, Walgreen, $3,405, Melville Shoe 
$1,516, Kroger $347. A typical chain grocery store of the A&P, 
Kroger etc. produced sales at least ten times as great as the average for 
the Lafayette Jackson stores. 
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Through the second half of 1933, and into the Spring of 1934, 
most politically active independents were preoccupied with the emerging 
codes of the NRA, and interest in chain taxation subsided. The 1934 
legislatures received only 40 chain tax bills, the lowest total since 
1928. However, two of the four tax laws enacted in 1934 were loaded 
with ominous significance for the chains. The Colorado tax -a license 
tax graduated up to $300 on each store in excess of 25 - made an especial 
impact because it was an expression of the people's will, voted into law 
as Proposition 7 on the ballot at the Noverber general election. Its 
enactment contradicted the complacent view of some chain store men that 
only a minority of vociferous independents wanted to see them taxed. 
There had been only one previous popular vote on a chain tax, in 1932, 
when the people of Portland, Oregon, ratified an ordinance passed by the 
city council the year before. This had been a somewhat inconclusive 
result, however: the tax was a modest one (only $50 per store at its 
maximum) and the vote had been close, 53,871 to 51,782. The Colorado tax 
was heavier, and the margin of victory greater,, 197,144 to 155,417. 
Furthermore, the people of Colorado could not be said to have cast their 
ballots in ignorance of the issues, for the two sides - the pro-tax forces 
organised as the "Colorado Civic association",, and the chains led by 
Safeway - had locked in such vigorous combat in the run-up to the election 
that Proposition 7 was adjudged the "most bitterly fought of all the 
proposals" on the ballot that year. In their publicity, the chains 
emphasized the idea that the chain tax was just a disguised sales tax, 
which the consurer would have to pay: chain store prices would rise, and 
so would those of independents, "in sympathy". That sales taxes were 
unpopular could not be doubted. Three states had thus far submitted 
ordinary flat-rate sales taxes to referendum, and in each case the tax 
had been crushingly defeated. The Colorado vote indicated that most 
people did not accept the chain store argumnt at its face value and 
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were inclined instead to 
ýrefer the Civic association theory that Wall 
Street would pay. 
2 
No less portentous was the 1934 Louisiana chain tax. This statute 
introduced a new principle into chain taxation, whereby the taxing bracket 
into which a chain fell was determined by its total of stores anywhere in 
the world, not just those in the state imposing the tax. It was an 
administration Tmasure, reputedly drawn up by Huey Long himself, who$ 
although a U. S. Senator, personally managed the proceedings of the 
Louisiana legislature. As with so much of Huey Long's legislation, local 
political advantage and broad philosophical purpose were bound together 
in the same measure. 'The principal beneficiary of the new law was the 
H. G. Hill Stores Inc., a large Louisiana-based grocery chain; the 
principal victim was the A&P,,, the major competitor of the Hill stores. 
Under the previous (1932) chain tax, which was an ordinary graduated 
license tax, the two chains had paid similar amounts. As a result of 
the 1934 law the tax on the Hill company was reduced, to $30 on each of 
its 87 Louisiana stores, its aggregate of stores anywhere placing it in 
the class of chains with 76 to 100 stores. The A9P, in contrast,, 
became liable to a tax of $550 on each of its 106 Louisiana stores, 
because it had more than 500 stores anywhere, thus coming into the top 
bracket. 3 The Hill stores lobbied hard for passage of the law,, and its 
2. Interstate'Grocerg Nov. 17,, 1934; Lee op. cit. p. 19; 'Colo"ado'Spring 
Gazette No: ý-. --89 1934; Shoup, op. cit. pp. 147-9.2639 302. In 1932-3,, sales 
tax proposals were defeated by votes of 1481,965 to 19,160 in Arkansas, 
113,807 to 419241 in North Dakota and 1679512 to 45,603 in Oregon. 
3. ]Fortune,, April 19389 "The A. &P Goes To The Wars", p. 136; Louisiana 
AO-tr; 'of 1934,, No. 51; No. 19. Details of the comparative 
burden on the A&P and Hill st are from v. 
grosjean, 16 F. Supp. 499,501-3. 
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enactment gained the administration credit with a major Louisiana company 
and confirmed its reputation as a defender of local, as opposed to "Wall 
4 
Street", business. At the same time, the tax reflected a more elevated 
purpose. It gave expression to the belief that the "evil" involved in 
chain operation increased in proportion as they spilled across state lines. 
For the first time, a state had enacted a chain tax which hurt the big 
national chains more than those small local chains which had the misfortune 
to have all their stores in the taxing state. The Louisiana principle, 
apparently so obvious, had never been seriously proposed elsewhere. 
That failure in part reflected a constitutional uncertainty, a doubt 
that the courts might consider such a tax to be an attempt by the state 
to tax beyond its borders. Such uncertainty persisted until 1937, when 
the U. S. Supreme Court ruled the law constitutional,, and it curbed the 
introduction of bills incorporating the Louisiana principle in the 
intervening years, the most critical in the history of chain taxation. 
5 
Enactment of the Louisiana law provided a warning to chain store 
leaders that the various chains, harrassed by the independents and 
feeling mutual resentments born of the hard competitive conditions of 
the depression, might take up cudgels against each other. If the Hill 
stores could turn against the A&P then so could other local chains try 
to divert the political attack against the big chains. Yet more 
disturbing was the possibility that the chain tax issue might become 
enmeshed in a wider politics of discontent. Huey Long was himself a 
menace. His Share-Our-Wealth organisation claimed several million merbers 
4. Senator Fred Osers a foe of the chains, charged on the floor of the 
Senate that "The bill is only put in here to help the Hill stores... " 
and produced a telegram of opposition from the New Orleans R. G-A-s which 
feared the new proposal would be unconstitutional and also saw no reason 
to help the Hill stores. Vew'Orle=s'Tim69`PidaYiIne July 8,1934. See 
also *N., Y. Jril. of Commerce . May 3,19 35. 
5. For a discussion of the possibility of a "fatal extraterritoriality" 
see YaU Law Jnl. vol. 44, Feb. 1935, at p. 631 ff. For doubts of anti- 
chain side, Interstate'Grocerg, July 289 1934. The Louisiana decision 
is discussed below, pp. 372-2 
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by the end of 1934, and its newspaper, the *Ambildc-M Ttogtdss nounted 
frequent virulent attacks on the chain stores - attacks which reached 
a larger public than did all the trade press coTrbined. 
6 By the surmr 
of 1934, there were 79 third parties in existence, most of them demanding 
that the New Deal be carried forward to radical extreTnes. 
7 Amid the 
ideological ferment, politicians were inclined to cast about for 
unpopular scapegoats for current ills, and some were prepared to condemn 
the chain stores as the cause of the national blight. Although the 
initial effect of the NRA - as late as the summer of 1934 - was to 
distract independents from chain taxation, the disappointment of the 
more radical expectations many of them had of the NRA ultimately drove 
them back to the pursuit of anti-chain tax legislation with a redoubled 
zeal. 
As 1934 drew to a close, the anti-chain forces laid their plans 
for the 1935 legislative sessions in a political atmosphere which had 
never been more favourable. The time had come, thelzitor-. 4tate Grocer 
asserted, for the chain tax to be employed to bring about the "complete 
suppression of the chain evil in all its ramifications". Theng with a 
difficult year inevitable in any case, the chains were dealt a dire 
blow when, in January, 1935, in Fox v. Standard Oil of New Jersey, the 
U. S. Supreme Court, by a majority of 5 to 4. held that the fact that a 
tax confiscated a chain's profits provided no ground for invalidation. 
Justice Cardozo, who delivered the majority opinion, spelled out that 
"when the power to tax exists, the extent of the burden is a matter for 
the discretion of the lawmakers". This was the dreadful conclusion that 
6. See, for example, the articles by Morley Cassidy it'Artidrican'Progress 
of February 15,22; March 1,1934. The last of the series was introduced 
by a page one headline declaring "Good Times Or Bad, Chain Store Octopus 
Tightens Stranglehold.. March Of The Monster Swiftly Bringing United States 
To Ruin As Money Ceases To Circulate". 
7. Plain *Talk Magazine . June 1934 1, 
"Third Party Thunder" . p. 7. At least 
70 of these parties opposed the monetary system, 65 opposed interest and 
54 advocated limitation of the size of incomes. 
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had been forewarmed to the chains by Justice Sutherland in his dissent 
in the Indiana case four years earlier'. The Fox v. Standard Oil case 
seemed finally to remove the legal prop from under the chain stores 
and to shift the resolution of the whole chain-independent conflict to 
the legislatures. At the time of the Indiana decision, chain store men 
had been consoled by the thought that even that mild levy had produced 
4 votes for invalidation, thus leaving it necessary for only one more 
justice to switch sides to strike down destructive taxation. However, 
the 5 to 4 division held good again in the Fox case, the Court splitting 
exactly as in the Indiana case, with the new associate justice Benjamin 
Cardozo assuming the place vacated by Justice Holmes, who had resigned 
in 1932, on the liberal wing of the Court. 
8 
Between 1931 and Fox v. Standard Oil, the Court had decided only 
one chain tax case. In Liggett v. Lee (1933) the Court reiterated its 
approval of the graduated license tax, but ruled invalid a provision of 
the 1931 Florida statute whereby a slightly higher fee was exacted of 
chains operating stores in more than one county. The majority held a 
variation according to geographical location, which would result in 
chains with the same number of stores in the state paying different amountst 
to be arbitrary. Of itself, the decision was of no great consequencet 
for the county variation was unique to Florida, a mere local curiosity$ 
and the Court was not required to decide any question about how severe 
the rates of a tax could be made. 
9 
A dissent by Cardozo, in which Justice Stone concurred, expressed 
the view that the county provision should be sustained as a "rough and 
8. Inter8tate'GrOder, September 15,1934; * 'Fox'v. * 'Stc-WdciAtd'Oil'of'New 
Jersey, 294 U. S. 871. 
9. Louis 'K. 'Liggett 'Co. ' 'et al'v. *Lee,, 288 U. S. 517. , 'Flotida'Acta of, 19319 
chap. 15624. The statute imposed a maximum fee oý $40 for each store in 
excess of 75 where all the stores were in one county, the fee being $50 
where in more than one county. 
197. 
ready form of justice", and because it was likely to have a "reasonable, 
average validity" in respect of the advantages of chains operated in 
more than one county. But what attracted most attention was a separate 
one-man dissent, of unusual length and exceptional breadth of argument, 
offered by Brandeis, which amplified some of the reasoning he had 
advanced five years earlier in the Quaker City Cab Co. case. 
10 
Seizing on the fact that all the plaintiffs in the Florida chain 
tax case were corporations, Brandeis went on to argue that the corporate 
form was but the creation and creature of the state. Brandeis noted 
that "The prevalence of the corporation in America has led men of this 
generation to act, at times, as if the privilege of doing business in 
corporate form were inherent in the citizen; and has led them to accept 
the evils attendant upon the free and unrestricted use of the corporate 
mechanism as if these evils were the inescapable price of civilized life, 
and hence, to be borne with resignation". However, until late into the 
nineteenth century, fear of corporations had led states to be sparing 
and restrictive in their grant of corporate charters. Such restriction 
had broken down, but the residual power of the states could still be 
seen in the fact that even in 1933 only nine states permitted statewide 
branch banking. That power had not diminished and,, whatever the rights 
of natural persons, the corporation enjoyed only those rights permitted 
to it by the state. Hence, "the license fee is not merely taxation. 
The fee is the compensation exacted for the privilege of ca=7ing on 
intrastate business in corporate form. As this privilege is one which 
a State may withold or grant, it may charge such compensation as it 
pleases". There wass in Brandeis' view, no obligation on the state either 
10.288, U. S. 541-580,580-586. See 'Qdakdt'CitV 'Cab 'C6 ' "V. ' 
of'Perina, 277 U. S. 389 (May 29,1928) ;; here the Court invalidated a law 
imposing a tax on thiT gross receipts of corporations operating taxicabs and 
not on individuals or partnerships in the same line of business. In his 
dissent in that case, Brandeis argued that the classification should be 
upheld because the difference between corporations and natural persons was 
of itself sufficient to justify the discrimination. The majority held the 
law amounted to a violation of the equal protection guarantee of the 14th 
amendment. The dissenters were Brandeis, Holmes and Stone. 
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to dress up anti-chain laws as ordinary revenue measures, or conversely, 
to demonstrate any adverse consequences to the public mrals, health or 
safety to justify an application of the police power. On the contrary, 
it could deal with chain store corporations'exactly as it pleased. 
"If the State should conclude that bigness in retail 
merchandising as manifested in corporate chain stores 
menaces the public welfare, it right prohibit the 
excessive size or extent of that business as it prohibits 
excessive size or weight in motor trucks or excessive 
height in the buildings of a city ... The elimination of 
chain stores, deemed harmful or menacing because of their 
bigness, may be achieved by levelling the prohibition 
against the corporate mechanism ... Or, instead of 
absolutely prohibiting the corporate chain store, the State 
might conclude that it should first try the more temperate 
remedy of curbing the chains by imposing the handicap of 
discriminatory license fees ... The State's power to apply discriminatory taxation as a means of preventing domination 
of intrastate commerce by capitalistic corporations is 
not conditioned upon the existence of economic need. It 
flows from the broader right of Americans to preserve and 
to establish from time to time, such institutions, social 
and economic, as seem to them desirable; and likewise, 
to end those which they deem undesirable... To that extent, 
the citizens of each State are still masters of their 
destiny". 11 
This opinion of Justice Brandeis was handed down on March 13, 
1933, the very depth of the depression, and with the nation awaiting the 
much-heralded New Deal. It was viewed, and clearly intended, as a 
manifesto for social and economic experimentation. 7be New Republic 
hailed it as a "document of permanent importance"; not because of any 
assistance it would give to chain taxation, which the New Republic 
thought "bad economics and therefore unwise social policy", but because 
it was an attempt by Brandeis to influence the Court not to interpret 
the Constitution in such a way as to obstruct the "unprecedented and 
drastic measures" that would come before it from the efforts of the 
11. ' '288 *U. S. 548,569-709 574,578-580. Brandeis illustrated the 
break-d-ownof restrictions on corporations in great detail at 548-66, 
laying his emphasis on the traffic in corporate charters created by 
lesser states which removed restrictions so as to gain filing fees and 
-franchise taxes from corporations which 
in reality transacted most of 
their business elsewhere. This had created a "rrankenstein". rive 
of the plaintiffs in the case were among the 200 largest non-financial 
corporations (A & P. Montgomery Ward, Liggett, United Cigar Stores and 
Woolworth). 
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legislatures to find a way out of the economic chaos. The Court had, 
the New Republic assertedg "committed itself to many fair-weather 
doctrines. The wonder is that it has not yet begun to feel the weight 
of its own shackles. When it does so, the critical question will be 
whether, and how soon, it will be able to rid itself of thed'. 
12 
The majority of the Court did subsequently demonstrate a willingness 
to lighten the weight of those shackles. In upholding the New York 
milk emergency law and the Minnesota mortgage moratorium law in the 
early months of 1934 the Court pushed back its previously prescribed 
limits on the right of states to interfere with the exercise of private 
property rights, so as to allow regulation where there was no real 
relation - other than the existence of an "emergency" - to public morals, 
health or safety, and where the business thus regulated was not of a 
sort normally regarded as being affected with a public interest. 
13 
However, the states did not explore the limits of the Court's liberalityq 
for they produced little reform legislation in the 1930's. Only six 
states carried out "Little New Deals". 
14 "Bold, persistent experimentation" 
12. New Republic, "The Florida Chain Store Case" April 12,1933 pp. 230- 
231. See also, 'The Nation, "Chain Stores And The Judges" March 29,1933 
p. 335, Americari'FederatiTnist "The People May Control", May 1933 pp. 470- 
487. Brandeis' favour for the individual in business was well known, 
but the dissent also noted (at p. 579) that the State might foster the 
cooperative or the publicly-owned enterprise. 
13. In Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (Jan. 8, 
1934),, t-he Court upheld a 1933 Minnesota law intended to bring relief to 
mortgage debtors. The existence of an emergency was held to justify the 
exercise of the "protective power" of the state to interfere with private 
contracts. In the case of Nebbia v. People of New York, 291 U. S. 5029 
(March 5,, 1934) Leo Nebbia, a small grocer, had been convicted for selling 
milk below the minimum retail price fixed by a state milk board set up 
under the 1933 New York state milk control law. Again, the Court upheld 
the right of the state to carry out emergency legislation., the emergency 
being the circumstance that farmers were receiving below the cost of 
production for their milk. In both cases Sutherland, Van Devanter, 
McReynolds and Butler dissented. 
14. James T. Pattersong The New Deal and the Stat2s, Princeton,, N. J. 1969 
p-153. The "Little New Deal" governors were Frank Murphy (Michigan), 
Philip La Follette (Wisconsin), Floyd Olson (Minnesota), Eurith D. Rivers 
(Georgia),, Herbert H. Lehman (New York) and George Earle (Pennsylvania). 
La Follette, Olson, Earle and Rivers were all strong believers in chain 
taxation and saw that chain tax laws were enacted under their administrations. 
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came instead mainly from the federal government, and much of that 
federal experimentation appalled the entire Court, including Brandeis,, 
involving as it did wholesale delegation of legislative powers to 
bureaucratic agencies such as the NRA., and the usurpation of states' 
rights. The Court found itself in the position of being obliged to 
invalidate roost of the essentials of the New Deal, and of appearing as 
the great obstacle to progress. There was, long before Fox v. Standard 
Oil was decided, more than a whisper from New Deal partisans that the 
Court might have to be "packed" or have its powers reduced. Thus the 
Court had every incentive to balance its sequence of rulings adverse 
to the federal experiments by showing an indulgent attitude to the 
experiments of the states. The decision handed down in Fox v. Standard 
Oil did not rely on the reasoning of the Brandeis dissent in the Florida 
case, and neither did it contradict the traditions of the Court in 
deciding taxing statutes. Nevertheless, the tension between the 
legislative and judicial branches of government, and the economic 
discontent in the country, worked in combination to make certain that 
the majority decided the case in the way it did. Although the four 
conservatives who had voted against the Indiana law in 1931 took a 
similarly negative position in 1935, they did so without having to assume 
the responsibility of having to justify their action which would have 
fallen upon them had they constituted the majority. The minority did 
not even produce its own opinion. It was perhaps this very difficulty 
that would have been involved in making such a justification that ensured 
that the minority was the minority, for the Court could not afford to set 
its face against the wishes of every source of elected authority. 
is 
15. The Idaho Supreme Court, in approving in 1934 that state's graduated 
license tax, at the time the highest in existence, did seem to recognise 
Brandeis: "If the fees charged are so high as to unduly raise the price 
of merchandise sold by chain stores, thus resulting to the disadvantage 
of the consuming public, the Legislature is answerable for this lack of 
wisdom to the electorates not to the courts.. -The citizens of each state 
must still remain the masters of their destinys and when they speak through 
their Legislatures it is not for the courts to say that such shall not be 
the policy of that state. " J. C. Penney Co. v. Diefendorfs 32 Pic. (2d)784, 
794 (Apr. 28p 1934). 
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Fox v. Standard Oil was a case arising from the enforcement of 
the West Virginia chain tax law of 1933, which imposed a license tax 
graduated up to $250 on each store in excess of 75. It came to the 
U. S. Supreme Court on appeal from the U. S. District Court for the 
Southern District of West Virginia, which, on March 1.1934, had found 
in favour of the taxpayer. In deciding it, the Supreme Court had to 
resolve two basic questions. The first was whether or not the Standard 
Oil filling stations met the definition of chain stores provided by 
the act - "any store... or... mercantile establishment ... in which goodsv 
wares or merchandise of any kind, are sold, either at retail or 
wholesale". The lower court had decided that they did not. The second, 
and yet weightier question, was whether or not Standard Oil was denied 
the equal protection of the laws in that the weight of the tax fell 
disproportionately on gasoline chains and in so doing confiscated the 
net profits of 90% of the Standard Oil filling stations. The lower 
court had likewise decided that point in favour of Standard Oil. 
16 
The District Court had not been the first court to deal with the 
applicability of chain tax statutes to filling stations. It was 
accepted that a state could exempt chains of filling stations from the 
provisions of such laws. The U. S. Supreme Court had itself said as 
much. In the Florida, chain tax case, the chain attorneys had urged 
that the exemption of "filling stations engaged exclusively in the sale 
of gasoline or other petroleum products" was discriminatory, but the 
U. S. Supreme Court had held the exemption "not offensive to the 
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment". 
17 What was in doubt was whether 
the state could choose not to exempt filling stations. The Indiana 
Supreme Court had upheld the application of that statets 1929 law to 
filling stations. In contrast, the Wisconsin Supreme Court had found 
16. Standard'Oil Co. 'of Vei4 'Jersey 'V. ' 'Fox, 6 Fed. Supp. 494- West 
Virgjýnia, Laws 'of '1933, Chapter 36. 
17. Liggett v. Lee, 288 U. S. 5179 538. 
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that "in common language a filling station is not referred to as a 
store or a mercantile establishment where goods, wares, or merchandise 
are sold or offered for sale at retail", believing that "if one were 
to stop five hundred well-informed intelligent persons travelling into 
any city and ask them to stop at the first store or mercantile 
establishment... it is quite probable that not a single one would stop 
at a filling station or a service station ... 11 The Wisconsin Supreme 
Court had ruled filling stations exempt, even though the legislature 
had defeated an amendment offered during course of passage specifically 
to exempt filling stations. 
18 
The West Virginia District Court followed the line of reasoning 
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court. "The dominant characteristic of the 
business is the "filling" of automobiles with gasoline, oil and water, 
and the rendering of "service" to the motorist ... Such transactions 
are in public thought quite distinct from the purchase of goods at an 
ordinary store". Chain filling stations had not driven out pre- 
existing independent retailers, there was no "body of public thought" 
identifying the filling station with the chain store problems and at 
least 10 states had actually explicitly excluded filling stations from 
the effects of chain tax laws. As filling stations had paid 85.3% of 
all taxes collected under the act in 1933, it seemed implausible to 
the Court that the legislature could have intended them to be included 
without more "particularity of description" than provided by the mere 
words "stores" and "mercantile establishments". 
19 
I 
18. Midwegtern'Petroleum Corp. v. -State Board 206 Ind, 688$ 187 N. E. 
882; Wadhams Oil Co. v. State 210 Wis. 448,245 N. W. 646. The Wisconsin 
9upr-eme Court also ruled that tailor shopss shoe shine p lors,, lurrber 
yards and other I'mercantile establishments" not conmonly referred to as 
"stores" were not liable to pay the tax. 
19.6 Fed. Supp. 508-14. 
203. 
The West Virginia license tax - top rate $250 - was not 
particularly severe in its effect on most chains. The question of 
confiscation arose because of the peculiarly disadvantageous effect 
of the tax on the outlets of Standard Oil, which were small and 
numerous. In 1933,, Standard Oil operated 949 filling stations in 
West Virginia, 101 of them by direct company ownership and the 
remainder under agency agreements which Standard Oil did not deny 
amounted to operational control by it within the meaning of the act. 
There were also 54 bulk distribution plants, also liable to tax,, 
which served the stations and , did a small amount of retailing# 
For the year 1933 Standard Oil had paid $240,173.50 in tax and filing 
fees, whereas the stations had sustained an average net loss for the 
first six months of the year of $94.39. The burden of a $250 tax 
could be seen from the fact that in 1932 the 948 agency stations had 
transacted an average gross business of only $3,892, with an average 
net profit of only $89.75. While the company-owned outlets were 
better placed - 1932 average gross sales of $26,822, and average net 
profit of $1,782- it was clear that the continued operation of many 
of the Standard outlets was put at great risk by the tax. 
The burden also fell disproportionately on the filling station 
chains, in comparison with other types of chains. Standard Oil alone 
had paid 42.16% of the aggregate receipts produced by the tax in 1933. 
The Court noted that "In 1932, the last year for which complete figures 
were available, 2,453 gasoline chain stations did an aggregate business 
of $15,198,638, or 4.6% of the total business, and would have paid 
84.46% of the total tax had the law then been in effect, while 1,889 
general retail stores in chain organizations did an aggregate business 
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of $75.454,257, or 22.9% of the total business, and would have paid 
10.7% of the total tax! '. 
20 The Court r-ecognised that such legislation 
had its origins in the "hostility" of small storekeepers towards the 
chains, but found that "there is no evidence that the feeling is 
intensified, if-indeed it exists at all" in relation to the gasoline 
chains. Furthermore, the West Virginia law had been adopted not with 
a regulatory intent but primarily as a revenue measure, in order to 
meet a need arising from the adoption in 1932 of a constitutional 
restriction on property taxes. The exceptional burden placed on the 
gasoline chains therefore seemed inappropriate and invidious. According 
to the reasoning of the District Court, in the previous U. S. Supreme 
Court decisions on chain taxes the essential element in justifying the 
classification had not merely been the nurber of stores but the specific 
advantages arising therefrom, and the District Court could not find that 
a large nurber of outlets had brought the gasoline chains such advantages 
in view of the poor sales and profits. ".. while it is settled that 
an occupational tax need not be measured merely by the value of the 
privilege enjoyed, it has never been said that, in determining whether 
20. Ibid. 496-502. 
A table was provided showing the comparative burden the tax would have 
imposed in 1932. 









Sears, Roebuck & Co. 4 $ 19.00 5629861.00 1409715.00 
Montgomery Ward 7 45.50 190589083.60 151$154.00 
S. S. Kresge Co. 12 118.00 19685.141.00 1409428.00 
F. W. Woolworth Co. 21 367.50 197781,671.00 840698.00 
Kroger Grocery & 
Baking Co. 94 12,469.00 5,499,0343.00 581,503.00 
Great Atlantic & 
Pacific Tea Co. 198 389521.00 1294559017.00 629400.00 
Standard Oil - 
company owned 
stations only 98 239569.98 2$628$615.00 26, s822.00 
- conpany owned & 
agencies comb. 19046 2519573.46 1 60428s701.00 62145.98 
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a particular tax is unreasonable or arbitrary, all considerations of 
value may be excluded". In view of the confiscatory and disproportionate 
burden imposed on the plaintiff, the Court held there was a denial of 
the equal protection of the laws* 
21 
If the principle that confiscatory chain taxation was permissible 
were to be disallowed, there could not have been a stronger case to 
have brought before the Supreme Court. The interlocking of the various 
arguments by the District Court had produced an opinion of some strength. 
Nevertheless, in giving the opinion of the U. S. Supreme Court, Justice 
Cardozo found force in none of these arguments, either separately or 
taken in concert. He considered that filling stations possessed the 
basic features of chain store operation cited in the Indiana, decision 
four years earlier: "abundant capital; standardization in equipment 
and display; superior management; more rapid turnover; uniformity in 
store management; special accounting methods (a swipe at the fact 
that Standard Oil had declined to disclose the profits of its refining 
and other operations); and a unified sales policy... " Cardozo also noted 
that Standard Oil had billed its gasoline to independents at a price 
one-half cent per gallon higher than the price payable by agencies 
acting on a commission basis. Cardozo did not dispute that filling 
stations could be exempted from such taxes, as decided previously in 
the Florida case (an implicit weakness in his argument, for it is unlikely 
that the Court would have approved a chain tax law exempting, for 
example, just grocery chains or dry goods chains. Such exemption would 
probably have been held an unreasonable discrimination between taxpayers 
in the same general class - chain store merchants; that filling stations 
21. ibid. 505-8. Standard Oil did, however, have the option, not 
discussed in this cases of selling off its directly-operated stations 
and loosening agency agreements so as to avoid tax, while still controlling 
supply to the newly created independents. Most oil companies moved in 
that direction during the depression, generally because of operating 
advantages arising therefrom rather than because of chain taxes. 
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could be exempted carried an implication that such outlets were not in 
the same class). However, Cardozo was satisfied that the wording of 
the West Virginia law clearly required inclusion, especially as an 
amendment to exempt filling stations engaged exclusively in the sale 
of gasoline and other petroleum products had been voted down in the 
Senate during passage. Thus the question of definition by popular 
understanding did not arise. 
22 
As for the disproportionate burden placed on the oil chains as 
against other types of chains 9 Cardozo held that "if the accidents 
of trade lead to inequality or hardship, the consequences must be 
accepted as inherent in government by law instead of government by 
edict". All chains operating the same number of stores in the state 
were subject to the same taxs therefore equality of treatment was not 
denied. 
23 
The crux of the case was confiscation of profits and the contention 
of Standard Oil that it would be obliged to reduce the nuTrber of its 
filling stations in West Virginia. Cardozo formally disavowed any 
concerm with notives or with the policy behind the tax. "We have no 
thought... to declare it expedient or even just, or for that matter to 
declare the contrary. We deal with power only". The opinion purported 
to consider the tax only as a revenue measure, without consideration of 
any regulatory intention or effect. However, the opinion really left 
little doubt that the Court had recognised the question of public policy 
and regulation. In phrases not dissimilar to those of the Brandeis 
dissent, Cardozo asserted that 
22. Fox V. ' Standard Oil, 294 U. S. 95-8. 
23. Ibid. 101-2. 
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"A chain ... is a distinctive business species, with its 
own capacities and functions. Broadly speaking its 
opportunities and powers become greater with the nurber 
of component links; and the greater they become, the 
more far-reaching are the consequences, both social and 
economic. For that reason the state may tax the large 
chains more heavily than the small ones,, and upon a 
graduated basis ... Not only may it do this, but it may 
make the tax so heavy as to discourage multiplication 
of the units to an extent believed to be inordinate, 
and by the incidence of the burden develop other forms 
of industry. In principle there is no distinction 
between such an exercise of power and the statute upheld 
in Magnano Co. v. Hamilton ... whereby sales of butter 
were fostered and sales of oleomargarine repressed. A 
motive to build up through legislation the quality of 
men may be as creditable in the thought of some as a 
motive to magnify the quantity of trade". 24 
The reference to Magnano Co. v. Hamilton was indeed most apposite. 
In that case, decided April 2.1934, the Court had upheld a Washington 
state excise tax of 15 cents per pound on butter substitutes, even 
though "so prohibitive in amount as to destroy the intrastate business 
of a dealer in such products". Justice Sutherland had spoken for the 
Court, finding the tax was on its face nothing more than a revenue 
measure, and, that being so, the burden was a matter for the discretion 
of the legislature. Sutherland had allowed the existence of an escape 
route for the Court to evade automatic approval of destructive tax 
measures: an exception where the "necessary interpretation and effect 
plainly demonstrate that the form of taxation was indeed a mere disguise 
under which a different and forbidden power was exercised". Yet there 
24. Ibid. p. 100. In his dissent in the Florida chain tax caseq Brandeis 
had really gone out of his way to emphasise the regulatorys rather than 
the revenue aspects of chain taxes, declaring that" ... the raising of 
revenue is obviously not the main purpose of the legislation. Its chief 
aim is to protect the individual, independently-owned retail stores from 
the competition of chain stores... by subjecting the latter to financial 
handicaps which may conceivably compel their withdrawal from the State". 
(288 U. S. 541). Yet the maximum fee in Florida was only $50, whereas 
it was $250 in West Virginia. In the Louisiana decision in 1937, 
discussed below, the Court more positively erbraced the letter, as well 
as the spirit, of the Brandeis dissent, at least in relation to the 
graduated license tax. The West Virginia decision was a half-way house, 
with the aspect of public policy and regulation brought in with some 
diffidence. 
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could not have been any real doubt that the excise tax on margarine 
was a 11mere disguise", intended not to raise revenue but to cripple 
competitors of the dairy farmers. The tax had indeed had this effect, 
the appellant manufacturer having entirely terminated his intrastate 
business as a result of the tax. Sutherland had chosen to turn a 
blind eye to the nature of the tax, and to ignore the loophole whereby 
it might have been invalidated. 
25 
In Magnano v. Hamilton the four conservatives voted with the 
rest of the court. Why, then, did Sutherland and the three other 
conservatives decline to agree with the majority in the West Virginia 
chain tax case? The West Virginia tax was not unanbiguously a 
repressive measure in the way of the Washington oleomargarine excise: 
the burden it placed on most chains was only a light one, and even 
Standard Oil had not been compelled to abandon its intrastate business. 
Of the possibility of the tax having been employed as a "cloak for 
something else" (which had been the principal complaint of the Magnano 
25. A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40. The exception referred 
back to the child labour tax case, Bailey : ý., Drexel Furniture Co. 
259 U. S. 20 where the Court condemned a "so-called tax" as a dl-sguised 
atterrpt at an unacceptable regulation. In regard to the oleomargarine 
tax, Sutherland suggested that had the fee been 5 cents per pound 
rather than 15 cents, "no one, probably, would have thought of 
challenging the constitutionality or of suggesting that under the guise 
of imposing a tax another and different power had in fact been exercised". 
This was an unreal doctrine in which the amount of the tax was 
dissociated from its purpose. The effect of the tax can be judged 
from the finding of the lower court that in 1930, before the act, 
Magnano Co. imported "Nucoall margarine into the state at 17C a pound,, 
sold it at 20c to retailers who in turm sold it to consumers at 25c. 
Butter prices were then 32 to 37c per pound. Thus a 15c tax on intrastate 
sales of margarine was intended to make it more expensive than butter. 
(, A. Magnano Co. v. Dunbar, 2 Fed. Supp. 417). As prices fell in the 
depression, the proportional burden of the tax became even greater. The 
logic of Sutherland's opinion in this case - and such was the established 
logic of the Court - was that it was constitutional for a tax to put 
" taxpayer out of business as long as it was an accidental result of 
" revenue measure, but it was unconstitutional if the legislature went 
about a similar end with an explicit regulatory intent. Such logic 
encouraged legislatures to disserble their motives arid, in practice, 
allowed the individuals on the Court to indulge their own interpretations 
of the purposes of particular taxes. 
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Co. in the oleo case), Cardozo noted that "there is neither evidence 
nor even claim of any such abuse. On the contrary, the complainant 
has stated in its bill that the "act is, in effect, a tax measure", 
its validity or invalidity to be adjudged upon that basis". As there 
was no opinion from the minority, which merely concurred in the opinion 
of the Court below, it is not entirely clear why the minority felt that 
Standard Oil of New Jersey should be afforded a protection not granted 
to a manufacturer and distributor of margarine. It is a reasonable 
inferences however, that the conservatives felt that the chain tax 
case involved far Twre far-reaching consequences, so large being the 
plaintiff corporation, and so central to the economic structure being 
the field of retail distribution. In contrast, the status quo could 
comfortably survive the loss or discomfiture of a few manufacturers of 
margarine, especially if thousands of hard-pressed, normally conservative, 
but temporarily rebellious dairy farmers were thereby appeased. 
What the contrasting attitudes of the minority towards the two 
laws does show quite clearly is the knife edge on which such decisions 
were balanced. 7be individual members of the Court decided these cases 
much as they pleased. Formally, the majority opinion in the West Virginia 
case simply picked up where the Court had left off in rendering the 
Indiana decision, with the reasoning that the legislatureg once granted 
the power to levy a particular tax had discretion then as to the extent 
of the burden. In reality the line of descent was not so straight- 
forward. The four conservatives, though now bound by the Indiana 
decision, refused to accept the next step. Had it not been 19359 the time 
of the New Deal, the tire when the Court was beset by critics claiming 
that it was reactionary and obstructives one justice might well have 
defected to the conservative camp and thereby have brought the whole 
ký 
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chain tax movement - except for minor lightweight revenue measures - 
to an abrupt halt. Spiritually, and perhaps tactically, the majority 
decision owed as much to the urgent plea for latitude embodied in 
the famous Brandeis dissent as it did to the drier logic of the 
precedents. If the majority did not espouse the Brandeisian doctrine 
in respect of chain taxation, they did at least nod in its direction. 
Anti-chain campaigners felt the warmth of this wind of change. The 
simple conclusion drawn from the judgment was that they now had a free 
hand to tax the chains out of existence. Thus the independents were 
able to go before the 1935 legislatures armed with chain tax bills with 
a strong confidence that at last the courts were no longer a problem 
and would stand aside so to allow the anti-chain forces to enjoy the 
fruits of any political victory. For the first tire,, there seemed every 
indication that the struggle between chains and independents could be 
resolved in the legislatures, without judicial interference to save 
the chains. 
vii. "Doublo-brarrelled" chain taxla, 4s 'of, 1935. 
Thus inspired, the independents did not let their ardour be 
dampened when, a few weeks after the West Virginia decision, the U. S. 
Supreme Court held invalid the Kentucky graduated sales tax of 1930. 
The Court restated the essential point of the West Virginia decision, 
that "Every taxing law must pass the constitutional test applied by 
the courts to the method of imposition, but the measure of the impost 
rests in the discretion of the legislature ... 11 However, the Court 
found nothing to commend the "method of imposition" of the Kentucky 
graduated sales tax. Justice Roberts, speaking for the Court, emphasised 
that the incidence of the tax bore no relationship to the varying net 
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profits enjoyed by different businesses from the same volume of 
sales, or to any other criteria of benefit or advantage: there was 
not even a "rough uniformity of progression within wide limits of 
tolerance". To avoid such inequality either an income tax or a flat 
tax on sales would suffice. 
1 
A dissenting opinion by Cardozo, which was joined in by Justices 
Brandeis and Stone, provided a lengthy statement of the view that the 
tax was a "sincere and rational endeavor to adapt the burdens of 
taxation to the teachings of economics and the demands of social justice", 
and that there was a "normal or average validity" in the "relation 
between the taxpayer's capacity to pay and the volume of his business". 
Cardozo, argued, in particular, that the property tax had imposed an 
injustice on small retailers with a low turnover. Kroger,, one of the 
petitioners, had paid a property tax of only 137/1000 of 1 per cent in 
proportion to its sales in comparison with an average of 934/1000 
of one per cent paid by the 16,535 merchants whose sales were less than 
$400,, 000 annually. "Kentucky is not chargeable with oppressive 
discrimination in superseding such a method of taxation by one more nearly 
equal in its burdens... It is not the function of a court to make itself 
the arbiter between competing economic theories professed by honest men 
on grounds not wholly frivolous". 
2 
Many independents and chain store men were confused by the 
Kentucky decision. The inference had been drawn from the Fox v. Standard 
Oil case that the independents had carte blanche in the matter of chain 
store taxation and Yets just a few weeks later, the Court had opted to 
1. Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis 294 U. S. 550 (Reversing 7 Fed. _Supp. 4389 8 Fed. Supp. 396_). 
2. Ibid. 566s 568-9. 
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invalidate one of the most famous of the chain tax laws. 
3 There 
were, however, two reasons why the independents were not dismayed. 
The first was that laws of the Kentucky type were not appropriate 
to an attempt to tax the chains out of business: they had an equal 
impact on department stores, which were not the target, and which 
often enjoyed considerable local political influence. The second 
reason was that the Court itself apparently explicitly indicated that 
the decision implied no modification in its general position on chain 
store taxes. Despite the historical background of the Kentucky law, 
the State Tax Commission had defended it before the Supreme Court as 
a variant form of an ordinary sales tax, rather than as a chain tax. 
The majority opinion likewise clearly distinguished the case from the 
decisions rendered in the various, chain tax cases which had come 
before it. Roberts observed of the graduated license tax that 
"We found this classification reasonable because 
of advantages incident to the conduct of multiple 
stores and obvious differences in chain methods of 
merchandising as contrasted with those practiced 
in the operation of one store ... The Kentucky statute ignores the form of organization and the method 
of conducting business. The taxable class is retail 
merchants, whether individuals, partnerships, or 
corporations; those who sell in one store or many; 
those who offer but one sort of goods and those who 
through departments deal in many lines of 
merchandise. 11 4 
3. Interstate Grocer, March 16,, 1935. Lebhar Chain'Stores in 
America pp. 150-151. All the graduated sales taxes, passed 1930-33 
were eventually invalidated because of the Kentucky decision. The 
first struck down was the 1933 Vermont law (Great A9P Tea Co. 
v. Harvey,, 177 Atl. 423. March 14,1935). This was the most se7eTre 
of the existing sales taxes, though some of its teeth had been drawn 
in 1934 by enactment of a curious "Remedial Act". whereby any merchant 
able to prove that the tax was confiscatory as applied to him was 
to be taxed only up to the maximum rate which was not confiscatory. 
The Court noted that the Remedial Act "does not touch the question 
which... is one of classification and not of confiscation". 
4.294 U. S. 565-6. 
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Many anti-chain campaigners were very keen to have chain 
taxation related in some way to the sales volume of chains, and 
not just to the number of stores, so that chains such as Sears, 
Roebuck should not escape while relatively humble local chains of 
groceries, candy stores and similar small-unit chains carried most 
of the burden. The inference they drew from the Kentucky case was 
that a tax could still be levied on chain store sales,, provided 
that it took account of the "form of organization and the method of 
conducting businessit, Thus, in addition to a barrage of graduated 
license bills, the 1935 legislatures received "double-barrelled" 
bills which sought to tax both according to the nunber of stores and 
according to volume of sales. Hitherto only one state,, Minnesota,, 
had enacted such a double-barTelled law, and it had not been challenged 
in the courts. Within three months of the Kentucky decision, two 
more states, Iowa and Florida, adopted this type of taxation. In 
Iowa, the "form of organization and the method of conducting business" 
were taken into account by the exemption of the single store from 
any tax. Chain stores were subject to a license tax graduated to a 
top rate of $155, and a sales tax which escalated to the equivalent 
of 10% on sales in excess of $9m. In Florida, the single store was 
not exempted from a minimum burden. However, the principle of the 
chain store classification was followed by fixing the tax on sales 
not by reference to a sliding scale based on sales volume, but in 
accordance with the nunber of stores operated. The maximum rate was 
reached under both schedules as early as the sixteenth storeo and 
applied retroactively, so that a chain with 16 or more stores in 
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Florida was liable to pay $400, and a sales tax of 5% for every 
store. These Florida and Iowa statutes were by far the most severe 
chain taxes that had ever been enacted. 
The Iowa bill was drawn up in the offices of Charles Hewitt 
and Sons, Des Moines wholesale grocers, and was initially sponsored 
by the Mid-west Wholesale Grocers' Association. It enjoyed the 
support of Governor Clyde Herring. That it was enacted into law, in 
an essentially unaltered form, was due to the exceptional unity and 
militancy displayed that year by retailers and wholesalers in all 
lines . who pooled their strength and resources to form the Iowa 
5. Iowa, Acts of 1935 chap. 75. Laws of riorida, 1935, chap. 16848. 
See alsog Yale--rEw=ournalD vol. 45, February 1935, pp. 314-3249 
"Recent C=n Store Taxes based on Volume of Business". 
The Iowa Law: 
Schedule A: A graduated license tax up to $155 on each store in 
excess of 50. No tax on the single store. 
Schedule B: Gross Receipts_Taxq with 27 classes. Single store exempt, 
sales of all stores under co-mon ownership ameizated. 
Class Total Gross 
Receipts 







of % of Gross 
Receipts 
1 $509000 $25 . 05% + 
2 $509000 - $10 $35 - 75 . 06% - . 08% 
1009000 
etc. to 
26 $8,0001,000 - $900 $386,900 - 4.8% - 5.3% 
99000,000 4761,000 
27 Over $9m. $1,000 $486,000 - 5.3% + 
(For full schedule see Yale Law Journal vol. 45 pp. 316-7 or 12. F'Supp. 761-3) 
Florida: Created six classes of stores. 
Class No. of Stores Tax per store of gross receipts_ 
1 1 $10 0.5% 
2 2-3 $50 1% 
3 4-6 $100 2% 
4 7- 10 $200 3% 
5 11 - 15 $300 4% 
6 Over 15 $400 5% 
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Independent Businessmen's Association, specifically to get a chain 
tax. The Independent Businessmen's Association applied immense 
pressure on the legislature, with throngs of up to 2,, 000 retailers 
and wholesalers gathering at the capito. 1 at the time of critical 
votes. Far from feeling abashed about "turning on the heat", the 
independents revelled in their new found vigour, prowling the lobbies 
to harangue recalcitrant legislators, and deluging them with letters 
and telegrams summoned up from the merchants of their home towns. 
Such was the pressure that the politicians opposed to the tax worked 
circumspectly, through weakening or confusing amendments, and by 
trying to reduce the proposed rates. Their efforts.. failed, the tax 
being passed with relative ease. 
6 
The closest issue concerned the exemption of chain filling 
stations. The Independent Businessmen's Association, and the bill's 
managers in the legislatures were adamant that the oil companies should 
be included under the bill and hoped to see them confined to wholesaling 
to independent dealers. They narrowly defeated an amendment to exempt 
filling stations. Then, after the chain tax had been signed into law 
by Governor Herring, the oil companies made a last ditch efforts 
securing the introduction of an exemption bill, and transporting 
thousands of filling station employees to Des Moines to lobby for it. 
Once again, they were narrowly defeated. Complaining of the legislature's 
failure to recognise the distinction between chain stores and filling 
stations, Standard Oil of Indiana announced that it would abandon 
6. Interttate Grocer, March 2,9,30; April 6,, 200 279 1935. 
Sairple Case March 1935 p. 20. 
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direct ownership of filling stations in the state, and modify the 
leases on agency outlets so as to avoid liability. 
7 
The chain stores announced a less dramatic response, but their 
plight was a real one. According to John Hartford, the A 2, P's 
sales in Iowa were $8.5m, producing a net profit of 1.75%. Such a 
volume already made the last $500,000 of A&P sales liable to a 
9% sales tax. Furthermore, as the $8.5 m sales had been achieved at 
a time of deep depression, it was inevitable that as soon as business 
began to pick up and prices to rise, the same number of A&P stores 
would produce additional sales, all of which would be taxed at the 
rate of 9%, and then, beyond $9m, at 10%. It was inconceivable that 
the A&P could raise its prices by 10% without driving away many - 
indeed most - of its customers. Its prices would have become higher 
than those of most efficient competing service grocers. Thus the 
company would face a choice between subsidising its Iowa operations 
from other states, or closing sufficient stores to keep the aggregate 
of sales within the lower tax brackets. In effect, Iowa had imposed 
a ceiling on the A& P's operations in the state. 
8 
Oppressive though the Iowa tax was, it was less onerous than 
that imposed by Florida. Even small chains in Florida were made 
liable at the maximum rates, and on their aggregate of sales, not 
just the increment of sales. And yet the tax had been adopted by the 
7. Interstate Grocer, May ll,, 1935; Wational'Petroleilm'News May 8 
pp. 17-18,, May 29, p. 249 1935; Business Week. June 1.19 =5p. 10. 
Exemptions were made, with little controversy, for dealers in coal,, 
lurrber, ice, grain, feed and building materials; for cafes operated 
in connection with chain hotels, and for stores in unincorporated 
villages where such stores were not more than 6 miles distant from 
every other store in the chain. 
8. Interstate Grocer, May 11,1935. 
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legislature as a "compromise" measure, as an altermative to the 
"Florida Recovery Act'19 undoubtedly the most punitive anti-chain 
measure ever to have come close to passage in any state. 
The Florida Recovery Act was the brainchild of Robert H. Givens, 
an attorney in Tampa, who saw in the chain store the reason why the 
nation had failed to make a recovery from depression despite the 
efforts of the President and the loyalty of the people. Givens 
believed that by removing from the community the vital "profit on 
the last transaction" the chain store fatally impeded recovery, for 
without that profit money could not circulate locally and no work 
could be provided for the army of middlemen - travelling salesmens 
bookkeeperso carpenters, insurance men, lawyers, sign painters and 
the like - who lived off the fruits of trade. In short, Givens 
believed, as did millions of Americans, that what was wrong with 
America was that the money was not "revolving! ', and while others 
recommended a dose of "sound money" (i. e. inflation), the abolition 
of the Federal Reserve System, or the Townsend Plan, Givens thought 
the abolition of the chain stores would suffice. His Recovery Actq 
be urged, "unlocks the door to the land of opportunity America was 
once known to bell without recourse to "the 'isms' of the Old World". 
The Recovery Act,, as offered to the 1935 legislature, wasq its 
preamble asserted, "Designed to eradicate the chain stores commissary 
and itinerant merchant evils, declaring an emergency to exist by reason 
of the spread of these evils etc. " To "promote the general welfare" 
the Act intended the creation of a state licensing system for retailers. 
No permit would be allowed for the operation of any retail business 
not wholly owned in Florida, and no person, firm or corporation 
would in any case be allowed to operate more than one store. 
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Commissaries were attacked by a requirement that no license would be 
granted to any retail business subsidiary to any mill, mining or 
manufacturing concern. The Act was designed to have immediate effect 
(as of July 1,1935), with no compensation for dispossessed owners* 
9 
Givens professed a total certainty that the Recovery Act was 
constitutional. It derived its inspiration from the Brandeis dissent 
in the 1933 Florida chain tax case, in which Brandeis had so force- 
fully asserted the right of the citizens of Florida to be "masters of 
their destiny" and that they enjoyed the "right of Americans to 
preserve, and to establish from time to time, such institutions, social 
and economic, as seem to them desirable; and, likewise, to end those 
which they deem undesirable". Although three Senate judiciary committeess 
by 10 votes to 8. held the measure unconstitutional, Attorney-General 
Cary D. Landis disagreed with them. In the recent past, the 
unconstitutionality of such a measure would have been taken for granted, 
but by 1935 the old certainties were in doubt. Just a few years 
earlier most of the lawyers in America had been sure that the courts 
would not permit confiscatory taxation of chain stores, but the 
Supreme Court had done so nonetheless. 
10 The further step to outright 
prohibition no longer seemed such a long one. 
9. The philosophy behind the Recovery Act is brought out in Robert 
H. Givens, Outlawry of Chain Stores, Tampa., rla.,, 1936. Quote is 
at p. 76. Interstate 'Grocer, April 139 19-35. riorida Times` Union, 
April 5.1935. 
10. Florida Times-Union, April 19,1935. Outlawry of'Chain Stores., 
pp. 81-143, gives a brief on legal aspects of the Recovery Act in 
its, slightly modified, 1936 version. The Recovery Act applied to 
any form of ownership, not just to corporations, whereas the Brandeis 
dissent, nominally, discussed only the regulatory powers of states in 
respect of corporations. This distinction was commonly overlooked in 
discussion of the Brandeis dissent, though of course the fact that 
Brandeis limited his discussion to corporate chain stores did not 
necessarily man that he believed the states had no, or less, such 
regulatory power over other forms of ownership. It merely simplified 
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Critics of the Recovery Act could scarcely contain their rage 
and amazement. (It was felt to be "bad for the state to even have 
it talked about "out loud"). The eminent business pundit Roger 
Babson, speaking in Tanpa, sympathised with them that it would be 
a "crime to let a good state like this go to hell". Sore leaders of 
the anti-chain cause also felt it too extreme: J. H. McLaurin, 
himself a native of Florida, compared the Recovery Act to a law that 
a man could not own two suits of clothes. Nevertheless, the proposal 
received immense backing from Florida independents. The Act was 
sponsored by a newly formed "Better Business Association", for which 
Givens acted as counsel. The headquarters of the Better Business 
Association was Tampa, and its officers came from that city. In the 
House, the Act was introduced by the Hillsborough county (Tampa) 
delegation. The principal leader of the Recovery Act forces in the 
legislature was State Senator Henry C. Tillman., another Tampang who 
had run against Givens for his Senate seat in the last election. 
Tillman was the son of "Pitchfork Ben" Tillman, rustic demagogue and 
one tire Governor and U. S. Senator from South Carolina. Despite this 
dominance by Tampans,, the Better Business Association had support 
statewide. It claimed menbers in 91 cities, and proved able to 
summon hundreds of merchants from every corner of the state to crowd 
the capitol during deliberations on the Recovery Act. In the 1920's 
Florida had been a boom state,, growing fat on wealth exported from 
other parts of the country, an outpost of the North being constructed 
10. (cont'd) 
the argument. No state ever passed a law taxing only corporate 
chain stores, and the majority of the Court - as in the Quaker Citv 
Cab Co. case - would probably have found such a discrimination 
unlawful. A law totally forbidding the operation of corporate chain 
stores within the border of a state may well, paradoxically, have 
stood a better chance of being upheld. The state had a right to 
refuse entry to corporations but once it had allowed entry the 
corporation was held by the Court to-enjoy the protection of the 
14th Amendment equally with natural persons. 
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beyond the rural South. In their conviction that the chain stores 
should be prevented from funnelling the wealth back to the North, 
the independent merchants reacted much as any natives in a colonial 
economy whose wealth had been built up by outside capital but were 
unwilling to see any flow in reverse, 
11 
The Recovery Act was by far the hottest issue in the 1935 
legislatureg with scenes of independent militancy similar to those 
in Iowa. The House passed the measure, amended so as to exempt 
commissaries, to allow out-of-state persons to own up to 50% of the 
preferred stock in stores., and to require ratification by an 
immediate (July 23) popular referendum. These amendments were 
acceptable to the bill's sponsors. The real fight occurred in the 
Senate. Senators wrestled with their dilemma under the double 
pressure produced by hundreds of independents who crammed the 
galleries during debate, and the awareness that their actions were 
being followed by an unseen audience back horm listening to their 
proceedings over WRUF,, the state-owned radio station. One Senator 
declared the Act to be "the most damnable piece of legislation ever 
introduced, but the people of my district seem to want to be saddled 
with it and I am going to vote for it". Opponents of the measure 
lacked both the votes and the nerve to try to kill it outright, and 
instead worked through weakening amendments. As passed by the Senate, 
the Recovery Act exempted agricultural supply houses and seasonal 
merchants who maintained stores in hotels for not more than five 
months a year. Two major amendments exempted rlorida. residents whose 
11. Interstate *Grocers May 25,1935. Florida TiMg--; Union April 10, 
119 129 169 IqJ5. 
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retailing businesses were in existence at the time of passage, 
and provided for a referendum vote at the 1936 elections. 
12 
The House, responding to the wishes of the Recovery Act forces, 
refused to accept the Senate amendments, and the Senate likewise 
declined to back down. The crux of the dispute was the referendum 
provision. According to the Senate opponents of the Recovery Act, 
the House referendum proposal was mere "trickery", as under it the 
Act would become effective at once upon receiving the Govermor's 
signature. If the courts ruled the referendum provision invalid - 
as was quite likely, Florida having previously employed the referendum 
only to decide constitutional amendments - the law would remain in 
effect. Senator Tillman agreed that such was the case. In contrast, 
the Senate plan required a referendum vote in favour of the Recovery 
Act to give it force. The protagonists of the Recovery Act also 
feared that, given a 1936 referendum, the chains would be able to 
organise to defeat the measure by mounting an irresistible pressure 
on the newspapers, farmers and consumers. The independents felt 
they could win in an immediate poll but to wait until 1936 risked a 
shift to conservatism in the prevailing political climate. 
13 
With House and Senate unable to reconcile their differencesq 
the Recovery Act disappeared into a conference committee where it 
languished and finally expired. Tillman meanwhile switched his main 
attention to a double-barrelled chain tax bill. Some of the leading 
opponents of the Recovery Act were in favour of a chain tax, and a 
majority of the legislators embraced the chain tax with relief. It 
12. Florida Tineg-Union April 26,279 309 1935. 
13. Ibid., May 15,, 169 175 1935. 
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killed two birds with one stone. The independent merchants were 
mollified, and important revenues were secured. In the closing days 
of the session, the legislatures urgently needing to find extra 
revenues to top up the fund to pay for the public schools, came down 
to a choice between the chain tax and a flat tax on sales, and the 
unwillingness of the House to countenance an unpopular flat sales 
tax made the chain tax inevitable. The influence of the Recovery 
Act was shown in the incorporation in the chain tax statute of a 
"Declaration of Policy" which stated that the multiplication of 
' 14 chain stores "should be discouraged as a matter of public poliCY19 
An uncertainty as to the constitutionality of the sales tax 
feature was evidenced by the incorporation in the statute of a 
provision that the rates of the license tax were to be doubled in 
the event that the sales tax were found unconstitutional. Neverthelessq 
most of the criticism on this score in legislative debate came from 
those who were trying to undermine the chain tax bill and impose a 
flat sales tax instead. The statute was passed in part to let the 
politicians off the hook, but it was also intended to raise important 
revenues, and was not - as a justice of the Florida Supreme Court 
later charged - enacted simply to "pass the buck" to the courts. 
Ironically - in view of the ultimate Florida Supreme Court ruling - 
one opponent of the tax charged during debate that 117be political 
situation in this state is in such a dastardly condition that we are 
told the Supreme Court has already arrived at an opinion", meaning 
an opinion that the law would be sustained. Some supporters of the 
14. Ibid. April 29 9 30; May 29 24 9 25 9 29 9 30; Jme 1,19 35 . 
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tax preferred it to the Recovery Act precisely because they felt 
it would be sustained, whereas the Recovery Act most probably would 
not, thus proving a hollow gesture. 
15 
The chains put up a pitifully disorganised opposition to both 
the Recovery Act and the chain tax, bringing no real counter-pressure 
to bear. After passage of the tax, 80 chain operators met in 
Jacksonville to form a state chain association, and to regret that 
they had not done so earlier. A court test was planned, but without 
much confidence. The chairman of the organisation meeting thought 
the tax had been "very cleverly drawn", with all the loopholes blocked. 
"If we had united ... we could have stopped it. Now it has been passed 
and it is well known that none of us can pay the taxes asked, and we 
will have to go out of business". Neither had their opponents ceased 
their activities, for the Better Business Association was put on a 
permanent basis with chairmen appointed for each state senatorial 
district, to lay the foundations for a reintroduction of the Recovery 
Act in the next legislature. 
16 
The advocates of chain taxation by no means swept the board in 
the early months of 1935. As ever, the efforts of independents were 
patchy. Chain tax laws failed to materialise in Texas, Minnesota and 
Pennsylvania despite the support of the respective Governors. While 
the merchants of Iowa stormed the capitol to demand legislation, 
chain tax bills in neighboui,, ing Missouri and in Kansas perished quietly 
with little agitation in their behalf. In many states the 
15. Ibid. April 30; May 2.159 24; June 1,1935. Senator Gomez, one 
of the most active opponents of the Recovery Act, had his own bill for 
a tax graduated up to 8% on the sales of chains with 20 or more stores 
compared with the 5% top rate of the Tillman bill. Gomez claimed in 
debate on the Recovery Act that Tillman "is not working for the 
independent merchant... This bill was put in by the chain stores to 
avoid tax measures". For the charge of passing the buck, see judgment 
in State Ex Rel. 'Lan(§*Drug. Stores v. Simpson, 122 Fla. 639,166 So. 
2279 opinion of Justice Bu ford. 
16. Florida Times-Union June 119 189 229 1935. 
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independents, through lack of militancy, missed an opportunity to 
press home their advantage. Only the California graduated license 
tax (top rate $500 on each store in excess of nine) was as 
disturbing to the chains as the Iowa and Florida double-barrelled 
laws, principally because California was seen as a pacesetter likely 
to influence other large states. Nevertheless, it was obvious that 
the whole chain tax fight had entered into a new and critical phase. 
The Iowa and Florida laws threatened a widescale curtailment of 
chain business in those states and the balance of probability favoured 
the assumption that the courts would decide that these laws were 
constitutional. Even if the chains succeeded in securing a ruling 
against those statutes., the independents, armed with the West Virginia 
decision, and demonstrating an unprecedented appetite and capacity 
for political struggle, were well placed to strike back with crippling 
graduated license taxes. Hitherto chain taxes had not threatened any 
fatal consequences, but by the summer of 1935 a situation had 
developed where, unless the chains were able to arrest the taxing 
movement and, indeed, throw it into reverse, they faced the prospect 
of widespread store closures and savage reductions in profitability$ 
if not outright extinction. 
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PART 4: Congress and the Chain Stores. 
i. Years of Inaction, 1927-32. 
The battles in state legislatures in the late 1920's and early 
1930's over chain store tax legislation had no parallel in the United 
States Congress. Although Congressman Henry T. Rainey, the veteran liberal 
from Illinois, suggested as early as 1930 that the whole chain store problem 
would ultimately have to be faced head on by the use of federal taxation, 
no one in the Congress or in the independent trade believed, that, the time 
had yet come to force the issue. 
1 Indeed, no federal chain tax bill would 
be introduced until 1938. In 1932, Congressman Emanuel Cellers the attorney 
for the New York State Retail Meat Dealers' Association, introduced a bill 
in the House which sought a graduated license tax on chain stores in the 
District of Columbia, thus attempting to bring the House up to date in the 
exercise of its local jurisdiction with what was happening in the states. 
No real interest developed in the bill, however, and a companion bill was 
not offered in the Senate. 
2 It so happened that the District of Colunbia 
was a chain store stronghold - the share of total sales enjoyed by the 
chains was greater than in any of the states - and a political weakpoint 
for independents. The anonymity and mobility of life in the District had 
discouraged any of the sort of trade cohesiveness and playing up to community 
sentiment which sustained anti-chain activity elsewhere. 
3 And while the 
enactment of a chain tax for the District would no doubt have sent ripples 
1. Interstate Grocer, May 31,1930. 
2. Congressional Recordq 72nd Cong. lst Sess. s pp. ID455-6 (May 17,1932). 
3. For the difficulty of arousing action in Washington -D. C., see comments 
of president of the local grocers' association in "The Secretaries' Forum", 
National Grocers' Bulletin, January 1929. 
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into the states, and been a great syrb6lic victory, independents elsewhere 
were far too preoccupied with their own local conflicts to turn their 
attention to Washington. Even Emanuel Celler actually showed more interest 
in 1932 in the chain tax bill he had drawn up for introduction in the New 
York legislature. Not until 1937 would the idea of a District of Columbia 
chain tax be considered again. 
Insofar as Congress gave any attention to the chain store problem in 
the period 1927-32 - and it gave very little - it tended to work all the 
way around the subject without tackling it directly. When the Senate 
adopted the Brookhart resolution in 1928, it effectively passed the buck to 
the Federal Trade Commission. Furthermore, it was the very Senate 
Progressiveso like Brookhart himself, who had for years been most critical 
of the Federal Trade Commission as being dominated by big business who 
showed themselves as most eager to thrust the problem into its hands. And 
if it had not been obvious in 1928 that the Commission would take its time 
over the investigation, the extent of its willingness to prevaricate and 
equivocate soon became clear. The Commission showed no great enthusiasm 
for its task; equally, it was determined that if it had to do it, it would 
do it thoroughly. As a result, it laboriously assembled- mountains of data 
over a period of more than six years$ releasing most of it in unconnected, 
half-digested reports of obscure relevance while all around the economic 
order of 1928 crashed into ruins and desperate independent merchants sought 
their own remedies. Not until December 1934 did it make the legislative 
recommendations sought by Senator Brookhart in May, 1928. 
That the FTC would take its time and err on the side, of caution in 
coming to judgement was perhaps implicit in its very nature as an 
administrative, regulatory agency. The politicians were still at liberty 
to act on their own account to meet immediate need, even if their remedy 
might be rough and ready. Insteads most of them seemed-to look up on the 
existence of the FTC's inquiry as precluding separate action, almost as if 
the chain store issue had somehow been rendered sub judice. At least one 
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Senator suggested that a Senate investigating committee might be able 
to bring matters to a head, by directly interrogating chain store men in 
public hearings, and by focussing on the sharp issues such as special 
rebates to chain buyers without the elaborate probing into totally non- 
controversial aspects of chain merchandising favoured by the Trade 
Commission. 4 But nothing became of the idea, and the chains were able to 
shelter under the protective umbrella put up by the Commission. 
The nearest Congress got to coming to grips with the chain store 
issue was the annual ritual of the Capper-Kelly price maintenance bill. 
Both Capper and Kelly frequently alluded to the bill as being designed to 
curb the predatory price-baiting chains, and it was generally accepted as 
the most useful thing the Congress could do for the small merchant short 
of a direct attack on the chains. Nevertheless, even the Capper-Kelly bill 
could not really be seen as a sort of federal alternative to the chain tax 
in the states. For one thing it lacked the urgent grass-roots appeal of 
the chain tax. Although trade association executives duly fil.. ed their 
statements in favour, year after year, with Congressional committees, only 
to the druggists, for whom price maintenance possessed a mystic significance 
indissolubly bonded with their conception of the profession of pharmacyg was 
the issue one of deep and abiding interest. 
5 Again, while most independents 
believed that price maintenance would do them good, in the unlikely event 
that it could be made to work,, it was best characterised as being 
4. (Senator McKellar of Tennessee). Interstate Grocer, Decerber 20,1930. 
5. At the time of the Henderson agitation in early 1930, the NARD laid great 
emphasis on the desirability of obtaining pro-Capper-Kelly resolutions from 
local anti-chain groups in order to demonstrate to Congressmen the breadth of 
support for the bill. These efforts met with little success fors as the NARD 
Journal expressed itq "practically 99 per cent" of the work done for the Fill 
was by retail druggists which "tended to create the impression in the mind of 
the average Congressman that the demand for the proposed legislation cam 
from a single class". The idea was "deeply eTrbedded" that it was "simply and 
solely a druggists' bill". (. NARD Journal March 27, July 100 October 16,1930). 
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pro-independent, rather than anti-chain, in intent. Reasonable doubts 
existed about the probable balance of power between chains and independents 
under a regimen of price maintenances and those doubts were considerably 
heightened when the leading drug chains declared their hand in favour of 
Capper-Kelly in 1932. Price maintenance was the prerogative of the 
manufacturer, and manufacturers were not as a class noted for their hostility 
to efficient mass distributors,, at least so far as their selling operations 
were concerned. 
6 In sharp contrasts the chain store tax was an exaction 
inposed by the government. It was a straight fine, with no ambiguity about 
who would be the victim. 
Why theng did no movement develop inside or outside of Congress for 
the federal government to take more direct and explicit action against the 
chains? Part of the explanation may be found in the character of the 
independent trade itself. It made no clear demand for federal action. 
because it was not yet ready to do so. The natural fighting territory for 
the small merchants was in the home towns and in the state legislaturesp and 
their quite striking successes in whipping up trade-at-home feeling and then 
in passing chain tax laws inevitably discouraged any thought of fighting 
battles on the unfamiliar terrain in Washington. A widespread conflicts 
fought out in many places simultaneously, naturally favoured the independentss 
who had the advantage. of nunbers and local knowledge over the chains, 
highly-centralised institutions which found it difficult to keep track of 
events. In contrast, no one could doubt that the chains were far better 
equipped to deal with affairs in Washington, to which the independents had 
only the most ill-defined lines of communication. It was symptomatic of 
the traditional preoccupations of the independent trade that the four 
6. See above,, pp. 43-46l 59-60. 
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largest national retailers' associations all had their headquarters in 
the Midwest, not in either New York or Washington. 
7 They were national 
associations primarily in the sense that they recruited nationally rather 
than that they engaged in federal politics. Not until the coming of the 
New Deal did that focus change. Before then, the national associations 
did little more than put on conventions to allow friends in the trade from 
around the country to get together for a few days and enjoy hospitality put 
on by courtesy of the wholesalers and manufacturers. Similarly, all trade 
relations tended to be "vertical" rather than "horizontal" thus reducing 
the possibilities for any combining of forces. Wholesalers or retailers 
in different lines had little organised contact with each other. There had 
been various suggestions from time to time to weld together the nation's 
retailers into a national federation,, but the idea had always faltered 
through indifference and the reluctance of trade executives to do anything 
which might compromise their independence of action or threaten their own 
jobs. The only offshoot of such ideas was the Retailers' National Councils 
which was set up in 1923 and served as a loose organisation for the 
Secretaries of national retail associations, chain and independent alike. 
The Council provided a forum for the occasional exchange of views, but the 
Secretaries were careful not to allow it an independent existence which 
might compromise their freedom of action, and few rank-and-file retailers 
even knew of its existence. 
7. Nat. Assn. of Retail Druggists and Nat. Assn. of Retail Meat Dealers 
in Chicago; Nat. Assn. of Retail Grocers in St. Paul; Nat. Retail Hardware 
Assn. in Indianapolis. The NRDGA and the NCSAs in contrast, were both based 
in New York. The unpretentious nature of the small retailers' associations 
is perhaps indicated by the fact that the NARG maintained its offices in 
out-of-the-way St. Paul simply because that was Secretary Janssen's home, 
and his children were in school there. It moved to Chicago in 1934 when 
Janssen resigned. 
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The lack of pressure from independent merchants was mirrored by the 
absence of any clear anti-chain faction in Congress itself. During these 
years - especially in 1931 and 1932 - Congress was a faltering, stuttering 
institution, incapable of finding a collective response to the calamity of 
the depression. It did little about anything, and it did nothing about 
matters upon which it was not under unrelenting pressure from well-entrenched 
vested interests. The most eloquent friends of the independent merchants 
were largely found in the ranks of the western Progressives, but their 
attentions remained fixed for the most part on farmers, the unemployed, the 
banking structure, Prohibition and such like issues of the day. Furthermores 
it was not altogether clear what they had to offer the independent merchants 
even had they enjoyed some degree of power. Their lack of decisive action 
was epitomised by the attitude of Senator Brookhart whol after introducing 
his chain store investigation resolution in 1928 offered no further anti- 
chain bill before losing his seat in 1932,, never to be re-elected. 
8 Only a 
motley assortment of other politicians, mostly from the Southq showed any 
interest in the chain store issue, and then to no particular purpose. No 
leader emerged in either Senate or House to'lead an anti-chain crusade. 
9 
8. For an acid description of the Progressive bloc as a "sorry bunch of 
weaklings and time servers" who "sit back, wait a bit, shake their headsp 
demand investigations, introduce endless and inane resolutions, and then 
take it out by "voting right"", see "Progressives of the Senate". American 
Mercury April 1929 pp, 385-93. George Norris of Nebraska and Tom Walsh of 
Montana were exempted from this description. 
9. Some who promised much delivered nothing. When Huey Long first ran for 
the Senate in 1930 his own newspaper asserted that the chain stores had 
"kicked in with thousands of dollars" for the campaign of his opponent because 
the "chain store kings realize that when he is elected... he will begin 
federal legislation to prevent the unethical practices that they for so long 
have been thriving on". (Louisiana Progresss August l4s 1930). But although 
Long's Share Our Wealth organisation did channel much anti-chain propaganda 
to a mass audiences the Senator did not introduce a single anti-chain bill 
in his Senate career. Assassination in Septerber, 1935 removed him from the 
scene just as the chain store was becoming an issue on Capitol Hill. 
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ii. Thd'rddd: tdl Timension, '1933-ý4. 
The New Deal platform upon which Governor Roosevelt came to the office 
of the President in 1932 contained no threat, either explicit or implicit, 
to the chain stores. Indeedo if there can be said to be a dominant 
philosophical position in the early New Deal in reference to distribution - 
actually production got all the attention - it was that the efficiencies of 
the chains were an advantage to a struggling economy, provided that chain 
buying methods did not depress prices to farmers and other suppliers. It is 
also an indication of the insignificance of the anti-chain fight in national 
political controversy that Roosevelt felt no obligation to make any sort of 
gesture to independent merchants for electoral reasons which might have 
contradicted that philosophy. 
1 
Neverthelessa the atmosphere of regeneration and unbounded expectation 
was so pervasive in the early days of the New Deal that some independents 
were quite prepared to believe that utopia was just around the corner. 
Earnest appehls were directed to Roosevelt to remenber that the country could 
never prosper without the restoration of a secure body of home merchantst 
and to take immediate action to legislate the chains out of existence. 
2 Sore 
hoped for the dramatic sort of direct action being taken at the tire under 
the auspices of the new administration in Germany where Nazi stormtroopersp 
in pursuit of the early populist phase of the Nazi revolution,, picketed 
Woolworth stores, while the government itself placed a ban on the opening of 
1. See above, pp. 57j 750 142. 
2. Thomas CarToll Daviss Chain Stores vs. 'Farm'Ppoblem (George W. King 
Printing Co. Baltimore, 1933). a work inspired by the 1932 Presidential 
canpaigns, warmed against an over-emphasis on the problems of the farmer. Davis 
called on the government to compel the immediate liquidation of chain store 
companies and then force manufacturers to stick to manufacturing, retailers to 
retailing etc. With this done,, the govermment could abandon all other "noble 
experiments" and leave business to itself. Ernest G. Shinner$*The'rOrgotten 
Man, Chicago, 1933 appealed to the "spirit" of the New Deal to urge the 
Timtation of any retail business to a gross annual volume not exceeding $5m. 
The author was himself the owner of a chain of retail Twat markets in and 
around Chicago - presumably with sales under $5m. 
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new limited-price variety chain. stores. 
Such dreams apart, what the trade longed for most by the beginning of 
1933 was salvation from the tyranny of "cut-throat corpetition". The 
National Industrial Recovery Act was greeted with almost universal relief 
and gratitude in the independent trade as a sort of colossal trade practice 
conference, backed up by powers of administrative enforcement never enjoyed 
by the rTC. Trade association executives flocked to Washington to participate 
in the processes of code-naking; federal regulation., for the first time 
other than in war, reached right down to the level of the small retail store 
on Main street. Inevitably, much of the code-making for the distributive 
trades involved the NRA in decisions on matters which divided chains and 
independents. The chain store problem arrived in Washington through the 
back door of the NRA while the Congress assured a passive role and delegated 
its responsibilities. During 1933 and 1934, the independent merchants forgot 
all about old panaceas like Capper-Kelly and the Trade Commission 
investigation, and looked instead to the NRA to usher in a new and better age. 
The one considerable attempt made by Congress to involve itself in the 
affairs of the NRA in the interests of the small businessman actually evoked 
little sympathy from mst leaders of the independent merchants. In the 
winter of 1933-4,, several of the Senate Progressives, notably Borah and Nyes 
mounted a vigorous assault of the NRA, claiming that it fostered monopolistic 
price-fixing and oppressed small business. In response to their complaints, 
and to avoid the creation of a Senate investigating committee$ General Hugh 
Johnson, the head of the NRA, acceded to the establishment of a five man 
National Recovery Review Board, headed by the Chicago lawyer and publicist 
3. Interstate Grocer April 8.1933. Even so sober an observer as C. H. 
Janssen, NARG Secretary, observed that "Hitler goes at the problem without 
the resistance of our American political structure . The government there 
is shaped primarily to. protect the middle class... Chain stores and 
consumer cooperatives are doomed under the present Hitler plan". (Modern 
. tler 
MerchantI Gt6ddry'W6rid, June 3.1933). This trade enthusiasm for7RH'2 
was, it should be noted, as short-lived as Hitler's enthusiasm for driving 
out the chain stores. 
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Clarence Darrow. The ostensible brief of the Review Board was to serve 
as a court of review in the interests of small business . and two of its 
members were apparently well-equipped to consider the problems of the 
small merchant. Samuel C. Henry was a director of the cooperative 
Philadelphia Wholesale Drug Co. and the recently deposed Secretary of the 
National Association of Retail Druggists, and Fred Mann was the one-time 
vice-president of the W. K. Henderson Minute hen. Despite this, few 
representative spokesmen for independent merchants found the proceedings of 
the Review Board to their liking. From the firstg it conducted its inquiries 
in an unbalanced and partisan manner, cobbling together all manner of half- 
truths and innuendo in order to discredit the NRA, while s. uggesting no 
alternative but a return to an ill-defined state of free competition. Thus 
while trade leaders were perfectly prepared to take their detailed criticisms 
of the NRA codes to the Review Board, they were most careful not to fuel its 
fires by condeming the principle behind the NRA. Indeed, the Review Board 
got so little material to its liking from the small retailers that its 
treatment ofthe retail codes was reduced to the recitation of some ill- 
founded tittle tattle arising out of the private feud of certain New York 
department stores. The Board's methods made it an easy target for General 
Johnson's jibes that 95% of the "little fellow" conplaints came from sweat- 
shops and "chiselers" who thought their fortunes would revive with a return 
to conpetitive anarchy. 
4 
4. Hu'ýh S. Johnsons The Blue Eagle From Egg ToTarth N. Y. 19359 pp 271-282; 
New York Times Hay 5.129 139 279 1934. Hawleys The New Deal and The 
Problem of Monopoly pp. 81-59 95-7. 
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To a prominent opponent of\the chain stores like George Schulte, 
the Review Board seemed an opportunity wasted. Instead of the Board 
providing a counterweight to the big retailers to assist in the further 
improvement of the codes in the interest of the independents, it merely 
gave comfort to the enemies of the New Deal such as the U. S. Chanber of 
Commerce, thus threatening "a return to the old system which can only mean 
destruction". Schulte's persistent fear was that big business would succeed 
in operating through a front of disgruntled "little fellows" to bring down 
the NRA, with untold consequencess both political and economic, for the small 
men. 
5 Even those less enamoured of the NRA than was Schulte had to face the 
question of what critics like Nye and Borah could put in its place. Senator 
Nye had himself, in 1932,, introduced bills to prevent sales below cost, to 
strengthen Section 2 of the Clayton act against price discrimination, and 
to make trade practice conference rules enforceable after approval by the 
majority in the industry. Nye had offered these bills, in good measure, 
specifically to help the independent merchants. 
6 To the trade s the aim of 
these bills seemed very much the same as that of the National Industrial 
Recovery Actl whatever the latter's deficiencies in actual operation. As 
for Senator Borah, he had something of a reputation as an obstructionist 
and negationist. Were not their attacks on'the NRA in a sense an expression 
of pique, of irpotence, because it was no longer the Senate but the New Deal 
agencies which held centre-stage? Their Progressive philosophy had apparently 
run into a dead end as far as the small merchant was concerned. The small 
man wanted more price-fixing, not less; he wanted governmental protection, 
not to be thrown to the wolf of free competition. Nothing done during the 
depression before the NRA had provided that protection, and the small ran 
could naturally only subject the rhetoric of its critics to the tests of 
that experience. 
5. Interstate Gr6cerg May 269 June 29 June 16,1934. 
6. New York Timess January 69 1932. 
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For nearly a year, the NRA-functioned virtually as an alternative 
business government, the creation, Of course, of Congress, but not its 
creature. It applied its own administrative edicts with little respect 
for any of the pre-existing laws relating to trade practices enacted by 
the Congress. Although the NRA's psychological and practical grip began 
to weaken from the Summer of 1934, as it withdrew from some areas of the 
econory and reduced its involvement in others, the process of progressive 
debilitation was only very gradual. As a result, the appearance of the 
Final, Report of the FTC's chain store investigation in Decerber, 1934 made 
only a modest immediate impact. The character of the Final Report actually 
served well to point up the practical merits of the NRA. After six years 
of study, the FTC produced only three legislative recommendationss which it 
outlined in only the most cursory manner,, despite the many complex 
economic and legal problems which each involved. Two of the recommendations 
actually arose from more general concerns of the Commission,, and the Report 
did not explain their specific importance and relevance to the chain store 
issue. Only the proposal to amend Section 2 of the Clayton act, to curb 
discriminatory prices to trede buyerso really answered the grievances of 
independent merchants. 
7 Even then, the Report made no reference to the fact 
that the NRA was already grappling with the difficult issue of price 
discrimination and had written into the codes many restrictions not found 
in Section 2. The FTC had itself conspicuously failed in the past to 
enforce Section 2-a failure which it ungraciously laid entirely at the 
doors of the Courts; 
8 
now it sought amendments without mentioning that -for 
eighteen months Section 2 had effectively not existed,, but had been replaced 
by the fiat law of the NRA. The Final Rei)ort did not even acknowledge that 
there was an NRA, functioning as its rival to authority over business. Was 
7. Final ReT56rt of Chain-Store Investigation pp 94-7. See also above, 
PP. 46 - 52. 
8. 'rinal'Report,, pp 90-1. 
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not this, perhapsg just the same impotent pique that had distorted the 
judgement of Senators Nye and Borah? The lofty disregard of the FTC for 
current political and economic realities scarcely boded well for a forceful 
and down to earth enforcement of a revised Section 2, even if such a 
revision could be obtained within a reasonable space of tire from Congress. 
Not surprisingly, the first reaction of independent leaders to the""Yk_al 
ReT)ort was simply to file it away for future reference, and get back to the 
immediate task of battling for tighter controls on chain buying advantages 
from the NRA. 
Then, through the early months of 1935, the NRA began to fall apart 
at the seams, and it became increasingly clear that its lawyers were just 
playing out time before the Supreme Court delivered the death warrant. Some 
independents never doubted in the NRA to the end and for months - even 
years - after it was killed off in May, 1935, there were recurrent reports 
that it was to be revived in a new, improved version which would somehow 
pass every test of constitutionality. But most trade leaders cam to the 
realisation well before the*, Schechter decision that other options had to 
be taken up, if only as an insurance policy. Many of the ideas in vogue - 
price-fixing and loss limitation laws,, trade practice conferencess industry 
self-regulation - iinplied a general drawing together of the trade, chain and 
independent alike. In contrast, the discussion of an attack on price 
discrimination sharpened up the conflict between chain and independent and 
even, to a lesser extent, between large and small in the independent sector. 
In the Spring of 1935, several bills were introduced in Congress to ' 
attack price discrimination. The rjost enthusiasm from the enemies of the 
chains was directed towards the Bankhead-Huddleston "Equal Rights Trade Act'19 
introduced in both Houses on March 3.1. Among its provisions was a fearsome 
restriction on chain buying, for the bill made it "unlawful... to discriminate 
in price between different purchasers of any co=wdity, regardless of the 
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quantity purchased". Exception was. to. be zmde only so that "a lower price 
may be charged in sales made, to wholesalers in contemplation of resale to 
retailers; and that higher prices Tmy be charged in sales made in good 
faith directly to consumers than are charged in sales of the same commodity 
to retailers". Thus the bill sought to destroy chain quantity discounts, 
while entrenching the rights of wholesalers to obtain functional discounts. 
9 
While the bill helped to arouse trade interest in the whole subject 
of Congressional action to curb price discrimination, most observers 
considered it too extreme to have a good chance of passage. Such was the 
view of H. B. Teegarden, the attorney of the United States Wholesale Grocers' 
Associations who prepared a rather more moderate measure, which was first 
unveiled at the association's annual convention, held May 21-3. The 
convention responded warmly to USWGA President J. H. McLaurints assertion 
that the bill was the wholesale grocers' "declaration of independence"s 
and excited speakers from the floor spoke of raising a fighting fund of 
$500,000 to $lm. to put it into law. 
10 At first, however, the bill seemed 
to have no particular qualities or breadth of support such as would take 
it to the head of the pack of price discrimination bills. The bill really 
began its journey to ultimate enactment, as the Robinson-Patman laws when 
it was picked up by Congressman Wright Patman, who introduced it in the 
House on June 11. Thanks to a sequence of developments arising in the field 
of retailers' politics, Patman was able to create so much publicity for 
the USWGA bill that it rapidly pushed al-I other price discrimination bills 
into eclipse* 
11 
9. Bankhead-Huddleston Bill, introduced as H. R. 6618/S. 2211. See also 
H. R. 62460 H. R. 49950 H. R. 5062. (74th Cong. Ist Sess. ). 
10. Interstate Grocer, May 25,1935. 
11. H. R. 8442'*Corigressi6nAl'Rdd6rd 74th Cong. lst Sess., pp 9077-8. 
Introduced as S. 3154 by Senator Joseph T. Robinson. 
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iii. ' 'The 'CreAtipt'of 'the PAtman 'committee 
On April 17s 1935, a front page story in the 'NovVYdrk 'Times announced 
the formation of the American Retail Federation. According to Louis E. 
Kirstein,, the vice-president of William Filene's Son's Co.,, the Boston 
department store,, the ARr was to serve as the "unified voice of the entire 
field of retail distribution on national legislation and economic problems". 
Kirstein explained that the need for such-a"unified voice" had become 
apparent in the early days of the NRA, and that the aim was to create an 
organisation of parallel prestige and irportance to those maintained by oil 
producer-sq steel, auto manufacturers, railroads and fax7mrs. As well as the 
national tasks of "coordination of all branches of retail distribution"$ 
furnishing statistics, and representing the interests of the member 
associations to government, the new Federation would also, Kirstein added, 
seek to create "well-organized and coordinated state councils". The position 
of president was to be taken by Colonel Clarence 0. Sherrill, a Kroger vice- 
president, who was to be assisted by an executive committee of ten prominent 
chain and department store men. 
1 Among those ten was Herbert J. Tilys the 
president of the Retailers' National Council, the thirteen member associations 
of which, Kirstein stated,, would become "the nucleus of the new federation"* 
2 
1. New York Times, April 17,1935. The executive committee comprised: 
Louis E. Kirstein; Percy S. Straus,, president of R. H. Macy & Co., Inc.; 
John Burke, president, B. Altman & Co.; Lessing Rosenwald, chairman of 
the boards Seam s Roebuck & Co.; E. C. Sams, president, J. C. Penney Co.; A. H. Morrill, president, Kroger Grocery & Baking Co.; C. W. Kress, president, 
S. H. Kress & Co. Inc.; H. J. Tily, president, Strawbridge & Clothier,; 
rred Lazarus jr., vice-president, r. & R. Lazarus Co.; George M. Gales, 
president, Liggett Drug Co. The Times story also named 20 other retail 
executives as having played an ac7t-ive part in the conferences leading to 
the formation of the ARF. 14 were department store men, and 6 from the 
chains. 
2. Nat. Ret. Dry Goods Assn; Nat. Assn. of Ret. Clothiers and Furnishers; 
Nat. Ret. Furniture Assn.; American Nat. Ret. Jewelers' Assn; Nat. 
Council of Shoe Retailers; Nat. Shoe Retailers' Assn; Nat. Ret. Assn. of 
Music Merchants; Mail Order Assn. of America; Limited Price Variety Stores 
Assn; Nat. Ret. Hardware Assn; Nat. Assn. of Ret. Druggists; Nat. Assn. 
of Ret. Grocers; Food & Grocery Chain Stores of America, Inc. 
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The ground had been ill-prepared for. such a dangerous venture. 
Spokesmen for several of the national retail associations which were to 
be the "nucleus of the new federation" expressed surprise at the 
announcement. Even the NRDGA,, some of whose most influential merbers were 
involved in the creation of the ARF, was not officially involved. 
3 To the 
large associations representing the smaller retailers - the NARG, the NARD 
and the NRHA - the announcement came as a declaration of war. H. C. 
Petersen, the secretary-manager of the NARG, stated that no invitation had 
been received to join the ARF, and that the association's attitude would be 
to "actively oppose it wherever possible". Rivers Petersons the secretary 
of the NRHA, announced that "the Hardware Association will not join, and 
from this day is out definitely to establish a cleavage between the 
predatory Goliaths ... such as the new federation representso and the great 
body of smaller retailers". To John Dargavel, the secretary of the NARDp 
the ARF was but a "shoddy cloak being used by these big and unscrupulous 
business men to cover their real purposes... a diabolically clever scheme of 
propaganda and wir-epulling! '. 
4 
The intensity of the opposition demonstrated by these three 
associations testified to the impact of two years of the NRA and internal 
trade feuds over the control and content of the codes. They had become 
aggressive and politically aware and, moreover, were responsive to the 
demands of the affiliated state and local associations in a way which had 
not been the case before the New Deal. The creation of the ARr marked a 
watershed: in the first half of the decadeo the national associations had 
3. New'Y6rk'Timesq April 269 1935. Some reportsq, however, spoke of Harold 
YomGg, Washington representative of the NRDGA as an active participant. 
4. 'New'Y6tk'Tities, April 24, l935--RetAil'Ldd#erq May 1935, "Retail. 
Federatiro-nDream Becomes A Nightma:; eII-; -NARD'J6=al, May 2,1935. 
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played little part in the evolution of the'anti-chain fight; for the 
rest of the 1930's they were to play a leading role. 
While the three associations had all arrived at the same 
destination, their experience under the NRA had-brought them by different 
routes. It was the NRHA which had made the most painful journey, and in 
declaring war on the "predatory Goliaths" of the ARF Rivers Peterson was 
seeking to atone for what many saw as having been the association's weak- 
kneed submission to the big retailers back in 1933 when the shape of the 
NRA code structure was being determined. At that tire , the powerful NRDGA 
had fostered the idea of a uniform retail code to be administered by a 
National Retail Recovery Board made up by the associations on the Retailers' 
National Council. The plan had collapsed because the grocers and druggists 
had won their own codes, but its barebones survived in the form of the 
National Retail Code Authority, which administered the general Retail Code. 
This code was drawn up by a small nurber of executives of big chain and 
department stores,, meeting privately "by invitation only". with the NRDGA 
assuming leadership in dealings with the NRA. The retail lines brought 
under the patriarchal guidance of the NRDGA were those in which the small 
dealers were disorganised, too few or too weak to compel separate 
recognition from the NRA. 
5 
Trade associations, in order to be accorded recognition by the NRAq 
nominally had to be representative of 50% of the units in their field. In 
fact, the NRDGA only claimed as members 2 or 3% of the dry goods retailers 
in the United States. Most of the other associations on the National Retail 
Code Authority were also very small in relation to the nunber of retailers 
5. Ruth P. Mack., 'C6ritrolling Retaileto., , 'A'Stil4y_'6f'C66Petatiorl 'arid ýCorjtrol 
In 'The 'Retail 'Trade 'With Spd CiAl R6fd±, dndd'T6 *Thd'NRA. N. Y. 1936 (1968 
repilint, Press Inc. ). p. 166. 
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in their fields or totally dominated by chains and big department stores. 
Only the NRHA could claim to be fairly representative of the mass of small 
dealers in its field and, not surprisingly, the other associations considered 
it prudent for Rivers Peterson to be pushed forward to serve as chairman of 
the Authority. As such he became a mere figurehead, presiding over a code 
which had been signed, sealed and delivered almst before the NRHA had 
realised what was going on. 
6 
As the rank-and-file became increasingly dissatisfied with the content 
and enforceTwnt of the code, the pleasures of unprecedented prestige and 
attention began to turn sour for Petersons and he found himelf increasinglY 
at odds with the rest of the Code Authority. In April, 1935, a few days 
before the unveiling of the ARr, he resigned his post as Code Authority 
chairman and went before the Senate Finance Committee,, which was holding 
hearings on the desirability of a further extension of the life of the NRAq 
to advise that it be left to expire. He was the only spokesmn for a 
national retail association so to advise. Peterson brought to the comdttee 
6. Ibidj, pp. 164-5. In the autum of 1933, the nine associations 
represented on the National Retail Code Authority had the following 
strengths: 
Stores in Assn. Stores in Field 
Nat. Ret. Hardware Assn. 119303 479224 
Nat. Ret. Dry Goods Assn. app. 40000 1689844 
Limited Price Variety Stores Assn. 69739 129046 
Nat. Shoe Council/Nat. Shoe 
Retailers Assn. 6,334 18,836 
Nat. Ret. Furniture Assn. 31,213 33,226 
Nat. Assn. of Ret. Clothiers & Furnisher 11,789 229373 
Nat. Assn. of Music Merchants app. 600 1- 
IMail Order Assn. of America 9 (wi th most of the bil-inesj 
Most of the stores in the LPVSA and shoe associations were in any case units 
in chains, thus making the NRHA the only association with a significant number 
of small independents in its ranks. 
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a catalogue of woes. His menbers were harrassed by endless rules and 
assessments imposed by a multitude of code authorities which claimed 
overlapping jurisdiction over the multifarious activities of the average 
hardware store; code labour provisions were unduly onerous to the small 
dealer without the staff to operate a shift system; retailers were being 
denied wholesale discounts because of classification clauses in 
manufacturers' codes; the chains were able to price goods above the 10% 
minimum retail mark-up and still sell for less than what the same goods 
cost the independent from his wholesaler because of special discounts and 
allowances. In essence, Peterson's complaint was that a code written by 
and for big department stores was unsuited to the needs of small 
hardwaremen. In that assertion he was right. Critics observedq however, 
that the NRHA had contributed to its own problem by not fighting for a 
separate code for hardwaremen back in 1933, and that it was blaring the 
NRA for its own failure in order to divert the criticism coming from the 
merbership. The NRHA traditionally had had little involvement in politics 
unlike, say, the NARD - and had believed in keeping government out of 
business. Thus when govermment had taken over the regulation of businesso 
7 the association had been unable to cope. While Peterson could hardly 
admit this publicly, his every action over the next few years showed a 
determined eagerness to prove that he had learned his lesson and was 
thoroughly alert to the crafty ruses of the big retailing interests. 
Hence the strident denunciation of the ARF. 
7. Hardware Retailers May 1935 p. 22; ' 'Senate 'Finaridd'COmmittees 
"Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 79: Investigation of the National Recovery 
Administrationlls'74th Cong. ist-Soss., pp. 1711-1727. For a forceful 
criticism of Peterson's attitude, see ibids pp. 1829-1832 (Statement of 
Arthur Greenwoods secretary of the "Co=dttee of Ten Thousand". a pro- 
NRA small business group). 
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For the National. Retail Grocers' Association, the emphasis was a 
little different. In 1933p the grocers had waged a vigorous and 
successful fight to secure their own code. Even then, there had been 
calls from the miore militant grocery associations that the National should 
sever its connection with the Retailers' National Council because of the 
NRDGA's attempt to work through it to bring about one over-all retail code 
8 
authority. Thus the announcement of the ARF was seen as a revival of this 
old unified code idea, and a challenge to grocery autonomy. At the same 
time s it came at the climax to a long period of increasing dissatisfaction 
about the way in which the National was conducted. In 1933, C. H. Janssen, 
then the Secretary-Hanager of the National, had accepted the job of 
chairman of the National Food and Crocery Code Authoritys while retaining 
his job with the NARG. In the view of many of the rank-and-files Janssen 
leaned too far in his NRA work in the direction of acting as a neutral 
umpire in trade controversies and the resultant criticism forced his 
resignation from the NARG job in March, 1934. Despite this change at the 
top, the clique in control of the association persisted in policies 
designed to improve relations with the grocery chains, under the aegis of 
the NRA, without attempting to stage an all-out struggle with the chains 
on vital questions like brokerage and advertising allowances. As the NRA 
drifted towards oblivion, and with it the precarious gains of code 
collaborations that position looked ever more untenable. By the time of 
the unveiling of the ARF, the leadership was under an obligation to 
demonstrate to the menbership that it understood that there were limits 
beyond which co" aboration must not be taken* The strong rejection of the 
ARF allowed all sections of the retail grocery trade to close ranks, for 
however keen the conservative leadership was to work with the grocery 
chains, as cooperating equals, it was absolutely opposed to any idea of 
being absorbed and "coordinated". 
8. 'IriteiioltAtd'Gt6Cer5 August 5p 1933- 
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It was probably the National Association of Retail Druggists which 
revealed itself as the most vehement opponent, of the ARF. For the NARD, 
the coming of the NRA had been the beginning of a. glorious transformation. 
Hitherto, although a large and cohesive organisation, its record had been one 
of failure, if only because it had, got nowhere with its keystone policy, 
resale price maintenance. But under the NRA it made a huge advance. The drug 
chains associated themselves with the demand for price maintenance, thus 
isolating the "chiseling five per cent" of price cutters,, and although the 
drug code formally did not countenance resale price maintenance but only "loss 
limitation", the actual loss limit provision, set within the context of the 
economics of the drug trade, did give something of the substance of true price 
maintenance. 
9 The image and reputation of the association was so inextricably 
bound up with price maintenance that this success represented a far greater 
triunph than it would have done for any other national retail association. 
The NARD was able greatly to extend its influence over state and local 
druggists' associations, reporting large increases in menbership, especially 
in the South and more rural areas, where it had previously enjoyed little 
adherence. At the same tire, the appointment of new officers, after a purge 
of an old guard considered too slothful and conservative for the needs of the 
age, brought a much more militant style of leadership. John Dargavels from 
Minnesota, became Secretary in 1933, and in the following year he was joined 
by Rowland Jones$ who took over the NARD's Washington office, and J. A. 0. Preus, 
a friend of Dargavel and a former Governor of Minnesotas who was appointed 
public relations counsel because of his "wide contacts in the national 
capitallf. 
10 
These new leaders quickly set the NARD on a new course. 
See above p. 61. 
10. ' 'HARD *Journal Sept. 25 s 19 33; Jan. '18 . Aug. 2, Nov. 1,19 34. The ten 
states with the largest increases in membership in the ten months from October, 
1933 were all in Southern and Southwestern states. - ranging from 246% in 
Florida to 1,2009o in North Carolina. Although-the preponderance of the member- 
ship still came from the big industrial staýtesq this heavy recruitment in the 
rural sections can only have encouraged the trend to assertively anti-chain 
policies. 
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Traditional activities such as "white listing! ' manufacturers were 
augmented by assistance for any sort of anti-chain activity, including 
chain store taxation, in which the NARD took'an active interest for the 
first time in 1935. By the time of the announcement of the formation 
of the American Retail Federation, the NARD was enjoying great success on 
a nuTrber of fronts simultaneously, with chain taxes and fair trade acts 
being considered, or having been enacted, in many states, while the NARD 
carpaigned vigorously for the retention of the NRA. This was an 
association in the ascendant and increasingly arrogant about its own 
strength. The NARD's attitude was sharply illustrated by its two-sided 
relationship with the drug chains. It had entered into a blissful enbrace 
on the price maintenance question. On that, the NARD and the drug chain 
association were united, with the chains deferring to the NARD's leadership. 
Yet this issue had been segregated from the chain tax question, so that 
the NARD was busily trying to throttle the chains with one arm while 
enbracing them with the other. Whether or not such an approach was 
ethicallys economically or politically consistent, it testified to the 
belief of the NARD that all things were now possible and it was the turn 
of the "little fellow" to call the tune. 
The sponsors of the ARF cannot have been totally taken by surprise 
by the abuse heaped upon them. The meetings preliminary to the formation 
of the ARF hdd been far from secretive, apparently in an attempt to test 
the waters. Furthermore this had gone on for months, indicating that the 
need for caution was understood. That not all the retail associations 
would accept the ARF had been clearly demonstrated as early as Februarys 
1935, when John Dargavel warned the druggists to "keep entirely and alertly 
11. The NARD committed itself to the principle of chain store taxation 
for the first time at its 1934 convention. '(NARD'J6urnal October 18, 
1934),, though price-fixing remained its prin, ýr_y -interest. 
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clear" of any. mve to create what was then being termed the "Institute 
of Retail Distribution of the U. S. A. ". which would use "simple-minded 
small businessmen-as "fronts" enrolling by loose, hook-ups the various 
retail associations, thus naking it appear at Washington that they speak for 
the small men". Dargavel had also warned the Retailers' National Council 
against becoming eTrbroiled in plans for the new prZanisation and, 
apprehensive about the drift of events, had written to disaffiliate the 
NARD from the Council on April B. a week before the ARF was announced. 
12 
While considerable allowance must be made for the fact that many of the 
sponsors of the ARF, including Kirstein, were not familiar with the 
undercurrents of sentiment among the small retailerss the element of risk 
involved in the ARF was apparent enough. Presumably it was hoped that, 
at the worst, only the grocers, druggists and hardwaremen would bolt, 
leaving most of the associations represented on the National Retail Code 
Authority, with the possibility of adding to these state retail 
associations. Where the sponsors miscalculated was in underestimating the 
new political influence of the independents and in ignoring the possibility 
that the internal conflicts within retailing might become intertwined 
with the general feeling in the country, and sections of the Congressq 
that big business was to blare for the depression, and deserving of 
punishment. Had it not been for this broader sentimentq the grievances of 
the small retailers might indeed have produced little more than a brief and 
inconclusive furore in the trade press. 
Instead, one week after the initial announcementq St. Louis Democrat 
John J. Cochran introduced a House resolution calling for the investigation 
by a special committee of what he termed the APX I'superlobby". The ARF 
was, the resolution stateds "the greatestaggregation of rich and powerful 
department stores and chain stores of'Awrica ever brought together for 
12. ' 'NARD'J6tir-ricAlq February 79 May 2.1935. 
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the purpose of directly or indirectly nullifying the effects of the 
N. R. A., the A. A. A. 9 the Sherman Acto the Clayton Act, and other antitrust 
laws now on the statute books of this Nation, and by propaganda and other 
methods inimical to the public welfare to attempt to control and influence 
the Congress of the United States in its legislative deliberations". It 
further averred that the Federation was "proceeding upon a plan" to 
"force" the small independent retail merchants into contributing $2m 
annually to its coffers with the intention that it "may thereafter hold 
out to merbers of Congress and to others in the Government that it 
represents a completely centralised and authentic voice for all retailers 
of the Nation". The allegations 6f-the-resolution were loosely based on 
the New York Times story, but it added the names of Harold R. Young, the 
Washington representative of the NRDGA and John Hartford, the president 
of the A& Ps to the list of organisers of the Federation. 
13 
The resolution was adopted by unanimous consent, after only a few 
cursory questions from other Congressmen: G. M. Lebhars the editor of 
Chain Store'Age, later charecterised the action as a "sneak attack as 
unprovoked and as unexpected, if not as world-shaking,, as the one which 
was to lay Pearl Harbor low some -years 
later. 14 The Congress was at the 
time abnormally sensitive to any and all attempts at high-pressure 
lobbying for, in addition to the immense pressures generated by business 
groups for and against,, especially against,, the continuation of the NRA9 
the struggle over the administration's bill for a "death sentence" on 
utility holding companies was producing the most intense lobbying of the 
New Deal era. There were allegedly more utility lobbyists on Capital Hill 
than there were Congressmen, and their tactics led to the appointment of 
13. (H. R. 2031 Congressional Record, 74th Co. ng. lst. Sess. p. 6338. 
14. Chain Stores In ATmrica , 1963 edn. p. 197. 
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special investigating committees by both the House and the Senate. 
15 
To hard-pressed Congressmen, the ARr bore all the outward signs of being 
a similar type of lobbying machine. 
Cochran was himself appointed to chair the seven man investigating 
committee. However, he fell ill before work could start and, upon his 
recommendation, Wright Patman, a fellow Dem: )cxet, from Texas, replaced 
him. 16 It was an inspired choice. Patman had no record of opposition to 
chain stores, but he was known as a determined foe of "the interests", 
whatever shape or form they took. Since entering Congress in 1929 he 
had worked relentlessly for his veterans' bonus bill, the measure which 
best encapsulated all the grievances of the neopopulists in the early 
19301s, enshrining as it did the belief that the soldiers should be 
corpensated for having been led into Wall street's war,, while at the 
sane time offering the prospect of a shot of free money into the deflated 
economy. By the Spring of 193S it was generally accepted, and taken for 
granted by Patman himself . that some form of the bonus bill would be 
passed without further difficulty at the start of the next session of 
Congress. Thus the main theme of Patman's Washington career to date was 
just about played out. He needed a new outlet for his energies, and 
Cochran was able to provide him with one. Cochran's illness proved a 
cruel twist of fate for the chains, for although he would no doubt have 
pursued his quarry with all due diligence had he been able, and although 
he unreservedly approved of the use Patman made of his opportunity, it 
seems irpossible that he, or indeed anyone else, could have set out to 
15. William E. Leuchtenburg, rrar3clin D. Roosevelt and 7be New Deal 
N. Y. 1963, Harper Colophon edn. p. 155-6. 
16. Congressional Record, 74th Cong. Ist Sess. p. 7741 (May 16,1935). 
The other merbers of the committee were Sol Bloom (N. Y. -Dem. ), Donald H. 
Mclean (New Jemey -Repub. ), Scott W. Lucas (III. -Dem. ), William Sterling 
Cole (N. Y. -Repub. ), John F. Dockweiler (Calif. -Dem. ), Gerald J. Boileau (Wis. -Progressive). 
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harrass the chains with, quite the remorseless tenacity which Patman 
17 brought to the task. 
On June 4. the Houseýgranted'Patman-supplewntary powers, adopting 
a resolution for the committee to "investigate the trade practices of 
individuals, partnerships, and corporations engaged in big-scale buying 
and selling of articles at wholesale or retail and their associations". 
The House was inforred, through Congressman Greenwood of the Rules 
Committee, that the further resolution was required because the ARF had 
incorporated since the passage of the original Cochran resolution and, 
pleading a "legal technicality", its founders were denying the Patman 
committee access to the information it sought. Asked how far the new 
resolution was to widen the scope of the investigation, Greenwood 
explained that "as I understand it... 'It is not the idea that the 
investigation shall be on any wider scale except so far as this information 
will disclose what efforts at lobbying have been carried on by this 
association". Patman himself offered only the most ambiguous explanation 
for the resolution, but despite thiss the House adopted the resolution 
without much discussion. 
18 
The committee began its work on June 50 and soon began to roam far 
and wide, with occasional returns to the subject of the AM On June 11 
Patman introduced H. R. 8442, the USWGA price discrimination bill, and soon 
his committee was deeply enmeshed in inquiries into the secret rebates 
enjoyed by the big chains. To chain store men,, this rapid turn of events 
was both unpleasant and suspicious. Dark hints were dropped that Patman 
l7. -C6ri9rd99idriAl'Redordq 74th Cong. Ist Sess. pp. 13575-6. A $2b. bonus 
bill was enacted over Too]ýeveltls veto in 1936. For an examination of 
Patman's social and economic thinking in relation to the bonus and more 
generally, see the-ch'apter "Wright Patman and the right For 7be Bonus" 
in Roger Daniels-Thd'Bonug March, Westport, Conn., 1971). 
18. (H. R. 239) Congressional Record, 74th Cong. lst Sess. pp. 8646-7. 
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had from the, start planned to use the committee as a propaganda vehicle 
for the bill. As the Safeway attorney alleged, in refusing Fatman's 
demand for that corpany's list, of discounts and allowances, ".. At has 
been apparent from the outset that your investigation is not bona fide 
but has been influenced by organizations atagonistic to the chain stores 
for selfish and pecuniary notives ... I do not propose to permit United 
States Whole Grocers' Association, through you, to conduct an inquisition 
on its competitors under false guise of governmental investigation". 
19 
Patman himself emphatically denied these charges. The supplementary 
resolution, he stated, had been solely to carry out the "real intent" of 
the Cochran resolution which,, he noted, had referred to the ARF as being 
"designed to prevent small businesses from securing competitive opportunities 
equal to those enjoyed by corporations representing vast aggregations of 
capital". Patman also maintained that he had not even been aware that the 
USWGA had a bill which they desired to see introduced until that 
association approached him after two days of the hearings. There wast 
therefore, no "direct connection" between the committee's probe into secret 
rebates and his advocacy of the USWGA bill. 
20 
The allegation that Patman was planning to introduce the USWGA bill 
even before the committee began its work was based on nothing more than 
the circumstance that he introduced it six days after his committee's 
hearings got under way. It is difficult to understand why some have found 
this sufficient reason to doubt Patman's erphatic denials, for if he first 
received the bill after two days of hearings, as he claimed, he would 
presumably have been capable of reading its text and deciding that he liked 
it within the space, of four days. 
21 
........... I. - . 
19. * 'Ibid. p. . 12989. 
20. -Ibid. pp., 12989-90. Safeway did ev6ntually back down and produce the 
information desired. 
21. Joseph C. Talanountain repeats this allegation izi'Thd'Politidt-of 
DigttibiItion,, CaTrb. Mass., 1955, p. 198. 
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Nevertheless,. it was the case that Fatman had not been entirely 
straightforward in obtaining the, supplementary trade practice resolution. 
That resolution conferred on the committee"'vastly-broadened powers... 
22 
rivaling the inquisitorial authority of the rederal Trade Commission. " 
Indeed, as employed by Patran, the resolution allowed him-greatly to 
exceed the inquisitorial authority of the Commission. No reasonable 
under-standing of the phrases of the original Cochran resolution would 
have allowed the committee to have gone so deeply into matters such as 
special rebates paid to chain stores or chain lobbying methods in state 
legislatures. 
Patman need not have been so disingenuous. Two months after the 
adoption of the trade practice resolution he came before the House again, 
seeking an appropriation to extend the life of the committee. By that 
time, chain store lobbyists were frantic in their representations to 
Congressmen that the committee was meddling in affairs totally unconnected 
with the ARF, and their corrplaints found a few spipathisers. Congressman 
Snell of New York, the minority leader, informed the House that the 
Cochran resolution would not have gone through by unanimous consent had 
it been known what course the committee would take. It was Snell's view 
that "we have gone far enough". But, despite this criticismg Patman 
carried the support of the great majoritylof Congressmen, and got his 
appropriation easily enough. The intense chain efforts to stop the 
committee were, he assured the House, a sure sign that "we are really 
getting pay dirt", and he reminded his fellow Congressmen that "thousands 
and tens of thousands of copies" of the committee's hearings were being 
sold. Obviously the "little fellows" liked its work. The whole chain 
store question, after several yearsagitation in the states and with the 
FTC's investigation concluded, was ripe for Congressional action. While 
22. ' 'NdvVY6tR 'TiThepý, June S. 1935. 
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the committee, ex6eeded the. letter of the Cochran resolution, it gave 
expression to its'spirit, for had it not been', for the much wider conflict 
between'chains and independents no one would have thought of investigating 
the ARF in the'first place. 
23 
iv. ' 'ThOTAtt. -iri *C6mmittdd 'arid thd 'American 'Retail 'Federation. 
Leading opponents of the chain stores from the first emphasised the 
chain, rather than the department store background to the American Retail 
Federation. They took the view that its formation was a response to the 
cumulative threat of such developments as the Bankhead-Huddleston bill,, 
the West Virginia chain tax decision of the Supreme Court and the Roosevelt 
administration's New Deal policies. Patman shared this interpretation and 
also believed that he had identified the guiding influence behind the ARF 
as being the Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. He referTed to the Federation as 
having been "born in Cincinnati", the headquarters city of the Kroger 
company. 
7bere was, most certainly, a strong Kroger involvement in the APS. 
Colonel Sherrills the man appointed to head the new rederationg was the 
former city manager of Cincinnati and had come to the Kroger company at 
the height of the Henderson agitation in 1930 to assume the position of 
vice-president with responsibility for public relations. In that role he 
had become well known to independent merchants throughout the Midwest for 
his regular appearances before legislative committees holding hearings on 
chain tax bills. Two of the ten man executive committee of the ARr were 
also Kroger men, A. H. Morrill, company president, and Fýred Lazarus, a 
director. 
23. Congressional Records 74th Cong. lst Sess. 9 pp. 12654-8 (August 7.1935). 
'Ijjtdrdtaitd 'Gr6ders April 20, October'19., 1935. 
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Fatman found a special s. ignificance in the fact that Morrill had 
been the president of the National Chain Stores Association, which was 
dissolved in 1933. The Congressman believed that the chains$ led by 
Kroger, had decided to abandon the open, style of campaigning established 
by the NCSA and to switch instead to covert lobbying operations and the 
establishment of "front" organisations. As evidence for this belief, he 
produced letters from the files of A. H. Morrill which showed how the 
Kroger president had been the instigator, in the autumn of 1932, of a 
scheme to "sell" the chain stores to the farmers through a publicity 
bureau nominally directed by men with a background in'farm organisations, 
but actually controlled and financed by the chains. This delicate 
operations which was financed by Safeway, Kroger and the National Tea Co. 9 
was put in the hands of one Stacy Van Patten, who had just completed four 
years special work at the national headquarters of the American Farm 
Bureau Federation, and was set up with the assistance of H. R. Kibler, the 
national director of information of that organisation. 
2 
2. The scheme was inspired by a fear that the depressed state of 
agriculture might lead the "cornstalk brigade", as Morrill styled the 
farmers in one of his letters, to blame the chains for their plight 
and favour chain taxation to ease their own tax burdens. Despite 
initial grandiose plans to influence "key leaders" in the farming 
community, little seems to have been done beyond the publication of 
a mimeographed bulletin,, "Farm To Market News". Sherrill testified 
that it was he who had recommended abandonment of the project - it 
was finally wound up in the Spring of 1934 - not because he thought 
it discreditables but because it was ineffective. His correspondence 
indicates that Van Patten had lost many of his old farm contacts; 
moreover, a Senate committee in 1933 exposed the way in which Van 
Patten and other Farm Bureau officials had put on similar campaigns 
on behalf of lumber interests, the asphalt industry and the electric 
power industry, all at a handsome profit to themselves. Sherrill feared 
that exposure of the , rarm To Market News" would prove a "fatal 
boomerang! ', for the chain stores. Seeq'Hc5iWd Special'Coimitted 'on 
Inve8tigAtion'6f 'th6_'American Retail 'rederdtion 
_Hearibgs, 
74th Cong. 
6. vol. I pp. 46-599 72-3; vol. II pp. 
vol. IV pp. 50-58. (Henceforth cited as 34-5; vol. III pp. 10-11; 
Patman Cttee. Hearings. ) 
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This atterpt to influence the farmers had not got very far. And 
so, Patman informed the House, "quoting what I know is bound to have 
happened". Morrill had told his fellow chain conspirators, 
"We have tot to use 6nother'plan. We failed to fool 
the consumers and the public when we came out into 
the open and said we were chain stores in 1928 to 1932. 
We had to disband. We then tried to fool the farmers, 
using their friends as a front, but we could not fool 
them, so we had to disband. Now, thens we have, got to 
get the small retail merchants togethers and see if we 
cannot use them as a front... *off 3 
Patman remained incurably addicted to this explanation of the origins of 
the American Retail Federation, even though it scarcely accorded with 
4 the evidence brought out by the committee. Certainly, there had been a 
general tendency, since 19319 for the chains to move away from the old 
style lecture tours, radio addresses and other attempts to woo public 
opinion which had been used to counteract trade-at-home propaganda. But 
this shift had nothing in particular to do with A. H. Morrill and the Kroger 
Grocery & Baking Co. It was, rather, a natural and general response to 
the changing nature of the anti-chain threat. Following the Supreme 
Court's decision in the Indiana chain tax caseq the chains were forced to 
resort to hard lobbying to resist the immediate legislative assault. The 
battleground having moved from Main street to the lobbiesq chain store men 
were inclined to believe, rightly or wrongly, that all their efforts would 
3. Congressional Record, vol. 79,74th Cong. lst Sess., p. 8994. This 
concocted quotation coTes amid Patman's most comprehensive review of 
his "Kroger-front" theory, at pp. 8992-5. 
4. The committee's majority report (H. R. Rep. 2373,74th Cong. 2d Sess. ), 
which was signed by Patman, represented something of a retreat. Howevert 
this did not make any difference to the accounts, given by Patman of the 
committee's findings in dozens of subsequent public addresses. 
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be best concentrated on this activity. As for the dissolution of the 
NCSA in 1933, Morrill was vague as to exactly why this had happened, 
suggesting only that it followed the fiiilure to develop a "consistent 
plan" because the different chains "just did not think along the same 
lines". Exactly what this meant, Morrill failed to explain. 
5 It seers 
that far from the abandonment of the NCSA having been a properly thought 
out response to conditions, and the prelude to a major development of 
"fronts" and other "underground" methods,, it was a rash blunder. The 
splitting of the chains into separate-trade associations for each principal 
line of business was eminently suited for dealing with NRA code 
authoritiess but it merely disorganised the chains when it came to 
legislative attacks which affected them all. Mutual assistance was only 
kept going by the efforts of some of the more far-sighted chain executives 
and association officers. And although a switch of sorts had been made to 
"covert" methods in dealing with the anti-chain assault, it does-not seem 
to have been made with any thoroughness or consistency. The "cornstalk 
brigade" schemep far from being part of a grand strategy on A. H. Morrill's 
part, was apparently an isolated venture, into which Morrill had perhaps 
been led by the Farm Bureau men. 
6 
The private correspondence of chain store ren produced by the 
Patman committee makes it clear that they were, in the early months of 
1935, painfully aware of-their lack of a coherent strategy. Their thinking 
showed a realisations if only a half-formed one, that the situation had 
become so dangerous that a much more complex approach was required, 
combining elements of the old style public relations work with hard lobbyings 
covert "front" operations and a calculated appeasement of independents by 
the development of areas of common interest. Undoubtedly, the ARF was 
5. See the colloquy between Patman and Morrill at Patman Committee 
Hearings, vol. III, pp. 19-21. 
6. Ibid., vol. I. pp. 72-3; vol. III, p. 11. 
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expected'to play an-important role in the. evolution. of this new approach, 
but it was not the bhains, in generdl-or Kroger'ih particular which first 
set plans for the formation of the ARF-in motion. Every witness asked by 
the Patman committee, including Kirsteih himself, agreed'that Louis Kirstein 
of Filene's department store in Boston had been the prime mover. Patman 
maintained that Kirstein, "whom I know to be a public-spirited gentleman", 
had been "imposed upon" and manipulated by the Kroger men, but Kirstein 
himself was eager to take full responsibility for everything done. Like- 
wise, the earliest discussions of the Federation idea occurTed between 
Kirstein and executives of various department store companies. Significantlys 
the first Kroger man to have been introduced to the discussions was 
Fred Lazaruss who was known in retailing circles not for his Kroger 
directorship, which he had acquired only in 1933, but as vice-president of 
the F&R Lazarus Co. department store in ColuTrbus, Ohio. Lazarus himself 
regarded his Kroger connection as being purely a subsidiary interest. He 
was a director also of Bloomingdale Bros., the New York department , stores 
as was Kirstein himself, but Patman failed to mention this, or the many 
other types of interrelationship which existed between the ARr's sponsors$ 
so eager was he to build up the "Kroger front" tbeory. Similarly, A. H. 
Morrill came into the affairs of the emerging Federationg at the invitation 
of Kirstein, only at the same tire as a number of other prominent chain 
store executives including Sewell Avery, George Gales, W. T. Grant and 
E. C. Saris. 7 There can be little doubt that the initial impetus for the 
creation of the Federation was provided by the feeling of department store 
men that they were not enjoying their place in the sun in Washington 
alongside other industrial leaders and that New Deal legislation was being 
7. ' 'Ibid. j vol. I, pp. 159 569 102-6o 112-50 124-9,0 144-59 167-72; 
Vol. ! -IIq pp. 52-3. 
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framed without reference to their wishes. The introduction of the chain 
stores into the prganisational process inevitablyýprofoundly affected the 
political identity of the Federations but, it was'inplicit in the original 
idea that the Federation would seek to speak for retailing in general that 
it would become entangled in the conflict between chains and independents. 
This was not an involvement foisted upon Kirstein by the Kroger men, but 
an inescapable consequence of the original idea. The selection of Colonel 
Sherrill as ARr president merely made that entanglement explicit. Sherrill 
himelf, far from having guided the planning of the Federation, apparently 
learned of its creation only a week or ten days before its public 
unveiling, and was a last-minute choice for the job. He was also a poor 
choice, because of his highly controversial background, and it may well be 
supposed that had Kroger really been the unseen guiding hand behind the 
Federation, it would have exercised its influence with more discretion. 
Indeeds the selection of Sherrill perhaps indicates that the sponsors, 
despite months of preliminary planning, had not clearly decided what they 
were trying to do. While their hope was to lure a large nurber of smaller 
independents into the new organisation in order to give it political 
weight and credibility, the selection of Sherrill showed an unwillingness 
to trust in that approach sufficiently to let the key executive post go 
to anyone but an experienced chain store lobbyist. Thus the ARF fell 
between two stools. 
8 
While Patran evidently was persuaded that he had stunbled upon an 
important truth in unravelling the Kroger connection, the primary purpose 
in giving it so much emphasis was undoubtedly tactical. It followed on 
from the naming of John Hartford, the A& P-president, in the original 
Cochran resolution. Cochran had quickly established that the A&P was in 
- ........... - ... I ......... 
8. ''Ibid., vol. -IO pp. 12,129-30; vol. 1119 p. 
44. The only reason 
suggested for the, decision. to appoint Sherrill was that he was not known 
in Washington as being either a Denocrat-or a Republican. 
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fact in no way involved with the founding of the ARF and, he told the 
House,, "passed this word to Patman and he promised to see that it was 
brought out in the investigation". It would have indeed been extraordinary 
had the A&P. which declined to join even a bona fide trade association 
like the FGCSA, been implicated in such a risky venture as the ARF, and 
testimony before the committee revealed that Hartford had rejected 
overtures by the sponsors with polite firmess. 
9 The A&P connection was, 
in short, a horse that would not run for Patman, and the undoubted active 
involvement of Kroger, the-No. 2 grocery chain, provided an obvious 
alternative. The "Kroger front" theory conveniently opened the way to a 
wide-ranging investigation into the special discounts received by the big 
grocery chainss which in turn provided propaganda for the advancement of 
the Robinson-Patman bill. It also opened the way for a full-scale exposure 
of the lobbying operations conducted by the chains in opposition to chain 
store tax legislation* operations in which Colonel Sherrill, as chairman 
of the public relations committee of the FGCSA, was a leading figure. The 
fact that Kirstein and other department store men were actually the initial 
sponsors of the ARF was of no practical use to Patman. There was no great 
struggle in progress between the independents and the department storess 
whatever their differences over trade questions such as price-fixing. 
Patman himself had a high regard for Kirstein, who was well-known as a 
friend of the New Deal. 
Patnan was right in believing that the thinking of the ARF's sponsors 
had proceeded on different levels. The sponsors gave rather unsatisfactory 
accounts of their motives. They were unanimous in their assertion that the 
new organisation was intended to function as a "clearing house" for the 
collection and dissemination of information of use to all retailers and to 
9. Congressional Record, vol. 80,74th Cong. 2d. Sess. p. 8104; Patman 
Ctte. Hearingsq vol. Is, pp. 160-1. 
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conduct research for the benefit of the meTrbers. They were also agreed 
that, as Sherrill expressed it, "the organization would not take a 
position on any matter relating to any particular class of retailers 
as against other classes"s chain store taxes and price maintenance being 
two of those matters. 
10 Where the founders did seem to differ was on the 
question of how far the ARF would seek to extend its influence as the 
"unified voice" for retailing. Kirstein quite unasharriedly described an 
intention for the Federation to loom large in Washington politics, 
representing retailers' interests in dealings with the administration, in 
the evolution of the social security programme and other questions which 
would not divide retailers. Morrill and Sherrill, in contrast, more 
acutely aware that to certain elements among the small merchants there was 
no such thing as an issue which did not divide retailers, denied having any 
arbitions to act as a Washington lobby. Indeed, Sherrill was so profuse 
in his denials about virtually every possible activity mentioned that the 
committee was left wondering why it was that he was to get $135,000 for 
a three year contract to do nothing. 
11 
The claim that a "research" body was all that was intended was 
patently absurd, for it was contradicted by the initial announcement that 
the ARF was to be a "unified voice" for retailing and by the actual 
structure of the organisation. 
12 
Had the sponsors wished solely to set 
up a neutral research body, they could have done so without provoking the 
least controversy. A research body would have had no need to claim to 
speak for national retail associations in order to do its job. 
10. Ibid., vol. I. pp. 13-140 159; vol, III* P. 32. 
11. Ibid., vol. It pp. lit 159 1159 158; vol. IIIt pp. 32-3; Vol. IV 
pp. 789 840 92-3. 
12. The sponsors tried to suggest that the original press release had 
been mishandled, but in fact considerable effort had gone into preparing 
drafts of the release, and a" these drafts made the central "unified 
voice" claim. See, jLid., vol. IIIs p. 45ff. 
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The intended function of the Federation ray best be judged from 
the character of the state retail councils from which its sponsors had 
derived their example, and which they intended to foster in states where 
such bodies were not yet in existence. The most highly-developed such 
organisation was the Ohio Council of Retail Merchants, which enjoyed the 
support of chain and department stores as well as that of a wide range of 
independent retail associations, although distrusted by more militant 
elements such as the grocers. Its position had proved strong enough to 
withstand the rise of anti-chain sentiment in the late 1920's and early 
1930's and, as Fred Lazarus explained to the Patman committee, "it 
happens that in the Ohio Council where we have been operating for -fifteen 
years we have never had... any conflict between large and small merchants 
or between chain and independent". 
13 The Council served to suffocate 
anti-chain legislative proposals under a blanket of retail consensus and 
cooperation and its efforts had much to do with the persistent defeat of 
chain tax bills in the Ohio legislature. 
14 The Council's relations with 
Kroger were intimate. Sherrill was a menber of its board of directors and 
it was George Sheridan, the Council's executive-director, who made the 
first suggestion that Sherrill might make a good president for the ARF. 
Documents taken from the files of A. H. Morrill by the Patman committee 
also revealed that Krog(Zr invested heavily in the Council, Sheridan having 
received $15,000 in 1933 from Morrill's "discretionary fund" for "public 
relations works legislative and otherwise". 
15 
13. Ibid., Vol. III, p. 38. 
14. In 1935, the state retail grocers' and meat dealers' associations 
held the Council and the state chaTrber of commerce primarily responsible 
for the defeat of its chain tax bill. (Grocers' Association'News, 
Columbus, Ohio, Noverrber 1935). Ohio never had a chain tax. For Sheridan, 
see also p-162,. 
15. Patman Ctte. HearingE, vol. I, p. 129; vol. III, pp. 4-7,46,53. 
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Only a little less influential was the Associated Retailers of 
Indiana, another well-established state association comprising both chain 
and independent merchants. The executive-secretary of the Indiana group, 
L. F. Shuttleworth, was also the recipient of funds from the Kroger 
"discretionary fund" and letters produced by the Patman committee showed 
how, in 1934, Shuttleworth had come to an arrangement with Sherrill, John 
Logan (the executive vice-president of the FGCSA) and R. W. Lyons (chain 
store lobbyist) to assist in the repeal of the Indiana chain store tax and 
graduated income tax. The idea was to bring about the substitution of a 
flat rate sales tax. It seers that the chain store ren found Shuttleworth 
not quite as "whole-hearted" as they had hoped, because of the contrary 
views of a large section of his membership, and Lyons and Logan threatened 
16 
to withdraw their "financial and moral support" from the association. 
Despite this upset, matters were smoothed over and Sherrill and Shuttleworth 
engaged in an agreeable correspondence until the time that Patman seized 
Sherrill's filesp In these lettersq Shuttleworth suggested that he could 
help to alleviate the chain tax problem by setting up a scheme to contact 
Midwestern farmers and Sherrill replied - this after he had taken up his 
"neutral" position as head of the ARF - that he should like very much to 
"take this matter up with you personally and in detail ... As soon as we get 
our organization well under way, I will then take up with you the matter of 
117 aiding ... and feel sure that I will be able to help you very much ... , 
Shuttleworth subsequently took office as the first Secretary-Treasurer of 
the ARF. 
18 
16. Ibid. * Vol. II, P. 42; vol. III, p. 2; vol. IV, pp. 85-7. 
17. Ibid., vol. I, pp. 95-6. 
18. Busines8 Weekl, December 21,19359 p. 21. 
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Such correspondence illustrated the brutally pragmatic approach 
Sherrill had towards cooperating with organisations of independents. 
Sherrill's intention was to promote the interests of his paymasters., not 
som vague altruistic idea of the 11commn good" of retailers , and his 
abrupt assumption of the position of ARF president had not changed that. 
19 
Neverthelesso organisations like the Ohio Council and the Associated 
Retailers of Indiana were notq as Patman seemed to suppose, mere puppets 
manipulated by the chains. On the contrary it was the element of genuine 
independence and their broad membership which made them so useful to the 
chains even ifo as the experience with Shuttleworth demonstrated, this 
could also prove a source of difficulty. Had such organisations existed 
in all the states, it cannot be doubted that the chains would have faced 
a more manageable legislative problem; unfortunately for the chains most 
states had no comparable influential and well-entrenched bodies. While 
state retailers' associations had sprung up in numerous states in the 
previous few years, usually with the initial purpose of opposing sales tax 
legislationg these associations were dominated by the departmant stores 
and were rarely recognised as possessing any qualifications to speak for 
the "little fellows" on controversial issues. 
The national organisational plan of the ARF also bore a strong 
resenblance to the model provided by the state councils. Confronted by 
pressing problems, the sponsors of the ARF had neither the time nor the 
patience to wait and see if the existing Retailers' National Council might 
possibly evolve into a strong and unified organisation. In view of the 
loose nature of the Council,, such a possibility was considered remote in 
any case. 
20 Instead,, they tried to force the pace by setting up an entirely 
19. For other relevant correspondence, see Patman Ctte. *Hearings. 
vol. 1. pp. 94-55 102-6; vol. IV, p. 88. 
20. Ibid., vol. I. p. 155. 
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newl, architect-designed, organisation of their own. 7be articles of 
incorporation were made extremely attractive to the "little fellow". 
in essence providing that the individual sponsoring coupanies would pay 
for it while the state and national associations were enabled to hold 
the balance of voting power on the board of trustees. At the same time 9 
precautions were taken to ensure that while the organisation was made as 
broad-based as possible it did not let in too many disruptive elements. 
A majority of the existing national retail associations - certainly a 
majority of those in the Retailers' National Council - were chain or 
department store controlleds or traditionally disinclined to engage in 
political conflict with the big retailers. At the state level, where the 
main conflicts between chains and independents had occurred hithertol it 
was expressly provided that only associations deemed to be representative 
of retailing in general - like the Ohio Council of Retail Merchants - 
would be admitted to merbership. Single-line groups,, such as state grocers' 
associations, were ineligible* 
21 
The ARF's troubles stemmed from the fact that it came into the world 
full-grown. Had it started mdestlyg as a quiet and unassuming "research" 
body, and then gradually extended its activities by providing a facility 
for consultation amongst retailers, it would not have attracted the 
attentions of a special House investigating committee. But then, of 
course, any hopes of creating a "unified voice" for retailing would 
necessarily have been deferred for years, until the coming of a time of 
less mutual strife anongst retailers. The problems of 1935 were too urgent 
for the ARF's sponsors to have waited that long. 
21. Ibid,., vol. I. pp. 210 90-91. 
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v. Subversion 'arid 'Lobbying. 
Patman was able to discover little about the ARr to justify the 
extreme language of the Cochran resolution; in particular, there was 
nothing to demonstrate clearly that it was a 11superlobby, designed for 
the purpose of intimidating and influencing Merbers of Congress through 
direct and subversive lobbying activities ... 11 In an attempt to rectify 
this deficiency, as well as to contribute to the growth of anti-chain 
sentiment in Congress, Patman produced considerable quantities of material 
illustrative of the subversive tactics used by chain store men, in 
Washington and in the states, in the course of their legislative battles 
with the independents. Patman's aim was to create a case against the ARr 
by a process of "guilt by association". His two principal victims in 
this attempt were Robert W. Lyons and John A. Logan, the "ringleaders" in 
the coordination of chain store lobbying activities, both of whom had their 
files seized by the committee. 
1 
R. W. Lyons was himself apparently not directly involved in the 
formation of the ARF, but six of the fourteen chain companies for which he 
conducted political work had been named in the original press release as 
sponsors of the Federation. 
2 In earlier years, as executive vice-president 
of the NCSA, Lyons had been a highly visible and often quoted spokesman 
for the chain storess but since the dissolution of the NCSA in 1933 he had 
slipped into the shadows. His correspondence convinced Patman that the 
chains had'indeed gone "underground". for Lyons had entirely abandoned the 
old speaking-tours debate-handbook and press release style of the NCSA and 
relied instead on lobbying methods. Lyons' every effort seemed to be to 
1. Patman's "guilt by association" technique led Congressman Donald H. 
McLean to threaten to resign from the committee at one point, and to 
increasing dissatisfaction and protest from other committee merbers. Howevers 
Patman brushed aside opposition. 
2. Patman Ctte. 'Hearings, vol. II, pp. 62-3. The six were the J-C. Penney 
Co., S. H. Kress & Co., Walgreen Drug Co., Belville Shoe Corp., W. T. Grant 
Co., S. S. Kresge Co. 
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establish a system of "contact" politics, with a spokesman for the chain 
store interest in both Houses of every state legislature as his goal. 
Lyons was particularly keen to hire, in a "confidential capacity", attorneys 
or former legislators who were believed to be close to Governors or 
4 otherwise influential around State Capitols. Although nothing was 
3. Ibid,., Vol. II, p. 107; Vol. IV9 pp. 19-20. 
4. Ibid., vol. Is pp. 394-7; vol. II, pp. 113-89 127; vol. IV, pp. 1069 
120-1. The publicity given to Lyons' correspondence had immediate 
consequences in Patnan's home state where, in early 1935, a chain tax bill 
had been lost despite the support of Governor Jams V. Allred. During 
the session, Governor Allred had departed to Washington on business and 
Lyons' contact in Texas, former State Senator George C. Purl, decided that 
the best way to eliminate the chain tax bill was to encourage the "speedy 
passage of a series of bills tightening collection of existing taxes".; 
this was done, Purl writing to Lyons of his "good tfinessel to get all 
these bills up at one time" while Allred was out of the states, and 
mentioning also how he had taken Senators out to lunch, three at a time 
Lyons thought it had been a "nice achievement". This correspondence 
became the subject of an investigation by a committee of the Texas Senate. 
In testimony given to this committee, Lieutenant-Governor Woodul maintained 
that Purl had had nothing to do with the passage of the "tax-tightening" 
bills, and Purl himself explained that in his letters to Lyons he had just 
done "a lot of bragging". However, as one pro-chain tax Senator put it, 
"Maybe you were doing a little bragging, but you certainly wrote a 
parable". Governor Allred had campaigned on a platform charging that 
members of the Senate were unduly influenced by the "vested interests"g 
and the Lyons-Purl correspondences although inconclusive, lent colour to 
the charge. Shortly after the Senate committee's hearing, another chain 
tax bills already passed by the Houses came up before the Senate. This 
time Governor Allred did not depart for Washington, but sat at the presiding 
officerts desk, "to attempt to put his eye on us". complained one Senator, 
"as if he thought we needed watching". Nervous opponents of the bill 
"ducked out to avoid a quorud' as the crucial votes approached but were 
"rounded up" by serjeants-at-arms, though "one senator in a, theater 
escaped the searching eye of a senate officer by wearing a woman's hat 
and fur". The bill's supporters were then able to produce both a quorum 
and a narrow majority, and Texas got its first (and last) chain tax law. 
The top rate of $750 on each store in excess of 50 made this the highest 
graduated license tax ever passed. (, Houston Post, October 1,49 59 119 
1935). 
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uncovered to contradict Lyons? statement that he had never paid a 
retainer to a sitting legislators, this evidence of his probity did him 
little good for when Patman spoke about Lyons he spared him nothing, 
giving vent to an evident personal animus - Lyons was the most recalcitrant 
of witnesses before the committee - as well as to political hostility. In 
Lyons,, Patman thought he had found the arch-superlobbyist, a model type of 
chain store corruptionist. 
5 Most pertinently to the ARF, Patman was able 
to show that Lyons had given financial support to one "false front" 
organisation, the Wisconsin Progressive Distributors and had also, through 
his agent W. Lee Smith, set up another, the Progressive Merchants of 
California. Of this latter group, Lyons had boasted that "this organization 
has been under the absolute control and direction of Mr, Smith, although 
its nominal officers and directors have been local merchants of recognized 
standing! '. This boast, and a description of the successful and shrouded 
activities of the Progressive Merchants$ were found by Patman in a letter 
written to Paul B. Scarff, a director of the S. H. Kress & Co., one of the 
companies responsible for the ARF. Patman found in these "fronts" 
financed by Lyons an indication of the way in which the ARr was intended 
to function in those states where pre-existing bodies like the Ohio Council 
of Retail Merchants were unavailable. 
6 
Lyons worked closely on legislative questions oF mutual concern with 
John Logang the executive vice-president of the food chain associationg 
both men having their offices in Washington. Colonel Sherrill was the 
chairman of the FGCSA public relations committee immediately before taking 
up the post of ARF president; the FGCSA executive committee had also voted 
5. In a typical speech to independents, Patman called Lyons a "trickster 
and fixer" who did not practice law but hired people with influence. 
(Interstate Grocer, Novenber 9,, 1935). 
6. PatTmn Ctte. Hearings, q vol. II, pp. 123-49 131-2. 
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to join the ARF even before it was officially unveiled and was, Patman 
explained to the House in an effort to justify the seizure of Logan's 
files, "working hand-in-glovell with the Federation. Patman was able to 
inform the House of a letter in Logan's files which showed how he and 
Sherrill had discussed the possibility of hiring one Fraser Edwards, who 
had been "working almost day and night" with Patman on his bonus bill, so 
as to use Edwards' presumed influence with the Congressman" in guiding the 
investigation to insure the inclusion of such information as may be 
beneficial". 7 
Patman's researches into Logan's files produced plentiful evidence 
of the use of "canned" editorials, form letters to be sent to politicians 
in the handwiiting of private citizens, and of efforts to bring pressure 
to bear on newspapers and other interests to oppose chain store taxation. 
Most of this material was tame, though cumulatively it helped to build up 
the I'superlobby" idea. 8 There wass however, one golden nuggeto the case 
of John Barr and the "National Anti-Chain Store League". 
John Barr was an out-of-work publicity man who, in January 19351, had 
taken a job with the newly-forming National Anti-Chain Store League which 
was being promoted, with headquarters in Washington, by one Leon Ackerman. 
Ackerman had no previous background in the anti-chain store movement. After 
a few weeks, Barr contacted Logan with an offer of information about his 
employer, and he was subsequently retained by Logan, with the approval of 
7. Congressional Record, vol. 79 pp. 11573-4; Patman Ctte. Hearin2 . 
vol. I. p. 389. Logan admitted to the committee (vol. I. p. 190) that 
some of the smaller chains in the FGCSA were "apprehensive about the 
federation" because it seemed to be dominated by large concerns. 
8. Of particular interest were Logan's plans for letter-writing programmes. 
Managers were required to provide those customers known to be of a friendly 
disposition with form letters, to be rewritten in their own words on 
stationery without letterheads and posted at the company's expense. Similar 
letters,, with subtly different themesq were provided for manufacturers, 
stockholders, chain store clerks etc. to send. This was the practice which 
had attracted so imich condermation to the utilities I lobbyists. For drafts 
of letters, see Patman Ctte. Hearingsq vol. I. p. 355 ff. 
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the executive committee of the FGCSA, at $50 per week, to supply inside 
reports on the activities of the League. This cloak-and-dagger operation 
was conducted within the confines of the National Press Building, where 
the chain store association had its offices on the 8th floor and the anti- 
chain association was encamped on the llth. Logan also sent one of his 
staff, B. D. Silliman, to a job interview with W. K. Mitchell, the vice- 
president of the League. Silliman was offered the position of Iowa state 
manager and told that he could expect to recruit 60000 merchants at $10 
each, with $200 per week as his commission. Silliman declined to accept 
this enticing offer, however. 
9 
Logan testified before the Patman Co=ittee that his involvement in 
the affairs of the League arose from information given to him by Barr that 
Ackerman was negotiating with two Germans, Dr. George Barthelmys the 
Washington representative of a Cologne newspaper, and Kurt Sells of the 
Wolfe Press Agency. Barr's information was that the Germans intended to 
finance the League and use its proposed tabloid journal for the 
dissemination of Nazi propaganda. Barr himself told the committee that 
Barthelmy had promised $30,, 000, the sum to be secured by stock issued by 
Ackerman. Barr and Logan represented their motives as having been purely 
patriotic and unrelated to the League's anti-chain activities, Logan 
stating that he had intended to take the whole story before a House committee 
investigating un-American activities as soon as the financial transaction 
between Ackerman and Barthelmy was completed and the anti-chain journal 
published. As his files had been taken by the Patman committee before 
this point was reached, he had done nothing. 
10 
9. Patman Ctte. Hearings, vol. 1. pp. 191-30 199-2000 2110 215-60 
238-41s 247-89 400-407. 
10. Ibid., vol. Is pp. 193-49 198,200-202,2131,239-409 249; vol. II, p. 2. 
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Congressman Bloom advised Logan that he would not be misled by 
"the Nazi herring that you are always drawing across the trail". As 
Patman pointed out to the chain store ran, "For your information, I will 
say that in all this correspondence that has been delivered to the 
committee there are no reports on Nazi propaganda". 
" On the contrary, 
Barr's reports were concerned entirely with Ackerman's apparent success 
in launching his anti-chain organisation. These reports showed Ackerman 
"determined to put this proposition over" and financing himself by the 
sale of waterfront property; he had offices opening in Raleigh and 
Philadelphia and state managers appointed for ten states; Rowland Jones, 
the Washington representative of the National Association of Retail 
Druggists, was planning to bring that association into the League and take 
49% of the stock. Likewise, Ackerman was hard at work on Capitol Hill 
lobbying for the Bankhead-Huddleston price discrimination bill and 
establishing contacts with prominent figures. Senator Huey Long and 
General Hugh Johnson had called on him to ask for data; even Colonel 
Sherrill had been in touch, to explain the purposes of the American Retail 
Federation. Ackerman had also asked Barr to talk with Cochran about the 
ARF investigation, "but I have refused, as I have no desire to make an ass 
of myself by being called as a witness in this investigation". 
12 
Barr did not act solely as an observer. He discouraged Ackerman 
from developing his political contacts, and when told by Ackerman to prepare 
copy for newspaper advertisements his plan was to make it "so strong no 
paper will touch it,,. 
13 Barr was Logan's Trojan Horse within the League. 
On April 10, according to a minute made by Logan, the executive committee 
I 
11. Ibid,, vol. I. pp. 202-39 222. 
12. Ibid., vol. I. pp. 219-223. 
13. Ibid., vol. I. pp. 220-223. 
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of the FGCSA approved the appropriation of "necessary funds for the 
purpose of buying stock preparatory to taking such action as appeared 
necessary, advisable, and expedient to enable the association properly 
to protect the rights and interests of its imnbers". The inspiration 
for this extraordinary decision was apparently provided by Barr, for in 
a letter to Logan, dated May 21, he asked 
"Inasmuch as he is now actually operating, don't you think 
it advisable to do as I suggested sow time ago and have 
this thing shut down by having someone buy three or four 
shares of stock and then after a short time charge him (i. e. 
Ackerman) with mismanagement, misapplication of funds, and 
ask for a temporary injunction". 14 
An effort was meanwhile underway to find out something damaging 
about Ackerman. A letter of May 8 from Logan to r. H. Massmann, president 
of the National Tea Co., referred to inquiries which had revealed a past 
"shady in some respects", though nothing "sufficiently incriminating to 
make a major case". Barr had also set a private detective to the same 
task and had learned of a previous involvement of Ackerman in the promotion 
of a fraudulent tobacco plantation. Barr's belief was that Ackerman was 
just a "racketeer". 
15 
Barr and Logan provided neatly interlocking accounts of the Nazi 
connection, but even R. W. Lyons seemed disinclined to believe them. Lyons 
testified that he had declined a suggestion by Logan that he should join 
him in a "counter-activity" to oppose the Anti-Chain Store League, and that 
the mention of the Nazi connection had "amused me, I will say to you very 
frankly, because I did not take it seriously". His "inference" had been 
that Logan was really concerned about the anti-chain side of the League's 
activities and, under questioning, Lyons admitted that he was unsure whether 
Logan had ever mentioned the Nazi aspect to him at all. 
16 Logan's claim 
14. Ibid., vol. I. pp. 196j 224-226. Logan told the committee that no 
stock was actually purchased. 
15. Ibid., vol. I. pp. 2429 245; vol. II, p. 46. 
16. Ibid., vol. II, pp. 959 137-9. 
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that Barr's written reports contained no mention of Nazi propaganda 
because that area was only discussed orally, owing to its sensitivity, 
met with a frosty reception from the committee. Looking at the story 
more broddly, Congressman Dockweiler could see no reason to have feared 
a Nazi involvement with the League, "because the Nazi philosophy is 
entrenched capitalism; and nazi-ism would have no placeýin the kind of 
organization that would be against a chain store". Congressman Boileau 
suggested there was an inconsistencys in that Ackerman was Jewish, to 
which Logan could only reply that "I thought of that, too, quite 
-frequently, but my interest was,, as I stated, from the Nazi angle". 
17 
It may be taken for granted that Logan's principal interest really 
was f-rom "the chain store angle". It was obviously deeply troubling to 
him that a man, like Ackerman, possessing no anti-chain background and 
only the skills of a promoters could so easily have established contacts 
in political Washington. Nevertheless, the Nazi connection was not pure 
invention. Two of Barrts letters to Logan referred to Barthelmy and Sellso 
one of them stating that negotiations had been delayed because of 
Barthelmy's ill-health. While these letters did not mention Nazi propaganda, 
it is difficult to see what other interest the Cermans could have had in 
the League. 18 Logan's statement that Sells and Barthelmy were known to 
the State Department which Itwas eager to obtain information which would 
indicate that they were engaged in destructive Nazi propaganda" was not 
17. Ibid., vol. I. pp. 203s 208-10; vol. II, p. 46. 
18. Logan also provided the committee with an affidavit from W. K. 
Mitchell, the vice-president of the National Anti-Chain Store League, 
which referred to the interest of Barthelmy and Sells in purchasing 
stock. Patman Ctte. Hearings, vol. I, pp. 1949 1989 2030 2089 213. 
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disputed, and Barthelmy's name had in fact been mentioned in the course 
of hearings held in 1934 by the House committee investigating Nazi 
propaganda activities. These hearings had thrown up examples of similar 
Nazi involvements to that alleged by Barr and Logan. Whether or not the 
financing of the Anti-Chain Store League was a well-advised project,, it 
would not have been out of line with similar German-backed schemes at 
the time. 19 Contemptuous though Patman professed to be of Logan's story, 
he did not take up his challenge to put Ackerman, Sells and Barthelmy on 
the witness stand. Instead he preferred not to put at risk the image he 
created of Ackerman as a martyr who had mortgaged his home and sold his 
property to help the independent merchant, only to be betrayed by his 
trusted assistant, Patman had exactly the information he required, and 
he did not tempt providence by seeking more. As he solemnly informed the 
House, Logan and the executive committee of the food chain association had 
been found guilty of the lowest "snooping, stealing, treacheryq and 
bribery". 20 
It was really the evidence about the Anti-Chain Store League,, the 
"cornstalk brigade" project, Lyons' "false fronts" and a nunber of other 
miscellaneous escapades of the chain store men which fixed the image of the 
American Retail Federation. In speeches before Congress and in rousing 
addresses up and down the country Patmang and those who took their cue from 
him, merged these separate incidents into a general indictment of the "chain 
store crowd". And such incidents did demonstrate an inportant truth. Th6y 
showed just how acute the struggle between chains and independents had 
become. Set against this backgroundl, the bland protestations of the 
sponsors of the ARF sounded hollow and unreal. The sponsors of the ARF 
19. Ibid., vol. I$ p. 202; ' Houge 'Spddidl'C6mmittdd 'Orl Un-ý-Aretican 
Acti-% =ties 'Heciringsl, 73rd Cong., 2nd Sess., esp-. p. 716 (Nov. 934). 
20. Patman Ctteo' Tdarings vol. I. pp. 2079 2099 227. Corigro8sional 
Record, July 22,1935, vol. 79, p. 11574. 
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asked the Patmn committee to believe that they intended the Federation 
to remain neutral on chain store taxations even though the Supreme Court 
decision in the West Virginia case and developments like the Florida 
Recovery Act threatened the very existence of chain store conpanies. 
Likewise the Federation was supposedly precluded from taking a position 
on the Bankhead-Huddleston bill, which struck at the basis of chain and 
department store buying methods. Clearly it was a preposterous assertion, 
and it was undermined by the evidence of Sherrill's files and, less 
tangibly, by the general tenor of his replies to the committee's questions. 
It may be that a few of the department store men, notably Kirstein, had 
not thought out fully the implications of the creation of the ARF for the 
struggle between chains and independents, but this cannot conceivably 
have been true of the chain store men. What is perhaps most significant 
is that the sponsors felt obliged to be so evasive about their intentions. 
They weres after all, seeking only to ensure their own survival. There 
was no idea that the ARF should lobby for special legislation to drive 
independent stores out of business, and in normal times it would no doubt 
have been thought quite natural that an organisation should, as a matter 
of basic principle, object to any piece of legislation designed to destroy 
a section of its own membership. The cowed and evasive manner of the chain 
store men arose from a sense that they were in the dock. It seemed to be 
perfectly acceptable on Capitol Hill that independents could set up 
organisations like the Anti-Chain Store League, storm state legislatures 
and boubard politicians with demands to tax the chains out of existence. 
In contrast, purely defensive measures by the chain stores were vilified 
as "superlcbbying" and a political outrage. Even those menbers of the 
Patman committee who were relatively sympathetic to the chain store side 
seemed reluctant to agree that the chains had a right to respond in kind, 
arguing only that they had not exceeded the bounds of propriety. 
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The American Retail Federation continued in existence,, in form but 
not in substance. Its sponsors were necessarily obliged to abandon all 
claims that it could be a "unified voice" for retailing and, carrying out 
to the letter the prescription written for it before the Patman committee, 
the Federation eschewed any engagement in issues upon which retailers were 
divided. Because virtually all the great issues to the trede over the 
next few years - price maintenance, chain taxation, unfair practice laws - 
were of a divisive nature, the Federation inevitably lapsed into invotence 
and obscurity. SherTill himself resigned as president in 1937, and was 
replaced by David R. Craig, an academic with a blameless reputation. Only 
in 1939 did the Federation show renewed signs of life and give a hint of a 
revival of the original political purpose behind it. 
21 
The destruction of the Federation as a real political force had 
serious consequences. G. M. Lebhars in an article written before the 
Congressional furore over the announcement of the Federation and warning 
of the "havoc" that would be produced by enactment of the Bankhead- 
Huddleston bill, advised that "it is not to be expected that public opinion 
would crystallise itself against such a proposition without the leadership 
of just such an organization as the new American Retail Federation 1,. 
22 
This prediction proved correct9 with the Robinson-Patman bill substituting 
for Bankhead-Huddleston. Had it not been for the Patman committees the 
ARF might well have drawn in a number of the more conservative national 
retail associations, as well as state retailers? associations. In such 
circumstances, it would undoubtedly have proved an appreciable obstacle 
to passage of the Robinson-Patman bill. Instead$ the billts trade 
21. See belows P. 414. 
22. Chain'Store Agel, Hay 1935. 
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supporters went virtually unchallenged in their claim that they spoke 
for all independent merchants. Furthermoreq the proceedings of the 
Patran committee helped to cement the anti-chain coalition. The three 
national retail associations whose protests had brought about the 
Congressional investigation were brought into alliance with the United 
States Wholesale Grocers' Association in support of the Rcbinson-Patman 
bill. And presiding over all was the suddenly arisen presence of Patman 
himself, for whose spectacular emergence as their national leader the 
anti-chain forces could only give praises to the founders of the American 
Retail rederation. 
vi. The Robinson-Patran Bill 
The Robinson-Patman Bill, as originally introduced, made four basic 
changes to Section 2 of the Clayton act. 2 (a) revised its general 
prohibition against price discrimination in such a way as to-make it both 
more stringent and more capable of enforcement; 2 (b) and (c) added 
entirely newq separate and explicit restrictions on brokerage commissions 
and advertising allowances; and 2 (d) provided a method for the 
assessment of damages in private suits. Section 2 (d) disappeared from 
the bill during passage without ever becoming a focus of controversy* 
1 
2 (a), like the old Section 2 of the Clayton Act which it was 
designed to replacep first prohibited discrimination in price and then 
2 
stated under what conditions such discrimination could be lawfully made. 
1. Congressional Record, Vol. 79, pp. 9077-8. (H. R. 8442). 
2. Sec. 2 (a) of H. R. 8442, as originally introduced, read: "That it 
shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of 
such commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price or 
terms of sale between different purchasers of commodities of like grade 
and quality, where either or any of the purchases involved in such 
discrimination are in commerce,, and where such commodities are sold for 
use, consumptions or resale within the United States or any Territory 
thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other 
place under the jurisdiction of the United States: Provided, That nothing 
.... 2 
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(The word "discrimination" as used in the Clayton Act simply meant 
"difference" and did not imply an unwarranted difference). The old 
Section 2 only prohibited discrimination where it had an effect to 
"substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any 
line of commerce", thus necessitating a laborious and difficult attempt 
to show the effect of a single discrimination in price upon the general 
competitive situation in an entire industry. While the sort of 
discrimination which was of real economic consequence was obviously likely 
to have such an effect, the burden of demonstrating it was inherently 
so onerous that it had discouraged enforcement of the Section. The bill 
drafted by Teegarden dealt with this difficulty by striking out the 
requirement of a demonstrable effect on competition. Thus all difference 
in price was made illegal except that allowed by the provisos, which were 
in turn substantially rewritten. 
The proviso allowing a seller to select his'customers, "in bona 
fide transactions and not in restraint of trade" was left unaltered. In 
other words, if a manufacturer did not care to sell to all his customers 
on the equal termsrequired by the law, he had the option of refusing to 
deal with any clbzs of them, provided that such a refusal did not involve 
what the courts considered to be a restraint of trade. This residual 
freedom was of some importance in view of the tight restrictions drawn 
elsewhere in the bill, though it was a limited freedom. In general terms$ 
it was of more use to the small manufacturers,, because the big 
manufacturer of a nationally-advertised brand for which there was 
2. (cont'd) ... herein contained shall prevent differentials in prices 
as between purchasers depending solely upon whether they purchase for 
resale to wholesalers, to retailersq or to consumers, or for use in further 
manufacture; nor differentials which made only due allowance for differences 
in the cost of manufacture, sale,, or delivery resulting from the differing 
methods or quantities in which such commodities am to such purchasers sold 
or delivered: And provided further, That nothing herein contained shall 
prevent persons engaged in selling goodss wares, or merchandise in commerce 
from selecting their own customers in bona fide transactions and not in 
restraint of trade". For the old Section 2§ see p. 380 Note l3s above. 
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a widespread consumer demand (i. e. a manufacturer enjoying a degree of 
ronopolistic power in the market) could scarcely refuse to deal with all 
independent wholesalers or retailers without sturbling into the minefield 
of restraint of trade. 
The other proviso of the old Section 2, permitting "discrimination... 
on account of differences in the grade, quality or quantity of the 
commodity sold, or that makes only due allowance for differences in the 
cost of selling or transportation, or discrimination in price in the saw 
or different communities made in good faith to meet coupetition... ", was 
profoundly modified. The new 2 (a) eliminated the "good faith" defence, 
thus raking it impossible for a seller to escape with the plea that 
somebody else's wrong had put him in the right. This changes like that 
removing the requirement of a showing of an effect on competition, was 
intended to isolate the dealings of the individual seller from those of 
his coirpetitors, thus simplifying enormously the task of the enforcement 
agency. It was also intended to obviate the possibility that a large 
buyer might bring pressure to bear on a nuTrber of competing sellerss in 
discreet or indirect ways which the FTC might not be able to detect, to 
set in motion a spiral of downward changes in price to that particular 
buyer's advantage, all of these changes being made, from the point of 
view of each seller, "in good faith" to meet the competition of the 
other sellers. 
7be main feature of the proposed 2 (a) was the elimination of the 
distinction between those lawful differentials raking "only due allowance" 
for differences in cost of selling and transportation and those made "on 
account of" differences in grade, quality-or quantity. All differentials 
were brought under the control of the "only due allowance" formula. As 
commodities genuinely differing in grade or quality were obviously 
different things, and therefore incapable of being the subject of price 
discrimination, in effect this change was only really concerned with 
quantity differentials. The FTC, in the ]Final Re ort_ of the chain store 
2%. 
inquiry, had laid particular stress on the need for the existing 
permission for differentials "on account of" quantity to be changed to 
Itonly due allowance", arguing that unless this were done the courts 
would likely interpret the phrase "on account of" to mean that any degree 
of discrimination could be justified simply by a small increase in the 
quantity purchased. 
3 Although the Clayton Act had been on the statute 
books for more than two decades, precisely that question had never yet 
been tested by the FTC in-the courts. Sore critics maintained that this 
argument was nothing more than the Commission making excuses for its 
own sloth and that the courts would, on the contrary, interpret the phrase 
in the light of the rest of the section so as to permit "only due allowance" 
for differences in quantity. 
4 The Commission was itselfs at the time 
of the Final Report, preparing for the first real test of the quantity 
proviso, and in March 1936 issued a cease and desist order against the 
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. which relied on an "only due allowance" 
interpretation. Obviously, the Commission could not have been right in 
both cases, and the order was perhaps little more than a speculative 
exercise. 
5 In the event, when the courts finally decided the issue they 
stuck closely to the literal meaning of the proviso and found that Goodyear 
was under no obligation to make "only due allowance" for its cost savings 
on sales of "Allstate" private brand tyres to Sears. While the attitude 
of the courts was to some extent influenced by the fact that Congress had 
in the interim altered the proviso, by means of the Rcbinson-Patman law, 
rinal Reportl p. 97. 
4. See Charles F. Phillips,, "The Robinson-Patman Anti-Price Discrimination 
Law and The Chain Store"q Harvard Business Rev. vol. 15 (1936) pp. 69-72. 
Many chain executives advanced this argumentq for obvious reasons. 
5.22 17C 232 (1936). For this order, see above p. 51-52, n-27. 
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precisely because it believed the old Section 2 had not required an "only 
due allowance" limitationi (the case was tried under the old Section 2). 
there cannot be much doubt that the same decision would have been reached 
even without that complication. The judicial ruling in the Goodyear case 
was, indeed, a powerful retrospective vindication in this respect for both 
the Robinson-Patman bill and the*Final'Report. If the old Section 2 was 
incapable-of stopping the massive sort of discrimination involved in the 
Goodyear case, which the FTC had found had driven "thousands" of small 
tyro dealers out of business, it was clearly incapable of stopping virtually 
anyth ng. 
6 
It was the wish of the sponsors of the Robinson-Patman bill to see 
a most restrictive definition of allowable costs adopted by the Congress,, 
so that each purchaser would be entitled only to the nost tightly defined 
savings arising directly from the specific purchase under consideration. 
7 
What is more, the concept of "only due allowance" was itself more 
unfavourable to the chains than was perhaps apparent at first sight, for 
it worked only one way round. The seller could not exceed due allowance 
for his cost savings, but he was under no obligation to make any such 
due allowance. He was perfectly free to rake no differentials of any kind 
and sell at the same unit price to all his customers. A large buyer might 
consider himself the victim of unfair discrimination if he received no 
recognition for the economies afforded to the seller by being able to handle 
one big order, but in the sense in which the Clayton act defined 
6. 'Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 101 Fed. 'Ond); '620. (1939). 
Cert. Denied, 308 U. S. 557. 
7. ror exarple, Teegarden insisted that a chain would have to pay a 
proportionate share towards the maintenance of a manufacturer's sales force 
even if this were used only to contact the independent trade. -Touse 
jton 'Act. 74th -C-gr Judiciary Committee, Hearings.. To Amend The Cla ongress, 
1935-69 p. 34 (Henceforth cited as*HJC. Hearin s. 
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discrimination he was merely being given equal treatment. Chain store 
buyers in practice confronted sellers with a wide spectrum of policies, 
ranging from those who sold at the same unit price to all on any reasonably 
sized orders to those who bent over backwards to curry favour with the 
chains by giving them all manner of special concessions in an effort to 
build volume or to establish a long-term buying Connection. Somewhere in 
between were a large nurber of sellers who made an approximate attenpt to 
make "only due allowance". subject to the vagaries of their cost accounting 
methods, the need to maintain fairly simple discount schedules, and the 
pressure of trade custom. The "only due allowance" formula of the Robinson- 
Patman bill not only required the seller to be very careful and cautious 
in what he conceded by way of "only due allowance", it attacked the 
favour-currying sellers, leaving only the middle and the unsatisfactory 
portions of the spectrum for the chain buyers to deal with. 
The "only due allowance" formula was nonetheless relatively generous 
to the chains. It contrasted sharply, for example, with the Bankhead- 
Huddleston bill, much favoured in the early part of 1935, which had flatly 
prohibited all quantity differentials, allowing only a functional differential 
for the benefit of wholesalers. As a result, only a few weeks after the 
Patman bill was first introduced, H. B. Teegarden, "acting at the request of 
Mr. Patman, and in response to the apparent wish of certain sections of the 
Congress", offered to the House Judiciary Committee a major amendment to 
the bill, inposing a carload lot limitation on maximum quantity discounts. 
As justification for this radical step, Teegarden cited the precedent 
provided by the Inter-state Commerce Commission which had for nearly half a 
century forbidden railroads to extend lower unit freight retes on shipments 
of more than one carload, regardless of the considerable cost savings which 
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could be made in handling entire trainloads. 
8 7be principle upon which 
the ICC had based this blanket prohibition was that differences in cost 
to the carrier had to be disregarded above the carload limit, because 
greater differentials would "be to the prejudice of the small shipper and 
the public! 
9 Advocates of such a limitation in the field covered by 
Section 2 of the Clayton act argued that the growth of the chain stores had 
introduced the same disease of rebating into retail distribution as had 
once disfigured the railroad industry. They were arguing, in effect, that 
a vital public interest was involved in sustaining small buyers and so 
warding off a potential monopoly,, and that in such circumstances more had 
to be considered than the position of the manufacturer who sold to the 
cbains. 
Teegarden himself never seemed entirely committed to the demand for 
the carload lot limitation. In the grocery trade many leading manufacturers 
already based their maximum quantity discounts on the carload lot: it was 
advertising allowances and brokerage commissions which were the more 
irportant. grievance to USWGA-10 At the same times the carload lot idea 
implied a massive dislocation to a wide range of heavy industries* such as 
8. HJC, Hearings, pp. 249 257-8. 
9. Anaconda_Co2per Mining Co. v. Chicago &'Erie'R. R., '19 ICC'592 (1910). 
10. Thus, for example, spokesmen for the General Foods Corp. and Standard 
Brands, Inc., the two largest contributors to the A& P's special discounts 
and allowances headquarters account, stated that on most of their products 
they based their quantity discounts on giving the lowest price on a 
carload lot. As a result, they had more wholesale than chain store accounts 
receiving the maximum quantity discount. There were some exceptions 
however: Standard Brands extended a maximum quantity discount of . 10% on its yeast for whibh only the A&P and Kroger qualified, and the A&P was 
similarly the only concern to get the maximum quantity discount of 7j% on 
salt from General Foods. (Patman Ctte. Hearings 5 vol. III, p. 76, vol. 
IV p. 29). 
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the coal industry, whose prectices were not an issue in the fight with 
the chain stores. To Teegarden's obvious alarm, the new provision brought 
forth immediate forceful protests from these industries and from the powerful 
National Association of Manufacturers, thus giving the chains some hope 
that they might be able to unite all business behind them in opposition to 
the bill. 
11 
But despite Teegarden's hesitancy, Patman and many supporters 
of the bill were keen to make a fight for a quantity limit because the 
quantity differential was the key to the lower buying prices of many types 
of chains, notably those in the general merchandise field, which made 
relatively little use of brokerage and advertising allowances. Implicit in 
the independents' advocacy of the carload lot limitation was a Mcognition 
that where big chains placed order-s on a scale sufficient to keep a whole 
factory in production for months at a tire innumerable economies of scale 
became possible which could be reflected under an "only due allowance" 
formula. It was this fact of business life which had enabled chains like 
Penney, Woolworth and Montgomery Ward to bUld up excellent relations with 
many of their suppliers, who themselves had grown fat on "cost plus" 
arrangements with these chains even while selling to them at prices which 
would have been unprofitable had they been trying to deal through a 
multitude of small jobbers. The FTC's case against Goodyears for example, 
was not that it sold tyres to Sears at a lower price than it sold to other 
dealers, but that it sold to Sears at a price which produced for Goodyear 
a lower rate of profit: Goodyear had nevertheless found the Sears deal 
profitable and satisfactory, and the FTC did not dispute that it was 
entitled to have given Sears a very much lower price than it gave to the 
11. HJC, 'Hearirigs, pp. 236-9j, 257-8. 
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independents on an "only due allowance" basis. 
12 In demanding that 
sellers should no longer be able to contract on the basis of the buyer 
taking a huge quantity - in the Goodyear case, millions of tyres - but 
only on the basis of what could be fitted into a single railroad car, 
Patman was calling for the end of the whole system of mass purchasing 
by general merchandise chains. 
13 
The quantity limit idea actually quickly developed into a bargaining 
point: it was an advanced position from which the billfs sponsors hoped 
to stage a gradual retreat which would nonetheless leave them occupying 
a position, when the bill became law, which was further forward than the 
flonly due allowance" demand of the original draft. Patman was particularly 
12. Comparing the price at which Goodyear sold tyres to Sears with that 
at which it sold to its own dealers, after appropriate adjustment to 
take account of cash discountsq dealer and trade-in allowancess bonusess 
freight on sales and replacement lossess the FTC computed a gross discrimination in favour of Sears of between 29 and 40% on the different 
grades of tyres. After making "due allowance" for Goodyear's extra 
costs in selling to its own dealers, the rTC found a remaining net 
discrimination of between 11% and 22%. In other words, the difference 
between these figures for the gross and the net discrimination was what 
the rTC thought that Sears was entitled to under a due allowance formula. 
At that, the Commission had rejected various arguable cost savings arising 
from the stability obtained from such a big long-term order, as "too 
speculative, intangible and remote to Justify, or to be reasonably 
related tog the price discrimination". (See Miller, Unfair Competition 
pp. 136-8). 
13. Except, of course, that there was the loophole that a manufacturer 
who sold only to a chain store could make any price he wished. Variety 
and department store chains already had many such exclusive dealing 
arrangements, and could presumably have extended them. And because 
chains and independents sold less identical, and directly competing, 
brands in the general merchandise field than they did in the grocery 
trade, there was a large area of purchasing to which the bill had no 
applicability. Chains also had the option of extending their own 
manufacturing operations if they felt they were being compelled to pay 
manufacturers more than was necessary in order to subsidise their sales 
to the independent trade. Even the full-blooded rigour of the carload 
lot limit could not have automatically reduced the likes of Sears and 
Woolworth to helplessness when it came to finding cheap ways to put goods 
on their shelves. 
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keen that, if a uniform carload lot were not to be adopted, the rTC 
should be given the authority to fix top limits whenever there was a 
risk of monopoly. His intention was that this power should be used 
frequently and very restrictively, not just in rare cases of exceptional 
disparity. It wass he assertedg "a question of fixing a quantity unit, 
so that, whenever small independents and small groups get together and 
they can buy that unitl, they are entitled to the saw price and term as 
the larger corporate chain that may buy 100,000 units". 
14 It was this 
idea, with its implication that the FTC would become the overseer of 
business rather than, as it had been for most of its history, just a 
friendly guardian,, which provoked the most extensive business opposition 
to the bill. Many industries with no interest one way or the other whether 
the chains were allowed to keep their buying advantages showed concern 
about this entering wedge for governmental control. This concern led the 
National Association of Manufacturers to condemn the bill as one of the 
five measures most disruptive of the President's announceVIbreathing 
spell" for business which followed the New Deal. 
15 It is, indeed, 
surprising that industry as a whole was not more energetic than it actually 
was in opposition to the bill. It seemed at times that the bill's 
reputation as an anti-chain measure had blinded both other business and 
Congress to the impact it would or could have in a far wider field. 
Section 2 (a) also provided for another form of deviation from price 
uniformity. Differentials were to be permitted to purchasers "depending 
solely upon whether they purchase for resale to wholesalers, to retailersq 
or to consumers, or for use in further manufacture". While this proviso 
had to be read in the light of the general purpose of the Act, it did not 
require such functional differentials to be automatically limited by any 
14. HJC, 'Hearings,, p. 394. 
15. New York'TimesI9 Harch 1.1936. 
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criterion of "due allowance" for cost savings. In other words, a 
manufacturer could, if he felt so inclined, give a wholesaler a special 
wholesale discount which he did not extend to a retail customers even 
though the retailer might be buying in the saw quantity. 
There was no especially radical intent behind this so-called 
"classification clause". 
16 On the contrary, it merely guaranteed a common 
business practice which had been protected by the courts by a sympathetic 
reading of the old Section 2.17 While this reading had worked to the 
disadvantage of certain retailers, on certain of their purchases, it had 
enabled manufacturers to maintain a degree of stability in their 
distributive arrangements. With few exceptions, manufacturers had 
classified integrated chains which performed their own wholesaling so as 
to receive wholesale discounts. 
Despite this, chain store men from the first claimed that the 
classification clause was a crafty device to entrench the wholesaler at 
the expense of retailers, retail cooperatives and chain stores. 
18 Their 
16.7bis is not the impression conveyed by J. C. Palamountain who (in The 
Politics of Distribution, p. 204) states of the original draft that it was 
designed to have the effect of "preventing mass distributors from receiving 
a wholesaler's discount even though they performed the wholesaling function". 
This interpretation is central to Palamountain's argument that in the 
course of passage the bill was profoundly modified under the influence of 
"middle groups" Obe classification clause not being found in the final 
Robinson-Patman law). Actually, few independents laid any particular stress 
on the classification clause. 
17. Mennen Co. v. rTC, 288_Fed. 774; National Biscuit Co. ' v. rTC, M 
Fed. 733. See above, p. 476for discussion of hese cases. The Senate 
Judiciary Committee report stated that "Although not specifically so 
provided, the present Section 2 of the Clayton Act also permits these 
differentials, since it places no limits ... upon any differentials not affectinE 
general competition. Since added restrictions are imposed in these respects* 
a separate clause safeguarding differentials as between different classes 
of purchasers becomes necessary. Such differentials, so long as equal 
treatment is required within the class, do not give rise to the competitive 
evils at which the bill is aimed, while to suppress them would produce 
an unwarranted disturbance of existing habits of trade". (S. Rept. 1502, 
74th Cong., 2nd Sess., reb 3.1936). The bill's sponsors wanted to be quite 
sure that the wholesaler would not be prevented from buying small quantities 
at jobber prices. 
18. H. B. Teegardeng who had written the bills dismissed the claim that 
the clause would oblige manufacturers to give a lower price to wholesalers 
than they gave to chain stores or other buyers as "a remarkable piece of 
juggling" (HJCv Hearings, pp. 206-7). 
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protests became especially loud after the bill emerged from the House 
Judiciary committee with the classification clause rewritten in such a 
way as to explain the type of classification which would be allowable: 
"That nothing herein contained shall prevent or require 
differentials as between purchasers depending solely 
upon whether they purchase for resale to wholesalers, 
to retailers or to consumers, or for use in further 
manufacture; for the purpose of such classification 
of customers as wholesalers or jobbers, or retailers 
the character of the selling of the purchaser and not 
the buying shall determine the classification, and any 
purchaser who, directly or indirectly, though a subsidiary 
or affiliated concern or broker, does both a wholesale 
and retail business shall, irrespective of quantity 
purchased, be classified (1) as a wholesaler on purchases 
for sale to retail dealers only, not owned or controlled, 
directly or indirectly,, by the purchaser; and (2) as 
a retailer on purchases for sale to consumers". 19 
In the Mennen case the court had done no nore than this, finding 
that retailers buying cooperatively were not by right eligible to a 
wholesale discount because "whether a buyer is a wholesaler or not does 
not depend upon the quantity he buys. It is not the character of his 
buyings but the character of his selling, which marks him as a wholesaler ... 1,20 
Howevers actual trade practice in the years since had been that wholesale 
discounts were commonly granted to any retailer or group of retailers 
who satisfied the criteria established by each manufacturer. In effect9 
business practicalities, and buying strength, determined the granting of 
functional discounts without any reference to what the courts may have 
said. This practice was continued under the NRA regulation. Thusp in 
the grocery codess functional discounts were permitted by code authorities 
provided the functions were performed. It was never questioned that 
chains, corporate and voluntary, and the properly constituted type of 
retail cooperative with its own warehousing were fully entitled to wholesale 
19. H. R. Rept. 2287,74th Cong. 2nd Sess. g pp. 1-2. This revision never 
appeared in the Senate version of the bill. 
20. Mennen Co. v. FTC, 288 Fed. 774,782. 
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discounts where such were made. 
21 By bringing in an explicit definition 
of the basis upon which classifications could be made,, the House Judiciary 
Conmittee cast a dark shadow over all these well-established trade customs. 
It also threatened to remove the right to establish his own classifications - 
provided they were not in restraint of trade - from the manufacturer with 
whom it had traditionally belonged. 
At this rewriting a great howl went up from the opponents, of the 
bill. They claimed that it would force manufacturers to sell to wholesalers 
at a lower price than they sold to any of their other customerss whether 
chains, cooperatives or individual retailers. The wholesalers they 
maintained, was about to be reinstated in his old nineteenth century position 
of untrammeled sovereignty over distributive channels to the detriment of 
every other distributor. This argument was used to considerable effect to 
stir up certain manufacturers and cooperatives, against the bill. 
22 Actually, 
even this rewritten classification clause was no real threat to the big 
chain store companies. It in no way required the manufacturer to grant 
functional discounts, only restricted the character of such discounts if he 
chose to make them. 
23 Manufacturers already had a perfect ri&%t to sell to 
wholesalers at a lower price than they sold to the big chainsg but they did 
not show much eagerness to exercise that right. Nothing in the bill really 
made*it more likely that they would suddenly change their policies in that 
respect, because chain store buying strength would still exert itself on 
the seller. If the manufacturer had a right to refuse to sell, the chain 
21. Modern Merchant & Grocery World, July 211,1934. For an attack on 
classification provisions in some NRA codes allowing chain stores to obtain 
maximum discounts, but denying them to small merchants buying In the same 
quantitys see Irving Fox of NRDGA in Senate Finance Committee, ''Hearings, 
(On) Investigation of the National'Recovery'Admin_istration-9 74th Cong. ist 
Sess., at p. 1886 ff. 
22. Senate Judiciary Committee,, Hearings On S-4171 - Price Discrimination 
74th Cong., 2nd Sess. 9 pp. 41-3.451,909 110. (Henceforth cited as SJC, 
Hearin&R). 
23. "The bill neither requires nor compels the granting of discriminations 
or differentials of any sort, and the words "or require" are especially 
inserted ... to make that clear". 
(H. R. Rept. 2287,, p. 10). 
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equally had a right to refuse to buy and to take its business to a more 
* 
24 The classification clause was not, however, such amenable supplier* 
an empty gesture in terms of the buying position of small retail and 
consumer cooperatives and individual retailers. Their position was far 
more delicate. Manufacturers already walked a tightrope if they chose to 
deal with these marginal buyers on a roughly similar basis to their chain 
and wholesale accounts. If most wholesalers had long since accepted it 
as inevitable that the chains were going to get wholesale prices, they 
were not so reconciled to the inevitability of manufacturers giving equal 
terms to these miscellaneous small fry. Enactment of the classification 
clause in the form approved by the House Judiciary committee would 
undoubtedly have provided the wholesalers with a perfect opportunity to 
hamstring the small fry. Although the Cooperative rood Distributors of 
Americas the federation of retail grocery cooperatives, seers to have been 
little troubled by the classification clauses the much more precariously 
established farm and consumer cooperatives - which many in the trade 
considered "illegitimate" - were vocally hostile, and the chains egged them 
on with enthusiasm. 
Most of the subtleties in the Robinson-Patman bill were found in 
Section 2 (a). Clauses (b) and (c) were far more straightforwards attacking 
specific practices rather than elucidating general principles. 2 (b) flatly 
prohibited the payment of brokerage commissions to buyers or their agents. 
2 (c) prohibited the extension of advertising allowancess or similar service 
payments to buyers except when available "on proportionally equal terms to 
24. For a recognition of this by G. M. Lebharq in the relative privacy of 
the chains' own journals see Chain Store Ages May 1936s Grocery Edn. p. 77. 
Lebhar thought the only possibility tM chains would be denied wholesale 
discounts would be in those lines where chains were still weak. It is 
interesting also to speculate as to what might have happened had the big 
chains actually been denied wholesale prices. Numbers of specialist 
wholesalers would presumably have blossomed forthq selling direct to the 
chains at cut-rate margins on large volumes and adding little to chain 
costs beyond the maintenance of an extra office and the salary of the 
obliging wholesaler. There must be a suspicion that, with these cut-raters 
scraribling for chain business, some chains might well have found a way to 
reduce the costs of their wholesaling functionss which over the years had inevitably tended to ossify and carried a permanent burden Of overhead 
exvense. 
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all other customers competing in the distribution of such products or 
commodities". The drastic nature of 2(b) was obvious on its face; but 
2 (c) was not much less repressive in purpose. The belief of the bill's 
sponsors was that the requirement that advertising allowances must be 
available on "proportionally equal terms" to all customers would sharply 
reduce, if not end altogethers such allowances, for few manufacturers 
would be willing or able to make such concessions to every small jobber 
or retailer who demanded them. The concept of "proportionally equal 
terms" was quite different from that of "only due allowance". Many 
customers - especially wholesalers - simply could not provide the service, 
in term of display and pronotion, which the integrated chain could give 
to the manufacturer, and would therefore have had no entitlement to a 
"due' allowance" reduction. The "proportionally equal terms" provision 
was designed to compel the manufacturer to extend similar allowances to 
all customers buying in similar quantities, and claiming to be able to 
extend the same service, even though the manufacturer well knew that the 
real value of the service given varied markedly. The bill's backers 
disguised this fundamentally different approach under a cover of vague 
talk about advertising allowances having been used as "rebates". 
The brokerage and advertising allowance clauses essentially embodied 
the programme fought for by the United States Wholesale Grocers' 
Association, the National rood Brokers' Association and the more militant 
retail grocery associations during the period of the NRA. Behind them 
lay the fundamentalist philosophy that the old ways of distribution had 
been the best and that all deviations therefrom were to be condetined. 
The brokerage clause, which quickly became the centre of the storm over 
the bill in the grocery trade, most clearly encapsulated that philosophy. 
The "evil" which it attacked was vertical integration. The fundamentalists 
had seen a group of retailers, the chain stores, become combined wholesalers 
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and retailers, and so eliminate the wholesaler from their scheme of 
things; they were not prepared to see the broker be eliminated also. 
Whether or not brokerage agencies controlled by buyers actually suited 
the needs of both buyers and se"ers was deemed irrelevant, and so no 
question of "due allowance" arose. Of course, the bill struck not only 
at the corporate chains. Its target was all who mimicked the chain store 
methods and that included, most prominently, the big grocery voluntary 
chains which since their appearance in the late 1920's had thrived on 
brokerage commissions and their ability to collect advertising allowances 
which the unaffiliated wholesaler, who had no control over the merchandising 
of his retail customers, was denied. 
25 
The fundamentalist group bad made strides towards the imposition of 
their programme under the NRA. 7beir militancy ensured that the NRA 
administrators conceded more protection to the small buyers in the food 
and grocery codes than was granted to distributors in most other lines. 
The master code for grocery manufacturers required a regime of "open 
prices", with all prices to be available on published price lists and 
advertising allowances specified in separate written contracts available 
for inspection by competitors. The, payment of brokerage commissions to 
buyers was prohibited. On paper, this was a hard regime for the chains, 
though scarcely comparable to that sought through the Robinson-Patman bill. 
The problem for the fundamentalists lay in enforcement. Although some 
sub-codes were adopted quickly, the master code itself was held up by a 
determined and stealthy resistance from those whom it sought to curb, and 
did not take effect until October 1,19349 by which time the initial 
authority of the NRA had decayed. In addition, some of the sub-codes for 
different branches of the food industry were notably weaker. As happened 
25. See above, pp. 18-199 n-19; p. 471 n, 22o 
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with all NRA rules which did not have overwhelming trade support, the 
restrictions on brokerage and allowances were simply ignored by many. 
7be NRA code authority itself admitted the problem for, ironically, the 
very USWGA convention which saw the first unwrapping of what became the 
Rcbinson-Patman bill, heard Armin Riley, the Divisional Administrator, 
confess the failures of enforcement and promise, in particular, that "early 
administrative action" would be taken to enforce the brokerage provisions 
as soon as Congress had decided to renew the life of the NRA. 
26 The 
Patman committee produced evidence of how the A&P had encouraged packers 
to ignore their codes and give it the customary brokerage commissions: 
A&P buyers threatened the too-scrupulous packer by warning that they 
would simply take their business elsewhere, and they also eased the way by 
agreeing to have brokerage concessions renamed as advertising allowances 
or quantity discounts so as to avoid detection. Although the A&P did 
lose sorse of its allowances under the NRA, it generally managed to maintain 
a good supply of the "gravy",, and there is no reason to suppose that other 
big buyers did not do the same. 
27 The findings of the Patman committee 
showed clearly enough the futility of the idea fostered by many moderate 
factions in the grocery trade at the end of the NRA that what was needed 
was a trade practice conference or some scheme of self-regulation. It was 
a natural and unalterable instinct of all buyers that they would get what 
they could from sellers, consistent with maintaining reliable supply, 
unless the law prevented them, and was enforced to prevent them. 
26. Modern'Merchant & Grocery_World, Septerber 219 1934; IntOrttate 
Grocer, September 29,1934; May 25,, 935. 
27. Patman Ctte. *Hearin , vol. 1. pp. 447-52; A&P headquarters allowances 
were $8.57 m. in 1932,7.7m in 1933, $6.59m in 1934 and $7.90m in 1935. 
Brokerage receipts of field buying offices fell off from a record high of 
$2.20m in 1933 to $1,23m in 1934, recovering to $1.75m in 1935. (Adelmang 
A& P- A Study in Price-Cost Behavior and'Public Policy, p. 225). 
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Large sections of the independent trade collected something by way 
of brokerage or allowances. The bill was so stringent that Tony wholesalers., 
even smaller wholesalers in the United States Wholesale Grocers' 
Association, stood to lose something. What the bill's sponsors promised 
was that the big corporate chains would lose much more, thus making the 
sacrifice amply worthwhile. Thus Patman urged that while "under the 
present system" voluntary chains were to be "commended and encoureged", 
they could not "continue to exist indefinitely" by getting minor versions 
of chain rebates. Patman thought that once the unaffiliated independents 
were "squeezed out", the corporate chains would "take over those 100,000 
voluntary units or destroy them! '. Likewise,, J. H. McLaurin denied that he 
had any animosity towards the voluntary chains, pointing out that some 
wholesalers in such groups were members of his own association, though 
admittedly not many. What the voluntaries brought by way of irproved 
merchandising, assistance to retailers and advertising was to be conmndeds 
he argued, but their allowances were "nothing" compared to what the 
corporate chains got. 
28 
This was not the view taken by the voluntary chains. The National 
Voluntary Groups Institute, which spoke for the overhead organisations 
of the elite voluntaries such as the ICA and the Red & White, was fiercely 
hostile to nearly every phase of the bill, but especially to the brokerage 
and advertising allowance pravisions. Equally, the National-American 
Wholesale Grocers' Association whose policies were heavily influenced by 
the voluntaries, and whose antagonism was sharpened by its bitter rivalry 
with the United States association, spared no effort to ridicule the bill 
as unconstitutional and disruptive. The lists of special discounts and 
allowances presented to the Patman committee certainly indicated that the 
28. HJC, 'Hearings pp. 119 43-459 391. 
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overhead organisations collected relatively small amounts of "gravy" when 
coTipared with what was ladled out by manufacturers to the big corporate 
chains. 
29 Howevers these figures were somewhat misleading. The 
affiliated wholesalers in the voluntaries therselves collected advertising 
allowances and quantity discounts,, and although no estimates were available 
as to the amount of these allowancess they were certainly more considerable 
than the equivalent surs collected by corporate chain branch offices and 
warehousesq voluntary chain buying being much more decentralised. 
Furthermore, special allowances played a more vital role in the running of 
voluntary chains. Nearly all the income of the headquarters operations of 
the Red & White Corp. and the IGA was derived from brokerage commissions, 
paid mainly on private brandsp and the Robinson-Patman bill proposed to 
do away with such commissions entirely. At the very least, the bill 
implied a total revamping of the methods of the voluntaries. In contrast, 
the corporate chains had existed for decades (and had achieved most of 
their growth) without brokerage commissions. Probably only the A&P 
among the corporate chains was as heavily committed to the collection of 
brokerage as a basic part of its operating method as were the big 
voluntaries. Executives of voluntaries and cooperatives were satisfied 
that they got most of the allowances extended to the corporate chainsg 
and they were certainly not anxious to bring about a condition of tight 
regulation by the FTC just because of the few things which they did not 
get. Over the past few years it had been the voluntary chain method , not 
the corporate chains, which had shown the strongest growth, and any 
29. In 1934, the A&P collected $8,105,000 in headquarters special 
discounts and allowancesg whereas the Independent Grocers Alliance, 
the leading voluntary, received only $6399736 through the Chicago 
overhead organisation. (Patman Ctte. 'Hearings 
'. 
vol. I. pp. 465-70; 
vol. IV, pp. 299-336). The figures for other corporate and cooperative 
chains showed a similar imbalance. 
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remaining discrimination in favour of the corporate chains seemed likely 
to be eroded by natural business evolution. Thus the bill not only divided 
chains against independents, it divided the smaller, unaffiliated wholesale 
grocers and retailers against the big voluntary chains. This division 
might well have become a factor of more importance than it did had it not 
been for the rather diffuse sense of identity of many of the grocers 
enrolled in the big voluntaries. Pulled one way by the economic logic 
expounded by the executives of the overhead headquarters they nevertheless 
felt an equally strong pull exerted by their contact with trede 
associations and other retailers and wholesalers. Most of these voluntary 
chain retailers in any case bought from a variety of sources, and were far 
from being coordinated cogs in great machines. Militant leaders like 
McLaurin and Schulte cultivated these self-determining independents with 
the argument that, in the long run, only the big Wall street chains would 
gain from a continued free for all. For this reason not much real rank- 
and-file opposition to the bill developed in the voluntaries and 
cooperatives. 
Estimates of the likely consequences of the bill for the corporate 
chains varied quite widely. J. H. McLaurin claimed that the success of 
the chains was "the result of the ability of these large purchasers to 
demand and receive... these concessions... that enable them to own the 
manufacturer's product at a net price which represents a difference of 
from 5 to 15 per cent".. a claim made also by Patman. It was similarly 
George Schulte's contention that the chains "must have rebates and 
30 
concessions to exist and without them they are doomed1t. At root, this 
assertion was ideological, rather than a judgement based on economic fact. 
Fundamentalists like McLaurin and Schulte, who were unreconciled to the 
30. HJC, Hearingss p. 30; Interogtate'Mdrchant, January 11,1936. 
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"legitimacy" of the chain store system, shared a deep and even unconscious 
reluctance to concede that much of the chains' success had arisen from 
nothing more sinister or "illegitimate" than good merchandising and 
advertising, and selling large volumes at modest margins, methods which 
were open to independents also$ especially when they acted cooperatively. 
Likewise, to Patman, the importance of "rebates" was not so much a question 
of arithmetic as an article of faith. To a Southern neopopulist,, saturated 
in the tradition that the great Northern monopolies had been fostered by 
biased freight rates and commercial conspiracy, it was only natural to 
suppose that the chains had grown in a similar way. While occasionally 
genuflecting to the notion - which underlay the "only due allowance" 
formula - that manufacturers were coerced by the chains into giving 
Itrebates"t Patman in his heart really seemed inclined to the view that 
there was a conspiracy between some of the manufacturers and the chains, 
presided over by Wall street, to destroy the independents altogether. 
Exactly why or how thousands of competing manufacturers could have 
systematically set out to deny the independents the prices to which they 
were entitled, was never explained by the Congressman. 31 
Chain store men themselves offered only the most impressionistic 
suggestions to the politicians as to what the bill would involve in 
terms of costs and prices. Their favourite estimate was that chain 
retail prices would rise by 10% or $750m, but as these were the figures 
they were fond of using in opposing chain taxes they clearly had no 
31. ror Patman's diverse utterances on this issue, see HJC. 'Hoarings 
pp. 7-ý80 129 1949 440. The Congressman was not exceptional in thiga 
respect, for independents had for years expressed themselves in 
contradictory fashion as to whether manufacturers were the victims 
or the instigators of "unfair rebates". 
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basis in any rational calculation. 
32 Indeed, chain store men often 
contradicted themselves. Thus Charles Adams, the treasurer of the 
First Nationhl Stores, on the one hand told the House Judiciary Committee 
that buying advantages were no longer of any relevance, and that what 
mattered was "the atmosphere of your store", yet on the other hand 
asserted that the bill would be the equivalent of an extra sales tax on 
food of from 8% to 15%. 
33 Ibis strain of self-contradiction ran through 
the testimony of most other chain store men. The bill was ruinous and 
would rob the consumer, they maintained, and yet it would backfire on 
its sponsors because the chains would make exclusive arrangements with 
manufacturers, thus putting themselves beyond the reach of the law, or 
32. New York'TimeSs March 239 April 59 1936. Numerous leading chains 
were required by the Patman committee to submit their "preferred lists" 
of special discounts and allowancesq and these lists were cited by some 
as evidence that chain buying advantages were actually rather insignificant. 
In fact, these lists were no proper guide to chain advantages or to the 
likely inpact of the Robinson-Patman bill. In general, they comprised 
only specific allowances arranged with manufacturers of national brands 
by chains' headquarters buying offices. Omitted were details of private 
brands, quantity discounts shown on the face of invoices and allowances 
or free goods obtained by warehouses or store managers from local or 
national manufacturers. Chain store buying strength was exerted at every 
levels every day, and was not reducible to the dimensions of the Patman 
committee lists. Chain store men themselves had no definite idea of 
what their aggregate buying advantage might be. An A&P buyer from 
headquarters, for instance., told the Patman committee that headquarters 
knew nothing about the deductions made on the face of the invoice for the 
local buyers. (Hearings, vol. Is p. 442). Likewise, A. H. Morrill of 
Kroger explained that he could not te" to what extent his company's 
representatives were able to make favourable deals at the local level: 
"They make a deal right there. The deal goes into the cost of the goods. 
It does not even appear on the books". (Hearings, vol. III., p. 14). 
Since no man in a sprawling company with hund ds of points of purchase, 
making thousands of transactions daily, could estimate the extent of the 
aggregate reduction from some notional "standard" price, it was obviously 
impossible to assess the relative advantage over any other buyer, whose 
arrangements were private. There was, of course, a certain security in 
this for the chains, for it implied the existence of plentiful opportunities 
to escape the provisions of even the tightest law on the greater nurber 
of their transactions. 
33. HJC, Hearings3, pp. 96-1059 "4. 
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would insist on receiving "due allowance" discounts which had previously 
gone unclaimed. Even raking "due allowance" for a large element of 
hyperbole and evasion, chain store men were clearly genuinely uncertain 
as to the potential menace of the bill. Even supposing it could be 
enacted in its full vigourg which few seriously expected, many questions 
remained. How would the FTC and the courts define allowable costs? What 
would be the standard for quantity limits? Would the brokerage clause be 
held constitutional? Would the FTC be equally as severe in curbing 
unjustified allowances to independent wholesalers and voluntary chains? 
How would manufacturers apply the classification clause? As the history 
of the old Section 2 had shown, there was many a slip between putting a 
law on the statute books and giving it a practical everyday vitality and 
meaning. 
vii. The Victory'of'the "'Ishmaelites". 
Despite the political impetus lent to it by the activities of the 
Patman committee$ sore of the opponents of the Robinson-Patman bill proved 
obstinately reluctant to accept that it had a real chance of enactment. 
What was the United States Wholesale Grocers' Association after all, they 
reasoneds but an assortment of Southern rebels who seemed to have set 
themselves the futile task of trying to turn the clock back on modern 
methods of distribution? And who was Wright Patman but'a Southern rebel- 
rouser, scarcely the sort of man the Congress would allow to prescribe 
for the regulation of business? To Edgar Watkins, the counsel of the 
National-American Wholesale Grocers' Association, those responsible for 
the bill were just disruptive "pests". "economic Ishmaelites incapable 
of a social attitude" whose wild demands were holding back the chances 
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for harmnious trade advancement. 
I In February,, 1936, O. M. Kile,, the 
Washington representative of the Mail Order Association, could lament 
to the House Judiciary Committee that "We proceeded on the assumption, 
for quite a while, that, naturally, in the course of your deliberations, 
you would see that you could not set up an ironclad strait jacket for 
business... " only at this late stage was he finally convinced that 
there was a "serious intent" in Congress. 
2 
The truth was that the prescription for the regulation of business 
was no longer being written merely by those with economic muscle: 
political strength had become a factor in the equation, and it was the 
fleconomic Ishmaelites" who had the political strength. With the price 
discrimination issue under the glare of Congressional scrutinyg it was 
not possible for the "big boys" to cobble together something behind the 
scenes$ as had so often happened in the days of the trade practice 
conferences and the NRA codes, so as to keep the "Ishmelites" quiet 
while leaving things fundamentally unchanged. In an attempt to restore 
the status quo$ and to keep political demagoguery out of business, NAWGA 
and AGMAO in the autumn of 1935s floated a "National Food and Grocery 
Conference Committee". and this attracted the cooperation of the FGCSA, 
the voluntary chains' association, the CFDA and the conservative officers 
of the NARG. The idea was to find a way out by producing a compromise 
legislative package upon which they could unite, thus isolating USWGA and 
the NFBA. 3 However, in the super-charged atnospherejý the committee was 
not allowed the peace and quiet it needed to bring its deliberations to 
1. Wholesale Grocer'News, NoveTfber 1935; 'Genesis, chap. 16, v. 11-12. 
2. HJC, Hearings p. 384. 
3, Interstate'Grocer,, October 5,1935. 
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fruition. With Patman leading the ways the tone of trade politics 
became noticeably more acerbic, Patman accused NAWGA's officers of 
being subsidised financially by the FGCSA, styling them "innocent-looking 
turncoats for Wall street". In response, NAWGA's officers bitterly 
satirised Patman's pretensions to speak with authority upon the problems 
of the independent grocers and warned of the "cruel disillusionment" and 
"internal strife" that would be the only result of heeding his siren 
call. 
4 The NAWGA officers right well have expected, as the representatives 
of the larger of the two national wholesale grocery associations, to have 
enjoyed some considerable influence upon Congress in its consideration of 
a bill advanced as being in the interests of the independent grocery trade; 
actually, with Patman dominating the situation, they were expelled to the 
fringes of the debate. The "preferred lists" of discounts made public by 
the Patman committee likewise weakened the position of AGMAq for most of 
its leading menbers featured prominently in these lists, making it rather 
difficult for AGMA to adopt its traditional posture of patriarchal 
disinterestedness in the feuds between the distributors. 
As the Robinson-Patman bill gained political momentums serious splits 
began to appear in the ranks of the Conference Committee. Although the 
NARG was represented on it, and some of its officers clearly yearned to 
be back under the protective wing of NAWGA and AGMA9 a 1935 convention 
resolution favouring the Patman bill,, and rank-and-file pressure,, made it 
impossible for the officers to do inore than sit in as observers. Some 
of the rank and file of NAWGA, less preoccupied than the officers with the 
4. Inter8tzite'Mdrchant, Harch 21,1936; ' Vh6ldddld 'Gtc5cdr'Newsq December 
1935. Patman's bI ribery charges were, based on nothing nore substantial 
than the fact that the FGCSA took the NAWGA. legislative news service, at 
$10500 per annum, and letters taken from John Logan's files which revealed 
him in a friendly correspondence with NAWGA Secretary, M. L. Toulme. The 
letters actually showed that while Toulre was personally opposed to chain 
taxation, he was unwi" ing to deviate from the official NAWGA line of 
neutrality on the subject, some of the associationts menbership actively 
supporting such taxes. See WC. 'Hdatirigs, pp. 231-4. 
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feud with EcLaurin's association, were anxious that a golden opportunity 
to secure remedial legislation should not be wasted; the officers were 
also put in a difficult position when both House and Senate Judiciary 
committees rejected their contention that the key provisions of the 
Robinson-Patman bill were unconstitutional, for it was this argument 
which they had used to avoid coming straight out for or against the 
substance of parts of the bill, such as the brokerage clause, upon which 
their reirbership was divided against itself. Even some of the grocery 
manufacturers were less than keen to frustrate altogether a bill which, 
if appropriately amended, might enable them to exercise the whip hand over 
their customers. 
5 Potentially, the Conference Committee approach was the 
most dangerous to the billts prospectss for it offered the prospect of 
a moderate alternative. In reality, it proved a total failure. Its 
members played a leading role in the initial opposition to the bill 
(except the NARG), but they-gradually fell into disarray, and such 
amendments as were eventually made of which they could approve were not 
readily identifiable as the fruits of their labour. Ultimatelys the crDA 
agreed to back the Rcbinson-Patman billq even though the much disliked 
brokerage clause had not been shed, and AGMA toned down its opposition 
as its merbers prepared to meet a new and uncertain era. 
The involvement of the rGCSA on the Conference Committee was an 
indication of just how well aware were grocery chain executives of the 
need to act as "insiders". cultivating the more moderate factions among 
5. Paul rishback, NFBA Secretarys claimed that many manufacturers 
favoured the bill but did not dare to, say so openly because of the fear 
of "reprisals" by their customers: they hado he stated, "asked us to 
carry the fight for them because they dared not "stick their necks out". 
(HJC, 'Hdatitgs, p. 65). Hanufacturers had, of course, little to lose 
from the "only due allowance" and brokerage provisions, but they were 
much opposed to any extension of FTC control over their practices. 
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the independents. The associations representing other types of chains, 
which had in the past not suffered so badly as the grocery chains from 
anti-chain attacks, showed a less realistic sense of political occasion 
and proved unwilling to concede that there was any need for a change in 
the existing law. Naturally, this made it difficult for them to influence 
Congressmen, who mostly thought that something had to be done and wished 
only to know precisely what that something should be. It also gave them 
no leverage, for they had nothing on show to tempt those leaders of 
independent trade associations who were unhappy with the Rcbinson-Patman 
bill, which had rather been foisted on them by an odd series of political 
events. With the ARr effectively destroyed, and with the chains not 
prepared to go half-way, most trade association executives who were not 
whole-heartedly in favour of the Robinson-Patman bill simply remained 
silent. The chains found themselves very much alone in Washington. They 
were$ declared Senator Marvel H. Logan of Kentucky, who steered the bill 
on the Senate floor, "the most powerful lobby... I ever knew". 
6 Active 
they may have been, but powerful they no longer were. The doings of the 
Patman committee, the discontent in the country, the fact that it was 
election yearg all worked against the chains. When at last they accepted 
that another strategy was needed, they threw themselves with ill-prepared 
suddenness behind a weaker alternative bill offered by Senators Borah and 
Van Nuys. By this tactic, the non-grocery chains did succeed in uniting 
their forces with the Grocery Conference Committee opponents of Robinson- 
Patman, and in stirring up a certain amount of farm and consumer sympathy 
for their cause. The tactic failed, howeverg because Borah and Van Nuys 
were not prepared to be lured into acting as "front men" to a scheme to 
sink Robinson-Patman. 
6. NeWl6rklites,, February 16,1936. 
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The active campaign in Congress for the Robinson-Patman bill was 
relatively short lived, especially when the complexity and importance 
of the measure are considered. The ball started to roll when the Senate 
Judiciary Committee reported favourably on February 3; on April 36 the 
Senate passed a heavily amended version, without a record vote; on May 
28 the House approved a largely intact version by the margin of 290 votes 
to 16; both Houses then quickly passed a revised final version worked 
out by conference,, and the bill was on Roosevelt's desk for signing on 
June 19. The final version was in some respects weaker than the original 
bill, but it did nonetheless represent a stunning political triumph for 
those so recently disparaged as "Ishmaelites". What is more, the 
weaknesses of the final version were due more to the oversights and 
tactical compromises which inevitably occurred in the course of a highly- 
pressured and rapid legislative passage than they were to & conscious 
repudiation by Congress of any of the bill's anti-chain content. Few 
independents - whether rank-and-file or association executives - had much 
grasp of the detail of the bill, either from the legal or economic point 
of view, and much of the contemporary trade discussion was muddled or 
mistaken. So many self-serving "interpretations" of the bill were in 
currency simultaneously that the trade had every reason to feel confused. 
What the bill's supporters knew was that they supported the Robinson- 
Patman bill,, and they supported it because it was known as an anti-chain 
store bill and it cam from an authentically anti-chain source. For this 
reason, such weakening amendments as were made to the bill did not greatly 
impinge on the awareness of independents, and they did not feel that they 
had suffered any reverse. The unequivocal conclusion drawn from the 
enactment of the Robinson-Patman law was that Congress was IIfoVI the 
independents and "against" the chains. 
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The legislative campaign was the first occasion on which any large 
nunber of independent-nerchants in different lines had corbined their 
resources to demand federal action against the chains. The pressure 
exerted far exceeded anything ever produced on behalf of the Capper-Kelly 
bill. The USWGA received the active support of many wholesale and retail 
associations, notably the big national associations of retail grocers, 
meat dealers, druggists and hardwaremen. Plenty of support also came 
from the "boys back home". By this tire, practically all Congressmen were 
covered by the NARD's "contact committees" of independent businessmen who 
relied on establishing personal contact with the legislators when they 
were in their home districts. This was a grass-roots lobbying network 
which made the chains' lobbying methods seem positively inflexible and 
naive. While Congress was in session, trade associations funnelled a 
good supply of petitions and resolutions to Washington to keep up the 
pressure, 
Trade support for the bill found expression in an "Independents' Day" 
rally in Washington on March 4. just as the vital push was getting under 
way in Congress. rifteen hundred wholesalers, brokers and retailers 
assembled in Constitution Hall, where they heard speeches by Senators 
Borah, Robinson, and Tydings and by Congressmen Patman and Boileau., The 
speakers well represented the political appeal of the bill, for they 
covered a spectrum of opinion almost as wide as that found in Congress 
as a whole, ranging from, the implacably anti-New Deal toryism of Millard 
Tydings to the Wisconsin Progressivism of Boileaug the latter being, as 
the New'York Tires commented, "loudly applauded for his attack on 'business' 
7 in general and chain stores in particular". A gathering of 1500 merchants 
hardly represented the news sensation of the day - especially as the 
Ibid., March S. 1936. 
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newspaperss generally hostile to the bill, gave only modest coverage - 
but the independents nevertheless made their presence felt where it, 
counted, breaking up into groups to meetthe Senators and Congressmen 
from their home states. A party of twenty, headed by J. A. 0. Preus, the 
public relations counsel of the NARD and a former Governor of Minnesota - 
one of a remarkable trio of anti-chain Minnesota Governors 
8_ 
also visited 
the White House, emerging in a satisfied mod. A hostile Business Week 
magazine declared that "Whatever the President said to the delegates who 
visited him, he is not personally interested in this legislation and it 
will have to progress under its own steam". 
9 However, the bill's 
supporters did not require active Presidential involvement, only the 
appearance of benign neutrality. Roosevelt was reported to have told the 
delegation that with Senator Robinson, the majority leader, having 
attached his name to the bill, they had no need of further assistance. 
10, 
It was a correct assessment, the bill rapidly raking progress. Business 
Week was soon reduced to a petulant complaint that "the delegates had 
obviously done some good spade-work somewhere - probably in Jim rarleyts 
office". claiming that "dark hints of campaign contributions and guarantees 
to rally votes at the polls are being passed around the trade". In fact, 
the bill enjoyed broad bi-partisan support, and was never an administration 
measure in any strict sense. Roosevelt himself seem to have known'little 
8. Preus was Republican Governor, 1921-2 . 
5; Theodore Christianson, 
Republicano was Governor 1925-31, U. S. Congressman 1933-37 and then 
in quick succession, NARG Secretary-Manager, NARD public relations counsel 
and president of the Freedom of Opportunity roundationt a group associated 
with Patman; rloyd Olson, rarmer-Labor Governor 1931-6,, enacted a heavy 
chain tax and was widely known as a friend of the independent merchants. 
9. Business Week, March 7., 19369 p. 9. 
10. Interstate Merchant, March 21,1936. 
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about the bill and was perhaps in the same position as many of the 
Democrat Senators: he took it on trust, because such a reliable middle- 
of-the-road party wheelhorse as Joe Robinson was sponsoring it. 
11 
The bill was strongly backed by all the anti-chain militants who in 
the past had so often found theTnselves at loggerheads with the staid 
national trade associations. George Schulte's advice to his readers was 
that "We have come to the crossroads.... if the chains defeat this bill 
through lack of action on the part of independentsq the latter will have 
to take the road to the left while the chains will go to the right ... The 
opportunity is here; seize it now and crush the chains as they would 
crush you if they got the chance". Schulte's response to the creation of 
the American Retail Federation had been to set in motion plans for a 
counter-organisation, to unite a" independent businesso and early in 
1936 this took form under the name of "Independence, Inc. " While Schulte's 
arbition for the new organisation was boundless - he hoped it would come 
to rival the American Farm Bureau Federation and the American Federation 
of Labor - its initial purpose was to campaign for the Robinson-Patman 
bill. 12 
The inaugural convention of Independence, Inc.,, held in St. Louis on 
March 1, was the greatest gathering of anti-chain forces ever assembled. 
At least two thousand attended, these coming from all over the Midwest 
and representing 80 lines of business. 
13 The character of the convention 
demonstrated the huge advances made since the Shreveport meeting of 
Henderson's Merchant Minute Men in 1930, the only precedent. Henderson's 
11. Business Week, March 21,1936s p. 9. See Roosevelt's letter to 
Robi? G-in-, May 4, in F. D. R. His Personal'Letterg-, 
-1928-45 . 
ed. Elliott 
Roosevelt, N. Y. 1970 reprinting, pp. 586-7. Farley was, of course, 
Democratic National Chairman. 
12. Interstate Merchants February 15, March 21,1936. The change of 
name from'Interstate Grocer to'Inter8tate Merchant was intended to 
syrbolise this attempt to unite all independents. 
13. St. Louis Post-Dispatch., March 2,1936. 
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convention had proved to be little more than an anti-chain revival 
meeting because there were then no definite political objectives. This 
time, the anti-chain forces were meting to lend their weight to a bill 
which was already making good progress on Capitol Hill. Furthermore, 
with the emergence of Patron the future seemed to promise a series of 
major engagements which the independents had every chance of winning. 
Patron told the convention that his present bill would be only the first 
step, and that he planned to introduce a bill to divorce manufacturing 
from retailing so as to knock out a tier from the vertically-integrated 
chains. More promisingly still, his references to the prohibition of 
chain banking contained in the constitution of Texas gave a clear hint 
of Patron's ultimate, though as yet undefined and tentatives plans for 
the final solution of the chain store problem. Similarlyq many of those 
present at the convention could point to their own huge contributions to 
the mounting difficulties of the chains, such as John Cunninghams at whose 
promptin& Senator Brookhart had introduced the resolution which ultimately 
led to the'rinal Report, and the large delegations representing groups 
such as the Iowa Independent Businessmen's Association and the Colorado 
Civic Association. These were battle-scarred veterans of the cause. 
14 
The highlight of the convention was an address by Father Charles E. 
Coughlin, speaking over a relay from Detroit as part of his regular Sunday 
radio sermon which was carried by radio stations over much of the country. 
In his address, Coughlin invited his millions of listeners to "come with 
me in spirit" to St. Louis where were asserrbled "brave Americans gifted 
with the fortitude to organize and fight to the death, if necessary, against 
monopolistic tendencies" which were dragging the country towards communism. 
14. Interstate Merchant, March 7,1936. 
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Coughlin explained that the success of the chain stores was "largely 
predicated upon the secret rebates by manufacturers and upon the long 
hours of their employees" ands outlining the Robinson-Patran bill, 
declared that his army of followers in the National Union for Social 
Justice was "vitally interested" in the work of Independence,, Inc. 
Coughlin warned that "the day of destruction is at hand for the independent 
merchant, unless farmer and laborerl veteran of the World War and 
professional man cooperate to save America and its independent merchants 
frx)m being swallowed by the Wall street of monopoly". 
is 
Schulte had gone to considerable trouble to secure Coughlin's 
endorsements negotiations for him to speak having been carried on for 
months. rew any longer believed that Coughlin was a spokesman for* Or 
influence upons President Roosevelt: two years of blowing hot and cold 
about the New Deal had put paid to that popular delusion of 1933.16 But 
all sensible politicians took some account of what Coughlin was saying. 
15. New'York Times_, March 2,1936; Interstate Merchant, March 7,1936. 
16. Schulte . who was an unwaivering supporter of Roosevelt, clearly still 
thought of Coughlin as basically pro-New Deal. C. J. Tull suggests that 
Coughlin's "open, irrevocable break" with the administration came on 
November 17,1935, when he told his radio audience that the principles of 
the New Deal and of Social Justice were "unalterably opposed". Yetq two 
weeks later, Coughlin declared that he wished only to "perfect" the New 
Deal a statement attributed by Tull to an "extremely confused state of 
mind" and on January 8,1936, he visited the White House for a lengthy 
private conversation with the President. Coughlin was also insistent at 
this time that the NUSJ was a I'lobbyll., not an incipient third party. The 
bills actively supported by Coughlin in 1935 - the rrazier-Lemke farm 
mortgage bill, the Wagner Labor Relations bill, the Wheeler holding 
company "death sentence", the Nye Munitions bills the Patman bonus and 
the Nye-Sweeney bill to restore to Congress the sole right to coin money - 
were the staples of the prograrmne of Midwestern progressivism. Whether 
or not Coughlin's later careers when he was regarded by many as America's 
No. 1 anti-Semite, fascist and friend of the dictators, represented a 
natural progression from his earlier career or was totally discontinuous 
to it, is too complex a question to answer here. The point is that, 
whatever continuities may be found in retrospect, Coughlin's predominant 
inage among the American people in early 1936 was not that of a Hitler in 
clerical garb but that of the popular conscience of the New Deal. This 
image collapsed suddenly in the summr of 1936 when Coughlin turmed 
violently against Roosevelt$ and pushed forward William Lemke as a third 
party Presidential candidate. (See, Charles J. Tulls FatheP'Coughlin and 
the New Deals Syracuseq 19659 pp. 939 102-5). 
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About one-third of the American people "listened regularly" to the 
priest's broadcasts in 1936, and his National Union for Social Justice, 
which claimed several million adherents,, prcbably actually had as many 
as one million menbers. Furthermoreq much of Coughlin's following was 
found in those states where the anti-chain movement had never put down 
very healthy roots. There were 8,945 units of the National Union in 
January, 1936 in New York alone, and New England and the industrial areas 
of the Midwest were other Coughlin strongholds. In Coughlin, Schulte 
saw the means to spread the anti-chain message to the whole American 
people. 
17 
Coughlin had never previously committed himself on the chain store 
issue, despite many impassioned appeals from independent merchants that 
he should. 
18 Perhaps the cautious priest had feared to become identified 
with any movement that might be seen as likely to raise the price of food 
to the poor. Presumably the dramatic anti-chain triumphs of 1935 had ' 
shown him that the independent merchants were now a force to be harnessed. 
19 
Coughlin's address to the convention of Independence,, Inc. itself evoked 
some favourable comment among his sympathisers, and his newly-founded 
newspaper, Social Justice, which first appeared on March 13,1936, then 
17. Gary T. Marx,, The Social Basis of the Support of a Depression Era 
Extremist: Pather Coupblin (unpublished M. A. thesis% Univ. Of Californiap 
Berkeley,, 1962). p. 57; David H. Bennetts Demagogues in the Depression: 
American Radicals and the Union Party, 1932-6,, New Brunswicko N. J., 1969, 
pp. 71-2; New York TimesI, January 6.1936. 
18. But he had made occasional critical references to the chains, which 
had troubled John Logan. See Patman Ctte. Hearings, vol. II,, pp. 46-47. 
19. Unfortunately,, none of Coughlin's biographers has mentioned his 
anti-chain connection. 
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followed up with anti-chain cartoons and features. 
20 BiA despite this 
support, it cannot be said that Coughlin threw all his energies into the 
Congressional battle for Robinson-Patman. His current obsession was the 
Frazier-Lenke bill to refinance farm mortgages. Had the priest identified 
more strongly with the Robinson-Patman bill instead, he might not have 
experienced that catastrophic disillusion with Congress and the 
administration which resulted from the defeat of the rrazier-Lemke bill, 
and he would not have been able to drag his followers into the third party 
fiasco of the summer of 1936 on the pretext that the existing state of 
affairs on Capitol Hill and in the White House was ruinous to the common 
man. President Roosevelt signed the Robinson-Patman bill into law on 
June 199 the very day on which Coughlin announced to a nationwide radio 
audience that he was backing William Lemke as his third party candidate 
for the Presidency. The priest had pledged his National Union to back the 
Robinson-Patran bill and had declared its solidarity with the independent 
merchants; yet no recognition was given by his newspaper to Roosevelt's 
signing of the bill or the fact that, on this issue, Congress had indeed 
sided with the "common man 
21 
20. Social Justice, March 27, April 179 1936. The Pittsbxltgh_'Catholic 
commented on Coughlin's broadcast that 11 ... it will 
ji7b-ably never be known 
how extensive was the harm done when the chain stores taught the public to 
disregard neighborliness, even friendship, to save an apparent few pennies 
... Who shall say how much of our present social and economic disorder can be traced to this victory of ruthless greed over the decent instinctso the 
common sense, the native shrewdness of the American people?... Social 
justice and chain ethics cannot be reconciled". (Pittsburgh'Catholic, 
March 5,1936). A Jesuit priest in Ohio was inspired - he issue of 
The Interstate Merchant containing Father Coughlin's speech to Hilaire 
Belloco also reco;;;, ending to Schulte that he read Belloc's book The Servile 
State. 
21. Coughlin told his followers (Social Justices May 29,1936) that "With 
the defeat of the rrazier-Leukce bilf-the last straw has fallen upon our 
weakened backs. The last hope for financial reform under the New Deal has 
vanished". He claimed that those Congressmen who had voted for the bill 
had been left "in the wilderness". The third party bid destroyed the 
priest's relationship with Schulte and Patmanp both of whom were strongly 
pro-Roosevelt, thus abruptly ending the prospect of an exciting triple 
alliance. Schulte's newspaper did not, in fact, so much as mention the 
Lemke candidacy. 
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There was much talk in the early months of 1936 that the future of 
American democrecy was in the hands of just such "little fellows" as the 
independent merchants. Extreme new doctrines of discontent flourished, 
their exponents seeking to lure the "little fellows" away from the old 
Democracy and Republicanism. Even the communist'New Masses was 
solicitous for the fate of the independent small storekeepers,, "shoved 
ruthlessly to the wall by ... the alarming growth of chain stores in every 
field". The'New'Masses called on the storekeepers to abandon their 
11exceptionalist illusions" and to unite in a "massive People's Front", 
warning that the "petty-bourgeois groups are caught between the anvil of 
reaction and the ham)er of revolution. Either way they are confronted by 
one supreme challenge: the challenge to organize ... The middle classes 
cannot organize independently for a "third world". Eventuallys they must 
throw their strength and allegiance 6n one or other side of the balance". 
22 
This was not just the view from Moscow. Many Congressmen worried about 
the boarded-up stores in their home districts and wondered what might 
happen if they tid not act to cement the social order upon which the 
nation's political institutions had been erected. Congressman John Martin 
of Colorado, a strong supporter of the Patman bill, reminded the-House of 
"the model town of Pullman, built and owned by one man. It had everything 
but liberty. It resulted in an explosion which shook the country -for a 
season. There is a question how much interest a ran has in a community in 
1123 which he owns nothing. .. Hatton Summers, a Texas Democrat who chaired 
the House Judiciary Committee's hearings on the Patman bill, sonbrely 
observed that the bill 
22. New'Masges, February 119 1936. 
23. Con&MssioncLl Record, vol. 80, p. 8132. 
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"in my hurible opinion, is in the interest of private property. 
In days gone by private property was secure behind the line of defense held by smaller men in business and industry. Whenever 
there was a red agitationg these little fellows gathered about 
them their schoolmates, their friends, and their kin folk 
established the line of defense... But under this drift the 
numbers of those defenders of private property is continuing 
to be reduced... Human beings do not fight for a boarding house 
as they fight for their firesides... We have been going along 
here dreaming that conditions which obtain in other sections of 
the world and in other ages of the world have by some mysterious 
sort of process been excluded from us. That is a foolish dream. 
It may prove to be a fatal dreaql. 24 
When corpared to such wild and disruptive ideas as the Share-ther 
Wealth scheme of the followers of the late Huey Long or the Townsend 
"revolving money" pensions plan, the Robinson-Patman bill could seem a 
very modest sort of proposal. There was something reassuringly traditional 
about the idea that the calamities of the tire might be met through an 
amendment to the antitrust laws. Whatever might be said about the 
Robinson-Patman bill, it had no taint of alien doctrine. Even those who 
had bitterly attacked the KRA as the road to dictatorship could not so 
convincintly raise this complaint against the bill, for although its' 
provisions were to some extent modelled on the NRA grocery, codess the- 
enforcement of the act was not left to theory-testing brain trusters but 
was placed in the hands of private litigants and'the FTC9 subject to the 
courts. What is more$ Congress itself was saying exactly what should go 
into this new "code". not some uncontrolled, Presidentially-appointed code 
authority. The westerm Progressives who had been so critical of the KRA 
were all very much in favour of this way of acting through alterations in 
the antitrust laws. Although much was heard-from big business to the 
effect that the FTC would become the new KRA if the bill were enacted,, 
this view was accorded little respect in Congress. Equally, Congressional 
24. Ibid. 0 p. 8109. 
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debate reveals no sense that the legislators in any way thought of the 
bill's supporters as "Ishmaelites"; on the contrary, they accepted them 
as the true representatives of the nation's backbone of Main street small 
businessmen. 
The bill's opponents placed their main hopes of salvation in the 
Senate rather than the House. A poll of Senators in the summer of 1935 
suggested that 26 were opposed to the Robinson bills including most of the 
leading conservatives; a story in early March, 1936 claimed that only 30 
Senators favoured the bills though a majority were said to be in favour of 
some sort of legislation. 
25 However, when the issue was put to the tests 
the predicted opposition failed to take shape. A number of Senators tried 
to weaken the bill by amendment or secure special exemptions for certain 
of their constituents such as automobile manufacturers and extractive 
industries, but only Warren Austins a Vermont Republicans could be said to 
have made a full-scale attack on the bill as a whole from the Senate floor. 
A highly favourable report from the Senate Judiciary Committees and the 
fact that the ITC, acting in response to a Senate resolutions had itself 
recommended legislation, helped to ease the bill's progress. Even more 
inportantly, Senator Robinson's sponsorship of the measure gave it an aura 
of respectability and eased many doubts. Several influential conservative 
Southern Democrats were initially reported as inclined to oppose the bi" , 
but they deferred to the majority leader when the time cam to make up 
their minds. 
The biggest threat to the Robinson bill came when its opponents, 
acting as of one mind, abruptly declared themselves in favour of an 
25. Interstate Grocers August 31,1935; Busipess'Wdeks March 7.19369 
PO 9. 
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alternative bill introduced by Senators Borah of Idaho and Van Nuys 
26 
of Indiana. In part, they were =tivated'by the consideration that 
this alternative bill was not, according to general understanding, anything 
like as restrictive. Taken almost word for word from a recent Canadian 
statute, it seemed to be riddled with loopholes, even though, being a 
criminal measure, it contained somewhat alarming references-to large fines 
and jail sentences for violators. In particular, while it prohibited a 
seller from granting different prices to different purchasers of like 
quantities, it did not require a "due allowance" limitation to be placed 
on differentials extended in respect of differing quantities. It also 
lacked a brokerage clause,, any type of quantity limit for maximum discountso 
or provision for the FTC to assist in its enforcement. Only in its 
prohibition against the making of sales at "unreasonably low prices" to 
destroy competition or eliminate a competitor did it propose anything of 
substance which was not found in the Robinson-Patman bill, and it was in 
any case the custom of chain store men to deny strenuously that they ever 
engaged in such competitor-destroying price cutting. 
The principal reason for the tide of support for the Borah-Van Nuys 
bill wass however, not this weakness of its provisions, but the opportunity 
it provided to create political confusion and to try to hold up the 
Robinson bill's progress. There was always the possibility that'if action 
could be deferred for the sessions changing political and economic 
conditions might prevent any bill being, enacted at all. With this 
optimistic thought in mind, at Senate hearings in late March nearly all 
those who had previously been active in opposition to the Rcbinson-Patman 
26. S. 41719 74th Cong., 2nd Sess., Introduced February 24,1936. This 
bill was never offered in the House. 
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bill, including the officers of the Limited Price Variety Stores' 
Association, the Mail-Order Associations and all the organisations 
represented on the National rood and Grocery Conference Committee, except 
the NARG, announced their support for the Borah-Van Nuys alternative. Only 
the NRDGA, whose counsel Irving rox could not bring himself to express 
approval for a bill which imposed criminal penalties on the perpetrators 
of price discrimination, remained incorrigibly opposed to any legislation. 
27 
Representatives of the chain store interests eagerly portrayed the Borah- 
Van Nuys bill as being "legislation in keeping with the system on which we 
have built". and flattered Borah and Van Nuys for their moderation and 
intelligence. 28 
This ploy fell flat,, because Borah and Van Nuys were unwilling to 
assist it. At the hearingst Borah revealed himself as increasingly 
unhappy at every plaudit which came his way from the chain store men; he 
had offered the bill in good faith, sincerely believing it to be just as 
valuable to the small independents as the Robinson bills not least because 
it excluded the discretionary element vested in the FTC by the Robinson 
bill. Borah had no confidence in the FTC's willingness or capacity to 
enforce an anti-discrimination statute$ and he wanted the whole subject 
brought within the provisions of the criminal law. Anxious that his bill 
should not be used as a chain store stalking-horse, Borah subsequently 
readily agreed, as did Van Nuyss, to a suggestion by Senator Robinson that 
it could be added to the Robinson bill as an amendment. Borah agreed 
that there would be no "incongruity" in tacking his criminal bill onto 
27. Fox observed sarcastically that "The Emperor Diocletian, in about 
300 B. C. (sic) issued a. proclamation against price discrimination, but 
he knew a way to Tmke the punishment fit the crime - any violator was 
promptly executed - but we all know what happened to Rome". (SJC 
Hearings, p. 61). 
28. SJC. Hearipgs 9 p. 22. 
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the civil measure, because "there are certain practices so obviously 
improper and unjust that they ought to be prohibited by specific provision 
of law,, and that indulging in them ought to constitute a crime. There are 
things like the granting of quantity discounts which are difficult to 
cover by a specific provision of law and Tmke the violation punishable.. *" 
29 
On this theory, the Senate passed a garbled version of the Robinson bill,, 
laden down with some incongruous special interest amendments and the 
Borah-Van Nuys bill, in the hope that the difficulties would be tidied up 
by Confer-ence with the House. The Conference Committee ultimately, as 
must have been expected, got rid of the special interest amendments, but 
kept in the Borah-Van Nuys amendmentq apparently on the principle that it 
could do no harm to the rest of the bill, and might do some good in its 
own right, if only through the deterrent effect of criminal prosecutions. 
30 
The Robinson-Patman law incorporatedg unaltered, the text of the Borah- 
Van Nuys bill. 7bus the only consequence of the major ploy to sink the 
Robinson bill was that its opponents were obliged to accept two anti- 
discrimination laws, fused together, where there might otherwise have been 
only one. 
The Senate gave a rather casual consideration to the Robinson-Patman 
bill. In contrast, and contrary to expectations, the House gave it a 
rather more critical scrutiny, passing its version of the bill (which was 
rather close to the original bill) some weeks later and after more debate. 
7he bill was steered by an 85 man caucus, with John A. Martin of Colorado 
as secretary and Patman himself acting as chairman. Although we" 
organised, and representative of both parties, the caucus demonstrated a 
29. Cmigtegsiorial*Red6rd, vol. 80, pp. 6276-71ý 62849 6346-9. 
30. H. R. Rept. No. ' *2951,74th Cong. , 2nd Sess. , p. B. 
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pronounced geographical irbalances only five of its menbers coming from 
the heavily populated Northeasterm states. 
31 Active opposition showed a 
similar geographical irbalance, most of it coming from three New York 
Democrats, a fact of which the bill's supporters did not hesitate to make 
use when suggesting that Wall street interests might be prompting their 
opponents. Emanuel Caller, the leader of this opposition, kept up a 
continuous attack on the bill, describing it as an attempt to revive the 
worst of the NRA price-fixing without any compensatory protection for 
labour or consumers and as likely to create "derangement of business" at 
a tire when the country was just beginning to recover from depression. 
He forecast that the attempt to enforce the-unenforceable - the Sears, 
Roebuck catalogue alone, he noted. contained 48,000 items, the costs of 
manufacture, sale and delivery for which would have to be laboriously 
investigated - would mean that "informers would abound everywhere" and 
that "thousands of experts" would have to be taken on by the rTC, which 
would degenerate into a "tyrant over industry, a price-fixing tyranny". 
Caller maintained that the bill was nothing but an atterpt to "make equals 
of unequals" by preserving inefficiency and throttling competition. 
32 
Many of the points made by Cellar were worthy of consideration. It 
was not, however, the content of his arguments but the contrast with his 
past record which provoked the most trade comment. in 19329 Celler had 
introduced the first chain tax bill to come before the House, and since 
then had represented the National Association of Retail Meat Dealers as 
their attorney in drawing up the NRA codes which he now so vigorously 
condenned. ror the tire being, Celler was able to protect himself against 
31. Congres8ioiIal'Rdc6rd, vol. 80, p. 5714. 
32.. Ibid.. s pp. 5976-89 6364-79' 8107-99 8116-21; ''H. R. ' Ropt. -Noo'22870 74th Uong., 2nd Sess., Part II. (Minority Report). 
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trade criticism with his record, and indeed argued that his basic 
33 
attitude towards the chains had not changed. In fact, his assaults on 
Robinson-Patman marked a watershed. Henceforth, Celler would be the 
most active Congressional opponent of the independents' prograrm , making 
perhaps the most emphatic about-face of any major figure connected with 
the anti-chain movement. 
An apparent lack of consistency did not help Cellerts cases and 
neither did his lack of any obvious constituency. The Congressman claimed 
to represent the dominant viewpoint of economistsv and that he did. 
economists controlled few votes and their corporate record over the, past 
decade had been so lamentable that many Congressmen were disinclined to 
take the slightest notice of what they had to say. For this reason, 
Celler made his main appeal in the guise of a protector of the farmers, a 
much nore influential section of society. He pointed to the range of 
objections to the bill made by a group of six big farm organisations, 
including the American rarm Bureau rederation, the National Grange and 
the National Cooperative Council. His advice was that "If you gentlemen 
from the farming communities want to disregard the emphatic protests 
leveled against this bill by those important organizationsq you are 
welcome to do so. You may take your political futures in your hands by 
doing so; but I warn you, gentlemen'le 
34 
Celler's warnings made little irpression on the farm state 
Congressmen. Not one of them joined the New Yorkers in their attacks on 
the bill, and many of them were among its most energetic supporters. 
Congressmen were, nonetheless, sufficiently alert to the farmers' wishes 
to allow them to exert some influence over the final form of the bill. 
33. Butdhdr-j' 'Adv6date, April 15,1936 p. 18; 'Congress ional, Rd cord,, 
vol. 80, p. 5977. 
34. 'Con9týdpsi6T%l'Redqrd, vol. 80, pp. 81070 8116-9. 
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Farm protest was principally responsible for the bill's managers striking 
out an anti-basing point provision which had been inserted into the House 
35 
version of the bill by the Judiciary Committee. The loss of this 
provision was not a significant setback to the bill's sponsors, many of 
whom, including Teegarden and Patman, thought the provision an undesirable 
or unnecessary complication, but the same could not be said of the 
elimination of the classification clause. While some retailer groups 
(notably the NRHA) had voiced their disquiet about the possible implications 
of the classification clause, it was the hostility of the farm cooperatives 
which finally induced the bill's managers to strike it out. Although the 
bill's protagonists in the House, including Patmang seemed none too 
distressed at the loss of the clause$ it clearly reduced the potential 
usefulness of the bill to the wholesalers. 
36 As well as forcing these basic 
changesq the farmers influenced the managers to make a nuTiber of 
"interpretations" of various provisions of the bill designed to reassure 
them, and to influence future judicial construction of obscure passages of 
the statute. 
37 Beyond these concessions the managers would not go. Patman 
maintained that the principal objections of direct concern to the farmers 
had been met by the elimination of the anti-basing point and classification 
35. The anti-basing point provision would have prevented manufacturers 
from absorbing or averaging out freight costs in such a way as to sell at 
a uniform price to all buyers regardless of location. Teegarden strongly 
opposed its inclusion by the House Judiciary Committee (it never appeared 
in the Senate bill) as an irTelevance to the purpose of the bill, which was 
to curb price discrimination in the same markets. Although some of the 
bill's supporters would have liked it kept in, most agreed with Patman that 
the provision "is not directly related to what we are trying to do... so it 
was all right to cut that out". '(Congressional Record, vol. 80, p. 8113). 
Basing point. systems had always been considered legal under Section 2., on 
the ground that there was no relationship of competition between buyers in 
different markets. 
36. H. *R. 'Rept. 
_'N6. 
* '2287,9 Pt. 119 pp. 25-26; * Congress iorial 'Record. vol. 809 
pp. 8113-40 8122-3. 
37. Most of these interpretations boiled down to reassurances that the 
farmers would be able to miake price changes to dispose of perishable goods 
and would be able to vary their prices as between different cities and 
sections. (Congressional Record, vol. 80, pp. 8114,8229-31). 
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clauses'. ýor had arisen-from a misunderstanding of the remaining provisions, 
a theme heard also, from other of the bill's supporters. other suggestions 
were that the farm groups had. been "unduly-aroused and promoted to a state 
of excitement" by other, less publicq opponents of the bill, and that the 
farm leaders were out of touch with sentiment back home. Farm state 
Congressmen felt that they knew best on this particular issue. As Jack 
Nichols of 'Oklahoma advised the three New Yorkers, "Listen boys, let us 
worry about our farmers. We think we know what is good for them. We live 
there with them. We have-grown up with them and if they are not healthy 
we are not healthy". 
38 These Congressmen seemed content to work on the 
time-honoured assumption that what was bad for Wall street must be good 
for the farmers and that any strengthening of the antitrust laws was all 
to the good of the South, the West and the common people generally. They 
were willing to modify the bill insofar as it specifically endangered the 
interests of the farmers as cooperative sellers and buyers, but they did 
not recognise that the farmers might also have a legitimate general 
grievance as private consumers. It was a well-worm cliche of antitrust 
oratory that if big business did not actually charge high prices at the 
present tire it was only because it was trying to drive out its competitorso 
and that particular argument was reiterated constantly. As Patman put it, 
because a corporate chain is bribing or baiting their 
customers with real low prices while their competitors 
are being destroyed does not mean that the consumers 
will continue to get those prices after competition is 
destroyed; it means that the sky will be the limit on 
prices... It just happens that the independent merchants 
are victim No. 1. Farmers and wage earners will be 
victim No. 2. and the consumers of the country will be 
victim No. 311. 
38., Congtýdgsiorial Record, vol. 80, pp. 81080 81101,81139 81249 81279 
8135-6. In January, 1936, the annual convention of the National (boperative 
Council "unanimously and unequivocally endor-sed the Rcbinson-Patman bill", 
but its leaders subsequently reversed the Council's position$ principally 
because of the classification and anti-basing point provisions. The Council 
nonetheless. still wanted a ban on the payment of dummy brokerage and for 
the FTC to have the power to fix maximum discounts. (HJC, H6aririgs, p. 383; SJC, Hearings% pp. 17-19). 
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Patmants-belief was that there was-such a thing as a-Ilfair-pricell 
which would give everyone a chance; in previous years something had 
been done to help the farmers, and now it was the, turn of the independent 
merchants. 
39 
While the bill's supporters in the House did from time to time make 
statements that its enactment would actually lead to lower prices . in 
truth most of them seemed not to care very much whether price rises occurred 
or not. After several years of protectionist measures on behalf of 
farmers, manufacturers, workers and the unemployed, and with inflationist 
sentiment still strong, the thought that the bill might lead to price rises 
in a few instances, or take some of the "rugged individualisal out of 
buying methods, was scarcely such as to inhibit the average Congressman. 
Patman himself, although capable of claiming that the bill would save 
consumers "billions" of dollars, more commonly defended it in terms of 
his frankly inflationary "fair price" doctrine. As he explained to the 
House, 
"The people of America today owe $250,000,000,000. How 
are they going to pay these debts? ... If you reduce wages 
50 percent and reduce prices, 50 percent you double the 
debt burden... the only way that America,, -will ever recover 
is by good. wages and good prices, the lowest possible 
price to the consumer, consistent with a living wage to 
the farmer and the wage earners together with a fair cost 
for distribution. Any other price is destructive and will 
not build up this country... the bill... enforces the Golden 
Rule in business. It is the adoption of the policy of 
live and let live". 40 
The defeat of the rrazier-LeTake farm mortgage bill, by the comfortable 
margin of 235 votes to 142, in the House on May 13 was widely hailed as 
a "big victory for conservative economics", and as a repudiation of Father 
Coughlin and a sign that the inflationist sentiment which had dominated 
39. -Cozigre, ttional Record, vol. 80, p. 8115. 
40. ''Ibid., pp. 7660, ' 8114. 
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in Congress since 1932 was on the wane. 
41 The prediction, of O. M. Kile, 
the Washington representative, of the Mail Order Association, in February, 
1936 that "... we have reached the climax on public hysteria. I think 
the ififlation situation is just about at a climax and that it will be the 
4 42 turning point on all these problems". was half right. In 1936 the 
"public hysteria" of the mid-thirties did indeed reach its climax and burn 
itself out. However, if Patman and those of his persuasion were no longer 
strong enough to secure approval for a huge flood of paper money to help 
the farmers and prime the pump sow more . that weakening could not save 
the chains from the Robinson-Patran bill. Its supposed inflationary 
character was less certain and less blatant than that of the Frazier-Lemke 
bill. What is more, its mild protectionism was designed to assist a 
different section of the populationg a section which had, unlike the 
farmers, been rather neglected in the New Deal programmes. The core of 
active support for the Frazier-Lerke and Robinson-Patman bills came from 
Congressmen representing districts west of the Mississippi, with nearly 
two-thirds (56) of the 85 man Patman bill caucus, including Patman, voting 
for Frazier-Lerke. However, whereas Congressmen from Easterm and industrial 
states voted very heavily against the rrazier-LePke billq they were quite 
prepared to cast their votes in favour of Robinson-Patman. Only 16 
Congressmen voted against the latter bill. Unlike rrazier-Leirke, it could 
not be seen as an attempt to hand out a special privilege to a section of 
the population concentrated in the South and West at the expense of the 
industrial states. 
41. New York'Times, May 17,1936. -Cdrigteptional Record, vol. 80, p. 7229; 
The er-Lenke bill provided for the Federal government to issue $36b 
of paper money in order to. purchase all outstanding farm mortgages, with 
the farmers to liquidate them gradually on very easy terms. 
42. HJC, ' 'Hdiiiiiigs . p. 389. 
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Eost of those who, led the campaign in Congress on behalf of the 
Robinson-Patman bill also supported the Patman "death sentence" chain 
tax bill introduced in 1938. The trade organisations active in backing 
the two bills were also the same. In many ways, the campaign for the 
Rcbinson-Patman bill may be viewed as a dress rehearsal for the later 
"death sentence" bill, and had the latter bill been offered instead in 
1936 it would no doubt have gathered much the same active following as 
got behind Rcbinson-Patman. There is every reason to suppose that the 
"death sentence" bill would have gone much further, had it been introduced 
in the exceptionally favourable circumstances of 1935 or 1936, than it 
ultimately did. That is not to say, however, that a "death sentence"s or 
any other chain tax bill, could have been pushed through Congress in 
1935-6. Although generally discussed as an anti-chain store bill, the 
Robinson-Patman measure differed in some important respects from a 
"death sentence". or even a more modest, chain tax bill. A few Congressmen 
explicitly argued, as did Dirksen of Illinois, that the anti-chain tag 
was "unfortunate" because the chain store "iss after all, intrinsically a 
legitimate institution ... I believe I can go along with this bill and still 
not subscribe to the idea that this is an anti-chain-store bills because 
I believe that is a wrong approach". Dirksen believed the bill would 
encourage the independents by giving them some legitimate protections but 
he hoped that that encouragement would be to "shake off the defeatist 
philosophy and get -into the business battle with renewed vigor and vid' 
rather than. -to demand inequitable curbs on their competitors. 
43 The 
sponsors of the bill repeatedly emphasised, somewhat disingenuously, that 
they were seeking to do no more than to bring up to date, and breathe 
life into, a piece of legislation which had been on the statute books for 
43. 'Cori gres e. ionAl *Redc5rd, vol. 80, pp. 8133-4. 
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more than twenty years . As long as the chains played fair, they 
suggested, they would have no problems under the act, and all businessmen, 
not just the chains, were restrained by it. On this basis, many 
Congressmen who would not have dreamed of supporting anything so nakedly 
anti-chain as a chain tax bill were quite willing to accept the advisability 
of curbing the abuse of buying power. They were able to make the 
distinction between the Robinson-Patman bill and a chain tax bill which 
was the distinction at the heart of all antitrust legislation: that 
it is the exercise of the power which is the inevitable attribute of sizes 
not "mere size" itself, which is the offence. 
viii. The Robinson-Patman Law and its Ezifdro-ement 
The Robinson-Patman law incorporated, in rewritten but basically 
unaltered forms the brokerage and advertising allowance clauses which had 
been at the heart of the original bill drawn up by H. B. Teegarden. The 
only modification which carried any potential dangers, from the point of 
view of the bill's supporters, was the inclusion in the brokerage clause of 
a somewhat awkward expression "except for services rendered"q although the 
Congressional intent behind this was only to safeguard the position of the 
bona fide independent food broker, and not to provide a buyer with any 
opportunity to justify his brokerage receipts in terra of cost savings 
afforded to the seller. 
1 
Much more changed was the general prohibition against price 
discrimination, what had been the Section 2(a) of the original bill. This 
was recast and heavily revised. The central "only due allowance" formula 
1. H. R. Repte No. 2287 pp. 14-15; H. R. Rept. No. 
-29_51, p. 
7. ror the 
text of law, see Appendix, pp. 457-9. 
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was left intact9 but so many contradictory statements were made in the 
course of debate and in Congressional reports as to just how this formula 
should be applied to specific business circumstances that it was rather 
put at the mercy of the FTC and the courts. As well as the "only due 
allowance" formula, the new Section 2(a) empowered the FTC to "fix and 
establish quantity limits... as to particular commodities or classes of 
commodities, where it finds that available purchasers in greater quantities 
are so few as to render differentials on account thereof unjustly 
discriminatory or promotive of monopoly in any line of commerce... 
The principle upon which this quantity limit was adopted was that although 
allblanket limitation" such as the carload lot idea favoured by Patman was 
"at present unwarranted". the public would be "but paying a willing price 
for its freedom from monopoly control" in forbidding discounts available 
only to a few buyers of "overshadowing size". The great weakness of the 
provision - just how great a weakness it might prove was not suspected by- 
the law's sponsors - was the element of discretion vested in the FTC. 
2 
The introduction of any form of quantity limit represented a 
tightening of the original bill. However, in two irportant Ways s the 
general prohibition against price discrimination had some of its teeth 
drawn. In the first place, a requirement was inserted that there had to be 
an injury to competition or a competitor for a discrimination to be 
unlawful. The language adopted very carefully avoided the pitfall of old 
Section 2, which had required the showing of an injury to competition in 
general, providing for the much less rigorous test of an injury to an 
individual customer - an entirely new feature in antitrust law. The idea 
behind this new, much broader test, was to catch all discriminations of 
H. R. Re2t. No. 2951, p. 6; S. Rept. No. 1502, p. 6. 
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economic significance while exempting the purely trivial examples of 
price discrimination inevitable in the normal course of business which, 
theoretically, would have been made illegal by the original Robinson- 
Patman bill. 3 No opponent of the chain stores could have reasonably 
objected to this purpose,, but the fact remained that any qualification to a 
general principle in this tricky area of law gave opportunities for clever 
lawyers to pick holes and it also introduced an element of uncertainty and 
difficulty into the task of making a case which inevitably reduced the 
enthusiasm of the rrC and private litigants. 
The second example of tooth-drawing was the inclusion of a form of 
words reminiscent of the old Section 2 proviso allowing price discrimination 
made "in good faith to meet competition". To Patman, the old proviso was 
a "weasel phrase" of the sort which had always enabled the Supreme Court to 
"read around" the antitrust laws; likewise to Senator Logans it had been 
the "chief defect" of the old Section 2. The inclusion of anything 
resembling it was extremely distasteful to the bill's sponsors. 
4 To the 
lawyers of the House and Senate Judiciary committees, however, it seemed 
essential to have sore sort of proviso which would protect the individual 
who found himself the victim of an unscrupulous attack by a conpetitor 
and wished to retaliate by cutting his own prices. After a conflict 
between the House and Senate versions of the bill developed, the Conference 
Committee ultimately hit upon the form of words found in the Act, which, 
they hoped, would protect such victims and yet not provide an all-purpose 
escape hole for business to evade the Act. To emphasize this hope, the 
Conferees segregated the new "good faith" proviso from the other provisos$ 
putting it in 2 (b) where it followed on from a requirement placing the 
3. S. Rept. No. 15029 p. 5. 
4. Congressional Recordq vol. 80, pp. 62810 8231; Interstate'Morchant$ 
March 21,1936. 
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burden of proof upon the person charged to rebut a prima facie case made 
against him. As Rep. Utterback explained, in presenting the Conference 
Committee report to the House, 
This does not set up the meeting of competition as an 
absolute bar to a charge of discrimination under the 
bill. It merely permits it to be shown in evidence. 
This provision is entirely procedural... If this proviso 
were construed to permit the showing of a competing 
offer as an absolute bar to liability for discrimination, 
then it would nullify the act entirely at the very 
inception of its enforcement, for in nearly every case 
mass buyers receive similar discriminations from competing 
sellers of the same product". 5 
Patman and mystified independents accepted this explanation of the clauses 
deferring to the eminent lawyers of the Conference. The simple question 
which it skirted was whether or not the plea of having made a discrimination 
"in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor" was or was 
not a defence. If it was, then Utterback's tortuous construction was 
meaningless; if it was notq then its introduction into evidence could 
serve no useful purpose to the person charged. Although the question took 
fifteen years to reach the U. S. Supreme Court, it was eventually answered 
with a decision that meeting a coirpetitorts price in good faith was indeed 
a complete defence for a discrimination that would otherwise be violative 
of 2 (a). 
6 While numerous awkward problems remained for the businessman - 
including the construction of the term "in good faith" and the distinction 
between meeting and beating the price of a corpetitor - the effect of the 
Supreme Court's ruling was little short of a r-einstatermnt of the old 
"good faith to meet coupetition" proviso. The confused form of words 
allowed to creep into the Robinson-Patman Act on the "good faith" question 
was just one of the many hairline cracks in the legislation, disregarded 
or noticed hurriedly and then passed over amid the press of events in 
5. H. R. Rept. No. 2951,, p. 7; Congressiorial'Rdcord, vol. 80, p. 9418. 
6. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC 340 U. S. 231 (1951). 
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1936, which eventually developed into enormous gaping holes which threatened 
to bring down the entire structure. 
7 
A final difficulty in the general prohibition of price discrimination 
concerned the status of fLmctional differentials. Reasonable classifications 
for the making of trade differentials had been permitted by the courts under 
the old Section 2. Nothing in the amended Section 2 necessarily ended that 
permission. Nevertheless, the very fact that the Robinson-Patman bill had 
originally carried a classification clause and this had been lost during 
passage, did raise a question about the status of such differentials. 
Wholesalers argued that trade differentials were not in jeopardy because 
they did not "tend to create a monopoly" or "injure, destroy or prevent 
competition" as wholesalers corpeted with each other, not with retailers. 
While this was the logic of the Mennen decision, it was not always an 
economic fact, and the reduction of the old requirement of a general effect 
on corpetition to an injury to a competitor made a judicial reversal of the 
Mennen case possible. The real safety net for trade differentials was that 
Congress had clearly not intended, in getting rid of the classification 
clause, to abolish all trade differentials, but only to make sure that the 
bill did not become a weapon to deny the extension of such differentials to 
certain weaker customers, notably the farmer cooperative buying groups. 
The clause had been chopped out of the bill by its managers at the request 
of these groups without adequate thought as to what other interpretation of 
its elimination right be made by an artificial construction of the legislative 
history. 8 rortunately for the wholesalers, no general attack developed on 
trade differentials, manufacturers being left free to classify their 
7. The proviso naturally made it immensely difficult to deal with market- 
wide discriminatory practices, since each seller could protect himself by 
pointing to the discriminatory prices of his competitors. See, Harvard 
Law Rev., vol. 90 (1977)1, pp. 1476-99, "Meeting Competition Under tfm- 
Robinso -Patman Act". 
S. New York Timess June 26,1936; 'Harvard Lavt ReView, vol. 50 (1936)s 
pp. 112-113. 
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customers, as they had always done in the pasts according to their 
estimate of their functional capacities. Insofar as conventional trade 
differentials were baseds albeit loosely, on the notion of making an 
allowance for the performance of the necessary distributive functions of 
breaking bulk and contacting and supplying retailers, such differentials 
were not inconsistent with the broad thrust of Section 2. Chain store 
companies had, of course, little reason to protest about the practice, as 
long as they received all the functional discounts which their own absorption 
of functions had earned. Nevertheless, wholesalers were put under rather 
more pressure than hitherto to justify their trade differentials in terms 
of real cost savings to the sellers when compared with his costs of selling 
direct to retailerss and the position of those cooperative and marginal 
buyers who had sometimes been obstructed from claiming such discounts was 
considerably strengthened. Manufacturers still were considered to have 
the options however, of refusing point blank to sell to retailers on any 
terms and this was a solution much recommended to them by the wholesalers. 
9 
The final point of major interest in the new law was Section 2 (f)q 
the so-called "buyer's liability", which made it unlawful "knowingly to 
induce or receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited by this 
Section ... 11 The phrase was a legacy of a separate bill, drawn up by Charles 
Wesley Dunn, the general counsel of the grocery manufacturers' association, 
and introduced by Senator Copeland. It was willingly accepted by the 
Rcbinson-Patman bill's managers for, as Senator Logan explained, "the seller 
is not the one who is guilty of these practices; it is the buyer. The 
seller suffers at the hands of the buyer... 1110 Whether the view was taken 
9. Wright Patmans Complete Guide to the Robinson-ýPatman Act, Englewood 
Cliffs, N. J. 1963j pp. 23-30. 
10. Con&Lessional'Record, vol. So. p. 3114.2 (a) also made liable the buyer who llknowinglyl'-Fe-cýived the benefit of an illegal discrimination. 
7be old Section 2 had placed no liability on the recipient, thus giving 
chains and other big buyers a free hand to press for all they could get. 
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that chains obtained discriminatory prices by collusion with, or by 
coercion of, manufacturers, this provision to make the buyer equally 
punishable with the seller was clearly a strengthening amendment. The 
predominant Congressional viewpoint seemed to be that, as Congressman 
Utterback put it, the provision would help the manufacturer to abide by 
the law by making it "easier for him to resist the demand for sacrificial 
price cuts coming from chain buyer customers. .. "ll 
11. Cone2psional'Redords vol. 80, p. 9419. The Borah-Van Nuys amendment 
was also incorporated in he Act as Section 3. The relationship between 
it and the rest of the Act was extremely anbiguous, but it was generally 
regarded as a separate statute, with its own prohibitions and penalties, 
not as an amendment to the Clayton act. Patman, it may be noted, assured 
that the Rcbinson-Patman law would be fully applicable to all discriminatory 
practices occurring within the borders of one state, at least where interstate 
chains were concerned, on the ground that they affected interstate commerce. 
However, to plug any gaps, he recommended the enactment of parallel 
legislation by the states. In 19370 Idahos Oregon and Utah passed unfair 
practice laws incorporating, with appropriate minor adjustments, the 
provisions of the federal law, but little general 'movement developed to 
enact such "state Robinson-Patman" laws. Numerous states put in their 
unfair practice laws language similar to that of the model California 1935 
Unfair Practices Act prohibiting the "secret payment or allowance of rebates, 
refundsp commissions or unearned discounts ... or secretly extending to 
certain purchasers special services or privileges not extended to all 
purchasers purchasing upon like terms and conditions, to the injury of a 
competitor and where such payment or allowance tends to destroy competition... 
As all leading chain store spokesmen consistently denounced "secret rebates" 
by this tire , they obviously could find little to object to in such language. The late 1930's Unfair practice laws in fact continued the old antitrust 
tradition of trying to prevent locality price discrimination (varying prices 
between different localities in order to drive out competitors) rather than 
attempting to tackle discriminatory prices at the buying ends which were 
seen as a federal matter. To the trade, the main purpose of all this state 
legislation was to enable it to prevent loss leader merchandising, and 
there was a natural reluctance to attempt to burden the legislation with 
provisions to which the chains might strenuously objects thus jeopardising 
the successful implementation of the anti-loss leader features, The states 
in any case lacked bodies similar to the Federal Trade Commission which 
could have enforced "state Robinson-Patman" laws. In all, by early 19419 
25 states had anti-price discrimination laws (the majority of them 
corbining sales-below-cost provisions) of which only three were modelled 
on Rcbinson-Patman, the rest being directed primarily against locality 
price discrimination. (Sees Grether, Price'Control Under Fair'Trade 
Legislation, pp. 403-67; G. J. Feldman,, "Legislative Opposition Chain 
Stores and its Minimization". Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 8 (1941) 
pp. 334-47, at pp. 340-1). 
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What, then, was the overall character of the new law,, and how far 
was it capable of fulfilling its anti-chain purpose? Nathan Isaacs, 
Professor of Law in the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, 
argued that it would force consumers to pay toll to the wholesalers who 
were the modern counterpart of the Medieval forestallers,, engrossers and 
regraters, and that, despite the formal similarity of language with the 
rest of the Clayton act, "since it stops competition at the level where it 
is most effective in American business ... it amounts to a repeal of the 
anti-trust policy in a very important part of American business". Likewise, 
James A. McLaughlin, the Professor of Law in the Harvard Law School,, 
thought that the Act "represents a raid by selfish interests attempting to 
uphold obsolescent and inefficient methods of distribution against the 
chief contribution of the current generation toward making the purchasing 
power of the masses effective. Its proponents align themselves with those 
short sighted agitators who from time to time have opposed the introduction 
of labor saving machinery". 
12 These basic themes have tended to be 
repeated endlessly, if less stridentlyq through the succeeding decades in 
academic discussion of the law. 
13 
12. SJC, Hearin . P. 30; E. P. Learned & Nathan Isaacs, "The Robinson- Patman Law: Some Assumptions and Expectations", *Harvard, Buginess'R6views 
vol. 15 (1937) pp. 137-55, at p. 139; J. A. McLaughlins "The CouiTs-anrd-the 
Rcbinson-Patman Act: Possibilities of Strict Construction"s Law & 
Contemporary Problems,, vol. 4 (19 37) 1, pp. 410-19 . at p. 413. 
13. Sees for examples D. T. Armentanos The, Myths'of'Antitrust, New Rochelle$ 
19729 pp. 164-97. M. A. Adelman's A&P,., A Sttd_V'in'Price-; Cost, Behavic5r, and 
Public Policy is much the most interesting elucidation of the theory that The Act enforces a regime which discriminates against the low-cost 
distributor, because it is based on the actual business operations of one 
chain store company. For a contrary estimates J. C. Palamountain, The 
Politics of Distribution, pp. 228-34, who asserts that "What had ýýgun as 
an attempt to hobble chains by making it difficult for them to receive 
anything more than normal retailers' discounts ended as a law which was 
relatively sound in terms of equity and economic efficiency". This 
interpretation (followed, for example, by Ellis W. Hawley, in'The'New'Deal 
and the Problem'of'Monopoly, pp. 253-4) is difficult to corprehend except 
on the assumption that the classification clause was the fundamental 
feature of the, original bill, its removal having therefore transformed the 
character of the bill. 
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Judgments made about the, Robinson-Patman Act in the 1940's,, 1950's 
and later may perhaps tell us more about the prevailing political and 
economic assumptions of those periods than about the character of the 
law passed by Congress in 1936. Congress created an instrument in 1936, 
an instrument which was modified by use, and some of whose purposes were 
not compatible with the expectations and desires of later periods. 
Equally,, the judgments made by Harvard professors in the mid-1930's may 
not have been relevant to the actual conditions for which Congress felt 
impelled to legislate. Democratic bodies do not usually, and cannot be 
expected to, legislate to bring into being or preserve abstract conditions 
such as "free competition": they legislate to assist or punish certain 
identifiable interests within society. Of course, the quantity limit 
provision, the brokerage clauseq even perhaps the "only due allowance" 
formulaq implied some restriction on the working through of the processes 
of free coupetition. They were enacted to assist independent distributors 
rather than to prevent anti-conpetitive practices. Howeverg this was 
true of the Sherman. 'Clayton and Federal Trade Commission acts to no less 
a degree. Congress acted on those occasions to come to the aid of those 
who considered themselves to be the victims of the trusts9 not because it 
wished to preserve "competition" per se. Equally, however much the 
Robinson-Patman law was to prove out of temper with later fashions in 
economic thinking, it was in line with much else at the time of its 
enactment. Granted that protective legislation for each major group in 
society was the order of the day, it is difficult to see why or how 
Congress could have reasonably denied some protection for hard-pressed 
independent merchants,, especially as for them the problems of depression 
had been increased by the emergence of the chain stores. To that extentg 
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the Robinson-Patman law may be seen as a natural product of the New 
14 Deal "broker state" 
At the saw time, any judgment based on the simple view that the 
Act was anti-competitive, a repeal of antitrust policy and a victory for 
Luddites is clearly a parody of its real nature. Patman, McLaurin and 
many others of the Act's sponsors were indeed out to wreck the machinery 
of chain store distribution. But, as they would soon accept,, the spanner 
they had persuaded Congress to throw into the works was a very lightweight 
one, capable of delivering merely a glancing blow. Their acceptance of 
that fact was seen two years later, when they care back to Congress asking 
for more, this tire with the chain store "death sentence" bill. The bill 
Teegarden had drawn up in 1935 was in many ways a fair and balanced 
measure. In particular, it did not seek to deny the chains "due allowance" 
for the manufacturer's cost savings, and even the quantity limit idea 
worked in subsequently was not out of harmony with the long-standing 
convention established in a related field by the ICC. In its final shape, 
the Act did indeed deny the chains the right to exercise their buying 
power to its full extent, but it also permitted them to enjoy some 
considerable advantages arising from their size. 
Neither can the character of legislation be judged without reference 
to the degree to which it is capable of enforcement. Several Congressmen 
in 1936 expressed concern that the big buyers would find a way to evade 
its provisions, much as business had in the past circumvented large areas 
of the antitrust laws. A whole section of the Act, the Borah-Van Nuys 
amendment, was witness to the fear that the FTC would not be capable of 
14. Edgar Watkins,, the counsel of the National-American Wholesale Grocers' 
Association, sarcastically suggested that the Act was the New Dealts way 
of taking care of the, lawyers, rather than of wholesalers and retailers. 
It must be admitted that the lawyers have often proved its main 
beneficiaries. '(Interstate Herchant, June 27,1936). 
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breathing life into a civil statute. Inasmuch as the new law was bound 
to be leaky, it was altogether natural that Congress should have chosen 
to make it a fairly capacious container at the start. Just how leaky a 
container it indeed proved to be may be seen from the subsequent record 
of enforcement. The quantity limit provisiono for instanceg remained 
totally unused. Patman had expected the FTC to fix a quantity limit 
wherever there was a risk of monopolys and as it was his view thatq although 
not all business was monopolistic, "in the lines of business in which 
corporate chains are engaged there is already a monopoly in many of the 
favorite areas in this country"p he clearly expected such limits to be 
used on a wide scale. 
is Insteadq the FTC did not issue a quantity litdt 
rule in any industry until 1951s only to then have its rule held 
arbitrary and invalid by the Court of Appeals for the District of Colurbia 
Circuit after the most protracted litigation. 
16 While some notable quantity 
discountsl calculated to give exceptionally fav, ourable treatment to just 
one or a few buyerss were suspended because of the Act, (including the 
Goodyear-Sears, contract)l Congressional intentg never mind Patman's hopes$ 
was never given effect in respect of the quantity limit. Similarly* the 
criminal provisions of the Borah-Van Nuys amendment went unused. While 
this might have been eNpecteds in view of the rather uncertain status of 
the amendment in relationship to the Act as a whole and the unwillingness 
of the Department of Justice, which alone had the power to enforce the 
criminal amendments to interfere in the FTC's step by step application of 
15. He also expected the limits to be given low ceilingss such as 
carload lots. Congressional Records vol. 809 pp. 7660-ll 8112j 8115, 
16. rTC v. B. r. Goodrich Co. 242 red. (2nd)-31 (1957). The Co=ission 
did not appeal to the Supreme Court. 
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the Actg it was nonetheless disappointing to independents. 
17 In the 
early daysp there was excited talk about the possibility of chain store 
men being obliged to "cool their heels" in federal penitentiaries$ but 
nothing of this sort occurred. Chain store men in practice faced nothing 
more frightening than a civil suit for triple damagesp at the worsts and 
as few private litigants appeared in the early years (most victim of 
discrimination preferring to forward their complaints to the 17C for it 
to take the risks of action) even that was something of an idle deterrent. 
Generally speaking* the only consequence for a violator of the Act was 
a cease and desist order. 
This was, indeed, a major weakness of the Act. It forbade buyers to 
do certain things,, but it did not punish them if they failed to obey. A 
cease and desist order amounted to nothing more than an order to stop a 
practice which was illegal: that being so$ there was little incentive for 
a buyer to stop that practice unless he was so ordered. No particular 
excess of immorality or cupidity was needed to motivate chain$ or any 
other buyers, to get round the law. 
18 They could persuade themselves 
that, all estimate of a seller's costs being necessarily speculativel they 
were not really getting more than "due allowance". They could comfort 
themselves with the thought that the "evil" practice in which they were 
engaged was considered a vital part of a competitive eC'Onony by many 
eminent lawyers and economists. They could also reason thats as violation 
was cormonplaceq they could achieve nothing by their abstinence from sin 
but the decline of their company and the loss of their own jobs'. Those 
17. Not until 1948 did the Department of Justice bring a case involving 
the Borah-Van Nuys amendment. (Corwin D. Mardsq'The'Pridd Discrimination 
Law$ Washington D. C. 0 1959s p. 682). 
18. It naturally influenced the reception of the new law that most of the 
major legislation pertaining to business in the previous few years had been 
ruled unconstitutional by the U. S. Supreme Courts a circumstance which 
encouraged the idea that "politically-motivated" or "unsound" laws were 
optional and not absolutely binding. This reinforced the tradition that 
the enforcement of the antitrust laws was a matter for negotiation and 
tactical manoeuvres rather than a question of black-and-white prohibitions. 
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from whom they bought naturally had some similar motives to be casual 
in their interpretation of the law. Congress had acted on the assumption 
that ogre-like chain store buyers were extorting unfair concessions from 
manufacturers; that being sop the manufacturer who actually felt it to 
be to his advantage to cultivate a particular buyer could reason to 
himself that it was legitimate for him to decline the protection of 
Congress. 
The Act never had a consensus of business opinion behind itg a fact 
which of itself encouraged evasion. Worse$ the enforcement of the laws 
being necessarily piecemeal and directed against individuals was 
manifestly arbitrary. A businessman against whom an order was entered 
looked about him and saw that his competitors were carrying on as beforet 
and he naturally saw no good reason why he should be discriminated against. 
This problem was seen particularly clearly in relation to the brokerage 
clause whichq as the simplest of the Act's provisionsg attracted the most 
energetic early enforcement by the FTC. Only the phrase "except for 
services rendered" raised any likely difficultyl for although Congressional 
intent in respect of this expression had been clear enough* some lawyers, 
felt that the courts right ignore the intent and construe the clause so 
that a buyer would be able to receive brokerage if he was able to prove 
that he had rendered some service to the seller. Howeverg in a series of 
emphatic judgments the courts soon decided that the expression only 
protected the bona fide brokerg not a buyer or his agent, and that the 
brokerage clause was an absolute prohibition against buyerss directly or 
indirectly, receiving either brokerage commissions or payments made in 
lieu of brokerage. Between 1938 and 19400 this clear-cut interpretation 
was reiterated by no less than five Circuit Courts of Appealp with the 
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U. S. Supreme Court also refusing to consider an appeal. And yet, despite 
thisý many buyers were still collecting brokerage years later and raking 
only the thinnest atteTrpts to conceal the fact. This was not because 
the rTC had lost interest in the brokerage clause., on the contrary, the 
Commission applied it with great frequency because, being relatively 
straightforward and firmly establishedo it was a good "bread-and-butterM 
provision to "make statistics" in order to show that the Commission was 
doing its job. 20 The problem was that each violators pleading sore 
subtle difference in his particular case, could drag the Commission through 
the whole curbersome process of preliminary investigations complaint, 
hearings on the conTlaint, order to cease and desist and review by Circuit 
Court of Appeal. 
21 At the end of all thisb he faced nothing more frightening 
than a confirmation of the order to cease and desist. 
22 
19. Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 Fed. (2nd) 687 (C. C#A. I 2nd 1938); 
Oliver -Bros. Inc. v. FTC, '102 Fed. (2nd) 763-(-C. C. A. 'g 4thg 1939); Great 
A&P Tea Co. ' v. FTP, 106'Fed. ' (2nd) 667 (C,, C., Ao, 3rdg 1939); Webb-Crawford 
Co. v. FTC,, '109 Fed. (2nd) 268 (C. C. A. ý 5ths 1940); 'Qilality Bakers of 
America v. aC. 114 Fed. ' (2nd)'393 (C. C. A-j lstj 19403-. The U. S. Supreme 
Court declined to review a brokerage clause case until 1966f when it 
decided in the sense in which the clause had been interpreted hitherto by 
the lower courts. 
20. Edwards , The Price Discrimination Law I pp - 69-72; Alan Stone 9 Tconomic 
ReM! lation and the Rglic Interest: The F6deral'Trade commission in Theory 
and Practice, Ithaca and London, 1977, p. 116. 
21. For pointed judicial comment on the way the FTC added to this by its 
own long-winded and over-elaborate procedures and argumentsp see the opinion 
in Modern Marketing Service Inc. v. rTg, 149 red. (2nd)-970 (C. C. A. 6 7th, 
1945). M dern Marketing was the du=V bro-erage agency set up by the Red 
& White voluntary after enactment of the Robinson-Patman law. The IGAs 
meanwhiles was not finally forbidden to collect brokerage until 1953. (ICA 
Distributing Co. v. FTC, 203 Fed. (2nd) 941). Obviouslys this length delay 
in enforcement was a great help to the big voluntaries in preparing ways Of 
financing their operations differently. (Sees Edwardsq The Price 
Discrimination Law, pp. 123-130). 
22. Writing in 1959, Corwin Edwards noted (op-cit. p. 79) that "Comment 
from attorneys indicates that until recently some clients were unconcerned 
about orders because they thought there was little chance of a check on 
their compliance". Adelman (A 9 P: A Study in Price-Cost Behavior and 
Public Policys pp. 182-193) describes the numerous stratagems used e 
A&P to get round the brokerage clause and other parts of the Act even 
after it had had a cease and desist order against it upheld by the Courts. 
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The difficulties experienced in putting the brokerage clause into 
effect were as nothing when corpared with those caused by the more 
aribiguous parts of the law. In particular, each case involving the "only 
due allowance" formula was, quite genuinely, unique, the range of cost 
savings available from each transaction being peculiar to it., Had business 
as a whole been willing to accept and adhere to rough guidelines about 
"only due allowance" effective enforcement of the law against a 
recalcitrant few might have been possible; but business was not so 
obliging. 7be law was conceived amid controversy and condemned by most 
of those whom it was designed to regulate. As the enforcement of the law 
evolved, the leading cases were reviewed by economic and legal journals 
not so much from the standpoint of whether or not the law had been broken 
as from that of whether or not the law was an ass. Much of the comment 
on the law came to take the line that it was the privilegel perhaps even 
the duty, of any rational businessman who favoured efficiency$ corpetition 
and lower prices, to do his utmost to wriggle his way aro=d its provisions. 
Thus, although its opponents could never muster sufficient support to 
secure repeal of the law they did succeed in undermining its moral 
authority. The pattern became established that the enforcement of the law 
was influenced primarily not by the extent of its violation but by the 
general political climate in Washington at the time. In that respecto the 
record with Robinson-Patman was to prove rather similar to the precedent 
set in the implementation of the Sherman and. Clayton laws. Like thems it 
has suffered from the argument that it came into being as a product of 
exceptional political and economic circumstances at the time of its 
enactment - which of course,, it did - and that "times are different now". 
23 
23. Sees Richard A. Posnerp The Robinson-Patman'Act, s Washington D, C. 0 1973, esp. p. 31. 
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In so far as the conditions of 1936 have never recurred$ it was perhaps 
inevitable that the lZobinson-Patman law would never be enforced in quite 
the way its sponsors hoped - just as it was inevitable that much of the 
enforcement would take place in fields unrelated to chain store 
distribution as the origins of the law as an anti-chain measure were 
largely forgotten. Independent retailers and wholesalers have continued 
to support the Robinson-Patman lawg but there has never been any repetition 
of the fervour which brought it into being in 1936. Only by fighting out 
the battles of 1935 and 1936 again and again could independents have 
brought Robinson-Patman enforcement into line with their original hopes, 
or amended it to be more effectives and the fact that in later years they 
lacked the energys the desperation or the political opportunity of 1936 
itself influenced the decay of the law. 
Opponents of the Robinson-Patman bill in 1936 warned that it would 
a" ow the rTC to become j in Emanuel Celler's wordsl a "tyrant over 
industry". Influenced by the recent experience with the NRAI they feared 
that the FTC would be transformed from the cautious, conservative and 
rather unobtrusive body which it had been for most of its history, into 
a great all-powerful machine for state interference in private businessl 
like the NRA in ambition and reach but with the added strength of knowing 
that the laws it irposed were constitutional. Actually$ the rTC showed 
no arbition to become the new NRAp even if that had been any longer 
politically acceptable. It operated more vigorously in the late 1930's than 
had hitherto been its wont,, but it did not seek to dispense the rapid* 
arbitraryg rough-and-ready justice or injustice meted out by the NRA 
during the New Deal emergency period. In facts although the law's 
supporters were slow to realise it, it was not the rTC or even the courts 
which progressively took control of the application of the new laws but 
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the manufacturers. It is not surprising to find that AGMAO which 
prominently opposed the enactment of the laws quickly changed its tune 
once it was on the statute books. 
24 The manufacturer was placed in a 
better position to fend off demands for extra discounts by claiming that 
he dared not exceed "only due allowance" and he could remind his 
overbearing customers thats thanks to the "buyer's liability" clause, it 
was no longer just the seller who could not find himself in conflict with 
the law. There were, of courses limits to this: a big buyer still 
remained a desirable customers worthy of some considerations and buyers 
had their own weaponsg including the ultimate sanctions of threatening 
to take their business elsewhere or to set up as manufacturers in their 
own right. Neverthelesss the overall tendency of the law was to reinforce 
the bargaining position of the manufacturer. To a considerable extents 
he was free to make more or less than "due allowance" according to his own 
estimate of what that "due allowance" should be and his own judgment as 
to the desirability of favouring certain distributors$ without his 
customers knowing for sure exactly what he was doing. With billions of 
buying transactions going on in business as a whole each years the rTC 
could obviously investigate only an infinitesimal number of all the cases 
of possible price discrimination and was, in effect, at the mercy of the 
goodwill of those whom it pretended to regulate. Critics have often noted 
24. A survey of its members by AGMA soon after enactment found that the 
larger manufacturers were more inclined to favour the new law than were 
the smaller. To a small sellers who could not otherwise compel shelf space 
for his product, the ability to offer a big buyer a startlingly good 
private deal could be of vital assistance. As a matter of facts big 
chains like the A&P were constantly being made such offers, most of which 
had to be refused because of the difficulty of trying to push a new brand 
in competition with well-established rivals. In contrasts the big producer 
of a nationally-advertised brand knew that the chain had to have his 
product or would find it difficult to substitute for it; for him it was 
not a question of making a sale, but of a negotiation, within narrow 
limits, about the term on which that sale should be made. (Interstate. 
Merchants Decenber So 1936). 
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the Commission's habit of summarily rejecting quite plausible attributions 
of manufacturers' cost savings under the "due allowance" formula and have 
inferred from this that manufacturers were consequently constrained to be 
very conservative in their estimates of the cost savings provided to them 
in selling to chain and other large buyers. However,, the formal complaints 
made by the rTC were so few, in relation to the volume of business 
transactionsg that the attitude it took to cost savings in these few cases 
25 
was =re or less of an irrelevance. It may well be that manufacturers 
did often adopt a conservative approach to the "only due allowance" 
formulas but if so, it was because it suited them not to give more in 
allowances to the big buyerq than could possibly be avoided. 
Congress enacted the Robinson-Patman law primarily to help small 
distributors 0 but it did so on the assumption that manufacturers were 
usually coerced into giving excessive discounts by overmighty big buyers. 
Inasmuch as there was any validity to this beliefg the law did work against 
the big buyers because it strengthened the position of sellers in resisting 
their demands. Howevers this belief was relevant to only a small amount 
of discrimination. Quite apart from any question of sinister collusion - 
something which Patman often seemed to suspect - manufacturers quite 
simply had found that many of the discounts and allowances which it was 
their wont to extend to chain and other buyers served a useful purpose. 
It wasp after all, not manufacturers$ but small wholesalers and retailers 
who had demanded a drastic change in the existing law. Manufacturers 
effectively adopted a "rule of reason" which was framed in term of their 
25. Edwards states (The Price Discrimination Law,, p. 66) that by the 
end of 1957 the rTC had -issued a total of 311 cease and desist orders 
under the Act. Many of these were in industries and in respect of 
practices unrelated to chain store distribution. 
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own self-interests not that of the small distributorsq and the rTC had 
little choice but to acquiesce in this. The advertising allowance 
provisions, for examples which the law's sponsors had hoped would virtually 
end this form of special concession, were commonly applied by manufacturers 
in the sense of "only due allowance". 
26 Contracts to provide advertising, 
display or promotional services became more, specific) as the manufacturers 
naturally desiredo thus reducing the abuse of such allowances to make 
straight price reductionsg but manufacturers interpreted proportional 
availability so as to deny such allowances to sore of their customers. 
Many vital questionsg such as the applicability of the law to private brands$ 
where these were generally of "like grade and quality" but distinguished by 
different labels and consumer acceptability from corpeting national brands 
distributed by the same manufacturerl remained in a sort of twilight zone. 
Even when the courts ruled on a principle* the law often actually took 
effect only in respect of the individuals immediately involved in the 
litigations with the rest of industry remaining unmoved. 
27 
By no means all the weaknesses which gradually appeared in the 
structure of the Robinson-Patman law can be ascribed to poor draftsmanship 
by its sponsors or to the haste with which it was passed. No antitrust 
legislation had ever produced the results predicted or hoped for at the 
time of enactment. As John Martin of Colorado, the secretary of the Patman 
bill caucuss expressed itj "The big fellow always gets by... He was only 
in swaddling clothes when the Sherman antitrust law was enacted.,,, now he 
Ibestrides this narrow world like a Colossust. All the antitrust laws 
26. Not until 1959 did this practice come to the U. S. Supreme Courts which 
then ruled that the requirement of "proportionally equal term" stood 
independently of any differences in se" ing costs and did not necessitate 
a showing of corpetitive injury. (rTC've''Sitnplidity'Pattern'Cd. ', 360, U. S. 55)- 
27. The U. S. Supreme Court did not consider the applicability of the law to 
private brands of "like grade and quality" until'TTC'v., Bordep Co. 383 U. S. 
637 (1966). Even after thisj, no general atta was made on the extension of 
lower prices on private brands. 
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down to now have only succeeded in raking bigger if not better trusts. 
Maybe some day we shall emerge. Maybe now we see only through a glass 
darkly". 28 All legislation in this field tended to be a shot in the 
dark and many Congressmen made it apparent in 1936 that they realised 
that their aim might be far from unerring in its accuracy. The only sort 
of law that could have stripped the chains of their btVing advantages 
altogether would have been one requiring a uniform one-price policy, 
perhaps with a maximum discount based on the average purchase per order 
of a srall wholesaler$ with this backed up by draconian penaltiesq and 
with manufacturers prohibited from entering into exclusive arrangenents 
with any purchaser or group of purchasers. Whether such a piece of 
legislation could ever have been put through Congress is another question, 
for many legislators would no doubt have concurred with the opinion of 
Senator Logan, who steered the Robinson bill through the Senates that "none 
but the narrowly selfish and grasping would ask for a system of equality 
that would give every customer the same price regardless of the differing 
29 
costs of serving thed' . It is doubtful whether Patman saw things quite 
like that, but he and others of the bill's supporters were to some extent 
enmeshed in a web of their own spinning. They made much of the argument- 
that the chains were growing fat on unearned rebates and that a formula 
restricting them to "only due allowance" was required to prevent this 
abuse. Howevero the quantity limit idea was so obviously incompatible 
with this theoryo that they were only able to press it with some diffidence. 
The bill's managers never stood their ground on the quantity limit and 
said exactly how it was intended to works and how often it was to be applied- 
The consequence was thatg although it was incorporated into the text of the 
laws the rTC disregarded it as being incompatible with the general spirit 
of "only due allowance". 
28. Congyesaiorial'Pedords vol. 80, p. 8131. 
29. Ibid., vol. 80 p. 6257. 
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While the Robinson-Patman law was to prove generally ineffective 
as an anti-chain measure in the long terms many of its weaknesses only 
became fully apparent over a period of years. In the first months after 
its enactment many manufacturerso especially in those trades whose 
maladjustments had prompted the agitation for the bills ostentatiously 
tore up contracts for advertising allowances and clamped heavy restrictions 
on other discountss often indeed taking the chance for an enthusiastic if 
short-lived revenge against their more irksome customers. After one year, 
the FTC confidently reported that "hundreds of business men or their 
attorneys have called at the Commission's offices and discussed the 
application of the new law... in some instances, entire industries haves 
pursuant to such conferences, revised general practices which appeared to 
be in conflict with the law". 
so Although the Act's supporters were 'well 
aware that many of the changes were probably only cosmetic and that the 
fundamental nature of the relationships between buyers and sellers had not 
been changed, there did seem to be at least some real alteration in 
business conduct. Quite apart from this informal effects the early history 
of the new law in the Courts was almost entirely conducive to optimism. 
Opinions variedl but the United States Wholesale Grocers' Associations the 
body which had sponsored the original bills in 1939 still felt happy 
enough about the rate at which progress was being made to vote thanks to 
the FTC for its "unremitting efforts to enforce the several provisions of 
the Act". 31 Ironically, much of the criticism from the independent trade 
in these early years stemmed not from the belief that the law was having 
no effect on the chains but from the disgusted realisation. by wholesalers 
30. rTC, Annual, R61jort'for 1937j p. S. 
31. 'Interstate*Merchantb April 299 1939; though contrast the accusation 
that enforcementlmd Seen "half-hearted and cursory in the extreme" in 
NARD Journals March 21g 1940. 
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and retailers that their own discounts were no less affected by its 
provisions. Voluntary chain sources were particularly scathing in their 
charges that while the cooperative buying efforts of independents were 
being curtaileds simply because they were necessarily open and vulnerables 
the subterfuges of furtive chain store companies were going unchecked. 
Such criticism were not allayed by the unfortunate circumstance that some 
of the most effective enforcement was directed against brokerage concerns 
like the Biddle Purchasing Co. which provided a buying service for many 
thousands of small jobbers. To those who found their own allowances being 
taken away$ the argument that the big chains were being affected even more 
was not necessarily much of a consolation, especially as there was no 
proof that this was actually so. 
32 
In retrospects the weaknesses of the Robinson-Patman law as an 
anti-chain measure stand out in sharp relief simply because it proved to 
be the one substantial legacy of the period of anti-chain ferment. Howevers 
to the enemies of the chains in the late 1930's the law's weaknesses seemed 
of only secondary importance, because for them it was not their final 
testament but just one preliminary statement of intent. Even while 
campaigning for the Robinson-Patman bills Patzan was laying plans for a 
Federal law to divorce manufacturing from retailing as well as egging on 
32. Voluntary 
-&'Cooperative 
'Groups *Magazineo April 1937; "Voice of the 
Trade"s Hardware'Retailerl, January 1937,. Adelman (opscitb P-225) estimates 
the A& P's total allowances (headquarters allowances$ profits of field 
brokerage offices and local allowances) fell from $11.22m in 1935 to $4.70m in 
1937 and $4.31m in 1938s recovering only to $7-63m by 1940. However* the 
immense success of its supermarket opening programme rather served to 
cancel out any adverse effects from these losses. The widespread withdrawal 
of allowances in the early years may actually have done more harm to the 
small retailer cooperative buying groups than to the big chains, dozens 
of these groups folding up. (Modern*Mdrchant & Grocery Worldo April 29g 
1939). These injuries to the indepe dent sector undoubtedly encouraged a 
considerable reserve about Patman and his ideas in many quarters and 
embarrassed even his most earnest supporters, 
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the state legislatures to pass anti-chain measures* and only a year elapsed 
between the tire of enactment of the Robinson-Patman law and his announcement 
of a definite intention to confine the chains to purely intrastate 
operations. Had Congress passed the other legislation which Patman desireds 
the shortcomings of the Robinson-Patinan law when it came to curbing the big 
chains would no longer have been of relevances for those chains would have 
been put out of existence. Where he miscalculated - org rather, was 
betrayed by the sands of time - was that the pecullar political 
circumstances of 1935-6 would never recur. The first great step on the 
road to the destruction of the chain stores by Congress actually proved to 
be the last. 
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PART 5. The Defeat of the Anti-Chain Store Movement, 1936-1940. 
i. "The Battle of the Century. 
In the years before 1935 the chains won some of their tax battles 
and lost others; the general trend was against them, but none of their 
defeats could be seen as decisive and conclusive. The law-making of 
1935 brought the chains face to face with an entirely new and grim prospect. 
Either they would have to reverse the chain tax movement or it would destroy 
them. The United States Supreme Court's decisions in the West Virginia and 
Kentuck cases indicated that while sore specific form of anti-chain 
legislation might yet be held invalid, in general the courts would no longer 
act to help them. They would have to save themselves. 
The California chain tax law of 1935, while far from being the most 
oppressive of that year's crop of anti-chain statutes,, was in some respects 
the most depressing for chain store men. 
1 California had hitherto been a 
relatively tranquil state, no chain tax bill ever having commanded 
considerable trade support or been brought out of committee. A scattered 
band of zealots, such as R. P. Craton,, the editor and publisher of The 
Independent Crusader, W. H. Cameron, shirt manufacturer and author of Our 
Juggernaut, and Milton Gairs a retail clothier and anti-chain polemicists 
had led a vain struggle to stir up the merchants to the heights of passion 
seen elsewhere. The organised trade in California, traditionally most 
interested in price maintenance, in which activity it led the nation, had 
tended to look upon chain tax bills as a waste of time, especially as the 
legislature was considered well under the thunb of chain store lobbyists. 
Even at the beginning of the 1935 legislative session, the California 
1. Laws of California. 1935,, chap. 849. The mxi=m rate was $500 on 
each store in excess of nine. 
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Retail Grocers' and Merchants' Associations which quickly became the 
organising force behind the chain tax fight, still had no position for or 
against chain taxation. The officers were nervous lest the chains found 
sow way to put the voluntary chains, a Tmjor element in the association, 
under any chain tax. Only the exceptionally favourable political conditions 
that year, with the legislature abnormally receptive to anything to help 
the "little fellows" against Wall street, and with the rank-and-file of 
merchants aroused by the example provided by other states following the 
Supreme Court decision in the West Virginia case, finally led the 
association to abandon all restraint. 
2 
In Iowa and Floridag where the heaviest taxes of 1935 were imposed* 
the chains turned to the courts for relief, probably with little real 
optimism. In California, they had the h1ternative option of forcing a 
popular referendum, and this was the course taken. The Califormia, statute 
in any case contained absolutely nothing likely to secure a reversal from 
the courts, being an orthodox graduated license tax. By Septenber, 19359 
the chains had collected sufficient signatures to have the tax submitted 
to a popular vote, which left more than a year to prepare to defeat it 
(the tax went on the ballot in the Novenber, 1936 general election as 
Proposition 22). Safeway, which with 1,336 stores in California was by 
far the largest chain in the state, assumed the leadership of the chain 
store side, and all the important chains in each line buried any differences 
they may have had to coordinate their efforts through the California Chain 
Stores Association. The Association hired a public relations firm, Lord 
and Thomas, in the hope of bringing to its cairpaign that edge of 
professionalism which the previous amateurish and rather directionless 
2. R. P. Craton, A Nation Chained, Los Angeles, Calif. 1936, p. 4; 
California Retail Grocers' Advocate, February 1.221,1935. 
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efforts made by the chains themselves had always lacked. At last, the 
chains as a body had agreed to fund the sort of campaign which only a few 
had previously been willing to admit was necessary. In response, the 
independent associations in California formed the Anti-Monopoly League in 
August 1935, and called upon all independents, both in and out of California 
to render assistance. Although sow anti-chain leaders in other states 
were apprehensive about appearing to become committed to the idea that the 
California battle was crucial to the future of the whole anti-chain 
movement, California never having been an anti-chain stronghold, none could 
deny the importance of the referendum. Small contributions to the Anti- 
Monopoly League came from trade associations all over the country. Most 
notably, California's struggle brought the National Association of Retail 
Grocers to assist a chain tax campaign for the first time, full support 
being pledged following a tumultuous demonstration from the floor at the 
June, 1936 convention. The battles of smaller Midwestern or Southern 
associations could be ignoredg but California, the linchpin of the National,, 
could not be denied. 
3 The previous referenda on chain store taxes,, in 
Portland, Oregon in 1932 and in Colorado in 1934, both of which the chains 
had'lost, were generally regarded as mere skirmishes. The California 
referendum, in view of the size of the state-only New York and Pennsylvania 
had more chain stores - and, more importantly, its reputation for'setting 
trends, made it seem likely that a third defeat would open the floodgates 
for chain taxation elsewhere. No wonder Congressman Patman called it "the 
battle of the century". 
4 
3. California Retail Grocerst Advocate, July 3.1936. 
4. Ibid., January 109 249 1936. 
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The initial fight for the chain tax in the legislature, and then 
the long drawn-out campaign for popular approval, were considerably 
influenced by the general political temper of the state in the mid-1930's. 
The chains faced sore peculiar, and awkward, political circumstances in 
Califormia. The state was, as Lord & Thomas reported, "a stronghold for 
all sorts of political doctrines based on discontent". 
5 The depression 
came late to the Golden state, but when it did it unleashed great waves 
of frenzied agitation,, for nowhere did the cruel paradox of "want in the 
midst of plenty" take on sharper definition. Large sections of the 
population, especially the expropriated, disillusioned or fearful middle 
classes$ eagerly espoused bizarre creeds which promised an immediate and 
easy restoration of prosperity. There were more Huey Long "Share Our 
Wealth" clubs in California than in any'state outside the South, but most 
of her discontented citizens preferred the home-grown faiths. 
The Los Angeles-based Utopian Society promised retirement at forty 
five and a standard of living defined as "opulence for all" in the Land 
of Utopia, where all America's productive capacity would run at a perpetual 
full output for the common good. Members of the Society were initiated 
by witnessing, as "pilgrim", a series of "Cycle Rituals"s which 
illustrated in parable form the mode of transition from capitalism to 
Utopia; they emerged, as "hermits", with a knowledge of the secret rituals 
and a duty to convert others. The Utopians expected society to change "by 
acclamation" once all had witnessed the Cycles, though they were also 
prepared for takeover by emergency decree of the property of those few 
greedy owners of productive capacity who failed to see the light. 
6- 
5. Lebhar, Chain Stores In America, 19639 p. 241. 
6. Hanson Hathaway, The Utopians Are Coming, Hollywood, Calif., 1934, esp. 
pp. 13-149 24-34; N Republic, "Utopia Incorporated",, July 18,1934 
pp. 255-9. 
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Inspired by rumours that President Roosevelt was himself the "greatest 
Utopian of them all", and only awaiting the call of his people, as many 
as 600,000 had joined the Utopian Society by the end of 1934, most of 
them in Southern California. 
7 More influential still, and entwined with 
the Utopian Society, was the End Poverty in California movement led by 
the novelist and social reformer Upton Sinclair. On a platform of 
setting the unemployed to work in production-for-use "land colonies", 
or in factories taken over by the state, Sinclair captured the Democratic 
nomination for Governor in the sunumr of 1934. Despite the opposition of 
the Democratic party machinery in both California and Washington and a 
ruthless red-smear campaign by virtually the entire daily press, Sinclair 
made a strong showing against the incuTrbent Republican Governor Frenk 
Merriam in the Noverber electionss receiving twice as many votes as any 
previous Democratic candidate for Governor of California. And although 
Sinclair lost,, a bloc of 24 Assemblymen were elected to Sacramento on 
the EPIC ticket, and theyq with others of sympathetic persuasion, were 
able to open the door in the 1935 legislature to much liberal and 
progressive legislation previously considered politically impossible. 
8 
The chains and the independent merchants were inevitably sucked into 
this turmoil. The philosophy of the Utopian Society was one of 
technocratic super-efficiency and of a vaguely socialist form of economic 
control; nevertheless, independents detected in its aspirations and 
underlying emotion something which was on the side of the "little fellow" 
and against the oppressive cupidity of capitalistic corporations, like the- 
7. The Unofficial Observer (John F. Carter) American Messiahs, N. Y. 
19350 p. 64; Newton Van Dalsem, HigtoLy'of'the'Utopian'SocietY-Of 
America, Los Angeles, 1942,, p. 16. 
8. Pacific Historical Review, vol. XXVII, 1958,, pp. 127-47, "The Epic 
r- Campaign of 193411 by Charles E. Larsen. 
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chain stores. Several dozen druggists took a page in the Society's 
newspaper to make a pathetic plea in a long and rambling poem, "The 
Lament of the Independent Merchant", which called upon the idealism 
of the Utopians: 
We have no quarrel with the petty,, nean,, 
Tight-fisted persons who are wont to rave 
About the weekly dollar that they gain; 
It is their right. 
But you, who are the generous, the keen, 
Outnurber these immensely; you can pave 
Our path with healthy business; kill the chain 
In all your might! 11 
I 
The chains were prepared to answer in kind. Big business associations 
condemned the Utopian Society as a communistic and subversive menace, 
but Safeway Stores, the chain which had been put together by Wall street 
bankers in the capitalist heyday just a few years earlier, was prepared 
to advertise heavily in the Utopian newspaper. "The Story of Safeway", 
declared one such advertisement, "while it is a story of business, is 
nevertheless a story of human service ... Safeway, in fact, may be likened 
to a great co-operative movement in which the farmer, the dairymang the 
manufacturer and the consumer are common partners". 
It was the independents who gained most from the upsurge of these 
movements, and especially from EPIC. Upton Sinclair was himself inclined 
to answer questions about the future of the independent merchant in an 
EPIC Califormia with an assertion that he was in any case doomed to a slow 
extinction as the profit system underwent a process of remorseless self- 
abolishment. Sinclair argued that once the cooperetive colonies were 
set up,, the srall business man "will see it, and he will notice retail 
stores in the state system and the need for managers and people to work 
in these stores, and if he wants to come in and take a salary, and have 
9. Utopian'News, March l8s 1935. 
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security ... all right. Or he can stay outside; it is up to hid'. 
10 
Fundamentally, Upton Sinclair was really only interested in the creation 
of the primitive-socialist commune which could be isolated from the 
corruptions and decay of capitalist society; his thinking about what 
would happen in the world outside was loose and incoherent. The EPIC 
movement could not be contained within the intellectual mould made for 
it by Sinclair, however. Several hundred thousand Californians responded 
in 1934 to his message that prosperity could be restored, but they did 
not thereby all become believers in the socialist commune. On the one 
hand, as a mass political movement, EPIC needed to appeal to a wide cross- 
section of the huge Californian middle class. Especially in the run-up 
to the Noverber, 1934 elections, it made much of the idea that if the 
unemployed were "off the backs" of the taxpayers (a favourite expression 
of Epic'News),, and producing wealth in the land colonies and cooperative 
factories, then the whole of the state's economy would enjoy the surge of 
newly-released purchasing power. In the vision of the EPIC future 
presented on the eve of the elections, the independent merchants had not 
been extinguished$ or turned into cooperative managersq but were enjoying 
better profits than ever. 
11 On the other hand, expediency apart, the 
liberal, populist and progressive sentiments stirred by EPIC were such as 
made quite natural a disposition both to attack the Wall street chains and 
to come to the aid of the small merchant. Upton Sinclair may have thought 
the battle between chains and independents an irrelevance, but thousands 
who joined EPIC did not. When rumours were circulated that Gray's Dairy 
10. Upton Sinclairls_E pic Newss June 18,1934. 
11. Ibid., October 299 1934. 
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Farm, a business described as being 11100% Utopian, 100% Epic". was 
connected with a chain grocery company, the owner angrily advertised 
that anyone discovered spreading such a dire slander would be "prosecuted 
12 to the fulL-extent of the law" . Incurably rotten the profit system 
may have been, but EPIC-ites were evidently believed to consider some 
parts more rotten than others. Epic News itself carried plentiful 
advertising by small businesses, but declined to accept the copy of 
large corporations. At a local level, EPIC clubs often provided an 
opportunity for customers to band together and arrange with independent 
merchants to grant them discounts, in return for guaranteed purchases: 
cooperation of a sort, of course, but not quite that of the socialist 
commune. 
13 The EPIC Assemblymen "helped wonderfully"s in the opinion of 
one of the bill's most important backersq in securing enactment of the 
chain tax, and, Epic News itself hailed passage as a "victory" for the 
movement. 
14 Quite apart from their direct contribution, the election of 
the EPIC politicians itself heavily influenced the attitudes of the 
legislature as a whole, for it showed the other politicians that they 
would have to accept nany things hitherto considered unacceptable if they 
were to avoid another election like that of Noverrber, 1934. 
This indirect influence was seen especially in the Senate, where 
there were only two EPIC legislators. ror a tires the Senate Committee 
on Revenue and Taxation, a body of men of, for the most part, decidedly 
conservative instincts, seemed set to kill the chain tax bill. Leader's 
of the independent merchants took advantage of the political climate to 
try to persuade it otherwise, using a mixture of blandishments and 
threats. The president of the California Retail Grocerst Association 
12. Ibid. , Decenber 31,1934. 
13. Ibid.. Deceriber 24,1934. 
14. Craton, A Nation Chaineds p. 6; National Epic News, June 24,1935. 
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advised the committee against affording comfort to those who spread 
doctrines of "chaos and confusion": "It is up to us as good conservative 
citizens to realize that some thought must be given to an equalization of 
conditions and opportunitiess or I hesitate to think what the ultimate 
result may bell. When prompt action failed to come, his association's 
journal ddopted a more menacing tone. The Assembly, it declared$ had 
proved itself responsive to the "common people", but the Senate was 
obviously controlled by the corporations: because of this, the 
independents had "already started their campaign in various parts of the 
state to clean up this situation once and for all and they may not have 
the patience to wait until election tire to do so. It has brought-all 
independent business together for one stand cementing an alliance that 
wi" result in many changes beneficial to the great majority of people 
15 in this state" . As happened in several other states 
in 1935, 
independents maintained a constant presence at the Capitol and eventually, 
after threats to initiate a referendum petition to irpose a truly 
crippling chain taxt forced the bill through the Senate. The final 
obstacle faced by the independents was Govermor Merriam, who was known 
to be disposed to veto the bill. Hearings held by Merriam to clarify 
his mind resulted in "the greatest mass demonstration yet witnessed in 
these venerable halls" with two thousand people, mostly independents but 
with a sprinkling of chain store employees opposing the bill, crowding 
in to the Asserbly charber. Twice during an uproarious hearing Merriam 
threatened to clear the galleries. Obviously impressed by what he had 
seens the Governor duly signed the bi" , while reminding the chains of 
their constitutional right to submit the matter to a referendum. 
16. 
15. Califormia Retail Grocers' Advocate, April 12, May 24,, 1935. 
16. Los Angeles Times, July 12,1935; Lebhar, Chain Stores in Americas 
p. 240. 
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The peak of radical discontent was reached in California in the 
latter half of 1934. From that points the people gradually drifted back 
to "normalcy", leaving only a core of die-hards to keep alive the movements 
which had once created such a stir. Without doubt, this trend worked to 
the advantage of the chains during the year-long referendum carpaign. The 
more extravagant the movement, the more rapid was its demise. The Utopian 
Society disappeared almost without trace in 1936 and EPIC crumbled away., 
leaving only a rump of devoted advocates of the cooperative commonwealth. 
No longer appealing or responding to the demands of a mass following, 
this rump was free to indulge in a more puris. tics and more aggressively 
socialist, interpretation of the meaning of EPIC. The movement was, in a 
senses restored by the people to its founder Upton Sinclair and his true 
ideological disciples. Sheridan Downeys who as Sinclair's running mate 
in 1934 had actually polled more votes than his leader and was a liberal 
of more flexible and conventional disposition, declared his support -for 
the Anti-Monopoly League, regarding its struggle as being "for the 
preservation of democracy and decency in American life". 
17 But this was 
not the view taken by most remaining EPIC leaders. As early as Septembers 
1935 . an inflamed editorial 
in Epic News wamed against "entangling 
alliances" with "plausible gentlemen" representing groups such as 
"neighborhood grocers' leagues" or "independent oil operators" who offered 
to make "common cause" against big business. These were simply "little 
capitalists" and "EPIC is not interested in pulling any particular 
capitalist's chestnuts out of the fire for him. WE LOATHE THE WHOLE 
DAMNABLE SYSTEM". 18 In the approach to the referendum, the newspaper 
17. California'Petail Grocers' Advocates October 25s 1935. 
18. NationalEpic Newsq September 239 1935. 
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advocated a "No" votes thus reversing the 1935 position. Reasons cited 
included the opinion of Norman Thomas, the Socialist Party leaderthat 
chain store taxes were "stupid", and the similar view of the left wing 
ragazine*Tho New Republic; the alleged opposition of the California 
Petail Grocers' Association to union labour; that prices would rise, 
and that the "most monopolistic chains" such as filling stations and banks 
were not included. But the fundamental argument was that further 
concentration of wealth "would make socialization easier, as there would 
ultimately be only a few owners in each line of production and distribution 
of wealth, which could then readily be taken over by the State". A 
doctrine so contrary to the traditions of American liberalism inevitably 
drew some protest and, to mollify its criticso Epic News added its belief 
that it was not really the "little fellow" but the "big wholesalers" who 
wanted the-tax, asserting that only 480 independent merchants had 
contributed to the Anti-Monopoly League whereas thousands of dollars had 
poured in from big wholesalers in other statesP This was not just a 
charge made by Epic News., The obvious source of the facts, and some of 
the argurentss it used was a skilfully produced booklet, 'The'rifty_'Thousand 
fer Cent Chain Store'Tax% published by the California Chain Stores 
Association, the main thrust of which was that the independent retailers 
were being manipulated as a "popular front" by the t1cunning forces back 
of this ta)el . the "grasping wholesalers and brokers" - 
20 In earlier years 
the chains had often showed an arrogant refusal to accept that the public 
might be inclined to side with the independent merchants on grounds of 
sympathy or ideology, even though they patronized chain stores for their 
19. National Epic Newss October 5,12,19,1936. 
20. California Chain Stores Association, Inc. The Fifty Thousand'Per 
, 
Cent'Chain Store Tax, Los Angeles,, 1936, p. is 55-58, 
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low prices. Men like R. W. Lyons and G. M. Lebhar had commonly been close 
to despair in their efforts to impress on some chain executives that their 
political troubles were not just the result of the schemings of a few 
self-seeking politicians currying favour with the independent merchantsq 
but had a solid basis in popular prejudices. By 1936,, most chain store 
men had learned-their lesson. Far from attacking the independent merchants 
who had descended on Sacramento to back the chain tax, the California Chain 
Stores' Association tried instead to persuade the public that relations 
between chains and most independents were perfectly satisfactory, and that 
trouble was caused only by the machinations of various middlemen, especially 
those who were not even based in California or were themselves "big 
business". 
In terms of votes, the 1936 position of Epic News was probably of 
little significance. What mattered was that there was no longer a great 
mass movement, with hundreds of thousands of followers, to be mobilised 
behind the tax. Had the referendum been taken in November,, 1934, the 
spirit of discontent at the time would almost certainly have resulted in 
a crushing defeat for the chains, with the EPIC supporters voting for the 
tax. By 1936, the only movement of real weight in California was that led 
by Dr. Francis E. Townsend, who advocated $200 per month pensions for all 
at 60,, these to be paid for by a 2% "transactions tax" on every business 
transaction. According to the Townsendites, the scheme would be non- 
inflatory because the pension money, the spending of which was compulsory, 
would stimulate a colossal economic boom. There were in 1936, the peak 
year, about 2.2 million members of Townsend clubs, with by far the greatest 
concentration in Californias Townsend's home state,, where membership 
extend6d well beyond the ranks of the prospective pensioners. Economically 
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more fantastic than EPIC, the Townsend movement tended to be politically 
far more conservative, a fact exploited by Governor Merriam, who professed 
to believe in the plan himself. 
21 
Although some independent rwrehants in California were merrbers of 
Townsend clubs, owing to pressure from their customers and to a disposition 
to hope against hope that its "revolving money" economics might work9 the 
Townsend Plan was loaded with danger for them. As Congressman Boileau, 
Patman and others pointed out, the transactions tax was nothing more than 
a pyramided sales tax, which would be paid only once by the integrated chain 
which carried on its own manufacturing and wholesaling functions, but 
would have to be paid at each stage of the independent wholesaler-retailer 
system. 
22 This was a no doubt unanticipated consequence of the transactions 
tax, and the Townsendites did make some attempt to rectify the anomaly, 
though there were always so many different versions of the "true" Plan in 
existence at any one tire that it is impossible to say that the problem was 
ever really solved. The transactions tax was in any case just a giant sales 
tax, which would have posed stupefying difficulties for the hapless 
retailer, especially as the fanatical Townsendites were quite convinced 
that he would not find it necessary to pass it on to his customersq but 
would be able to absorb it in the manner of a commission paid for the 
creation of an extra volume of business, 
23 
21. Richard L. Neuberger and Kelly Loe,, An Army_-of*thA-'Aged, Caldwell, 
Idaho,, 1936, p. 62; Abraham Holtzmanq'The Townsend'Movemerit.,, A*Political 
Study,, N. Y. 19759 p. 49. 
22. An Army of the Agedq pp. 70-71s 103. 
23. During its first year of existence,, until late 1934, the Townsend 
Plan explicitly called for a federal retail sales tax sufficient to produce 
$24 billion for the "prosperity pensions". As total U. S. retail sales were 
only $25.7 billion in 1933, the Plan clearly implied a sales tax approaching 
100%. Finding themseives in an increasingly uncomfortable position, because 
they dared not spell out a size of the sales tax to the growing army of 
converts, the Townsend leadership invented the notorious "transactions tax! 1 
... . 
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Rlegardless of their opinion of the economics of the Townsend Plan, 
chain store men were well aware of the political influence of the 
Townsendites. The chains -in California "displayed pictures of Doctor 
Townsend and cooperated in many ways with Townsend clubs" in an effort 
to ingratiate thenselves. 
24 Safeway was by far the biggest advertiser 
in the Townsend newspaper, which had a huge circulation, and as the 
referendum drew near the advertising by it and the A&P in the California 
editions of the*Townserid'Natiozial'Wdekly took on such proportions that 
the nurber of pages had to be increased. (There wass in contrest, little 
chain advertising at the tire in the eastern editions circulating in states 
23. (conttd). ... to be levied on every business transaction. The 
new calculation was that a 2% tax on an alleged $19200 billion of 
transactions would produce the $24 billion needed to pay the $200 
per month pensions, and the theory was that the revitalising effects 
of the pensions would create new wealth and therefore be non- 
inflationary. Why, in that case, the pension was not made even bigger 
and given to everyone, was never explained. Much of the appeal of 
the transactions tax in fact lay in its pseudo-precision: anything 
more or less, the Townsendites claimed, would have been futile or 
disastrous. Appearing before the Senate rinancie Committee in 1935, 
Townsend was forced to admit that the transactions tax would favour 
the chain stores; following this, a revised version of the bill was 
introduced in the House which made intemal transactions of integrated 
companies also liable. The provisions of subsequent bills and statements 
of the Plan varied on this point, but in 1939., appearing before a House 
Committee, Dr. Townsend "dismissed the middleman and the small 
businessman as not worth preserving". Congressional supporters of 
the Townsend Plang many of whom favoured bills designed to assist 
independent merchantst were more inclined to see the dangers of the 
transactions tax than were the Townsend leaders themselves. (See, 
Holtzman, The Townsend Movement, pp. 38-90 96-8,114. Willis Owen 
Making Honey For The Merchant, Chicago, 1937,, was the official 
explanation of the plan for merchants, advocating the tax as a commission 
on sales). 
24. Luther Whiteman and Samuel L. Lewis, Glory Roads: - The'Psychological 
State of Califormia, N. Y. 19369 pp. 779 94. The hard-pressed utilities 
coupanies were often said to have worked with the Townsend movement 
in the Pacific Northwest for a similar reason. 
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where the chains had no tax -problem and Townsendites were few and 
uninfluential). Vendors of patent medicines for the elderly were the 
only other considerable advertisers in the Townsend newspaper. Although 
the Townsendite leadership took no open position on the referendum, their 
silence was itself worth a lot to the chains. Dr. Townsend alone could 
quite possibly have swung the result of the referendum, for his followers 
were noted for their blind obedience to "The rounder". Possibly the 
degree of chain store identification with the movement also convinced 
some that the chains were thereby "approved". 
The basic themes of the chain store canpaign were simple: the tax 
was a scheme dreamed up by grasping middlemen; the consumers would pay 
it - the slogan was 1122 Is A Tax On You', "; chains were fair competitors 
and in any case "have just about grown to their full stature in relation 
to independent business". As was by this time a habit, the chains put 
the price rises that would follow a "Yes" vote at 10%. The handbook 
published by the Chain Stores' Association asserted that the tax would 
"positively drive thousands of chain stores out of business"s especially 
small neighborhood food stores. The result would be higher property taxes 
on other taxpayers, and that outside investors would avoid the state as 
a bad risk. Every effort was made to counter the favourite anti-Wall 
street arguments of the Anti-Monopoly League by erphasising the local 
character of the chains. Managers and clerks were encouraged to, intensify 
their "community integration" work, and statistics were published showing 
how long erployees had lived in the same communities$ how many of them 
owned homes, voted and went to church. A favourite image in chain 
store advertising was the soulful face of "Grandma" See, an 82 year old 
widow who, at the age of 65, had begun a candy business, which had since 
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grown to 30 stores. "Do You Want To Put Me Out Of Business? " pleaded 
Grandma See in newspaper advertisements. The Anti-Monopoly League,, 
which bitterly resented this pushing forward of the local chains, had 
ample cause to regret that the tax schedule was such that the maximum 
license was imposed as early as the tenth store, with the result that 
no opportunity existed to try to split off the small chains from the 
large. Virtually every lodge, club, union local and other gathering 
was reached by the hordes of speakers laid on the Chain Stores Association: 
one speaker began his day with a Negro janitors' meeting at 4 a. m. 
Propaganda was also distributed through an elaborate network of "fronts" 
such as the "Consumers' Protective League". the "Property Owners' 
Association" and the "Associated Housewives League". With most of the 
press on their side, the chains were assured of ample publicity for every 
anti-tax resolution passed by any group of Californian citizens. 
25 
Particular attention was given to the farmers. Traditionally 
considered good friends of the chains, except for a few populistically 
inclined malcontents, the farmers had shown an increasing dissatisfaction 
with them during the past few years of depression. Egged on by 
commission men selling to the independent trade, some farmers had come 
to blame the chains - especially their commission houses, such as ACCO - 
for low farm prices. The November, 1935 convention of the California 
State Grange voted to endorse "legislation to curb expansion and to 
regulate existing chain stores in California" on the ground that "mass 
buying as practiced by chain stores is a menace to the farmer". rrank 
25. The Fifty Thousand Per Cent'Chain'Store Taxq pp. 8-14-, 25,67-8-j 
73; 'Printers' Inkq Novenber 199 1936, "BusiFe-ss Goes To The Polls"* 
The Nation, "How To Swing An Election'19 Decerber 11,19379 pp. 638-640; 
is Nation's Business,, "The Retail War On Main Street,, October 1936, 
pp. 20-229 96-8; California Retail Grocers' Advocate, October 9.1936. 
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Abernathy, president of the Farners' Union of San Jose, was a director 
of the Anti-Monopoly League. 
26 
In the first few rwnths of the referendum campaign, Lord & ThoTms 
interviewed four thousand farmers in "the search for mistakes". Then, 
in the Spring of 1936, the chains were presented with an opportunity to 
show their goodwill when California's peach growers were threatened by 
a glut of their crop. With impressive efficiency and unity (even the 
A&P. so often uncooperative in its relations with other chains joined 
in) the nation's grocery chains took up the surplus crop, at a profitable 
price to the farmers, and sold it off amid a fanfare of advertising. 
Following this display, John Logan arranged a conference in New York 
between the executives of chain grocery companies and farm leaders to 
thrash out their grievances. The meeting was chaired by C. C. Teague, 
vice-president of the National Cooperative Council, who was also the 
president of the Califormia Fruit Growers' Exchange, and it was an open 
secret that the purpose of the meeting was to negotiate a deal which would 
secure farm support in the California referendum. The result was a 
"Statement of Policy" in which the chains announced that they would no 
longer use farm products as loss leaders, a practice which the farmers 
believed, perhaps wrongly, worked back to force down prices to the 
producer, and that they would no longer demand brokerage or other special 
concessions from farmers. The chains also promised to put on further 
special drives to assist farmers faced by crop surpluses, and in the 
period before election day Nature provided the chains with the opportunity 
to assist Californian producers of beef, dried fruits and avocados in 
this way. 
27 Intense chain advertising in the state pledged that these 
26. California'Rdtall Grocer8'Advodate, Noverber 22, Decerber 6.1935. 
27. Lebharý Chain Stores In -America, pp. 2470 320-5,, 'AdVd igillgi&; S611ý1ý1, I rebruary 11,1937, "Inside Story of California Chain Tax War0l,, pp. 53-4; 
, 
Chain Store Age May 1936, "Nation's Chains Unite In Drive To Move Surplus 
Peach Crop". 
363. 
special drives would be continued and expanded after the referendum, 
while reminding growers that the grocery chains each year bought $230 
million of farm products in California 5' $89 million more than their 
total sales of all foodstuffs in the state. While not all farTers were 
irpressed by this demonstration of affection - the State Grange declined 
to overturn its 1935 endorsement of anti-chain legislation - the general 
impression, including in the Anti-Monopoly League, was that this farm 
strategy was a resounding success. This was confirmed on election day 
when small rural counties with a dominant farm vote proved the most 
heavily opposed to the chain tax. 
28 
It was a fundamental policy of the chains that the small retailers, 
as such, should not be attacked during the campaign, and that the fire 
should be directed instead against "middlemen" and the Anti-Monopoly 
League. 29 Safeway Stores eirphasised the anti-middleman theme by 
intensifying its efforts to wholesale to independent retailers, setting 
up the "Food Buyers' Association", a form of voluntary chain supplied 
from the Westerm States Grocery Co., the Safeway wholesale division. 
Hundreds of grocers in California were recruited to participate in this 
scheme, apparently finding Safeway a satisfactory and even-handed 
wholesaler. Naturally, this struck terror into existing voluntary chains 
and cooperatives, and to some extent confused and demoralised the 
advocates of the chain tax. Safeway's strategy appears to have been part 
of a broader national programme to combat chain taxation, for in the 
early months of 1936 several prominent grocery chain executives, including 
28. Sacramento Union, October 28,1936, "Our Pledge to California 
rarmers". by L. A. Warren, Safeway president; Transactions of*the 
Commonwealth Club of Californiag vol. XXXI No. 4, October 13,1939*9 
pp. 161-1949 "A Chain Store Tax - Yes And No". p. 186. 
29. Lebhar, 'Chain'Stores In America, pp. 245-6. 
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John Hartford of the A&P, suggested that they would retaliate against 
wholesalers who-pressed for chain taxes, and avoid paying such taxes, by 
converting to limited voluntary chain operation, if necessary selling or 
leasing the stores to managers. While militant opponents of the chains 
dismissed the threat to sell the stores to managers as pure bluff, the 
suggestion that the chains night make a major attempt to set themselves 
up as wholesalers in their own right did alarm some wholesalers. It 
strengthened the hand of those - such as the leaders of the National- 
American Wholesale Grocers' Association - who had for some time been 
advising that the chain tax might become a monster which wholesalers could 
not control. 
30 
7be chains were in the fight by this time with their gloves off. 
Quite ruthless methods were used to discredit the Anti-Monopoly League, 
and such passions were aroused during the campaign that there was an 
attempt at arson at the League's Los Angeles offices. Allegations given 
big press coverage, especially in the Hearst newspapers, that the League's 
chief fund-raiser was working on a 40% commission, did little to inspire 
the confidence of independent merchants. The League's money-raising was 
also hampered by the parallel activity of various unauthorised promoters 
who siphoned off resources and created a feeling of disillusionment and 
suspicion amongst the merchants. Squabbles between the different trade 
groups sponsoring the Leagues rivalries between different parts of the 
state, especially Los Angeles and San rrancisco, and an undercurrent of 
30. Business W6eko Jan. 11,19360 p. 9. March % 1936 p. 10; Interstate 
Grocer Jan. 11,1936; New York Times Jan. 120 1936; California'Retail 
Tr--ocer-91 Advocate June 19,1936. Following Hartford's threat,, T. B. Terrys 
the president of the National-American Wholesale Grocers' Association, 
reminded its annual convention that "at no tire have wes as an association, 
contributed to bringing about this situation... We realized that competition 
like the fabled hydra is many-headed and will grow new heads as necessity 
arises. The retail head may be cut off, but an even more terrifying head 
appears labeled "Wholesale"... " Terry warned that if advocates of chain 
taxation tried to move on to tax cooperating wholesalers and retailerst the 
only result would be to stimulate the spread of consumers' cooperatives, 
which the politicians would be unwilling to legislate against. (Modern 
Merchant & Gr6d6ry'World, January 25,1936). 
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fear that too. aggressive a campaign might lead to a public backlash, 
31 
all weakened the fighting strength of the organisation. At the same 
times many of the more, conservative merchants were reluctant to let the 
chain tax issue stand in the way of fulfilling their dreams of thorough 
trade regulation, under the state's generous fair trading laws. While 
Safeway led the offensive against the chain tax, it also gave every 
assistance to the-grocery associations to set up enforcement machinery 
to make the 1935 Unfair Practices Act effective. Other chains proved 
similarly cooperative. For about a year, the grocery trade used mainly 
"educational" methods to restrain price-cutterss but during 1936 the 
enforcement bureaus demonstrated an increasing willingness to use the 
courts, which in turn handed down a series of favourable decisions. 
Similarly, drug chains and independents were by this time working well 
together, albeit informallys to spread resale price maintenance. 'Thanks 
to California's early starts its fair trade law with the crucial "non- 
signer" clause having been enacted in 1933, before any other state., drug 
trade price maintenance was far advanced. By July, 1936 well over two 
thousand drug store items were price-maintained in Califomias and at an 
average margin, including discounts and allowances, of 35.84%. which was 
more than the NARD's historic demand for 33.1/3% 
?2 Some progress with 
price maintenance was also being made in other lines by this time. While 
nothing in these'price-fixing developments disbarred independents from 
pursuing aggressive anti-chain policies, this progress did take some of 
the wind out of the sails of the Anti-Monopoly League. Preoccupied with 
31. Cal-ifc5rmia'Retail'Grocers"Advocatt, March 27, June 19, August 14,289 
Septe-rb-er 4.11, October 30,1936; Western'Tobacconist, November 19369 "Vote 
"Yes" on 22". The Anti-Monopoly Leý"g__ue explained the 40% commission as 
including money for the provision of extra radio time, speakers, offices, 
etc. 
32. Grether'Ptice Control Under'Fair TraddIdgiglation, p. 102,, and see 
above pp-61-62,70-71. 
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the laborious job of setting up a complicated structure of price 
maintenance, in which it helped to have the cooperation of the chains, 
the trade associations, at the very least, had less time and energy to 
devote to the chain tax. The 1935 tax law was passed thanks to a sudden 
welling up of enthusiasm, much of which arose from the broader political 
climate in the state. Confronted by the much more drawn-out and 
intrinsically less rousing task of defending the tax in a referendum, 
independents tended to lose interest or return to their long-standing 
price-fixing preoccupations. Theys like California as a whole, were 
settling down by the latter part of 1936. 
According to figures filed with the State Treasurer, the Anti- 
Monopoly League collected a total fighting fund of $771,477. This 
compared with the $1,137,876 spent by the California Chain Stores 
Association. The difference in the amount of money spent by the two sides 
became most apparent in the closing weeks of the campaign when, just as 
the chain publicity was building to a crescendo, the Anti-Monopoly League 
was obliged to reduce some of its activities. One casualty was the 
regular broadcasting by the "Corner Store Philosopher" who "in a kindly 
drawl" told listeners of the harm done by chains to their communities: 
Lord & Thomas considered this the most effective of the ploys used by 
the Anti-Monopoly League, and were delighted when it went off the air. 
As the battle drew to a close, State Senator Chris N. Jespersen, the 
managing director of the Anti-Monopoly League, complained that ninety 
per cent of his time had been spent in trying to arouse the independent 
merchants themselves. He was, he confessed, "awfully, awfully tired of 
it". Only in San rranciscos where the trade associations were strong, 
did the pro-tax campaign really come alive in the final stages, that 
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city witnessing, repeated marches and demonstrations, and every grocerts 
truck carrying pro-tax slogans* 
33 
On election day itself, the chain-campaign reached its climax, 
with stores closing for the day and thousands of employees laying on 
free transport to the polls for their sMathisers. In all, 1,067,443 
votes were cast in favour of Proposition 22 and 1,339,778 against. 
Of the state's 58 counties only one, San Francisco, voted in favour of 
the tax. 34 
Without doubt, the chains had won the referendum by the intensity 
of their efforts. Chain taxes had previously been considered to be a 
matter of only mild interest to the public as a whole, but more votes 
were cast,, for and against, on Proposition 22 than on any other issue on 
the ballot that year, save only the vote for President of the United 
States. The total vote for Proposition 22 would have been enough to 
secure victory in ordinary circumstances, but the chain store side had 
gone one better. Polls taken by Lord & Thomas some time before election 
day which showed a majority in favour of the tax may perhaps be discounted 
as coming from a source with a vested interest in magnifying the impact 
of its own efforts; however, a poll taken by the American Institute of 
Public Opinion in different sections of the country in August, 1936, 
indicates a greater opposition to chain taxation on the Pacific Coast 
than elsewhere, a circumstance attributed by the Institute to the growing 
influence of the chains' referendum campaign. 
35 
33. Itterttate'Merchant December 26,1936; Lebhars Chain'Stores'in 
, 
America, pp. 251-2; California Retail Grocers' Advocate, October 23, 
Noverber 6.1936. 
34. Lebhar, 'Chain'Storer; in-1merica, p. 250. The independents won quite 
comfortably i7n San Franciscog by 132,687 votes to 99,, 208, (SanFranci5co 
roxiidle,, November 4.1936). 
35. The American Institute of Public Opinion survey asked "Are You In 
Favor of Legislation Requiring Chain Stores In Your State To Pay Special 
Taxes? " The proportions answering "Yes" were: 61%, Pacific; 65%. 
Mountain; 67%9 New England and 70%,, Southern and Central States. The 
000 
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The referendum was virtually the death knell for militant anti- 
chain activity in California. Although there was much talk at first 
about "taking the chains to a third round" in 1937 and of "revenge" 
against some who had made themselves particularly obnoxious in siding 
with the chains, including the Hearst press and the State chamber of 
commerce, not very much developed from this. California trade associations 
continued to give support to harrassment of chains at the federal levels 
but in their own state they were more inclined to follow a "gentlemen's 
agreement" under which chains and independents refrained from attacking 
each other. Most trades found compensation for the defeat in an ever- 
expanding application of the statets fair trade and unfair practice laws. 
In the history of relations between chains and independents in California, 
the years 1935 and 1936 stand out in isolation as a time of unique strife, 
much as the mid-1930's were a period of exceptional political instability 
in the'state. 
Independents elsewhere, in looking at the result of the referendum, 
took some consolation in the thought that California was in some respects 
different. Its people were,, as George Schulte put it, "not loyal" because 
so many of them were recent settlers. San Francisco, the oldýcity of 
established neighbourhood loyalties had voted for the tax. Nevertheless, 
even Schulte had to concede that the chains had won a "big victory". 
36 
35. (cont1d) ... polling organisation attributed the Pacific Coast figure 
to the influence of the chains? referendum campaign. A statewide poll 
taken for the chains in California in August showed 42% of the people in 
favour of the tax, 28% against and 30% undecided; earlier. test polls 
indicated that few knew 'much about the tax, and that those who did favoured 
"taxing the chains out of the state". (Beckmann and Nolen, 'Thd'Chain'Store 
Problem., A'Critical Analysi . 242; 'ChAin Store Age, Deýember 19 New York 'Times. November 15 0 19 
P; 
6). 
36. Intor8tateTerchant,, November 7.1936. See also E. T. Grether, 
"Mar, k-et Factors Limiting Chain Store Growth" in Harvard, Bugindss-Review, 
7- vol. 10, April 1932, pp. 323-31, a discussion of why, in 1929,, acc rding 
to the Census, the single store grocer still enjoyed 63.4% of the grocery 
00* 
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Chain. store men were naturally elated. The result was, Wheeler SaTrnons 
of the Institute of Distribution asserted, a "warning to pressure. groups 
of middlemen'and politically minded retailers that against their organized 
minority stands the heretofore unorganized majority of the consumerý'. 
7be result would, Sammons believed, "give the legislators the information 
they have wanted, but which has never heretofore been available to thed's 
The'Ntw'York'Times agreed, suggesting that the politicians "should ask 
themselves whether they have not been deceived by the agitation of 
organizations representing small storekeepers into believing that the 
opposition to chain stores is much wider than it really is". The New 
York'Times even thought that the vote should encourage revision or repeal 
of the recently-enacted "ill-advised Robinson-Patman Act". 37 
36. (cont1d) ... business in San Franciscog whereas over the bay in Oakland his share was only 33.2%. Grether suggested (and was guided in this by trade opinion) that: (1) San Franciscans required more 
service because of hilly topography which discouraged cash and carry; (2) a more stable population, with neighborhood loyalties; (3) greater 
racial and ethnic mixture, with well-entrenched specialist independents 
catering to their own people; (4) San Francisco was an "organization" 
city,, with strong trade associations which had long forcefully spoken 
up for the virtues of patronising the independent merchantg and had 
also provided the basis for the development of cooperative advertising 
and buying groups. In Oakland the grocers were relatively disorganised 
and fewer of them were members of voluntaries or cooperatives. Grether 
considered the grocery chains to be well-established in San Francisco 
only in middle-class apartment house districts with floating populations. 
This general pattern, it may be noted, was repeated in other trades 
also. 
37. New York Times, November S. 6s 1936. 
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ii. Chain Tax Laws of 1937 
Following the United States Supreme Court's invalidation of the 
1930 Kentucky graduated sales tax, in the'Stewart case, the other four 
surviving graduated sales taxes from pre-1935 were struck down in state 
courts or repealed. 
1 Independents were able to accept the loss of this 
small group of tax laws with equanimity, as casualties of the period of 
experimentation. They were much less happys however, with decisions 
handed down by the Florida Supreme Court and a Federal District Court in 
Iowa which ruled unconstitutional the graduated sales features of the 
two 1935 "double-barrelled" laws, on the authority of the Stewart 
decision. 2 These decisions seemed to ignore the obvious fact that the 
Iowa and Florida laws, unlike that under consideration in the'Stewart 
case, were aimed only at chain. stores, and anti-chain campaigners had 
every hope of a reversal of the Iowa decision, which was appealed to 
the U. S. Supreme Court. 
In the events on Noverber 9s 1936, less than a week after the 
California referendum votes the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of 
the lower court, by a margin of 6 to 2.3 As there was no opinion, it is 
difficult to understand exactly why the Court decided the case the way 
it did. In the Stewart, caseq Justice Roberts, speaking for the Courts 
1. Stewart Dry Goods Co. V. Lewis. '294'U. S. * 550; 'Safeway'Stores v. 
Vigi12 57 Pac. (2nd) 287 (Supreim Court of New Me Great Atlantic 
& Pacific Tea Co. v. Harvey, 177 Atl. 423 (Suprem Court of Vermont); 
Schuster & Co. v. Henry, 261 N. W. 20 (Suprerm Court of Wisconsin). 'Rinnesota repealed its graduated sales tax in 1937 in anticipation of 
an unfavourable ruling in the courts, and replaced it with a graduated 
license tax. 
2. State Ex. Rel. Lane Drug Stores v. Sirpson, 166 So. 227 and State 
Ex. Rel. Adams v. Lee,, 166 So. 249 (Supreme Cýurt of Florida); Great Xt--lantic & Pacific Týa Co. v. 
- 
Valentine, 12 Fed. Supp. 760 (District 
Ct. S. D. of Iowa,, Noverber 199 1935)* 
3. Valentine v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 299 U. S. 32. 
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had emphasised that the objection was that the statute "ignores the 
form of organization and the method of conducting business" in that 
the tax applied to all retail sales, without being based on a separate 
classification of chain stores. The Iowa Law had been framed 
specifically to meet that objection, the tax being imposed only on sales 
of stores in excess of one. 
4 Thus it was not a general retail sales tax 
but a true chain tax, calculated not by number of stores alone, but by 
volume as well. As the number of stores was arguably a less reliable 
indicator of the advantages inherent in chain store operation than the 
volume of business which those stores produced, the statute seemed to 
accord well enough with the criteria previously established by the Court. 
The opinion of the District Court so ineffectually skated over this point 
that it was incongruous that the Supreme Court proceeded to affirm its 
decision without any explanation. 
5 Having admitted the right of states 
to tax chain stores out of existence in the West Virginia case, the 
Court was proving exceedingly pernickety about the exact method that 
could be adopted. 
The Court's position appears less awkward when its actual flesh and 
blood divisions are considered. Brandeis and Cardozo dissented from the 
decision in the Iowa case, thus maintaining their record of voting in 
favour of the constitutionality of every chain tax law brought before 
the Court. Van Devanters Sutherland,, McReynolds and Butler were equally 
consistent in their opposition to each new extension of the chain tax. 
Justice Stone was indisposed and did not sit on the case. Only Roberts 
and Hughes, therefore, the two 11swingers"s had taken a contradictory 
position as between the "power to destroy" West Virginia case and the 
4. See aboveg pp. 213-214, 
5.12 Fed. Supp. 760,765. 
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pernickety Iowa decision. Once again, a chain tax case was a microcosm 
of the Court's dilemma on many social and economic issues in the New 
Deal period: its decisions lacked an absolutely clear guiding philosophy, 
and for that reason lacked conviction and credibility, because not nine 
men but two were making up its mind. Nine learmed men may require 
profound and weighty reasons to rove and act in concert, but two men, 
burdened with other concerms, and perhaps deciding an individual case by 
a quick rule of thurb,, ray be swayed by lighter causes. 
Chain store men were well enough aware of this not to rush to 
premature conclusions that the Court had begun to retreat on the chain 
tax issue. Their caution was amply justified when, six months laters 
the Court handed down the last of its important chain tax decisions, 
finding constitutional Huey Long's 1934 law taxing chain stores in 
Louisiana according to the nurber of stores operated by the chain anywhere. 
6 
This time Hughes and Roberts voted with the liberals Brandeis and Cardozo 
to produce a4 to 3 majority. (Neither Stone nor Van Devanter took part 
in the decision: had they done so, the vote would presumably have been 
5 to 4). The opinion. written by the "moderate" Roberts, added little 
of substance, perhaps, to the previous decisions of the Court, but in 
spirit it seemed to indicate an acceptance by the majority of the sort 
of arguments expounded in the past only by Brandeis. Roberts explicitly 
related the right to irpose chain taxation to the police power of the 
state, in the exercise of which "the state may forbid, as inimical to 
6. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. -Groslean, 301 U. S. 412 (May 179 
1937). Roberts argued that "if the competitive advantages of a chain 
increase with the nurrber of its component links, it is hard to see how 
these advantages cease at the state boundary". 
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the public welfare, the prosecution of a particular business or 
regulate the business in such manner as to abate evils deemed to arise 
from its pursuit". The state, it appeared, no longer was obliged to 
put the chain stores out of business by indirection, with its eyes 
shut, under the pretence of raising revenue: it could say that the 
chain stores were an evil and dispose of them under its police power. 
7 
In the space of but four years, therefore, the majority had travelled 
practically the whole distance, at least in respect of graduated license 
taxation, marked out for it by Brandeis in his one man dissent in the 
Florlda chain tax case. While the Louisiana decision can be seen as 
a natural next step for the Court, there was perhaps some significance 
in the fact that it was made right in the middle of the famous "switch 
in time that saved nine" by which the Court wrecked Roosevelt's plans 
to "pack" it with his own appointees. In a sequence of decisions in the 
Spring of 1937 Justice Roberts sided with the liberals to produce 5 to 
4 majorities for New Deal legislations effectively reversing some 
recent decisions of the Court. The full-blooded quality of Roberts' 
opinion in the Louisiana case might suggest that it was influenced by 
his new liberal mood. Thens on May 18, one day after the Louisiana 
decision was given, the conservative Justice Van Devanter announced his 
resignation from the bench. Van Devanter's resignation helped to ease 
the constitutional crisis, but it did not help the chains. They lost a 
reliable opponent of anti-chain legislation and saw him replaced by 
Justice Hugo Black, who was not only on the liberal wing but had also, 
when U. S. Senator from Alabama, delivered himself of attacks on the 
economic concentration and destruction of opportunity caused by the 
7. Ibid.,, P. 426. 
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chain stores. The slight flicker of hope kept alive for chain store 
men over the years by the thought that all the key Supreme Court decisions 
had gone against them by only one vote was finally extinguished. 
8 
One week after the Supreme Court's ruling on the "double-barrelled" 
Iowa law, and less than a fortnight after the California referendum, the 
South Dakota license t, ax of 1935 was also lost in the courts, on a 
technicality. This had been, along with the 1935 Texas statute, the heaviest 
gx, aduated license tax ever adopted. 
9 Thus, in a short period of disaster 
in late 1936, the independents saw nearly all their chain tax prizes of 
the great year of 1935 snatched away from them. As the 1936 legislative 
sessions had produced little of consequence - it being an 'off' year for 
many state legislatures 
10 
- the independents were really back where they 
had been immediately after the Supreme Court's decision in the West Virginia 
case in early 1935, but with the important difference that the chains were 
now fully active in defending themselves and had proved (in the California 
referendum) that they had plenty of friends. 
There were many teTiptations for the independents not to rejoin the 
chain tax battle in 1937. In Deceuber, 1936, the U. S. Supreme Court 
approved the Illinois and California fair trade laws, thus opening the way 
to the enactment of similar legislation everywhere. About the same time, 
the National Food and Grocery Conference Committee, after months of 
dithering, finally produced a model unfair sales bill for the trade in the 
B. Leuchtenburg, Pranklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, pp. 236-7; 
Congressional Record, Vol. 720 January 8.1930. 
9. Barnsdall Refining Corp. v. Welsh, 269, N. W. 853 (Supreme Court of 
South Dakotas Novenber l6s 1936). The House Journall-indicated that the 
bill had not in fact received the necessary 2/3 majority. The legislature 
enacted a replacement chain tax in 1937s but with a top rate of only $2501 
compared to the $750 maximum of the 1935 tax. 
10. Kentucky and Mississippi enacted graduated license taxes, the top rate 
being $300 in both cases. 
375. 
several states to copy or use as a basis for their own bills. The 
widely-publicised success of the California trade, especially the 
grocery trade, in setting up enforcement bureaus to operate the 1935 Unfair 
Practices Act stirred great interests as did the benevolent attitude 
assumed by the courts. 1937 proved to be the peak year in the spread of 
trede regulation laws,, with 28 states enacting fair trade laws and 12 
unfair sales or unfair practice laws. The chains were not happy with some 
of the provisions worked into a few of the unfair practice laws, but in 
general they offered no resistance to the construction of this immense 
edifice of trade regulation. Even the department stores$ so vocal in 
Washington in their opposition to resale price maintenance, were rather 
half-hearted in opposing fair trade laws in most of the states. With, 
at most, only fitful criticism coming from any other important interest 
groups,, the trade had an easy time of it in most states in pushing through 
these laws. Such experience compared favourably in the minds of many with 
the brutal and hazardous struggles involved in forcing through chain tax 
laws. 
No less important was the return of prosperity. In 1937, most 
independent merchants found business better and competitive conditions 
more relaxed than at any time since the depression began. What is more, 
the figures published by the Department of Commerce and the reports of 
the 1935 Census of Distribution, which began to appear towards the close 
of 1936, made it clear that the onrush of the chains at the expense of 
the independent sector had come to a halt. Indeed, in the grocery and 
drug lines, the source of much of the militant anti-chain activity, the 
independents had actually clawed back some of the ground lost in the early 
19301s. The "chain store menace". in the sense in which it had been 
understood in the 19201s. was no more. The militants argued that the time 
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was ripe to close in for the kills while the independents were strong 
politically and before the chains had a chance to stage a recovery, but 
inevitably some of the old urgency had gone out of the rhetoric. The 
anti-chain movement was a movement of attack, an anti-chain offensive, 
but much of the emotion on which it thrived was generated by the purely 
defensive desire of independents to save themselves and their way of life 
from extinction. As soon as it seemed possible that that desire might 
be satisfied without the enemy being utterly destroyed, many merchants 
became attracted to the idea that the trade would do best to seek an , 
accommodation with the chains. The anti-chain movement had a political 
momentum which would keep it going for two or three years more, but in 
1937 there began to appear the first definite signs of a withering away 
of anti-chain militancy at grass-roots level and of a cooling of the 
political temperature. 
Root and branch fundamentalism was nevertheless still strong enough 
among the independent merchants of Florida in 1937 for them to turm the 
Florida Recovery Act into the most vigorously contested issue in that 
year's legislature, as it had been in 1935. The compromise "double- 
barTelled" chain store tax won by the Better Business Association in 
1935 was mutilated by the Florida Supreme Court with the result that all 
that was left was the graduated license feature and a uniform sales tax 
of one-half of one per cent on all retailers. 
11 The programme of the 
11. See the cases cited at note 2. above. Robert H. Givens, the author 
of the Recovery Act, called the mutilation "a construction which was 
unquestionably well founded in good law" and insisted that such disasters 
were the inevitable consequence of all compromises with evil, such as chain 
taxation or Robinson-Patman- For Givens, it was the Recovery Act or 
nothing. (Outlawry of Chain Stores, pp. 58-62). The Florida Supreme 
Court got round a provision i 935 law requiring the doubling of the 
license fee rates in the event of the graduated sales tax feature being 
invalidated, by leaving intact the bottom rate (0.5%) of the sales tax. 
The Court did not so much rule on the validity of the law before it, as 
rewrite it. 
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Recovery Act supporters in Tallahassee, led by Senator Henry Tillman, 
was to press hard for adoption of the Recovery Act but, as a safety net, 
also to offer bills to replace the mutilated 1935 law with a stiff 
graduated license tax modelled on thelouisiana-principle. Tillman also 
introduced an unfair sales bill which provided for a compulsory mark up 
of cost plus 6%. 
As in 1935, the House passed the Recovery Act, with provisions for 
a popular referendum at the next general election and that the Act should 
take immediate effect if the Supreme Court hold the referendum requirement 
unconstitutional. Once againt the Senate proved the stumblifig block. In 
1935 it had crippled the Recovery Act with amendmentss and then left it 
to die in conference committeeg but this time the Senate grasped the nettle 
and voted the measure down, adopting a motion made by Senator S. L. Holland 
to postpone consideration indefinitely, albeit by the narrow margin of 18 
votes to 16. In the course of the debate preceding the-critical vote, 
Senator S. L. Holland, the main foe of the Recovery Act as in 1935, made 
much of the apparently waning powers of the Better Business Association. 
He advised his apprehensive fellow Senators that the Association had made 
the most intense efforts to defeat him at the 1936 elections, but had 
failed, and that it was "as impotent politically as is a blind, dumb and 
deaf person". He pointed out that the Association had been unable to 
produce "the army" of supporters with which it had besieged Tallahassee 
in 1935, and also noted that the same measure had been rejected by the 
legislatures in neighbouring Georgia and South Carolina. At the same tire, 
Holland was able to demonstrate that he was no enemy of the independent 
merchant. He had introduced, in cooperation with Senator Fred Touchton, 
himself a leading supporter of the Recovery Act,, a fair trade bill and 
a bill to repeal the much disliked flat rate sales tax which was the legacy 
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i 
of the rutil-ated 1935 chain tax law. Holland argued that the merchants 
were no longer in favour of the Recovery Act, and would be taken care of 
by his bills,, whereas the enactment of the Recovery Act would have 
disastrous consequences for consumers and for farmers, whose produce 
would be boycotted by the chains in retaliation. 
12 
After the Senate vote on the Recovery Act, Tillman announced that 
he had no plans to resuscitate it. It was, in fact, the end for that 
particular piece of fundamentalist anti-chain legislation. Tillman's 
chain tax and unfair sales bills also failed of enactmenti, the latter being 
voted down by the Senate partly as a gesture of disapproval not for the 
bill itself but for the inconvenience and pressure to which Tillman had 
subjected it over the Recovery Act. In contrast,, although Senator Holland 
failed to secure the repeal of the flat rate sales tax, largely because 
the Governor wished to see that source of revenue maintained, he was able 
to steer his fair trade bill to victory. Thus, after three years of 
agitation, the Better Business Association had been able finally to 
produce nothing but a moderate ($400 top rate), graduated license tax and 
a flat rate sales tax which was an irritating burden on all merchants. It 
was Senator Holland, its main enemys who could claim to have done most for 
the merchants,, by turning rlorida into a resale price maintenance state. 
Just as in California, anti-chain militancy had ultimately proved futile, 
whereas the more measured and moderate course of trade consensus and fair 
practice legislation had produced definite gains. 
13 
While the spread of trade practice laws in 1937 was rapid, the chain 
tax movement faltered. Eight states enacted chain tax laws, but the 
general level of taxation adopted was very modest. Although their right to 
12. Tloricldlimes--ýUriion,, May 5.69 149 18,27,1937. 
13. Ibid.,, May 5.14s 189 259 27, June S. 1937. 
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tax the chains out of existence had been confirmed by the U. S. Supreme 
Court, the state legislatures were clearly reluctant to exercise it. Two 
states, Georgia and Minnesota, incorporated in their statutes special 
provisions to tax branches of mail order houses at much higher rates than 
other chain stores. 
14 Tennessee also experimented with a new type of tax, 
in which the fee was assessed according to the floor space occupied by 
chain stores, although the license imposed - $3 on each 100 square feets 
or major fraction thereof, of each store in excess of one - was a slight 
burden to most types of chains. Otherwise, the states kept closely to the 
well-tried pattern of the graduated license tax, with none of them 
adopting a maximum per store rate above $500. 
is 
This highest rate was imposed in Pennsylvania, whose chain tax was 
undoubtedly the most important enacted in 1937, because of the size of the 
state and because it was an Eastern state. 
16 The circumstances surrounding 
passage of the so-called Store and Theatre Tax Act were somewhat unusual. 
Although many small merchants sent their endorsements of the bill to the 
legislators, it received little organised trade backing and there was 
certainly no "march on Harrisburg! ' or other such ranifestation of coordinated 
zeal. Indeed, there was much less trade activity than there had been in 
14. Georgia (Laws. 1936, No. 355) required a $200 maximum fee on each chain 
store in excess of 409 but a maximum of $10,000 on each mail order store in 
excess of 4; Minnesota (Laws of 1937, chp. 93),, required a maximum fee on 
ordinary chain stores of $350s on each in excess of 150, but the maximum 
rate for stores operated by mail order cotpanies was $1,200 on each in excess 
of 10. Of minor interest is a variation in the 1937 Montana law (jaw_-S-at 
19375 chap. 199) whereby chain filling stations and lurber yards were taxed 
at lower rates than chain stores, rather than being exempted altogether as 
was the case in many other states, 
15. Tennessee-. Laws of 1937, chap. 108. 
16. Pennsylvania. Laws of 1937% Pub. Act 344. The top rate of $500 was 
irposed only on stores in excess of 500, with the result that only the A&P 
and theAmerican Stores Co. had any stores liable at the maximum rate. 
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favour of an unsuccessful chain tax bill in 1935. The powerful and 
conservative Pennsylvania Retail Grocers' Association actually opposed 
the bill, as it had consistently opposed chain taxation. The Association 
was motivated partly by fears that the politicians would, once given a 
precedent for taxing retailerso prove insatiable and seek to tax 
independent merchants at ever higher ratess and partly by a concern, 
for which there was no justification, that the state would try to bring 
voluntary chains under the provisions of a chain tax law. But the crux 
of the Association's objection was the argument that "the most, sinister, 
destructive and dastardly threat to the individual merchant today" was 
not the chain store but the price-wrecking supermarketsl many of which 
were individually-owned. Relations with the big chains like the A&P 
and American Stores were generally good and, especially in the Philadelphia 
area where the Food Distributors' Association had brought together chains 
and independents, much was already being done to restrain price-cutting 
wars, even without the legal sanction of an unfair sales law. What the 
grocery association wanted was an Unfair Sales Actq which the legislature 
obligingly gave it in 1937. The druggists, and other interested trades, 
also had the opportunities provided by the state's 1936 fair trade act to 
distract them. 17 In contrest to this generally lukewarm attitude of the 
independents to the chain taxl the chains fought frantically hard and 
succeeded in mobilising a certain amount of organised opposition to the 
18 
bill, especially from farmers. 
17. Penrisylvariia'G_roder, February 1937 pp. 14s 28; June 1937 pp. 4-5; 
Harri-sburg'PAtriot, February 27,1935. 
18. But the Pennsylvania State Grange, as part of a programme of liberal- 
progressive policies,, favoured the chain tax. (POiTilylVaiiia 'Gtazigd 'News 
February 1937, p. 5). 
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Enactment was in fact due al=st entirely to the personal efforts 
of Governor George Earle. The Governor considered a chain tax to be an 
integral part of his "Little New Deal" for Pennsylvania, as a means of 
getting back from the chains "a small part of what has been trickily evaded 
in the past" and because it "protects the little fellow, and if our system 
of democracy is to continue we must have a great many small capitalists - 
not just a few big ones". Earle had first tried to put a chain tax bill 
through the legislature in 1935, his first year in office, but had failed 
because of the intransigence of the Republican-controlled Senate. The 
1936 elections gave the Democrats a majority in both House and Senates thus 
clearing the way for the "Little New Deal". Neverthelessq Earle still had 
to fight for the chain tax bill: when it faltered in the Senate he made it 
a piece of "must" legislation and demanded party loyalty. As a resultq the 
Senate passed the bill on party lines, by 33 votes to 14, with only one 
Democrat voting against and two Republicans voting fore 
19 
The grocery chains reacted dramatically to the tax threat. A few 
days before Govermor Earle signed the billo the A&P and the American 
Stores Co. abruptly closed 150 stores in Philadelphia. Spokesmen for the 
companies stated that the stores closed were those which made insufficient 
profit to pay the new tax, and that the closures were final and would be 
followed by hundreds more. As a representative of the American Stores Co. 
put it, "We have removed the goods and fixtures, locked the stores up and 
returned the keys to the owners in the hope they may be able to find some 
new tenants". 
20 In 1926, back in the golden years when the chains ruled 
19. Modern Merchant & Grocery World, April 10,1937; Harrisburg Patriot 
May 13,25, June 2,1937; Pittsburgh'Press, May 11,1937; 'New*Reýublic 
August 18,19370 pp . 38-40s 'Pennsylvania Under Earle' by Bruce Bliven. Bliven approved of Earle's "baby Wagner" labour relations law, his 
unemployment compensation law and his legislation protecting civil liberties 
and regulating public utilities, but he did not care for the chain tax. 
20. Time Magazine, "Chainsters' Tussle",, June 14,1937 p. 70; New York 
Tires, June 2.39 1937. 
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the roost, his company had made an average profit per store of $4,890; 
by 1937, after a decade of steady decline, that figure had fallen to 
only $692. Weighed down by labour troubles and social security taxes 
and harTassed by the competition of voluntary chains and the new 
supermarketss the American Stores Co. regarded the imposition of the $500 
chain tax - which Governor Earle had claimed could easily be taken from 
the bloated profits of the chains - as the last straw. Its response was 
to accelerate the weeding out of hundreds of the old-fashioned, long- 
established little stores which it had planted throughout the Commonwealtho 
and to concentrate on larger stores, especially supermarkets. For the 
A&P the course adopted was essentially the same. 
21 Up to a point, the 
fears that the Pennsylvania Retail Grocers' Association had advanced about 
the chain tax were confirmeds for the tax did encourage the trend to 
supermarket operation. The major chains did not use their still small 
nuTrber of supermarkets for price wars, howevers for they had too many 
remaining small and uneconomic units of their own left as hostages of 
their competitors. Neither had they any wish to engage in impossible battles 
with the powerful and efficient voluntaries and cooperatives which were 
now more than capable of striking back. As the independent grocery trade 
had not sponsored the bills relations remained good, although the prevention 
of loss leader price-cutting received a serious setback in 1939 when the 
courts invalidated the 1937 Unfair Sales Act and a new Governor, Arthur H. 
Jamess a conservative Republicans vetoed a substitute bill. 
22 
1 
21. Modern Merchant & Grocery World, April 10) 1937; March 5,, 1938; 
February 18,1939. 
22. Pennsylvania Grocer,, July 1939, p. 4j 18-21; Noverber 1939, pp. 4-6. 
The Ch7a-ir-n-tax was ruled unconstitutional by the State Supreme Court in 
1939. See below, p. 407-408. 
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Passage of the Pennsylvania tax law demonstrated to chain store 
men that they were by no means out of the woods. It stimulated a flurry 
of activity among independents in several northeastern states, including 
New York and New Jersey, who nurtured ambitions of achieving a similar 
breakthrough. It also proved that, in these tires of political flux, no 
state, no section of the country could be considered entirely immune from 
the anti-chain virus. 
23 This quickly became a consideration of importance 
when Wright Patman introduced his federal chain tax bill, for it suggested 
that it might not be totally beyond the realms of possibility, given the 
right configuration of political and economic conditions, for the Texan to 
cobble together enough votes from the industrial states to add to his more 
solid support from the South and rural Midwest to drive some sort of bill 
through the House of Representatives. 
iii. The Patman "Death'Sentencell Bill 
During the course of the campaign for the Robinson-Patman bill, 
Patman made it clear that his ultimate goal was to break up the "interstate" 
chains and confine their operations to the boundaries of one state. 
However, twenty months elapsed between Roosevelt signing the Robinson-Patman 
bill into law and the introduction of the Patman "death sentence" measure. 
There were three basic reasons for this hiatus. The first was that in 
1937 Patman was sidetracked by his alternative projects to which he had 
committed himself during 1936, to divorce manufacturing from retailing. His 
original idea of bringing about a total divorce between the two functions 
23. A small compensation for the chains came in Maine,, which repealed 
its modest 1933 chain tax law, apparently following an understanding 
between the Maine Development Commission, the A&P and rirst National 
Stores that the chains would promote the sale of Maine potatoes in return 
for repeal. ACCO handled most Aroostook county potatoes, even those 
sold to independent grocers, and the legislature was persuaded by the 
argument that this promise of promotion was worth more than the $439,000 
which was all the revenue produced by the chain tax. (Interstate'Merchants 
May 1,, 1937). 
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actually had to be abandonedo because it provoked so much criticism from 
the thousands of small concerns around the country which did a certain 
amount of manufacturing or retailing incident to their main business. 
Consequently, early in 1937, Patman introduced a bill which sought to 
prevent manufacturers from selling at retail only where "the effect... may 
be substantially to lessen competition between such manufacturer and his 
customers... " In this watered down form the bill was of primary interest 
only to tyre dealers - Patman enjoyed a close relationship with the officers 
of the NAITD - who were customers of big tyre companies like Goodyear and 
Firestone which also ran their own retail chains. This bill received 
hearings in the winter of 1937-8. but generally it failed to create much 
excitement and no action was taken on it. 
1 
The second cause of delay was that the Miller-Tydings bill, to free 
resale price maintenancelcontracts from the threat of the Sherman law, held 
the "inside track" for legislation on behalf of the independent merchant in 
Congress in 1937. This bill had been held back in 1936 in order to assist 
the passage of the Robinson-Patman bills and it automatically came to the 
top of the agenda in the following year. rair trade fever was at its height 
in 1937, and the flood of state laws in the early months of the year, in the 
aftermath of the U. S. Supreme Court decision in December, 1936 upholding the 
California and Illinois fair trade statutes, made the Miller-Tydings bill a 
doubly urgent matter. Patman himself identified prominently with the bill, 
even though he had previously been critical of resale price maintenance 
and all devices, such as the FTC's trade practice conference proceedings, 
which could be used as a cloak for price-fixing. His new position was that 
Congress should pass the Miller-Tydings bill regardless of its own opinion 
1. H. R. 47229 75th Cong., Ist Sess.; Interstate'Mero-hants January 160 
Decerber 11,1937. 
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on the merits of fair trade, because it was purely an enabling measure 
which would permit the states to give effect to their own policy on the 
question. 
2 This relaxed view of legislative responsibility was widely 
shared in both House and Senate and the bill commanded fairly general 
acceptance, only Emanuel Celler staging an assertive,, full-blooded 
opposition. However, the hostility of Roosevelt made for a rather 
difficult legislative passage, the bill ultimately being enacted only 
through the dubious method of attaching it as a rider to the District of 
Columbia appropriations billg which Roosevelt had no option but to sign. 
Until the Miller-Tydings bill became law, there was no real opening for 
any other major piece of legislation on behalf of the independent merchant. 
Significantly, Patman's first definite statement that he intended to 
introduce a federal chain tax bill was made simultaneously with the 
successful conclusion of the Miller-Tydings canpaign in the middle of 
August 1937.3 
The third obstacle in the way of quick action was that neither Patman 
nor anyone else had a concrete legislative proposal prepared which could 
accouplish the "death sentence" objective. The most obvious approach was 
a federal chain tax, which could be modelled on the graduated license taxes 
approved by the U. S. Supreme Court. In June, 1937, Martin Dies, Patman's 
colleague from Texas, offered a bill in the House seeking a graduated license 
tax for the District of Colurbia. This was the first chain tax bill offered 
on Capitol Hill since Emanuel Celler's unsuccessful measure in 1932,, and it 
2. House Judiciary Ctte., "Hearings On ... Resale Price Maintenance", 75th Cong., lst Sess., January 27-9.19370 pp. 20-22. Patman effectively took 
control of the price maintenance forces in the House even though, in 
defending the Robinson-Patman bill in 1935t(HJC9 Hearings$ p. 14) he had 
contrasted its purposes with the old Capper-Kelly bill which "gave the 
thriftless and the lazy the same benefits as the fellow who was industrious 
and energetic". 
3. Interstate Merchant, August 21,1937. 
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was seemingly an attempt to test the waters for a federal chain tax. If 
so, it was a successful test, for although the bill was not strongly pressed 
in the Senate, where it was lost in committee, it was adopted by the House 
by 131 votes to 53 with the minimum of discussion. 
4 In August, Patman 
indicated his intention to introduce a federal chain tax measures but then 
he suddenly switched round to the view that the best strategy would be to 
offer an amendment to the Clayton act which would specifically confine 
retailing businesses to the boundaries of a single state. Despite the 
obvious incompatability of such an amendment with the general character of 
the Clayton act and with the antitrust law doctrine that "mere size is no 
offense'19 numerous Congressmen aasisted Patman in drafting a bill, and a' 
final draft was reported as being ready at the beginning of 1938.5 Then, 
in a further abrupt reversals a chain tax bill was substituted. Patman 
later stated that the change had been made because the Clayton act amendment 
would probably have been considered unconstitutional, and because "we did 
not want them (the chains) to be broken up like the Standard Oil and then 
put together under one common management or holding company". Another 
possible reason for the change was the thought that the composition of the 
House Ways and Means committee, to which a chain tax bill would be referred, 
was such as to rake it likely to prove relatively sympathetic. Whatever 
the reasons behind these fluctuations in strategy, the fact remains that it 
was not until the very last minute that Patman finally decided on the form 
his "death sentence" bill should take. 
6 
4. Congressional Record, vol. 81, pp. 59369 5983 (June 17-189 1937); 
Interstate Merchants July 10,319 1937. 
5. Interstate Merchant, October 2,, 1937s January So 193 8. 
6. Congressional Record, vol. 84, pp. 345-7; House Ways & Means Cttee., 
subctte. Hearings on H. R. 1 ... An excise Tax On'Retail Storess 76th Cong. 9 3rd Sess., 1940, p. 115; Business'Weeks February 5.19389 p. 18. 
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H. R. 9464, introduced on February 14,1938, was basically a 
graduated license tax, but with the graduation ascending to dizzy heights 
never attained in any state law. The schedule had two components. The 
first was a graduated licenses on the Louisiana principle which rose from 
a minimum of $50 on the 10th store to $1,, 000 on each store in excess of 
500 anywhere in the United States. The "death sentence" component to the 
schedule was a multiplier provision whereby the total tax was to be 
multiplied by the nurber of statessincluding the District of Colunbia, in 
which the chain had its stores. Thus a chain like the r. w. Wo6lworth Co. * 
operating in every states would be liable to a tax of $49,000 on each of its 
stores in excess of 500. Entirely exempt from any payment were chains of 
less than 10 stores, or with a gross annual business of less than $250,000; 
wholesale chains; facilitiess such as cafeterias, maintained by common 
carriers; branch offices maintained by newspapers for taking advertisements 
or distributing their papers; filling station chains which did not sell 
tyres and tubes, and voluntary chains. Two years were allowed before the 
tax was to take full effects so that, as Patman explained, chain store. owners 
could "straighten out their affairs". 
7 
Patman argued that the Robinson-Patman lawlwas not enough, because it 
"does not prohibit interstate chains from diverting net profits from stores 
in one town to sustain the ruthless selling at below cost by chain stores in 
another town until independents are driven out of business from town toý, 
town". His new bill would, he claimed, curb the "interstate desperadoes" 
by serving to "substantially restrict retail distribution to the boundaries 
of one state". Patman emphasized repeatedly that there was no intention 
to hurt the local chains which kept their profits at home, and that the 
7. H. R. 9464 was re-introduced as H. R. 1 in 1939 and 1940. 
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real weight of the tax would fall on about 20 big interstate chains. As 
an example, he suggested that the A&P would be reduced from its existing 
sprawlings bloated condition to a modest 500 stores, all in one state. 
(He presumably meant New York). It would then be up to that state to decide 
whether or not it wished to allow a chain of that size to survive within its 
own bordersý 
8 In fact,, H. R. 9464 was totally unsuited to the task of 
confining chains within one state, though it was undoubtedly capable of 
delivering a "death sentence" to some chains. The difficulty with it was 
that, as with all graduated license taxation, the burden fell disproportionately 
on those chains with large nuribers of small and unprofitable stores, notably 
the grocery chains. The levels of tax were quite clearly sufficient to 
wreck the A&P. and perhaps to restrict it to the scale of operation forecast 
by Patman. However, Sears, Roebuck* the chain with the second largest sales 
volume, could actually have met the tax, had it been collected in 1938, from 
its net profits, and still have been left with a considerable surplus. Even 
within the same lines of business9 the construction of the tax schedule was 
such that chains faced a widely varying burden regardless of their volume of 
sales or ability to pay. Thus while Sears, Roebuck could have escaped 
anything worse than a heavy raid on its profits, J. C. Penney, merely because 
it transacted its business through a large number of modest small town stores 
rather than through full-scale department stores in large and medium-sized 
cities, faced a ruinous exaction. Similar-sized chains in the same line, 
such as Kinney and Endicott-Johnson, faced dramatically different tax bills,, 
owing to nothing more than the accident of the geographical location of the 
stores. All the disparities and inequities long familiar from state chain 
taxation wereg thanks to the astronomical rates and the multiplier provisions 
inflated to grotesque proportions. The disparities inherent in the schedule 
8. Congressional Record, vol. 83, pp. 1534-56 1955-80 1986-7; Daniel 
Bloomfield, ed.,, ChaiTýtores and Legislati '(The Mferened'Shelf, vol. 12 no. 7, N. Y. 1939)9 pp. 335-6. 
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made no difference to the solidarity of the chains in opposing the billq 
but they did make a nonsense of Patman's often-repeated theme that the 
purpose of the tax was to confine retail businesses to the boundaries of 
the single state. 
9 
9. Impact of H. 'R. ' 9464'on selected leading'chains'(1938 figures . 







l H. R. 9464 
Annual Tax. 
$ 
V. J. A&P Grocery 129000 40 I 991199114 471j6200000 
Endicott-Johnson 
*2 
Shoe 401 4 8579191 805,600 
Firestone 
*2 Auto 664 49 51,2589041 2292709500 
Accessories 
First National 
Stores Grocery 21,350 7 297059191 1409830500 
Goodyear 
*2 
Auto 626 41 660129423 179076,500 
Accessories 
W. T. Grant Variety 491 38 21,766s424 lOs7319200 
G. R. Kinney Shoe 328 37 1516503 594209500 
S. S. Kresge 
*3 Variety 679 27 81,9979051 12,, 6769500 
Kroger Grocery 30992 19 39741,569 7198679500 
Liggett 
*2 
Drug 552 36 5181,432 1293309000 
Melville Shoe 639 40 19484jO61 179180,000 
Montgonr-ry Ward 
*4 
Gen. Merch. 575 46 1906449956 1698139000 
Newberry Variety 476 45 197929741 1291009500 
J. C. Penney Gen. Merch. 1,541 48 l3s7390160 639912jO00 
Safeway 
*3 
Grocery 29873 22 492060781 58j5970000 
Sears. Roebuck 
*4 
Gen. Merch. 492 46 2393549364 1390310800 
United Cigar-Whelan Cigar and 614 36 6960531 1495629000 
Stores *5 'Drug *6 
Woolworth 
*7 
Variety lj864 49 2895849944 8190709500 
*1. Estimated U. S. Stores; earnings for U. S. and Canadian stores corbined. 
2. Earnings of parent company; separate figures not available for retail 
stores. 
3. Corbined earnings for U. S. and Canadian stores. 
4. Includes mail order earnings. 
5. Including sales to independently-owned agency stores. 
6. Deficit. 
7. Corbined earnings U. S., Canadian and Cuban stores. 
(Source: Institute of Distribution, "Keep Market Street 
Open",, Appendix B, In House Ways & Means Ctte. s subctte., Hearings on H. R. l.. An Excise Tax On Retail'Stores 76th 
Cong. 9 3rd Sess., 1940, p. 652). 
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This somewhat hit-or-miss "death sentence" was no private whim of 
Patman's. Dozens of Congressmen were consulted during its preparation, 
and Patman claimedq when the bill was first introduced, that 150 Congressmen 
had already signified their approval. H. R. 9464 was officially co-sponsored 
by 75 Congressmen, including Patmang from 33 states. 
10 In the following 
months, the trade coalition which had spearheaded the Robinson-PatTran drive 
in 1936 was reassembled, support for the "death sentence" coming from the 
NARG, NARDj NRHAj NAITD and the United States Wholesale Grocers' Association, 
as well as from the Independent Bankers' Association, an organisation of 
small town bankers opposed to branch banking. This was a strong alliance. 
At its centre stood the NARG, the largest trade association in the country 
and which claimed to have added 200000 new members in the 12 months to Junes 
1938, and the NARD,, which was widely considered in the wake of its fair 
trade successes to be "the Nation's most powerful trade association today". 
" 
After Robinson-Patman and Miller-Tydingss no one could any longer dismiss 
this alliance as a collection of "Ishmaelites". 
The inveterate enemies of the chains eagerly welcomed the bill as 
likely to produce the cli mact6ri c-: struggle with their foes. It would means 
warned J. H. McLaurins "war in deadearnest". George Schulte was of the 
opinion that the chains would "sink or swim on its defeat. Likewise the 
independent retailers, wholesalers and manufacturers, especially of the 
12 local typef will survive or become victim of chain store monopoly" . But 
just how solid was the trade support for the bill? Much depended on the 
political weight of the NARD and the NARGj but the position of these two 
10. Nev: 'York Times, February 159 1938. For the nares of the co-sponsors, 
see AppendixIYO P. 460. 
11. Business Week, August 28, l937, p. 42. 
12. Wholesale Grocer'News,, June l938,, *Intdr6tat6 Merchants March 12,, 1938. 
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associations was not without its ambiguities. Although the 1938 NARG 
convention gave Patman a rapturous reception, by no means all of the 
officers, the men who actually regulated the association's activities 
between conventions, were so keen to remain tied to his demagogic style 
of leadership. Retiring president Charles E, Smith openly expressed the 
apprehensions of the more conservative element within the association at 
the 1938 convention, warning, in a speech containing long passages taken 
from that delivered by E. S. Berthiaume, NARG president at the tire of the 
Henderson agitation, that "no group can conduct both a war and a 
constructive program at the same time, and with the same forces... " In 
1930, the conservatives had favoured the alternative course of the trade 
practice conference: in 1938, their preferred strategy was an intensified 
effort to secure enactment of the National Food and Grocery Conference 
Committee state unfair sales bill, which had been approved by the National 
Association of Food Chains. In the early months of 1938 the attractiveness 
of this strategy was seriously reduced by the price wars - the worst since 
1932 - which spread through the grocery trade as a consequence of the 
savage recession, lasting from the Septerber of 1937 to the early summer 
of 1938,, which abruptly interrupted the nation's gradual but orderly 
recovery from the depression. As was usual, independents blamed the chains 
for the price-cutting, especially the A&P which was busily opening cut- 
price warehouse stores and supermarkets in many cities and adopting an 
ambivalent attitude towards anti-loss leader legislation. Had the chains 
really been tamed, or were they about to begin a return to the worst of 
the price wars and ruthless methods of the 1920's? Many grocers agreed 
with Roger S. Flournoy, the secretary of the Texas R. C. A., that the chains 
had just been "playin' a little possum until they were ready. And then 
they cut loose ... If the chains had been satisfied, maybe it wouldn't have 
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been necessary for Congressman Patman to push his new national chain 
store bill. But they weren't and the new law has to come". To Schulte, 
the reckless chain price-cutting was convincing proof of the old adage 
that "He whom the gods would destroy they first make mad". It remained 
a distinct possibility, however, that once the worst of the recession and 
the price-cutting which it had produced was over the more conciliatory 
atmosphere of 1937 would be reestablished, and a more conservative attitude 
prevail within the NARG. . 
10 
The situation within the NARD was somewhat different. The zealotry 
of the leadership was unquestioned. It was the determination of the rank- 
and-file to lend effective support to the "death sentence" which was in 
doubt. By this time, the druggists had achieved fair trade legislation in 
nearly every state, and it remained only to capitalise on this long 
dreamed-about situation by securing a structure of maintained prices. In 
this task,, the assistance of the chains was essential, as drug chain 
executives were well aware. The chains were, conplained NARD executive- 
secretary John Dargavel, "sending emissaries into the ranks of the 
independent druggists ... trying to sow the seed of the idea that a fight for 
this legislation will be detrimental to the rair Trade movement ... They are 
attempting to reach some of the leaders,, some of the "key men" in the 
various states ... offering them positions or other remuneration if they 
will use their best efforts to discourage support of this legislation... 
I do not like to admit it, but the chain emissaries have been successful 
in sore instances... " The comparative absence of price-cutting in the 
drug trade during the recession thanks to fair trade was a potent reminder 
to druggists of what they had gained by cooperating with the chains. 
13. Inters. tato'Merchant, February 19, June 25,1938; ' M6ddxTi 'Merchant & 
Grocery World., August 13, 1938; ' N. Y. Jril. of'C6=fxýrce, May 20,, June 241,1938. 
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7hus although only two state pharmaceutical associations, Mode Island 
and New Jersey, actually repudiated the NARD executive's endorsement of 
the Patman bill during 1938, the retail drug trade noticeably failed to 
generate the fervour in favour of the "death sentence" which had enabled 
it to secure the fair trade acts. 
14 
The underlying weakness of the trade support for the bill was that 
the rank-and-file panic about the chains was gradually ebbing away. The 
national associations, having won great triumphs in Washington in 1936 and 
1937, naturally were inclined to try their luck for something more in 1938. 
There was, however, something increasingly formals ritualistic, even 
affected about the attacks on the chains now made by independent leaders. 
There were in 1938 no great paradesq rallies or other manifestations of 
rank-and-file enthusiasm for the Patman bill. Neither was it much of an 
encouragement to the co-sponsors of the "death sentence" that only 19 , 
chain tax bills were offered in the state legislatures, with only one stateg 
Mississippi, passing a chain tax statutel and that being merely a revision 
of its moderate 1936 law. Significantly, the circulation of George 
Schulte's newspaper, in the past always a reliable indicator of the anti- 
chain temperatures failed to show any increase in 1938, even though the 
I'moment of truth" had supposedly arrived. 
7be trade coalition supporting the I'death sentence" was actually much 
the same as that which had got behind the Robinson-Patman bill. There 
were nevertheless some vital and obvious differences between the two measures 
which could not fail to influence Congressional thinking. The Robinson- 
Patman bill had carried forward the r-ecommndation made by the rTC to amend 
Section 2 of the Clayton act; in contrast$ the rTC had explicitly rejected 
14 Drua'Tradd 'News, April ll,, June 6.1938; ' NARD'Journalq August 18s 
Oc; ober 6,1938. 
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the idea of a federal chain tax as likely to lead to higher prices, 
15 
Similarly$ the Robinson-Patman bill, while generally discussed as an 
anti-chain measure, was couched in the language of established antitrust 
law, and attacked only the abuses of size, not the right to operate a 
large business. The only recent remotely comparable precedent for the 
"death sentence" bill was the Wheeler-Rayburn utilities holding coTrpany 
measure, enacted in 1935. The holding companies, widely condemned for a 
wide range of abuses and as a parasitic excrescence on the power industryp 
had enjoyed little sympathy from public opinion, but the same could not 
be said of the chains, as the California referendum had shown. Even in the 
extraordinary political circumstances of the "Second Hundred Days", and 
with enorrmus administration pressure behind it, the utilities "death 
sentence" bill had had an extremely rough passage,, and had only been enacted 
in considerably weakened form. Indeed, the struggle over the Wheeler- 
Rayburm bill had been one of the key events in the revival of a more 
conservative mod on Capitol Hill,, a mood which was dominant in both Houses 
by 1938.16 
It was, of course, alarming to chain store men that 75 Congressmen 
could be found to co-sponsor a "death sentence" bill. These 75 were, 
however, unrepresentative of opinion in the House as a whole. They came 
disproportionately from the liberal, populist and progressive end of the 
political spectrum, and only eight of them represented northeastern states* 
17 
15. FTC, Chain Stores, Final Report, pp. 91-2. 
16. Hawley, 'The New Deal and the Problem'df 'Monopoly, pp. 329-337; James 
T. Pattersoný Congressional Cons e rvati8 m'an_d__tFe 'New 'Dd al '- The'Growth of 
the Conservative Coalition in Congress 1933-399 19679 pp. 40-41. 
17. All eight from the northeastern states, four of whom came from 
Pennsylvania, were very much to the Congressional left. Seven of them were 
Democrats, the one Republican, James C. Oliver, being a liberal who had 
captured his party's nomination in rock-ribbed Maine in 1935 thanks to the 
unusual political circumstances of that year and the active and influential 
backing of Father Coughlin. (New York Times, March 13,1935). In later 
years he sat as a Democrat. One of the eight from the northeast, Mrs. 
Caroline O'Day, a close friend of President Roosevelt, subsequently withdrew her support for the Patman bill, an event seen by some as an indication that Roosevelt looked upon the bill with disfavour. (Business'Week, July 2, 
-1938 p. 21). 
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A similar imbalance had been evident in the House Robinson-Patman caucus 
in 1936, but on that occasion the irbalance had mattered less. The earlier 
bill had enjoyed a general acceptance which the much more extreme "death 
sentence" obviously did not. More importantly, perhaps, the political mod 
had changed. The years of popular discontent which had thrown up such 
phenomena as Father Cox's hunger march, Huey Long's Share-Our-Wealth 
movement,, Upton Sinclair's EPIC, the Townsend pension plan and rather 
Coughlin's National Union for Social Justice, were over. The rout of third 
party insurgency at the 1936 general election,, when the Union Party 
candidate William Lerke polled only 882,479 votes in the entire countrys 
ended fears that rather Coughlin, Huey Long's self-appointed successor 
G. L. K. Smith and Dr. Townsend could translate their immense popular following 
into an effective political force. 
18 Ironically, Roosevelt, who received 
the endorsement of every state except Maine and Vermont in the election, 
actually lost his hold over Congress in the wake of the election, for 
conservative legislators no longer feared that something wome might come 
about if they resisted the experimentation of the administration. During 
1937 and 1938 Roosevelt attempted little that was new and radical, and was 
humiliatingly rebuffed by a now more conservative and self-confident Congress 
in those few major projects - such as packing the Supreme Court and the 
reorganisation of the executive branch of government - that he did undertake. 
This donservative trend in Congress not only discomfited the administration: 
it undermined the activities of all those within Congress of populist or 
progressive leanings who had thrived in the climate of upheaval and change 
created by the New Deal. The chain store issue was not one which fitted - 
as did, say,, labour or welfare issues - into a straightforward pattern in 
18. William Lerke was a menber of the Robinson-Patman bill steering 
conmittee and one of the "death sentence" cp-sponsors. 
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which liberals were normally on one side of the argument and conservatives 
on the other. Conservative Southern Democrats could sometimes be found 
hand-in-hand with Western Progressives and Republicans in their attacks 
on the Northern "octopus",, just as many Eastern liberals, impressed by the 
modernism and efficiency of the chains,, were often corpelled to conclude 
that this was one area in which they had to take the same side of the 
argument as the most rock-ribbed Eastern Republican. Nevertheless$ there 
was no doubt that the stronger were the liberal and radical curTents in 
Congress, the better were the chances for anti-chain legislation. 
The definite support for the bill in the House was known, but the 
attitude of the Senate remained an imponderable. The bill was not 
introduced in the Senate, and so no steering committee of co-sponsors was 
formed. Borah, who commanded the left-of-centre ground in the Senatet and 
whose support was perhaps vital, immediately declared that he "sympathized 
with the objective" of the new Patman bill. 
19 But other Senators who had 
in the past been vocal in their criticism of chain stores were generally 
rather guarded in their response, unwilling to commit themselves one way or 
the other before it was necessary. With the new conservative strength 
particularly evident in the Senateg it was from the first unclear that the 
Senate would prove amenable to a "death sentence" bill even if the House 
were to pass it. 
Whether the "death sentence" was constitutionally acceptable was 
also open to question. Patman assumed that a federal chain tax would be 
held constitutional because of the freedom to tax the chains out of 
existence extended to the states by the Supreme Court in the West Virginia 
and Louisiana cases; and, as the Court had traditionally been more 
19. New'York Times, February 15,1938. 
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indulgent towards federal taxing statutes anyway, it was not an 
20 
unreasonable assumption. Chain store men, who in the past had-cried 
"unconstitutional" almost as a reflex action, were no longer willing to 
put any trust in the courts,, and in fact accepted that they would have to 
beat the "death sentence" politically if they were to beat it at all. 
However, granted that the Brazideisian philosophy had triumphed in the 
Louisiana chain tax case, something of a paradox was involved in the 
assumption that the "death sentence" would be held constitutional. To 
Brandeis, it was an article of faith thatq just as big business was bad, ý 
so too was big government: his belief was that the states, not the United 
States, should settle their own destinies. Whenever federal legislation 
designed to accomplish something of which Brandeis approveds but involving 
an imposition of a policy upon the statess had come before the Court, one 
or other of these articles of faith had had to be temporarily suspended. 
Not infrequently, as decisions on New Deal legislation had shown, Brandeis 
and the liberal wing of the Court as a whole had elevated the protection 
of the constitutional prerogatives of the sovereign states above any 
consideration of a possible general good to the United States arising from 
the imposition of a policy "from above" by the federal government. The 
states had enjoyed the right since the West_Virginia decision of January, 
1935 to tax the chains to "death sentence" levels, but only Iowa and 
Florida had made the attempt, and even they had given up after being 
1 20. The main precedent was somewhat antique: Veazid, B=k, v. 'Fenno. 
8 Wall. 533 (1869). where the Court upheld a 10% federal tax on state 
bank notes even though this was liable and intended to drive such notes 
out of circulation. More recent wa8, Mo-C=a 'v. 
_U. 
'S. 'l95'U. S. 27 (1904)0 
upholding a federal tax of 10% on coloured margarine even though this 
amounted to a prohibition on sale. These were not particularly satisfactory 
precedents for an attempt to destroy by federal taxation some of the 
largest business enterprises. in America. Sees George H. Brown, "A Note 
On The Federal Taxation of Chain Stores" irlZril. 'of Business, vol. 139 
January 1940, pp. 74-86, and Orme W. Phelps, "The Supreme Court and 
Regulatory Taxation" in'Jnl. of Business., Vol. 14, April 1941,, pp. 99-126. 
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frustrated at their first effort. That being so, how could the federal 
government legitimately core along and irpose its own policy upon the 
states? There was not even any possibility of arguing that the federal 
government was assisting the individual states by acting in a field of 
interstate commerce which might be beyond their reach, for, as a result 
of the Louisiana decisi. ono any state was free to single out the "interstate 
desperadoes" like the A&P and Woolworth for special punishment by taxing 
them more heavily than the local chains. It would seem that the "death 
sentence" could have provided an opportunity for the Supreme Court liberals 
and the conservatives who had never been reconciled to chain taxation 
anyway to join forces to reject an attempt to coerce the states. 
21 
There could not be any real assurance in this line,, of masoning, 
however. Much of the New Deal had consisted of an attempt by the federal 
govermment to impose uniform national policies in fields which had 
traditionally belonged to the states, and the Supreme Court had progressively 
abandoned its resistance to such coercion in the face of insupportable 
political pressure. 
22 In view of the fact that the Supreme Court had already 
shown itself as being favourably disposed towards the principle of chain 
taxations there was no particular mason to suppose that it would suddenly 
pick up this issue to defy the Congress. rurthermore , the argument was ' 
21. The Patman "death sentence" was also, it may be noted, discriminatory 
as between the several states. It was intended to drive the interstate 
chains back to the boundaries of a single state, and was obviously capable 
of forcing the A&P,, Woolworth etc. to retreat to a few key states like 
New York and Pennsylvania where their main concentrations of stores already 
were, and where it would be possible to run large nunbers of stores without 
falling foul of the multiplier provision by crossing too many state lines. 
Thus small states like North Dakota, Oregon and Arkansas which had never 
seen fit to enact state chain taxes would be arbitrarily deprived of the benefits of mass distribution. 
22. Compare Bailey v. ' Drexel rdrnituro Co., '259'U*'6* 20 (1922) with 
National Labor'Relations Bd. v. Jones Lattjhlin'Steel'C-c5rp,. q 301'U. S. 19 (1937). 
399. 
essentially a circular one. It was obviously most unlikely that Congress 
would pass the "death sentence" unless anti-chain agitation revived to the 
level of the early and mid-thirties, or exceeded it, in which case numbers 
of the states would themselves likely be taking "death sentence" action 
against the chains simultaneouslys thus reducing the force of the argument 
about the denial of states' rights. On the whole, the balance of probability 
favoured the presurption that if the chains lost the political argurent 
they would also lose the legal one. Such had been the situation through 
the whole history of chain taxation, the courts not holding out when the 
political pressure became sufficiently intense. However, as the Suprerm 
Court's rejection of the "double-barrelled" Iowa tax had shown, the chances 
of any variation in the taxing method being found acceptable were always 
difficult% indeed impossible, to assess with any degree of confidence. The 
constitutional problem was not the highest hurdle in the way of the "death 
sentence" bill, but it was just one more obstacle, each of which had to be 
cleared without sturbling, strewn along an already hazardous course. 
23 
23. Among the lesser possible objections to H. R. 9464 were: (1) the 
exemption of the first nine stores. In the 1920's. laws exempting 
small chains of four stores were held unconstitutional, though the 
Supreme Court had never passed on the question and might well have 
thought differently. (2) In the 1933 Florida chain tax case, Li, &e-tEt 
v. Lee, the Supreme Court had ruled invalid a multiplier provisfoýn whereby 
the tax was increased if the chain operated in more than one county, 
However, the three liberals had dissented forcefully, and it was their 
philosophy in respect of chain taxation which had subsequently predominated. 
What is more, the majority in Liggett v. Lee had emphasized the 
arbitrariness of basing the multiplier o-n---tYe county, a flimsy unit of 
political, administrative and economic identity. The same objection could 
not be advanced in respect of a tax multiplied by the nunber of states, 
for great slabs of the law relating to business were premissed on there 
being fundamental distinctions between businesses acting across state 
lines, and those which were purely intrastate. (3) What was the 
strongest political argument against H. R. 9464 - that it would confiscate 
business, cause economic dislocation and force up prices, was, of course, 
the least persuasive from the judicial point of view, though that is not 
to say it might not have influenced a close decision. 
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In retrospect, the Patman "death sentence" may seem a futile 
enterprise, doomed to failure if only because it was introduced at a 
time when the anti-chain movement was already in a state of terminal 
decay. But chain store men did not feel so sure at the times especially 
in the early months of 1938 when the "Roosevelt recession" evoked nervous 
recollections of all that had gone on just two or three years earlier. 
Patman had made good on his menaces in the pasts and no bill with 75 
co-sponsors could be taken lightly. While these 75 were, only'a small 
proportion of the House of Representatives as a whole, the percentage of 
Congressmen sponsoring the bill was noticeably higher from those states 
where the independents were particularly active. Four of the five man 
Florida delegation in the Houses for instance, were co-sponsors, thanks 
no doubt to the influence of the Better Business Association. Equally, 
the list of co-sponsors was far from being a reliable guide to the full 
strength of Congressional interest. Only two Missouri Congressren were 
co-sponsors, but Schulte was ableg by the October, to name seven of the 
13 ran House delegation who had made definite statements that they would 
vote for the bill. 
24 Very few Senators and Congressmen went out of their 
way to attack the bill - once again, Emanuel Celler proved the rast vocal 
defender of the chains - and chain store men were well aware that fence- 
sitters might topple over the wrong way if anti-chain agitation revived. 
The enemies of the chains were also considerably excited for atime 
in early 1938 by an outbreak of antimonopoly oratory among menbers of the 
Roosevelt administration. When the Republicans eagerly took revenge for 
the epithet "the Hoover depression" by labelling the vicious 1937-8 
recession "the Roosevelt depression", prominent administration figures 
like Harold Ickes-and Assistant Attorney-General Robert H. Jackson hit 
24. Interstate Merchants October 22,1938. 
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back by blaming the recession on the rmnopolistic tactics of big business. 
Roosevelt had always had a weakness for the old Brandeis-Josephus Daniels- 
Samuel Untermyer school of antinonopoly liberalism, and in giving a free 
hand to these attacks he inspired hopes that he might look with-favour on 
the Iýdeath sentence". ratran claimed unequivocally that his bill was 
giving expression to the President's wishes, a claim which he atterpted to 
prove by stringing together various, mostly irrelevant, quotes from 
Roosevelt speeches. While Patman's scissors-and-paste method of constructing 
his thesis was incapable of convincing anyone, anti-chain zealots wondered 
whether the administration might not decide to slaughter a few scapegoats 
to ease public concern about the recession. 
25 Old Brain Trusters like 
Donald Richberg and Raymond Moley forcefully condemned the "death sentence", 
which was obviously a contradiction of everything they had attempted in the 
days of the NRA. 
26 Yet even in 1933, when the Brain Trust approach was at 
its zenith, Roosevelt had unleashed tirades against big business and its 
evil ways of which the mst eager trust-buster might have been proud. In 
early 1938, the antimonopolists were seemingly mra influential in the 
President's counsels than at any time previously and those who advocated 
planning by government in concert with big business were out in the cold. 
27 
25. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of'Monopoly, pp. 390-5; 
Interstate Merchant, December 18,1937; January 8s February 19,, 1938. 
Samuel Unternyer, famed for his work as counsel for the Pujo committee's 
"Money Trust" investigation of 1912, was at this tire acting as general 
counsel for the "Empire State Independent Retailers and Wholesalers 
Association", which campaigned for a chain tax bill at Albany in 1938. 
(New York Tires, July 12,1937). 
26. Bloomfield, ed., Chain Stores and TApislation . pp. 110-5; Newsweek September 5,1938. 
27. It should not be supposed, however, that there was a simples clear- 
cut division between "planners" and"antitrusters" on the chain store 
question. In the Houses Maury Maverick of Texas led a small group of 
left-wing planners, the "mavericks", which argued for a programme of 
planned "production for use", using machinery similar to the NRA and AAA, 
but to achieve full output rather than restricted production, and with 
governments labour and consumers to play a major part in the plannings 
rather than leaving business to regulate itself. Three of this group 
(Maverick himself, Robert 0. Allen of Pennsylvania and Jerry J. O'Connell 
of Montana) were co-sponsors of H. R. 94641, and a fourths Henry G. Teigan 
of Minnesota, an active advocate of the bill. (Hawley, rhe New Deal and 
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As well as firing - salvoes . at big business , the , administration. seemed 
to be interested in cultivating small business sentiment. Commerce 
Secretaxy Daniel Roper su=mned representatives of the nation's small 
business men to a convention in Washington in early February,, one thousand 
"little fellows" attendi. ng. According to critics, the delegates were 
llhand-pi`6kedllýfrom ano. ng those known or thought to be sympathetic to the 
New Deal; if that was so, it lent added point to the fact that the small 
business conference voted support for the "death sentence" bill. 
28 In the 
wake of the conferences'small, business, organisations sprang up all over the 
country, most of them basing their main appeal on being either for or 
27. (cont'd)... the Pr2blem of Mono'Doly pp. l82-3: -C0tgrd9Si0nal'R6d6rd 
vol. 839 pp. 2305-7). Similarlys the Minnesota rarmer-Labor party had 
tended to drift away from the old style trust-busting idea during the New 
Deal period,, favouring instead the extension of social control over key 
aspects of the economy so as to facilitate "production fbr use". But the 
party supported chain taxation and fair trade laws, as being in keeping 
with its philosophy of decentralising and keeping in local hands those parts 
of the economy,, such as farming and retailing, which were seen as being 
the natural province of the independent "little fellow". This support for 
the independent merchants was also combined, somewhat awkwardly, with the 
advocacy of consumer cooperatives, of which Minnesota had imre than any 
other state. Four of the five rarmer-Labor party delegation in the House 
were co-sponsors of H. R. 9464 (the fifth being Henry G. Teigan) and the 
1938 convention of the party subsequently endorsed the bill. (Congressional 
Record, vol. 83, pp. 2305-7; The Progressive, April 99 1938). In the 
spring of 1934, the party, then at the high point of left-wing fervourt had 
gone dangerously close to the brink of disaster in adopting a platform calling 
for the "complete reorganization of our social structure into a cooperative 
conmnwealth": the consequent defection by farmers and small businessmen had 
led to nervous back-tracking by party leaders, who emphasised that there was 
no intention for the state to take over retail businesses. The daTogo was 
repaired sufficiently for Governor Olson to secure reelection in the November, 
1934 elections, but the rarmer-Labor party lost its control of the House. 
This blunder was not repeated. (See, Donald R. McCoy, 'Arigry'Voio-es-. ''Lcift-of- 
Center Politics it, thdVeo Deal'Era, Lawrences Kans., 1958, pp. 53-58; 
'Congressional'Rdd6rd,, vol. 79, pp. 13526-8; George H. Mayer, The-political 
Eareer of Floyd'B. 'Olgon,, St. Paul, 1951, pp. 165-839'250-19 2-5=790)0 
28. New York Tirmss February 3,, 49 1938; NARD-Journal February 17,1938. 
The "hand-picked" conference actually adopted a nurber of resolutions very 
hostile to New Deal legislation, especially that relating to labour 
questions. 
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against Roosevelt. These were not anti-chain organisations, or even 
primarily groups of independent merchants, but several, of them, especially 
those of the pro-Roosevelt factions did endorse the Patman bill. 
29 With 
the administration apparently eager to divide small business off from the 
Ifeconomic Royalists"s and with many of the administration's friends in 
small business favouring the Patman bills the risk for the chains was 
apparent for all to see, even if it was really just a mirage. Actually, 
the wooing of small business by the administration did little to advance 
the battle against the chains. On Roosevelt's initiative, Congress voted 
funds in the Spring of 1938 for a full-scale investigation of the nation's 
economic problems by the so-called Temporary National Economic Committee; 
Patman urged that the Committee should investigate the "feudalistic chain 
system", but it in fact. gave the chain store question the minimum attention 
compatible with the objective of conducting a thorough economic review. 
With the end of the "Roosevelt depression" in the summer of 1938, the 
administration's wooing of small business, though not abandoned, rather 
cooled off. When this happeneds the optimistic forecasts of Patman that 
the administration would look upon his bill with favour were seen as 
thoroughly fallaciouse 
30 
The balance of probability from the first appearance of the Patman 
"death sentence" bill favoured the view that it had little chance of 
enactment. Nevertheless, it remained a distinct possibility that something 
would come of it: perhaps a weaker federal chain tax or a stirring up of 
29. Biwitds8'Wdek,, Septenber 24,19389 pp. 28-9s''Interstate, Merchantl, 
February 12,, March 26, April 16,, 1938. Groups opposing the chains inc37uded 
"Small Business-of America"q Colunbus, 0., led by James 0. Daly, editor of 
the SanVld*CAse, organ of the UCT; the Little Business Men's League,, 
Chicago; Freedom of Opportunity Foundation., Berne,, Ind., and George Schulte's 
Independence, Inc., which had failed to develop in the way its founder had 
hoped in 1936; its 1936. inaugural convention had attracted 2,000 to hear 
addresses by Patman and Coughlin,, but the 1938 convention was a quiet affair, 
in a hotel. 
30. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly . pp. 410-9. 
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anti-chain, sentiment whichnight have serious consequdnces'in some of 
the states,, or even legislation of an entirely different character. Chain 
propaganda had,, -in the aftermath of the California referendum, become 
somewhat boastful about how, public opinion was now on the side of the chains, 
but the position was really still quite delicate. Just how delicate, was 
seen in the Novenber, 1938 general election, when the people of Colorado 
voted to retain the chain tax law put on the statute books by popular 
referendum in 1934. The pro-tax plurality was more than doubled,, despite 
a lavish public relations campaign by the chains, modelled on that used in 
California two years earlier, which allegedly cost the chains $7.52 for 
every vote they actually got. There were, admittedly, some sound reasons 
for chain store men not to-draw too dire a conclusion from the Colorado 
result, as they were the first to point out. Colorado was a small western 
state, with strong home state loyalties; the pro-tax federation, the 
Colorado Civic Association, was exceptionally well-organised and had been 
in the field for five years; the revenue from the chain tax went directly 
to finance the state old age pensions scheme, which the majority of the 
voters were anxious to see retained. And, of course, the -fact that the 
people had favoured a relatively mild chain tax (top rate of $300 on each 
store in excess of 24) provided no conclusive evidence as to what attitudes 
would be to a "death sentence" taxs particularly one imposed by Washington. 
The Colorado Civic Association emphasised in its propaganda that the tax 
would not force any chain stores out of business, only rake them pay their 
rightful share of the tax burden which was supposedly falling 
disproportionately on the independents. Nevertheless, a chain tax was a 
chain tax, and the chains in Colorado, as was their custom, had fought 
their campaign on predictions of disastrous consequences for wages, 
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employment and priceso predictions which would have beeh nore appropriate 
to a discussion of a "death sentence". Clearly, the people had either 
disbelieved the chain. store propaganda, or they had refused to be 
influenced by it. Whichever was the reason, chain store men had no cause 
for complacency. 
31 
iV. 19 39: The Swing of the Pendulum 
Having given the "death sentence" a fairly successful launch in 
1938,, Patman reintroduced his bill in 1939 as H. R. 1 with some hope of 
action at this second time of asking. But H. R. 1 made no progress 
whatsoever. rew speeches were made in its favour in Congress,, and the 
bill languished unattended in the House Ways and Means Committee. All 
Patman achieved in 1939 was a promise from House leaders that his bill 
would be granted hearings in 1940. 
The 1938 elections produced a pronounced swing to the right in 
the country as a wholel, with adverse consequences for the "death sentence" 
bill. A heavy toll was taken of the co-sponsors,, 32 of the original 75 
not returning to the House in 1939. Because of a ruling against the 
31. * 'Timd'Magclzines "Colorado No",, November 219 1938: Colorado Chain Stores 
,i dh Assn; =e: "Colorado 'St6rd Lidense'Lawq Denverg 19380s ' Iritdl ItAtd 'Mdr Antq 
November 19 s 19 38; ' 'Nevt York Times . November 10,19 38. Some weeks later . 
the people of Columbus, Ga., voted by 1,708 to 1,470 in favour of a municipal 
tax ordinance (top rate of $1,200 per store). '(Intdr-., tat6'Merchant, January 
28,1939). A survey by the American Press Association oT Ritors Uf small 
town newspapers in 28, states found that "a majority of their readers oppose 
legislation which night put the chain stores out of business or which would 
tend to increase prices in chain stores" but that "a majority of opinion 
night be swung from one side to the other by a strong presentation of either 
side". This survey may be treated with some reserve, as it was made "for 
the information of groups which are... considering using advertising space... 
to educate the public on the chain versus independent controversy, " 
(New York'Timesq November 259 1938). 
1. New York Times, July 2.1939. 
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practice by the Speaker, Patman introduced H. R. 1 alone, without 
co-sponsors: he claimed still to have the support of 150 Congressmen, 
but there was little evidence of it. Patman himself did most of the 
speech-iraking in favour of the bill, and no movement developed to corrPel 
action from the House Ways and Means Committee. Indeed, during 1939, 
Congress ceased to continue on the New Deal road and, responding to the 
mood in the country, actually began to undo some of the things that it 
had done during the depression. Radical and disruptive legislation was 
definitely out so far as the majority of the legislators were concerned, 
and even the most zealous advocates of the "death sentence" had to admit 
that the times were not propitious. The tremendous business upturn in 
the latter months of 1938,, an upturn which continued through 1939, only 
served to encourage the idea of a return to "normalcy". The economic 
and political climate could never again be quite what it had been back 
in 1929, but it was the nearest thing to it since the depression began. 
2 
The courts also showed an inclination to reassess sore of the things 
that had happened in the strenuous years of the depression and New Deal. 
Since the 1931 decision in the Indiana case, the state courts had 
obediently followed the line on chain store taxation laid down by the 
U. S. 'Supreme Court. A few decisions had arguably gone against the spirit 
of the Supreme Court's rulings, but none had gone against their letter; 
any contrary traditions in the interpretation of state constitutions had 
been routinely brushed aside so as to ensure harmony. In 1939 this 
harmony was shattered by a series of decisions in state courts. 
The first of this series was handed down on March 21, when the 
Kentucky Supreme Court invalidated a perfectly ordinary graduated license 
tax. The crux of the decision was a bald assertion that in the 5 to 4 
2. Interstate'Merchant, January 73, April 221,1939; Leuchtenburg, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, pp. 270-4. 
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vote by the Supreme Court in the Indiana case the minority had been 
right. The Kentucky court held that the differences between chains and 
independents described in the Indiana case - abundant capital, superior 
management, lower operating costss greater efficiency in purchasing, 
buying for cash, warehousing and cheaper advertising - were differences 
which could also be found between individual independent merchants. "It 
is obvious that the differences relied on as a basis for the 
classification, are not peculiar to a group of stores under unified 
management or ownership... A classification of a business,, based on differences 
in nunber only, is without substance and does not have a reasonable 
relation to the object of the taxing act, which is to raise revenue". 
3 
While this finding was a direct negation of the rulings of the U. S. 
Supreme Court, the Kentucky Supreme Court was careful to throw up some 
camouflage in the form of ample references to the limitations on license 
taxation supposedly required by the state constitution. Three months 
later, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adopted the same line of attack, 
perhaps less surprisingly, for that ultra-conservative body had 
traditionally interpreted the uniform taxation clause of the state 
constitution so as to preclude any form of graduated taxation whatsoever04 
When the Pennsylvania tax was enacted, at the height of Governor Earle's 
"Little New Deal" in 1937, the Attorney-General had confidently predicted 
that there would be no trouble with the courts, presumably in the belief 
3. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Ken 
S. W. (2d) 581. 
Tax'Commission, 128 
4. American Stores Co. v. Boardman, 6 Atl. (2d) 826. The relevant 
provision of the state constitution decMr-ed that "All taxes shall be 
uniform, upon the same class of subjects... " This was a typical sort 
of uniform taxation provision found in most state constitutions'. 
including many states with chain taxes. A decision supposedly based 
on the state constitution was$ of course, invulnerable to appeal to 
the federal courts, which partly explains the tactic adopted by the 
Kentucky and Pennsylvania Supreme Courts. 
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that they would feel obliged to adapt to the new spirit of reform 
abroad in the state. But by 1939 conditions were very different. 
Earle had been voted out of office in 1938 and replaced by a conservative 
Republican, Arthur H. James, who was elected on a platform of getting rid 
of "discriminatory" taxes and so bringing business back to Pennsylvania. 
The state Supreme Court might well have struck down the chain tax even 
at the high tide of the "Little New Deal" but the political change made 
its action a near-certainty. 
5 
While no informed. cbserver could have misunderstood the thrust of 
the decisions handed down by these two state Supreme Courtso it was left 
to a judge in Richmond County Superior Court in Georgia to come right 
out and say, without evasive references to state constitutions,, that he 
disagreed with the U. S. Supreme Court. Judge Hardeman did so, he 
declareds with "embarrassment and hesitancy" because be was prepared to 
"yield to no man in my respect and regard for the United States Supreme 
Court". He felt, howevers that the tax levied by the city of Augusta on 
its chain stores went far beyond being a tax for revenue purposes, and 
yet could not be justified as an exercise of the police power. "Police 
powers are not intended to be exercised in support of or against this 
theory or that theory in the realm of political economy". This had not 
been the view taken by the U. S. Supreme Court in the Louisiana decision, 
but Judge Hardeman was unwilling to be hemmed in by such a consideration. 
Naturally, chain store men were elated. Split decisions of the U. S. 
Supreme Court were no longer,, it seemed, sufficient to keep even Superior 
Court judges in line on the chain store issue. 
6 
5. Harrisburg Patriot, May 21,, 1937; New Republic, May 6,1940 pp. 
599-: 601, "Pennsylvania After The New Deal". 
6. City Council of Augusta v. Southern GrocdýX Stores Inc., 2*S. E. -(2d) 181 - The Judge might have based his objection to the tax on the lesser powers OY 
the municipality, as opposed to the state, but he did not. Contrast, Great 
Atlantic & Padifid Tea'Co. v. City of Colurbus, 6'S. E. (2d) 320. The U. S. 
Supreme Court had never ruled on a municipal chain tax ordl-nance so any 
conflict with it could have been avoided. 
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Also in 1939 came decisions in the Supreme Courts of Colorado and 
North Carolina which were. given widespread publicity as meaning that the 
chain tax noose was being drawn around the necks of the voluntary chains. 
7 
In fact neither case directly related to voluntary chain operation, the 
Colorado case concerming the. status of independently-owned but tightly 
controlled agencies of the Gamble-Skogmo auto supplies chain, and that in 
North Carolina relating to a "family" of department stores in which there 
was some common identity of ownership. The decisions, especially that in 
the Colorado caseq were arguably more strictly corparable to those in 
which courts required oil companies to pay chain taxes on filling stations 
operated under various types of leasing arrangements which created an 
appearance of individual ownership and yet kept effective control in the 
hands of the oil corganies. 
8 Nevertheless, the two decisions taken together 
did provoke a genuine unease inasmuch as the courts looked to evidence 
of common management, centralised advertising and purchasing and other 
features also found in bona fide voluntary chains to infer an identity of 
interest. Just where would the line be drawn? As one observer succinctly 
put it, although the Colorado and North Carolina cases "by no means settle 
the position of the voluntary chains, they do present a thread which, ý, 
unwound for another year or two, may prove disconcerting to the voluntaries". 
9 
7. Newsweek , June l2s 1939, "Blow at voluntaries; they're liable to chain 
taxt Colorado'Supreme Court rules"; Business Week,, June 3,1939 p. 14; 
Belk Bros. v. Haxwell,, 200 S. . 915; Bedford v. 'GaTrble-Skogmo Inc., 91'Pac. T-2d) 475. 
8. Mid-Westorn'Petroleum Corp. 'v. State Boards'187V. E. 882 (1933); Gulf 
Refin`il-ngCo. v. 'Fox, 297 WS. 3-81 (193 Maxpell'v. ' Shell Eastern, e oleum 
Products, Inc. ', 90 1 Fed. (2d), 3 C. A. 9 4thl, 1937); Co. v. Texas 142 S. P. (2d) 519 (1940); Standard Oil Co. v. State Board, 99 Pac. 
(2d) 229 (1940). U. S. Supreme Court decision in the ggulf-RefL-M-Co g_ r, -- v. Fox case effectively put an end to blustering by executives of other 
types of chains, especially in the grocery fields that they would evade 
chain taxes by leasing stores to managers. 
9. M. W. Lees 'Recent Trends in Chain Store Tax Legislation', Journal of 
Business, vol. 13 (1940); pp. 253-740 p. 266. 
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Whether the U. S. Supreme Court would allow the discriminatory 
taxation of bona fide voluntary chains was another question. The tenor 
of the Court's opinions in the past actually made it unlikelys though 
this point was not given much attention in the aftermath of the GaTrble- 
Skoom and Belk cases. 
10 Furthermore, as the states had not hitherto, 
as a matter of policyg sought to bring the voluntaries under their chain 
tax laws, there was no reason,, except desire for revenue, which would 
suddenly make them do so at this late stage in the chain tax movement. 
The Garble-Skogmo and Belk cases were nonetheless a godsend to the 
corporate chains. For years they had tried to bring the voluntaries over 
into their camp in the chain tax battle,, often stealthily having cleverly 
worded amendments offered to chain tax bills in the hope that the 
voluntaries would panic at the thought that they might be trapped by the 
arbiguous language. 
11 But, although pursued with unflagging dedication, 
this tactic had never worked particularly well simply because the voluntary 
chains had never once in fact been corpelled to pay a chain tax. Thus 
while executives of voluntary and cooperative groups had shown some 
10. In the Indiana chain tax case in 1931, Justice Robertsq speaking for 
the Court, casually dismissed any comparison of the methods of voluntary 
chains with those of corporate chains with the observation that a "series 
of independent units cannot, in the nature of things, be as efficiently 
and successfully integrated as a chain under single owner-ship and 
management". This loose theory encouraged chain attormeys in the 1933 
Florida-chain tax case to attempt to prove otherwise and to show that 
"there is no essential difference between the two methods of conducting 
a business". But Justice Roberts brushed this aside with the emphatic 
declaration that "the difference between an integrated and a voluntary 
chain is ftidamental". This doctrine indicated that what really counted 
with the Court was not any presumed advantage in operating method, which 
would have been open to erpirical review in each case, but the form of 
ownership. Thus it seemingly conferred an absolute immunity on the bona 
fide voluntary chain even if it actually copied many of the methods of 
the corporate chains and proved more successful than them. On the other 
hand, no legislative intent to tax the voluntaries had been involved in 
these cases, and it is not unthinkable to suppose that the Court might 
have chosen to respect such an intent had it existed. 
11. The Patman committee hearings produced evidence of this. See, in 
particular, vol. I, p. 377; Vol. II, p. 40. 
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distaste for such political assaults on their competitors -a survey 
of 500 of these executives in 1935 revealed that 86% of them opposed 
chain taxation - their attitudes had not always been shared by the 
rank-and-file wholesalers and retailers in the voluntaries. The result 
had been that NAWGA and the National Voluntary Groups Institute had tried 
to straddle the issue, and to say as little about it as possible. Howeverg 
the Belk and GaTrble-Skogmo cases, combined with a fear that Patman would 
not be happy until he and his fimdamentalist friends had consigned anything 
remotely resembling a chain to oblivion, and turned the clock back fifty 
years, encouraged a more assertive attitude. Prominent figures in the 
voluntary and cooperative field made increasingly sharp attacks on Patman 
and questioned his assurances that he would or could ensure that the 
voluntaries were not brought under his "death sentence". Discreet behind- 
the-scenes warnings were given to the NARG not to fight too hard for the 
bill; popular magazines and newspapers, as well as the trade press,, 
carried stories "leaking" allegations about Patman's real intentions and 
suggesting that more and more opposition was developing towards him in 
the grocery trade. These allegations did their work well, as rumour and 
suspicion soured the trade poll tics surrounding the Patman bill. 
12 
Cratified as chain store men were by these developmentsq they did not 
neglect to take action of their own to throttle the bill. In the autum 
of 1938 the chains launched a counter-offensive which soon threw their 
I ener&es into disarray. For the first time, the A&P joined in the battles 
annotmcing its intention so to do in a somewhat poirpous "Statement of 
Public Policy" which appeared in nearly every newspaper in the country. 
The A&P placed its campaign in the hands of Carl Byoir & Associates, 
12., New Yorklirms,, June 21,1938; January 6,, 1939; 'Voluntary & 
'CoopJ-Fa't3ve -Cltoups 'Magazine, July 1935,, February 1938; ' 'Interstate'Mdrdhantq 
Tu'gust 26 . Septerber 2099 19 39. 'M6ddrm 'Merchant & 'Grc5cery_ Worl-d. February 259 1939. 
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public relations counsellorsq and assumed the position of leadership which 
it had for so long shirked. Theories abounded as to why the A&P had 
chosen this moment to join the fray, but there was an immediate, general 
expectation that, having crossed the-Rubicon, this great eirpire of a chain 
would act with the utmost forcefulness. 
13 
13. As late as 1935, John Hartford had declared publi6ly that "If the 
people of the United States like our. stores so little that they are wi" ing 
to tax us out of business9 that is their privilege. We will shut up shop. 
We have not spent, nor will we spend, a single penny to fight chain store 
taxation". While, this declaration was not entirely accurate - the A&P 
had consistently opposed chain taxation through the courts and many of its 
local officials had helped other chains in their political activities - it 
did reveal an attitude unique among leading chain executives. Behind it lay 
the reluctance of the Hartford brothers to become entangled with other 
chains and their unwillingness to accept that they had many and powerful 
enemies. They were. -rortune magazine thought, "two bewildered, elderly 
gentlemen caught between forces that they nbither understand nor know how 
to conbat". living in the past, and unwilling to seem to be begging for 
public sympathy at this late stage in their lives. Even in 1938, Georgeg 
the brother less in touch with the world outside, was apparently reluctant 
to mount a public relations campaign. The belated decision to alter course 
had several causes. (1) The old method of doing nothing had clearly failed. 
Supercilious remarks about shutting up shop reflected a deep conviction 
that such a thing would never be necessary. However,, the Supreme'Court's 
"right to tax to destroy" decisions, especially the May, 1937 Louisiana 
decision, which raised the possibility that states might preserve their 
local chains while crippling the A&P. shook that faith. (2) Patman's 
success in building support for the "death sentence" in early 1938,, and 
his past victory with the Rcbinson-Patman bill. (3) Enactment of an 
anti-supermarket ordinance by Camden, N. J. in April 1938 taxing supermarkets 
$10,, 000, with extra fees on each concession. This was followed by anti- 
supermarket ordinances in Atlantic City and New Brunswicks and posed a 
new threat to the A& P's programme of massive supermarket openings. Such 
ordinances would perhaps have spread to other states in time had they not 
been decisively condemned by the New Jersey Supreme Court in February, 
1939. (4) John Hartford's belief that A&P employees were becomingg as 
Carl Byoir testified in the A&P trial in 1945, "almost ashamed to work 
for chain stores" because of the constant attacks on the morality of chain 
methods. Patman particularly singled out the A&P in this respect, 
referring at every opportunity to a series of prosecutions in Washington 
D. C. in late 1935 in which A&P managers were fined for giving short weights 
on chickens. (The A&P later charged that Patman himself had instigated 
these cases, through the Superintendent of Weights and Measures for the 
District of Columbia, who happened to have core originally from Patmants 
own Congressional district). Patman used these cases to support his belief 
that the A&P, through its inventory systemp effectively compelled its 
employees to cheat the consumer. Following these prosecutions, John Hartford 
personally signed letters sent out to all 459000 store employees warning them 
that anyone giving short weight would be dismissed. Such attacks on the 
company's reputation, as well as the programme of closing smaller storesq 
had demoralising effects on some of the A&P managers, and it was this 
internal problem of the A&P which was perhaps the major single factor in 
deciding on an image-building public relations programme. (Carl Byoir & 
Associates, Cilrrentlrends 'in Chair! Store Taxation, 1939, pp. 19-23; New 
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Patman's reaction to the A& P's "Statement of, Public Policy" 
was to welcome it as a chance toýput the issue to the test of public 
opinion. "The fight is coming out into the open", he declared. "I 
hope it remains in the open. I abhor and detest false fronts and 
deceitful-propaganda. Let us hope the day of cornstalk brigades, fake 
consuimr groups and other, false fronts is gone". He would, he announced, 
it 14 ask no quarter - just a fair fight" . In fact, all that had been seen 
before by way of "false -front" methods paled into insignificance before 
the tactics now enployed. Carl Byoir & Associates were particularly 
actives disposing of apparently limitless resources 'and acting as puppet 
masters on an epic scale. Perbaps the most ambitious of Byoir's projects 
was the "National Consumers' Tax Committee". nominally headed byra Mrs. 
Kenneth C. Frazier, which set up women's groups to study "discriminatory 
taxation" in thousands of cities, often with locally prominent clubwomen 
becoming involved. The A&P openly made a donation to Mrs. Frazier, but 
the fact that the wholeýprojectwas masterminded by Carl Byoir was kept 
well hidden. Many of these study groups existed only on paper, or were 
just made up of wives of chain store managers, but those that were active 
kept up a steady flow-of resolutions for publication in home town 
newspapers, thus helping towards the manufacture of a synthetic public 
opinion against the Patman bi" . With the "fronts" traced back to other 
chain sources$ and including the 24 state units of the reviving American 
Retail Federation,, George Schulte estimated towards the close of 1938 
that there were-57 varieties of "fronts" in existence. 
is 
13. (cont1d) ... York Timesý September 15,169 189 1938; Tortunef, April 1938 "A &P Goes to th; Waisll; N. Y. Jnl. of Commerce, Api-rfl 5.1935; 
Congreggional'Record, vol. 81, pp. 5912-3; Intergtatd'Merchant. June 1, 
1940; September 8.22s 1945; November 3,, 1945). 
14. Interstate Merchant, October 15,1938. 
15. 'The Annalist, April, ll, 19406 pp. S18-9-, Propageatda'Analysis, vol. 
Iis 19 D38,, "The A&P Campaign"; ''NARD'Journal, September 159 
1938; InterttaktO 'Merchants Decerber 3.1938; July 21,28; November 3j, 
1945; Congressioric-LIL 'Record, 79th Cong., lst Sess., vol. 91, pp. A3960-2. 
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This proliferation of, "false fronts" did not provoke the sort of 
outcry in Congress which hadýgreeted the formation of the American 
Retail Federation. Indeed, the ARF itself was back in business, and 
establishing itself in Washington in a way that bewildered the militant 
opponents of the chains, to whom its name was still anathema. The ARF 
still only had seven national retail trade associations in its ranks, all 
of them being basically chain, voluntary chain or departrent store 
organisations, yet it was reported as being "tacitly accepted" in 
Washington as "the representative of the vast 80% of business men engaged 
in retail trade". In Hay, 1939,, the Federation brought off a major coup, 
staging a "Retailers' National Forud' to enable retailers to meet the 
politicians: dozens of Congressmen attended the event as did Commerce 
Secretary Harry Hopkins, Agriculture Secretary Henry Wallace, and President 
Roosevelt himself. Executives of chain and department stores were there 
in drovess, as well as sore "little fellows" of the 11safer" type-ý The 
irony of the situation was that Roosevelt's decision to address the Forum - 
his speech was a rousing defence of the administration's spending programme 
and had nothing to do with the chain store problem - was generally 
interpreted by the press as being an attempt to appeal to I'little, business" 
over the heads of big business, for he had rejected the opportunity to 
attend the convention of the bitterly anti-New Deal U. S. Chamber of Cormrce. 
Anti-chain groups were appalled by the whole affair, for the big retail 
associations which were truly representative of "little business" - the 
NARDs the NARG and NRHA - had all refused their invitations to the 
Retailers' National Forum. To Schulte it was "the biggest hoax ever pulled 
on government officials"; the NARD*Journal could only conclude that 
Roosevelt did not know the background of the Federation and had been lured 
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into attending by his friend. Louis Kirstein, in whose Boston department 
store theTresident's son John was working, "and for that reason one 
million independent retailers will be inclined to charity". 
16 The truth 
seemed to be that the administration and many Congressmen were quite 
prepared to forget about theýorigin of the ARF and the attendant uproar - 
even if they remembered it - and to deal with the organisation that seemed 
well established, non-partisan and to have in its ranks wide sections of 
large and riddle-sized retailing. Washington was tired of the more 
fanatical type of "little fellows" whom it had indulged in the over-excited 
atmosphere of the mid-thirties; it had less and less time for those whose 
principal interest seemed to be to get lbgislation to cripple their 
coMetitors. Some weeks after the Retailers' National rorum the anti-chain 
forces held their own forum to let the trade met the politicians, with a 
boat, trip down the Potomac followed, by a picnic at rort Washington. The 
meting was sponsored by the NARG, NARD9 NRHA 9 NARMD and NAITD - the true 
voice of little retailing - yet it attracted only about 20 Congressmen, 
not one administration leader and little press attention. The militants 
were now out in the cold. 
17 
Back in 1935 and 1936, many Congressmen had acted almost as if they 
believed that the battles between independents and chains were the latest 
variation in the age old struggle between Good and Evil, But by 1939 a 
considerable reaction had occurred. The enactment of Robinson-Patman and 
Miller-Tydings meant that the militant independents could no longer be 
looked on as quite the oppressed underd6gs-they had seemed in 1935.7be 
NARD, in particular, was by 1939 under a close and hostile scrutiny from 
16. May-27,1939, p. 14; 'Inter9tatd'Mdrchant, May 20s 27* 
1939; 'NARD'Journal, June 1,, 1939. 
17. 'Busizitsg Week, July 8,, pp. 28-9. July 22, p. 321,1939; 'Intdr.. "tate 
Merchant, July 1.229 1939. 
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sections of the presst the FTC, some Congressmen and the Department of 
Justice, as critics demanded to know how, it was that this one association 
had almost alone succeeded in rewriting the antitrust laws so as to 
permit its members to enjoy the benefits of-price maintenance. The 
growing reserve in Congress was seen in its failure to follow up on the 
Miller-Tydings law by enacting fair trade legislation for the District of 
Colurbia. And it was seen also in the greater consideration accorded to 
those like Emanuel Celler, who argued that the independents were no better 
than their chain opponents when it came to the morality of their lobbying 
methods. 
Patron's enemies seized their opportunity to tarnish his reputation 
when, in the winter of 1938-9. a sensational scandal engulfed McKesson & 
Robbins, the nation's leading wholesale drug concern. This scandal, surely 
one of the strangest in American business history, reached its climax with 
the discovery that McKesson and Robbins president r. Donald Coster, who 
committed suicide, was in fact one Philip Musica, a swindler who had 
disappeared on release from prison and then, with a new identity, entered 
the drug business. In 1926, Coster had bought McKesson and Robbins and 
then, showing great business acumen, built it up through a series of mergers 
to the point where it enjoyed 30% of the U. S. wholesale drug trade. With 
the help of his two brothers, each having a different assumed nameg Coster 
perpetrated a massive fraud throu&% the conduct of a "crude drugs department" 
whose millions of dollars of supposed assets were entirely fictitious. Of 
all this, Patman was entirely ignorant: his only definite connection with 
McKesson and Robbins was that he had conducted a lecture tour on the 
Robinson-Patman law in 1936 for which the company had paid the major slice 
of his expenses. But from this slender thread artful propagandists spun an 
elaborate web of innuendo, and newspaper columnists and Congressional 
cloakroom gossip circulated the rumours. Had Patman received $18,000 and 
a car from McKesson, and if so why? What discussions had he had with Coster 
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in connection with the passage of the Rcbinson-Patman or Miller-Tydings 
laws? Had he met Coster in a New'York hotel room the previous auturn to 
discuss the "death sentence""bill? ' Did Patman know of any money paid by 
McKesson and Robbins to retail drug associations to assist their fair 
trade cargaigns7 Tho-'Chidzi96'T: týib-ane, a bitter foe of Patman, demanded 
his "firing" from Congress; chain lobbyists asked that there should now 
be a Congressional investigation of the lobbying methods of their opponents. 
In a passionate hour-long speech in his own defence on the floor of the 
House Patman angrily rejected the charges, or rumours, being manufactured 
against him. He had received money from McKesson and Robbins, he admitted, 
but as payment for a lecture tour of the type made by many Congressmen, 
and it had in any case left him out of pocket; he had never had any other 
business or political transactions with Coster or his company, and though 
he had met Coster, "lots of men have". Coster,, Patman stated, had actually 
been discovered to have contributed to organisations opposed to the "death 
sentence" bill. Patman warned his fellow Congressmen that a $100 million 
lobby was out to destroy him and that "it would not surprise = if this 
method of attack and lobbying, backed by such enormous sum of money, 
continues that eventually some of the enthusiastic supporters of the 
opposition will actually resort to kidnaping and murder in order to silence 
those who oppose them". His fellow legislators seemed reasonably satisfied 
that Patman was indeed the victim of the sort of smear campaign which had 
been turned against rany another Congressman who had got "out of line" on 
one issue or another. Nevertheless, the publicity given to the rumours 
contributed to a vague sense of unease - for can there be smoke without 
fire? - and further discouraged action on the "death sentence" bill. 
Bugindsd'Wdek concluded that the "adroit publicity" used by chain publicists 
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to tie in Patran to the McKesson scandal had, played a. "good part" in the 
"sidetracking" of the bill for the year. 
18 
Patnan's friends rushed to his defence over the McKesson and Robbins 
affair, testifying to his good character and elevated motives. Thd'NARD 
Journal thought the circulation, given to the innuendoes proved the press 
to be a "fascist dictatorship" and warned that the struggle for the "death 
sentence" bill would now become "a big fight; a dirty fight; a fight to 
the end". Less militant independents agreed with this prediction, but they 
were much less eager to become enbroiled in such a fight. Once they had 
benefitted from the image of being downtrodden "little fellows". but now a 
conspiracy theory was being erected to suggest that all they had achieved 
had been masterminded by backstage manipulators like F. Donald Coster. At 
the same time, the attempt to grasp the forbidden fruit of the destruction 
by political means of business competitors was reducing their trade 
associations to the level of pariahs in the eyes of the broader business 
community. Was it now not time to settle back - to enjoy the benefits of 
such legislation as had been achieved, to seek a more cooperative 
relationship with the chains and to take advantage of the improving economic 
conditions generally? Might Patman prove not to be the Moses of the 
independent merchants, but their Pied Piper? Keen though the NARD 
leadership was on the 11fi&%t to the end", many of the rank-and-file had 
tired of the conflict. There was, admitted Rowland Jonesq the association's 
Washington representativet a "defeatist frame of mind on the part of many 
NARD members, a feeling that we have eubarked upon a crusade that is 
impossible of final success". The "death sentence" bill, which in 1938 had 
18. Drug Tradd'Newsj, Decerber 191,1938; ' 'BtLlinegq'Wdek,, December 24,, 1938 
s January 259 1939; NARD pp. 30-31, July 8. 
D39 p. 29; ' Ne,, tlork'717 res 
Jourrial . January 5,, 19 0 19 39 Congrdgsi6ziaFRdd6rd,, 76 Cong. . Ist Sess - January 24,1939. 
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been the association's "No. 1 legislative objective" had to be 
downgraded during 1939 to one of three major objectives, the most 
19 important of which emerged as being the defence of the fair trade laws. 
Similarly, although the NARG remained formally committed to the bill by 
virtue of a resolution adopted at the 1938 convention, a resolution intended 
to reassert that commitment somehow failed to arrive on the floor at the 
1939 convention. This failure was widely, and rightly,, regarded as having 
been an "oblique denial" of the Patman bill. The association also elected 
to its board the president of the Massachusetts association, who was an 
unabashed opponent of Patman and an advocate of close collaboration with 
the chains. 
20 Even more confused and awkward was the position of the 
NRHA. Although the 1938 convention had endorsed the bill, a direct poll 
of the neribership, subsequently found that only 1,948 were willing to support 
the measure, with 8,678 unwilling, 486 non-committal and 1$927 not heard 
from. As a consequence, the board,, although anxious to maintain faith with 
Patman and the other national associations, felt obliged reluctantly to 
withdraw association backing for the bill. At the 1939 convention, Patman 
supporters staged the "hardest fought parliamentary battle in the recent 
history of the Association", but obtained nothing better than the setting 
up of a committee to rake a "complete study" of the chains with a view to 
finding a method of controlling them. The committee saved the face of 
the NRHA board by quickly determining that the way to control the chains 
was by nothing less than "every possible means", thus allowing the board to 
19. 'NARD'Jdarnal, January 59 October 19, Noverber 16,1939. 
20. ' Busiriegt 'Week, July 80 19 39 j p. 30; ' 'Nevý 'Yotk 'Timsl, June 23,19 39. 
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reinstate, support for the. PAtman bill in time for secretary Rivers 
Peterson tomake an appearance at the Congressional hearings on the bill 
in 1940.21 
The protagonists of the Patman bill were also inconvenienced by the 
findings of the new opinion poll industry, for the polls showed that while 
a sizeable section of public opinion believed in some sort of discriminatory 
legislation there was only a small constituency for the view that the chains 
should be sentenced to death. Thus a nationwiddT6ftune survey in 
February, 1939 found that although 43.6% of those questioned favoured taxing 
chains more heavily than independents, only 6.3% believed that they should 
be legislated-or taxed out of existence. Similarly. an Opinion Research 
Corp. poll conducted for Sears, Roebuck found that only one-sixth of 
respondents subscribed to the view that "chain stores should be driven out 
of business entirely", though 45% believed that they should be subjected to 
taxes not levied on other stores. Whether or not public opinion had shifted 
sharply since the mid-thirties as chain store ran suggested - the California 
referendum was often cited as the 'Iturming point" - the lesson seem-ad 
obvious that although the voters might favour the milder type of chain, tax 
approved in the Colorado referendumg there was no great groundswell in 
favour of a "death sentence". On this occasion, the views of the "silent 
rajority", as translated by the pollsters, seemed to accord with the 
22 
attitude expressed by most organised sections of society. 
21. HarclWare Reýtailer, August 1939, pp, 48,519 rebruary 1940, p. 6. 
22. -F6rtUne surveys showed that 43.6% of those questioned favoured sore 
degree of chain taxation in February,, 1939; 48.7% had done so in January, 
1937. Fortune's 1939 conclusion assisted by a r1sleading comparison of 
the figures for the two surveys was that the "sands have suddenly shifted 
from under the feet of the Honorable Wright Patman". The earliest 
systematic poll on the chain tax issue was taken by the American Institute 
of Public Opinion in A, ugust, 1936,, when 69% of those with opinions favoured 
special taxes on chains: the equivalent figure was 63% in June, 1937 and 
65% in January, 1938, with no later studies made. Another survey by the 
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ThO 'H6 dL iýiri grý 'c5ri 'H .R-1 
The long-awaited he&iings on the Patnan "death sentence"'bill, were 
held before a seven man subcommAttee'6f the House Ways and Means 
Committee in the Spring of 1940. There was by this time no widespread 
demand in Congress for action on the bill; the hearings were, as chairman 
John McCormack of Massachusetts rather pointedly commented to Patman, 
granted for you personally". Although the menbers of the McCormack 
committee sat through the weeks of laborious and frequently repetitious 
or unenlightening testimonywith considerable patience, regularly informing 
witnesses that they were listening with open rinds, there was never much 
doubt that the committee was likely to make a recommendation unfavourable 
to the bill. On June 17th, 1940s it duly decided, by 4 votes to 3. to 
advise that no further action be taken either on H. R. 1 as originally 
introduced or as revised by an amendment to "freeze" the chains which had 
been offered by Patman at the start of the hearings. It was the opinion of 
the McCormack committee that if any regulation of the chains were to be 
undertaken by Congress it should not be accomplished through the use of a 
federal tax. Not just the seven norbers of the committee took this view. 
22. (Cont'd)... same organisation, in May 1937 found that 30% of those asked 
were in favour of prohibiting all chain stores in their home states. 
Professor Paul D. Converses who studied attitudes in Champaign-Urbana in 
1931 and then again in 1937, considered that there was a similar division of 
opinion among consuners generallys but that feeling was somewhat less intense 
in 1937 and that the nunber definitely opposed to chains had declined. It 
was this decline of aggressively anti-chain sentiment which was, of courses 
the undoing of the anti-chain =vements not any change of mind on the part 
of the passive "silent majority". '(Fortune, January 1937, p. 154; February 
1939, pp. 88,91; -New'York'Times, Noverber 22s 1939; Hadley Cantrils 
Publid'Opinion, 1935-4946, Princeton, N. J. 19510 pp. 95-6; Paul D. Converses 
T, Prices and Services of Chain and Independent Stores in Champaign-Urbana, 
193711 in'J6urnal*of*MArketing, vol. 11 (1938), pp. 193-200. See also$ Louis 
Bader,, 11 sumers and Chain Store Taxation" izi'J6tiftal 6f'Rdtailin&, December 
19395 pp. 115-119). 
1. House Ways and Means Committee '6n'H. R. l: 
A Bill 'Pr6vidihg'ftiý 3rd Se s. 9 
March 17-May 16,19409 p. 143. ' (Henceforth cited aE%'MdC6ft)Adk'Cttd. ý'H6a: tings 
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So lopsided was the balance of testimony in favour of the chains at the 
hearings that it finally convinced all but the most diehard advocates of 
the "death sentence" that it was a political impossibility. No move 
developed in the House to countermand the recommendation of the committee 
and although Patman reintroduced his bill as H. R. 1 in 1941 he did so more 
as a last gesture of defiance than as a serious legislative proposal. If 
any particular occasion ray be seen as marking the end of the political 
threat to the existence of the chains, then the H. R. 1 hearings were surely 
its 2 
For the militant opponents of the chain stores the hearings were a 
kind of swan song in which they brought together every statistic, argument 
and appeal to the emotions which they had used up and down the country 
over the past decade and a half. Most of the burden for the anti-chain side 
was carried by Wright Patman and George Schulte, who was introduced to the 
committee by Patman with the generous tribute that "I believe ... if there is 
one expert in this country on matters ... affecting this vital problem, he 
is the expert". 
3 The other major contributions to the conduct of the 
2. The 4 Democrats on the committee (McCormack, John Boehne of Indiana, 
Richard M. Duncan of Missouri and John D. Dingell of Michigan) outvoted the 3 
Republicans (Frank Crowther of New Yorkq Harold Knutson of Minnesota and 
Roy Woodruff of Michigan). Dingell had actually been one of the co-sponsors 
of the original "death sentence" bill. The Republican members had shown no 
sympathy for the bill during the hearings and it seems that they took the 
easy way out by putting the onus for suffocating it onto the Democrat 
majority. As the committee had received letters from acting Secretary of 
Commerce Edward J. Noble and Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace 
condemning the bill in no uncertain terms, the Democrats must have assumed 
that the administration expected them to "do their duty" in this way. Patman 
himself continued to profess a complete assurance that his bill would "carry 
out the will of the President", though no one else believed it. (McCormack 
Ctte., Hearings, p. 749 356-79 2255-7; Interstate Merchant, June 22,299 
1940; Lebhar, Chain Stores In America, pp. 292-3). 
3. McCormack Ctte., Hearings, p. 71. 
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hearings were made by Rivers Peterson, J. H. McLaurin and Theodore 
Christianson, who appeared in the double role of president of the Freedom 
of Opportunity Foundation, the urrbrella organisation set up to coordinate 
the anti-chain forces behind the bill, and public relations counsel of 
the NARD. The National Association of Retail Grocers made only a half- 
hearted attempt to help the cause, president G. Vander Hooning making a 
distinctly low-key presentation in favour of the bill, and the failure of 
the voluntary chains to endorse the bill did not go unnoticed by the 
committee. Two other national trade associations, the Motor and Equipment 
Wholesalers' Association and the National Association of Independent Tire 
Dealers*, also indicated their approval for the measure to the committee. 
The only organisations other than independent business alliances and 
retail and wholesale trade associations communicating their support were 
the Independent Bankers' Association and the Louisiana Farmers' Protective 
Association. A few of the bill's Congressional supporters also made 
personal appearances at the hearings but most of them seemed to have had 
second thoughts about the desirability of going ahead with something so 
drastic as the full "death sentence". 
On a siuple head count, the chains swanped their opponents. Even 
on the very first day of the hearings, which was given over to Patman's 
launching of the anti-chain case, only 25 of the 250 present were on the 
anti-chain side. As the hearings progressed, the chains had a seemingly 
inexhaustible supply of witnesses on hando many of these being not rarely 
opposed to H. R. 1 but gushingly enthusiastic about the chains. The chain 
store men themselves were able to remain in the wings much of the time 
while a procession of farm leaderss, manufacturers, labour leaders, 
consumer advocatess spokesmen for real estate interests, academics and 
others paraded through the committee room. It was Patmants complaint that 
all these pro-chain witnesses had been asserbled by the "best financed 
r 
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lobby in th6Fhistory of the world" whereas his side, lacking similar 
resourcesq had been able to offer only a 11pol boy" canpaign. There was 
an element of truth in the charge. The A&P alone spent tens of 
thousands of dollars to bring witnesses to Washington, Carl Byoirls agency 
entertaining them in lavish style once they were there as well as 
assisting in drawing up some of their statements. 
4 Nevertheless 9 the 
anti-chain forces could have made their point simply by filing letters and 
resolutions received from sympathetic organisations: the real problem 
was that hardly any such endorsements of H. R. 1 were available. Even the 
commitment of the rank-and-file of the trade associations backing the bill 
was open to question. In the pastq there had never been a shortage of 
funds to finance anti-chain offensives. In 1930 W. K. Henderson had 
collected sums running into the hundreds of thousands of dollars, and in 
1936 the Califormia Anti-Monopoly League, although fractured by internal 
strife and limited in scope to one state, had raised nearly $80,000.7be 
Freedom of Opportunity Foundations in contrast, notwithstanding the 
nominal sponsor-ship of all the groups supporting the Patman bill and the 
fact that it was seeking the final solution to the interstate chain store 
problems proved unable to attract any such rich endowments. The president 
of the roundations 7beodore Christianson, informed the McCormack Committee 
that reports of a $2m lobbying fund had embarrassed him because his board 
might wonder "what I had done with the money". The actual amount raised 
was, he added,, "approximately one-fifth of I percent of the amount stated". 
4. ConE2,,. ýessional Recordq vol. 86, p. 1946; vol. 91 pp. A3960-2-9 
Interstate Merchantq March 23,1940. 
5. McCormack Ctte. 9 Hearings, p. 188. 
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In the hearings on the Robinson-Patran bill held before the House 
Judiciary committee in 1935, Patman had demonstrated the strength of 
his position by opening his attack with a call to amend the bill under 
consideration so as to rake it more fiercely anti-chain. This tire, he 
indicated the weakness of his cause by offering a series of amendrents 
to weaken H. R. l. Its ratess he proposed, should be cut by half and 
chains of 50 or less stores exempted altogether where all the stores were 
located in one state or within a 100 mile radius of the principal place 
of business. Most significantly, he proposed that the multiplier provision 
should not take effect for seven years provided that the chain did not 
open any extra stores, or change the location of any existing storesq in 
that time. Formallyo this was just a prolongation of the period of 
"purgatory", originally fixed at two years, which chain store men were to 
have to put their affairs in order. However$ much of the actual discussion 
of the amendment worked around the idea of "freezing" the chains at their 
existing,. or some other, level. This idea seemed to stir sore slight 
interest anong the merbers of the committee, who asked each witness about 
it, but the bill's sponsors, perhaps because the "freezing" idea only 
evolved during the course of the hearings, were both confused and confusing 
when they tried to explain what exactly it was that they wanted. Patman 
himself cited the case of a 1933 Swiss law as a parallel: "that is, one 
to freeze the large retail chain concerns and not permit them to expand 
any further or even enlarge their present locations"; yet at other tives$ 
he seemed to look upon the "freezing" stage nerely as a terporary phase 
to precede dissolution-after seven years. A further difficulty was that 
the "freezing" idea, insofar as it represented an alternative to the chain 
tax approach, was clearly not the business of the House Ways and Means 
Committee. For this reasons the Patman bill's supporters based virtually 
426. 
all their remarks on the need for H. R. 1 as originally introduced, making 
vague references to the "freezing! ' idea only by way of afterthoughts and 
asides. Consequentlyq any tactical advantage derived from this indication 
that the anti-chain forces were willing to accept something less drastic 
than H. R. 1 was entirely dissipated and the hearings largely proceeded as 
if it was a case of all or nothing, with no room for a middle way. The 
merits of destroying, not "freezing! ', the interstate chains rerained the 
crux of the debate. 
6 
It proved to be a feature of the hearings that menbers of the 
committee repeatedly indicated their belief that the matters being brought 
to their attention were really more appropriate to the consideration of 
the Judiciary committee or Interstate CoTmnarce committee. In 1935-6. 
Patman and his allies had been able to harmer home the argument that 
certain specific abuses needed to be remedied by raking wide-ranging 
reference to the evils of chain store methods in general. Such was the 
natural order for legislative action -a broad indictment being focussed 
to one point of action. In 1940, the order was reversed. The enemies of 
the chains. demanded a universal "death sentence" tax, yet most of the 
6. Ibid. 0 pp. 5-69 1480 2020 213-40 2649 4220 478. Patman offerx3d 
ano-Ch-"er, singularly misconceived, amendment to include filling stations 
under the bill. He argued that their original exerption had been a "very 
close question" and that he had since "talked to menbers who helped me to 
draw up this bill and it seems to be the unanimous opinion that since they 
have been evading the Social Security Act, and using the lease system as a 
loophole - and it is a monopoly; we all know that... And so we just 
decided to put them in". This so-called "unanimous opinion" was seen to 
be a piece of self-delusion on Patman's part. Nearly all the Congressmen 
who appeared at the hearings, including those who were otherwise sympathetic 
to the bill, did so specifically to oppose this inclusion of filling 
stations. The recurrent themes of the objectors were that filling stations 
were not chain stores, that they provided invaluable service facilities for 
the motorist in country areas with few accessory stores and that they were 
already subject to special petroleum taxes. Only 5 of the 20 chain tax 
states taxed filling station chainsg and in only 3 of the remainder was the 
exemption confined to stations exclusively selling petroleum products. The 
majority of states allowed the sale of varying proportions of accessories, 
týres, cigarettes, cold drinks etc. without taxing the stations as stores. (Ibid., pp. 940 489-949 1557s 1764-5g 1778-800 1799-18049 18079 1836-89 
1784-1-3). 
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arguments which they advanced in favour of this indiscriminate instrument 
of destruction hinged on the theory that the chains had violated a nunber 
of canons of good behaviour all of which were covered, individually, by 
existing laws, many of these laws having been enacted at the behest of the 
independent merchants precisely to deal with the chain store problem. The 
supporters of H. R. 1 were reduced to demeaning the value of legislation 
they themselves had sponsored. "We thought when you passed the Robinson- 
Patran Act you had our problem answered"# admitted Rivers Peterson. But 
experience had shown, he maintained, that the Act could not work properly 
in the hardware trade "because the methods of evasion are too devious; 
tangible evidence of violations too difficult to secure - and the processes 
of the law too slow", The NRHA was willing to cover dealers' costs in 
bringing criminal prosecutions, but the individual dealer was reluctant 
to take such a step "for fear of what would happen to his business" as a 
result of retaliatory action by the chains. Merbers of the committee 
seemed to think, howevers that Peterson would do better to take his 
grievances strAight to the FTC, or Department of Justice or seek extra 
appropriations for these agencies to do their Job properly. 
7 J. H, McLaurin 
and C. Vander Hooning based much of their case on the depredations of the 
A&P. particularly its violations of the Robinson-Patman law. The 'irony 
was, as the committee could scarcely fail to notice, that great slabs of 
their evidence came from the record of proceedings before the M, as clear 
an indication as could bave been given that there was another way to deal 
with these problems. All the talk of how the big chains were building 
themselves into monstrous monopolies fell rather flat. A few years earliers 
7. Ibid. j pp. 461-59 478-9. 
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when the antitrust laws were effectively suspended, Congressmen migbt have 
been persuaded that some such unusual action as H. R. 1 was the only method 
of protecting those whom the failure to enforce the antitrust laws had left 
exposed. But in 1940 antitrust prosecution was undergoing a revival under 
the energetic direction of ThurTan Arnold, the head of the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice. Major cases were underway at the 
time of the hearings against giant concerns such as General Motors and the 
Aluminum Co. of America. And,, as the firm enforcement of the brokerage 
clause of the Robinson-Patman law against the A&P had showns the rederal 
Trade Commission was also prepared to be more adventurous in tackling big 
corporations and had shrugged off its traditional disposition to do no more 
than police the petty misdemeanours of small business. 
8 The truth wass as 
became blindingly obvious as the hearings progressed, all the abuses and 
oppressions of size of which the supporters of H. R. 1 complained amounted 
only to an argument for the better application of existing laws. Far from 
sitting back and allowing the recital of details of unfair brokerages, 
short weights9 advertising allowancesq low wages, tax evasion and price 
variation between citiesto swell into a resonating crescendo, the McCormack 
committee picked out each charge in turn and subjected it to sceptical and 
frequently dismissive inquiry, With all these real or alleged abuses 
dismissed from the argument about the need for H. R. l. the bill's supporters 
were left naked but for their belief thato whatever the efficiencies of the 
chains, the interest of the nation lay in keeping control of distribution 
in local hands. It was a belief with which every merber of the committee 
evidently had sore syrpathy, but it was equally not the sort of thing for 
8. Ibid.,, pp., 347-351,359-85. The Departrent of Justice initiated its 
antit-Fu-st case against the A& Ps picking up Tmny of the points made by 
McLaurin and Vander Hoonings in 1942. 
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which they thought it was desirable for Congress to legislate. It was 
after all the case that if any state wished to extend a blanket protection 
for local chains and independent merchants against interstate chains, it 
had the answer in its own hands. 
9 
Patman devoted much of his time to an assault on Northerm domination 
of the national economy and the "octopus tentacles of monopoly" which 
spread out from Wall street. He was, he informed the committee, "diligently 
directing my effort and attention to curing the North of monopolistic evils, 
that threaten the complete and final ruin of many southerm and westerm 
sections and which will result in great injury to the North". Supporting- 
his arguments, with plentiful quotations from the Pujo committee and Walter 
Prescott Webb's recent denunciation of "Northerm corporate feudalism", 
Divided'We'Stand, Patman offered the committee an assortment of elaborate 
charts9 statistics and "wheels of wealth" which revealed the extensive 
interlocking directorates between a nurber of big New York banks and nearly 
all the leading interstate chains. There was, the Texan was convinceds a 
"conspiracy to get control of the retail distribution of this country" 
between these banks. Unfortunatelys the committee seemed none too impressed 
by this reasoning. "You dragged that old Wall street bugaboo out". 
complained Frank Crowther of New York, "and walked it up and down before 
us". All Patman's charts told the committee was what it knew already: that 
New York was the nation's financial capital. Patman's "wheel of wealth" 
showing the interlocking between 24 leading banks and 100 major 
corporations served only to demonstrate that the whole economy was organised 
on similar lines and that the interstate chain store industry was in respect 
9. Only 3 states had enacted laws on the Louisiana principl-e_: Louisiana, 
itself (1934),, South Dakota (1939) and Kentucky (1940). 
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of its ownership and control no different from railroads, manufacturing, 
insurance and other major forms of enterprise. While Patman made it 
abundantly clear that he opposed concentration of economic wealth and 
control in all its forms, that was not the question at issue with H. R. l. 
The question was why the chain store industry should uniquely be singled 
out for this form of destructive taxation,, and to that the Wall street 
connection of itself provided no answer whatsoever. Patman had no 
evidence, as he was forced to concedel that the "money masters" had involved 
themelves directly in the operating methods of the chains or worked to 
coordinate the policies of the various chains in which they had an interest. 
Even if he had possessed such evidence, it would naturally have been a 
matter for the Department of Justice or the FTC rather than the Ways and 
Means committee. 
10 
Patman laid even more stress on the injustices served upon the farmers 
by the chain stores. Indeed, the tenor of his rerarks was at times such 
that he almost seemed to be advocating H. R. 1 principally as a farm relief 
bill. With the aid of miscellaneous statisticso Patman argued that the 
chains had forced down the prices received by the farrers for their 
produce and had been responsible for the long-term fall in the proportion 
of the consumer's dollar paid for farm products actually reaching the 
farmers. He estimated that the farmers would have earned $3 bi" ion extra 
in 1939 had it not been for the chains, and that this money circulating 
through the economy would have increased aggregate national income by 
$15-$20 billion. Whether or not there was any validity to this argument, 
10. McCormack Ctte " Hearings, pp. 48-706 94-5$ 131. Patman also argued (pp. 14-17) that the interstate chains had ruined the small town banks by 
draining the wealth to New York. He noted that 1921-33s the period of 
rapid chain store growth, the number of commercial banks in the United States 
had fallen from 30,748 to 14,565. However, as he was himself obliged to 
concede, "very few banks have failed since 193311 -a clear indication that 
the problem had been with the banking system itself, prior to the creation 
of the FDIC. 
11. Ibid. 9 pp. 29-46. 
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the emphasis placed upon it by PatTran was entirely self-defeating simply 
because the farm organisations did not believe it, and their representatives 
attended the hearings in droves to tell the committee so. Speaker after 
speaker pr4iised the producer-consumer campaigns which the chains had been 
staging since 1936 to take care of crop surpluses and also emphasized the 
benefits which the chains had brought to farmers as consumers. Such abuses 
as had occurred in the past could and should, they considered,, be dealt 
with under existing laws. Only one small farmers' group, the Louisiana 
Farmers' Protective Associations endorsed H. R. 1 and the right of this 
organisation to speak for the Louisiana strawberry growers whom it claimed 
to represent was hotly disputed by a rival body of shippers and growers 
whose leader declared that the two things the growers needed most were good 
12 
weather and chain store cooperation. The vocal and nearly unanimous 
opposition of the farm groups can scarcely have taken Patman by surprise in 
view of the past record of the farmers on the chain store issue and the 
many resolutions passed at farm conventions in opposition to the "death 
sentence" during 1938 and 1939. His insistence on laying so much weight 
on the value of his bill to the farmers represented a victory of his 
neopopulist ideology over his grasp of political and economic realities. 
The chains, aware that Congress always had the interests of the farmen. close 
to its heart, had carefully prepared to ensure that many of their nunber 
attended the hearings: Patman simply set himself up as a sitting target. 
12. Ibid. 9 pp. 397-4019 710-20 1399-1407. The Farmers' Protective Association had fýo--rced the A&P, Kroger and Safeway off the auction in 1938 when they 
refused to go along with its demand that they should not sell strawberries 
as loss leaders, regardless of market conditions, the Protective Association 
believing that this loss leader selling forced down the price to the grower. 
According to the president of the rival Growers' and Shippers' Union, the 
Protective Association's leader, James H. Morrison, an attorney, was "a 
radical with political ambitions" who had been operating a "shakedown" backed 
up by threats of violence and had stirred, up shiftless elements among the 
casual growers who "expect too much for what they do". Whatever impression 
the committee formed of Morrison, he was clearly not a typical farm leader. 
Morrison himself claimed that "There are many farmers ... that would like to testify,, but wouldn't dare to do so because the chain stores handle a certain 
percentage of their crop, and if they did$ naturally they would suffer 
retaliation from the chain stores". There ray have been something, if not 
much, to this claim. 
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Patman promised that labour would benefit, greatly from his bill. 
He predicted that one million would find e7rployment as travelling salesmen 
alone if the interstate chain system did not exist and solemnly calculated 
that at least seven or eight million people were "unerployed today because 
of this vicious system that is forcing concentration of wealth and power 
into the hands of a few men". 
13 This view was broadly shared by the United 
Commercial Travel. erss the business organisation which acted as a fratermal 
society for 100,000 salesmen representing manufacturers and wholesalers .A 
flatly opposite attitude was taken by the trade unions in the fieldq however. 
Traditionally, the Retail Clerks' Intermational Protective Association and 
the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen, the principal unions in 
the retail trade, had tried to steer clear of any involvement in the political 
feuds between chains and independents, having merbers in both types of stores, ) 
some of whom identified strongly with the interests of their employers in 
such disputes. But H. R. 1 was so drastic that these unions felt obliged to 
take a clear position on it. The bill would, complained Matthew Speedie# 
the vice-president of the RCIPA, "compel many of our melfbers to look for 
jobs in that section of the distribution industry which generally pays lower 
wagess works its employees longer hours, and does not, generally speaking$ 
assume certain of the major social responsibilities which organised labor 
and government both believe business must assure". Speedie argued that the 
greatest problem for the efficient and reputable independent merchant was 
not the chain store but the "surplus competition" created by "mama-papal' 
stores, run from front rooms using family labour, which stayed open late 
at nights and on Sundays and then frantically slashed prices when they got 
13. Ibid. 0 p. 24. 
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into trouble. Such stores Speedie wished to see regulated by some sort 
of licensing system. 
14 Pat Gorman, the president of the meat cutters' 
union, made a very forceful attack on the Patman bill at the hearings. 
Thanks to Section 7 (a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act and the 
National Labor Relations Act which superseded it, as well as the generally 
pro-union climate of the New Deal, his union had been able to make rapid 
advances into the chain grocery field in the previous few years, with a 
slight majority of the Amalgamated's retail renbership coming from the 
chains for the first time in 1940. Even the A&P, long considered the 
greatest single obstacle to the union's progress in the chain sector, had 
fallen into line, with 6,300 of its 9,400 meat cutters in the Amalgamated 
by the time of the hearings and Gorman confidently predicting that the 
remainder would be recruited "within another year". Over the past two 
yearsq the A9P top management$ as part of their public relations campaign 
had actually bent over backwards to accommodate the unions, in the process 
reversing 70 years of company historyq bewildering many of the lower level 
executives and'managers and giving the unions a foothold in the nation's 
leading chain which had implication for labour relations in the chain store 
industry as a whole and which the unions could not possibly have achieved 
so easily, if at all, by their own efforts. 
15 
14. Ibid. $ pp. 1105-110 1841-3. 
15. The A& P's anti-union posture was becoming uncomfortable by 1938 
because of the spread of unionisation to its major competitors, the National 
Labor Relations Act and the daunting prospect of an eventual CIO invasion 
of the industry. The company already had contracts with AFL unions in some 
cities. Nevertheless, the principal cause of the dramatic 1938 policy shift 
was the desire to find allies to defeat the Patman bill, the initial contacts 
between the company and AFL leaders being explicitly based on the idea of 
an "exchange". This was public knowledge at the tire. 'Remarkably, union 
leaders like Gorman found themselves negotiating with Carl Byoir, rather 
than an A&P executive., surely an indication of the company's lack of 
preparedness to deal with unions and of the extraordinary influence the 
desire to defeat the Patman-bill had in shaping company policies. There 
cannot be much doubt that the ArL unions got the better of this "exchange": 
their influence was of little significance, if any, in defeating the bill, 
but they gained an easy way into the nation's No. 1 chain company - sometimes 
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For the Amalgamated-and the RCIPA, the process of "organizing the 
employer" was working miracles. - on the edge of total'organisational 
collapse in 1933, they were nowýsurging ahead. By "organizing the 
employer" a stroke of the pen could bring in hundreds or thousands of 
new menbers, including recruits in those areass such as the South, where 
it had never been possible to establish a position in the independent 
sector. In their euphoria, union leaders seemd quite prepared to antagonise 
those among the independent merchants who supported the Patman bill and 
had also respected the rights of their employees through the many years in 
which the chains had fought the unions tooth and nail. Pat Gorman's 
energetic campaigning against the Patman bills as well as irritating sore 
of the Amalgamated's own membership, care as a bitter blow to the National 
Association of Retail Meat Dealers, which in 1937 had negotiated a 
favourable agreement with Gorman and expected that he would at least respect 
the tradition of neutrality in regard to the chain tax battle. 
16 The 
assiduous efforts of the A&P to cultivate the An also disgusted some 
trades unionists. In a series of hot-tempered attacks through the medium 
15. (Cont'd) ... against the wishesof the employees themselves. In 
later yearss the strength of the unions in the A&P and the major, 
grocery chains generally, and the higher wages and restrictive practices 
which this involved, proved a distinct liability in competing with 
independents and local chain supermarkets (McCormack Ctte,, 'Hearingsg 
pp. 1060-7; David Brody, 'The'Butcher Workmen: A Study of Unio-n-iiation, 9 Canb.,, Mass., 1964, pp. 137-410 148-51; New York'Týmes, September 179 
1938; Herbert R. Northrup et al Restrictive Labor Practices in the 
'Supermarket'Indq9try, Philadelphia, 1967, pp. -43-64). 
16. The Amalgamated-NARMD agreement required that the union side abandon 
its recruitment of one-man proprietors, who were to transfer to dealer 
associations, while the NARMD recognised the Amalgamated as sole 
bargaining agent. The agreement was not very successful in practice. 
A sizeable minority in some Amalgamated locals - 40% in the labour strong- 
hold of Seattle - were non-employing meat dealers, and the locals would 
not let them go; equallys the NARMD could not bind its own menbers. 
(Brody, The'Butchdr Workmen, pp. 139-419 144-5; Butchers"Advocatell, 
April 24,1940s p. 11; ' BUt-ch6rVorkman, March 1.19409 p. I. 
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of his union's journal and at the 1939 AFL convention, Harry Bates, the 
president of the BricklayersLMasons and Plasterers, accused certain AFL 
officials of working hand in glove with chain lobbyists to influence 
conventions of state federations of labour to pass resolutions opposing 
HR1. Bates portrayed a condition of sordid intrigue in which the AFL was 
being taken advantage of by Carl Byoir and Chester Wright, who was both 
Byoir's Washington representative and public relations adviser to a nunber 
of AFL international unions as well as running the International Labor 
News Service. All this was going on, Bates complained, at the same time as 
the A&P was on the unfair list of the New York Building Trades Council 
and as the chains were continuing to force thousands of independent merchants 
out of business by their "nefarious conduct" and then replacing them with 
stores which needed less labour. Any gains handed over by way of union 
recognition could not be relied upon, Bates warned, because they had not 
been earned by proper trade union organisation and would likely be withdrawn 
once the immediate political problem was over for the chains. Although his 
demand that the 1939 convention should go "squarely on record" in favour 
of H. R. 1 met with no real support, the heated exchanges between him and 
those who had been negotiating with the A&P did seem to make an adverse 
impression on some of the delegates and made it impossible for the AFL 
itself to take any positive position against the Patman bill. Howeverg as 
the point of view represented by Bates was not communicated to the McCormack 
committee, it was Gorman and Speedie and others of their persuasion who were 
17 
left with a free hand to speak for organised labours 
17. American Federation of Labor., 'Ptiodd6dirigg *of'Annual Cdnvdnt1oni'1939,, 
pp. 463-79; ' 'Lidklaydr, 'Magon-S, 'Plagtdrer, February, p. 19,, Aprilq pp* 70-719 
September pp. 147-9. October pp. 163-5. Decerber, pp. 202-31,1939; April 
1941 p. 57; Decenber 19429 p. 205. There was little CIO activity in the 
chain store field, except in New York. One, CIO union, the United Rubber 
Workers of America, voted support for the Patman bill at its 1938 convention,, 
though after little discussion and with no apparent consequences. (United 
Rubbdt'Worker, October 1938, p. 2). 
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Far from Capitol Hill,, on the other side, of the, Atlantic, events 
unfolded which put the last nail in the coffin made for the Patman bill. 
During the two months taken up by the hearings, Hitler invaded Norway and 
Denmark and then swept through the Low Countries and into France. Congress 
at once turned anxious attention to the state of America's defences and the 
raising of money to iTTrove them, an activity in which the Ways and Means 
Committee was, of course, centrally involved. While all the ordinary 
business of Congressional life did not core to a halt because of the 
international situationg Hitlerls'invasions made it quite certain there 
would be no time available for such a contentious and unessential matter as 
the Patman bill to be given consideration. Aware that their great effort 
had now come too late, the bill's sponsors were reluctantly compelled to 
accept the inevitability of yet another delay, with no real prospect that 
it would ever be resurTected. 
18 
They nonetheless did make some attempt to interest the McCormack 
committee in the idea that just such 16gislation as the Patman bill, when 
set in the context of the broad sweep of history and the rise and fall of 
nations, did have some relevance to the world crisis and the nation's 
defences. In an affecting address$ Rowland Jones, the Washington representative 
of the NARD, harked back to the Years immediately before the last world 
war. Then, he wistfully recalled, in the small cities and towns in which 
most people lived 
"every man who was honest and willi 
, 
ng to work had an equal 
opportunity in which to carve himself a real place in the 
life of the community ... Few millionaires were to be found in these small towns and cities, but ... these sralls self- 
contained economic units always took care of their own... 
Poverty in its true sense was unknown. It was in those 
days, in such small towns and small cities, that we saw 
attained the nearest thing to Utopia that any of us now 
living will ever see again". 
18. TARD June 6,20p 1940; ' 'Ihtdr9tAtd'Mei%dhant, June 8,1940. 
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But then a cloud had covered the sky. "At the b. eginning of the 
1920's we, as a Nation, began to be admirers and even worshippers of 
bigness in business. Efficiency became a fetish, Hain street became "chain" 
street". Capitalism began to devour the little fellow in business who had 
been "the strongest and the most potent defender of our democratic system 
of government and with it, capitalism". Now,, Jones continued, 
"Every TneTrber of this co=ittee, I am sure, looks with 
foreboding upon the decline of denocratic governments 
and ideas in the other hemisphere of the world. rew will 
dispute that capitalistic democracy is on trial. We have 
seen the GerTmn people, equally as. intelligent and equally 
as literate as ours... fall under the yoke of a Tmn on 
horseback ... Gentlemen of the committee, a nation of clerks, 
a nation of cogs in great corporate wheels, a nation where 
the individual citizen is dependent for his livelihood 
upon absentee ownership, is not the foundation upon which 
the American way can long continue". 19 
A few years earlier, such an appeal right have 7mved just such a 
representative group of Congressmen as the McCormack committee. Thens 
the threat from the enemies of the "American way" had been ideological, 
a danger that large sections of the population would succumb to the lure 
of demagoguery and dictatorship as a solution to the nation's ills. 
Washington had responded to the danger with the New Deal and a programme 
of domestic economic relief. But by 19409 tires had moved on. 'The 
economy was in good measure restored to health, the grip of "regular" 
politics had been reestablished and the New Deal's critics, many of whom 
had quaked with apprehension in the early 19301s, were now inclined to 
argue that there had never really been any sort of crisis at all to justify 
the "excesses" of the Roosevelt administration. The new threat to the 
"American way" was not ideological, but military. With Germany spilling 
across western Europe, Hitler and Stalin partitioning the lands that lay 
19. McConnack Ctte. ý Tdatizigs, pp. 418-9. 
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between them and Japan menacing the Pacific, the prospect was of the 
victory of totalitarianism through conquest. This was a threat which 
could not be met by vain attempts to restore the domestic values, culture 
and social order of a previous generation: it could only be met by a 
superior armament and industrial efficiency. To an extent which had 
surprised many, the independent sector in distribution had adapted to the 
chain store challenge and had justified itself by the stern tests of the 
market. A wide range of legislation had also been enacted to provide sore 
measure of cushioning against the most severe buffetings of change. H. R. l. 
however, went far beyond being an addition to such cushioning. It sought 
the destruction of a large element of the most efficient part of the nation's 
distributive machinery and also implied such a relaxation of competitive 
pressure on other distributors that -some of the improvements made by the 
independent sector night be thrown into reverse. All the evidence brought 
before the committee indicated that hundreds of thousands of forward-looking 
independent merchants - including many of the meribers of the trade 
associations sponsoring H. R. 1 - were not only surviving but were positively 
thriving in spite of chain store competition. The very associations like 
the NARD and the NARG whose representatives loudly complained of the 
impossibility of survival if the chains continued to wreak havoc had more 
members than at any tine in their history. What is more,, as the committee 
was perhaps surprised to learng these reirbers were in practice often 
engaged in collaborative work with the chains to police price-cutting, store 
opening hours and other matters of mutual interest. In such circumstancess 
there seemed no good cause for Congress to whip itself up into a frenzy 
over the fate of the independent merchant. 
It was perhaps Benjamin Marsh, the executive secretary of the People's 
Lobby, who put the hearings in the clearest perspective. "Of course, you 
are going to kill this bill'19 he unceremoniously informed the committee. 
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"It would save a lot of carfare if it had been announced in advance... 
whether we like. it or not, I think we have, got to face the fact that it 
is not the meek, lut it is the efficient who are, going to inherit the 
earth, including all the six continents, And they are learning about that 
"1 20 over in Europe just now . During the depression, the idea of anti-chain 
legislation as a socially justifiable make-work project for inefficient 
marginal retailers had had some appeal. Patman and those of his persuasion 
had co=nanded sympathy when they argued that a regime of "fair" competition 
with "fair". that is high, prices - was what the deflated economy needed. 
Fatman still enthusiastically promulgated this theory, arguing that II. R. 1 
would create millions of jobs and allow farm prices to rise, thus 
stimulating huge increases in national incoTm as this liberated spending 
power circulated through the economy. 
21 But such talk now chilled the 
souls of =st politicians. They recalled the first world war and reasoned 
that the coming problems facing the nation, even if it kept out of the new 
war itself, were likely to be those of labour shortages and inflation. 
Patman's rhetoric was several years out of date. Congress was no more 
likely to pass H. R. 1 on the basis of the sort of economic scenario he so 
eagerly described than it was to demand a return to the days when tho 
unemployed on New Deal rake-work projects like the FERA, CWA and PWA spent 
their days sweeping up leaves or were instructed not to use labour-saving 
machinery so as to let the work take longer. 
20. Ibid. 9 pp. 1515-6. 
21. 'Ibid. 0 p. 91. 
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gRiloole 
Shortly after the conclusion of the McCormack committee hearings, and 
with the whole country alarmed by the spectacle of Hitler's triumphant 
conquests of one country after another in turopes Patman announced from the 
floor of the House that he had "startling news ... facts which are of grave 
concern to our Nation". There was reason to believe$ he declareds that "the 
entire United States Army mobilization plans are in the hands of Adolf Hitler" 
and that the man responsible was none other than Carl Byoirl "the same-man who 
rode Hitler's first Nazi Trojan Horse into the United States"o This charge 
was based on the fact that in 19339 while a lieutenant colonel in the 
Intelligence Division of the U. S. Arny reserves, Byoir had entered into a 
contract with the Cerman government to do public relations work for the German 
railroads9 a role which had beeng according to Patmano a mere front for the 
dissemination of Nazi propaganda and the organisation of fifth columnistse 
Over a period of several months Patman energetically returned again and again 
to these allegations, even though the rBI1 the Department of Justice and the 
Dies Un-American activities committee were all apparently satisfied with 
Byoir's conduct. No informed person could have been unmindful of the way in 
which Byoir had so adeptly organised the powerful coalition which had defeated 
the Patman "death sentence" bill and Patman's attacks, which were protected 
by Congressional immunitys looked suspiciously like a particularly unpleasant 
case of pique. 
' 
These attacks on Byoir as an alleged Nazi agent got nowhereq but they 
did testify to the evident intention among the anti-chain forces to take some 
sort of revenge on the A9P for its prominent role in defeating the "death 
1. Congressional Record vol, 86p 76 Cong. j 3rd Sess., May 27, June 4g 
June Us August 220 Septtrber 236 1940, 
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sentence" bill. Having broken cover the A&P had made itself vulnerable. 
Calls came from all sides - even from some known to be opposed to general 
anti-chain legislation - that something should be done about the A&P. In 
1942 those calls were answered when the Department of Justice began the opening 
round of more than a decade of litigation against the A& Ps for the 
government's case against the company was based not only on its business 
practices but on the political operations conducted for it by Carl Byoir. 
In 19456 shortly after Roosevelt's deaths the story also broke that in 1939 
John Hartford had "loaned" $2006000 - only $4,000 of which was ever repaid - 
to the late Presidentts sons Elliott, Every indication was that Roosevelt 
himself not only countenanced but initiated this loan and some Republicans 
and others could see in the arrangement nothing but evidence of an intent on 
Hartford's support to buy administration opposition to the "death sentence" 
bill and of a willingness on Roosevelt's part to capitalise on Hartford's 
political difficulties. on this occasion, however, Patman$ as a good Democrats 
remained silent. 
2 
When it is considered that the A& P's campaign against the "death, 
sentence" bill was probably unnecessary anyway - for by 1940 no such bill 
stood a chance - it ray seem that the Hartfordst decision to come out of the 
shadows in 1938 was a terrible mistake. By the term of the 1954 consent 
decree the structure of the company - except for ACCO - remained intact2but 
this followed years of embarrassment and humiliation during which even George 
Schulte occasionally felt a twinge of sympathy for the two elderly brothers., 
3 
7be A& P's difficult experiences should notj howeverl obscure the fact that 
for the chains as a whole the period of bitter conflict with the independents 
came to a very definite end in 1940. Two statesp Florida and Utah, enacted 
2. New York Timesg October 2j 1945; qongrdsgiotal Records vol. 91,79th 
Cong-p lst Sess., pp. A1115-6; John T. r1ýyfin-b-'The'Roogev; it 'Myth I N. Y., 1956s rev. edn. pp. 271-3. 
3. Interstate Merchant, October S. 1946, 
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chain tax laws in 1941, but the people of Utah voted down the tax the 
following year and no more states enacted such legislation. 
4 Thenceforth 
a ntmber of chain tax bills were introduced in various states each year but 
without ever again becoming part of a concerted legislative attack. Patman 
remained an inexhaustible source of anti-chain bills in Congresal including 
tax bills and bills to divorce retailing from manufacturings but these 
measures no longer stirred any interest even among independents. By 19400 
owing to court actiong only fairly modest chain taxes were in effectg but even 
these declined into insignificance as inflation and a booming econory made 
sums of a few hundred dollars seem the pettiest of petty cash. If chain store 
taxes had any effect on the scale of chain store operations before 1940 - and 
any such affect was undoubtedly very limited - they ceased to have any after 
1940.5 Soria states repealed their tax laws over the yearsg and in others 
they remained as a minor revenue raising device devoid of any aspect of 
political controversy. The chains fought hard against every chain tax, 
however modests in the 1930's simply because they wished to arrest the 
development of lethal chain taxes$ but once that threat evaporated the modest 
chain tax laws that remained ceased to be worthy of opposition. 
4. Busihess Weeko November 14l 19420 pp. 72-5. 
S. The most considerable alleged consequence of chain store taxation was 
the so-called "Iowa plan"s adopted in Iowa after enactment of that state's 
crippling 1935 chain taxb whereby oil companies shifted from direct operation 
of filling stations to leasing agreements with independents. However$ this 
process had begun before the Iowa tax and it became a national trend even 
though only a handful of states imposed chain taxes on filling stations. The 
real motivation behind the "Iowa plan" was that the companies escaped social 
security taxes, problems with unions etc. and found that the independents 
worked harder than they had as managers. Short-term leases and control of 
supply of the product enabled the companies to keep a tight grip on these 
nominal independents. (Sees'Business'Weeks April 25,1936, p. 9; TNEC 
Hearingst Part 156 p. 8699). - 
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The anti-chain forces came close to crippling the chains in the nid- 
19301so in two or three states at leasto and it may be that they could have 
come closer. Had Patman introduced a "death sentence" chain tax bill in 
Congress in 1935 instead of the Robinson-Patman bill events might well have 
turned out very differently. It is hardly conceivable that Congress would 
have passed such a billo even in the political conditions of 1935 and 19369 
but the attention such a bill would have produced might well have proved the 
trigger for several states to have followed Iowa and rlorida along the road 
to really drastic anti-chain legislation. Perhapso toos a vigorous struggle 
in Congress might have swayed the courts in rlorida and Iowa into approving 
the 1935 chain tax laws of those statess Instead$ no state ever put into 
effect a thorough experiment in the regulation of chain stores by discriminatory 
taxation and the opportunity to find out what that experiment would produce 
was lost. 
Whether the anti-chain forces could actually have held on for long to 
any gains they might have made is another matter, Certainly$ some states 
seemingly prospered and had no less happy citizens even though they absolutely 
forbade chain banking; equallyo public opinion surveys uniformly showed that 
there was a very general public synpathy for the idea that the chains should 
be held in check in some way even if this sympathy sometimes broke down when 
it came to facing the question of exactly what method of restriction should 
be used. Opponents of chain store legislation occasionally asserted that such 
restriction was incompatible both with a free econory and with a democratic 
form of government - sometimesp indeedg drawing ominous parallels with the 
situation in Europe where curbs on chain stores were of-ten associated with 
fascist ideologies which explicitly appealed to the ideal of turning the 
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clock back on capitalistic concentration - but such claims were mere fanciful 
rhetoric. 
6, it may be that in practice a considerable experiment in breaking 
up the chains would have been undertaken only had the social and economic 
dislocation and those who fed upon it ` the Coughlins and the Longs - become 
yet more powerful and 'more disturbing than they did; but it cannot reasonably 
be contended that drastic anti-chain legislation would have been fundamentally 
incompatible with the traditional American system. Certainly Justice Brandeiso 
as zealous a defender as any of the democratic ideall did not believe so. A 
fascist form of government would no more have been needed to bring about the 
breaking up of chain stores than it had been to destroy the breweries and 
saloons in the days of Prohibition. 
Neverthelesso public estimation of what is or is not a desirable 
application of the regulatory powers of government does vary, and vary 
dramatically, from period to period even within an approximately identical 
framework of political'and sociological values. New'Deal economic regulation 
perhaps helped to shore up the social and political structure in the 1930's 
but much of that regulation was widely considered to be damaging and 
inappropriate in the post-war United States. In economic lifep the trend in 
the*1940'st and more especially in the 1950's, was steadily towards a competitive 
laissez-faire and away from the protectionism fostered during the depression 
years. This trend weakened the Robinson-Patman Act - though the Act's status 
as an extension of the antitrust laws ensured that it was not altogether put 
aside - and progressively made the use of resale price maintenance more and 
more difficult. Ands of courseq these price control laws merely defined the 
limits of competition: they did not obliterate a whole class of competitors. 
In all, it is difficult to imagine that any sort of "death sentence" chain 
6. Sees for instances the comments of Daniel Bloomfield in McCormack 
Committees Hearingsq pp. 849-850, 
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store taxation could have lasted for many years. Even in those European 
countries which put drastic curbs on the, opening of chain stores in the 1930's 
the universal tendency in the post-war world was towards a breakdown of all 
forrs of licensing control and the introduction of free corpetition. 
7 
The attitude of the trade itself underwent great changes after 1940, 
and those changes occurred rapidly. The trade associations which had supported 
the-Patman "death sentence" bill between 1938-1940 were quick to-pull back 
from their exposed and untenable position under cover of the need for responsible 
policies fostering business and national unity during the war; rank-and-file, 
meanwhile, virtually abandoned discussion of the old 'chain store menace' as 
they enjoyed excellent conditions in'the booming wartime econonF. With goods 
relatively scarce and consumers prosperous price-cutting became almost unknown* 
and in such circumstances independents found themselves doing appreciably 
better than the chains. The principal political activity of trade associations 
during the war proved to be not demanding restrictions on competitors but 
ensuring satisfactory treatment from government agencies like the office of 
Price Administration (OPA); 8 indeedg the American Retail rederation at last 
found a role for'itself in furthering this contact with governments with the 
result that the national retail associations which had once fought it so hard 
came to give it their support. 
9 After the war relations between chains and 
independents did not always remain so harmonious but there was no return to 
the animosities of the, 1930'sl which were by then regarded as ancient history- 
It became generally accepted that the overall framework of trade regulation 
7. The post-war changes in European regulation inay be studied in detail in 
Public PolicyToWdrd'RetAilinge InInternatiprial'S or yrnp iums J. J. Boddewyn 
and S. C. Hollander) eds. 6 Lexitgtons Massab 1972, 
8. The boom conditions created by the war were reflected in the fact that 
OPA price controls set "ceilings" rather thano as had been the case under 
the NRAD "Floors" for retail prices. 
9. Lebbarl Chaiii Stores in Amepicab pp. 204-5. 
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could not be further altered in an anti-chain manner and that the fundamental 
legitimacy of chain store operation was no longer a matter for political 
controversy. 
Trade association executives simply adapted their policies to circumstances: 
their basic function remained the same even if the issues changed, But for 
9thers who had led the anti-chain movement it was not so easy to find a place. 
The style of agitation favoured by W. Y,. Henderson was a thing of the past even 
in the late 1930's when the anti-chain battle was still intense. Henderson 
could make no sense of the New Deal, its "half-baked theorists" and its 
alphabetical agenciesgand he saw the solution to the nation's problems as 
residing in currency inflation and "throttling" the monopolies with the antitrust 
laws. In 1937b he attempted a comeback, broadcasting over the powerful radio 
station operated by Dr, John "Coat Gland" Brinkleys noted quack and several 
times candidate for Governor'of Kansaso over the border in Mexicoo but his 
return produced little response from the merchants, The baton of leadership 
had passed by then to the more sophisticated leaders who operated in the milieu 
of Washington politics which Henderson so ostentatiously despised, Henderson 
became paralysed iný19390 and died in 1945. In his late years$ it was 
reported at the tire of his deathb he often reiterated, "I was right you know. 
I was right about those chain stores, s. "10 
George Schulte had no real role left once the battle with the chains 
had come to an end. During the war Patman became chairman of the House Small 
Business Committeeo and he took on Schulte as his assistanto partly because 
he realised that-Schulte was scarcely making a living from his paper and mostly 
as a reward for his long years of hard campaigning. "Johnny at the rat hole" 
10. tlf I Were Presidentl, 'Plain Talk Magazines November 1935; Shrdveport 
Times., May 290 1945. 
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was Patman's name for Schultep and the admiration was mutual. While Schulte 
worked in Washington his daughter helped to bring out the'Interstatd Merchant 
from St. Louist but in 1949 Schulte died and the paper folded. 
11 Patmang of 
courset'had a long career in the House - the fourth longest in Congressional 
history at the time of his death in 1976 - still ahead of hims and as chairman 
of the Small Business and other co=ittees he was able to do much towards the 
provision of positive assistance to independent business by the federal 
government. Yet it would be difficult to judge Patman's career as anything 
but a failure when considered in terms of his own goals and vision of America. 
He remained to the end an unashamed "unreconstructed populist"s stubbornly 
bringing back the same proposals to smite the "big interests" and Wall Street 
year after year to no avail. After his great tiiurphs of the 1930's came only 
a long drawn-out anti-climax in the very different environment of post-war 
America. 12 In a ways Patman's later career served as a mirror to the destiny 
of all those independent merchants who had so militantly fought the chains in 
the depression years. They survived$ even prospered$ in so far as they were 
able to prove themselves by the standards of business efficiency and 
competitiveness required in the post-war world, but this economic survival was 
accompanied by a gradual withering away of many of the values with which the 
whole concept of the "independent merchant on Main street" was loaded in earlier 
times. The anti-chain store movement was based on more than a desire to ensure 
the economic survival of the independent merchant. At least some of its fire 
-came from a belief that the independent merchant and the chain store 
represented entirely different ways of ordering sO'Ciety and that ultimately one 
or the other system of values would have to prevail. It was an exaggerated 
belief born of the stresses of the times no doubts but it remains true that 
ll, I am grateful to Mr. George J. Schulte Jr. for this information. 
12. Studs Terkel, 'Hapd Tirness Londono 1970 pp. 282-616, 'New Y6rk'Times 
(obituary) o March 
rs 1-976. 
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many of the values and attitudes associated with the opposition to the 
chain stores in the 1930's would seem strange and curiously anachronistic 
to most independent retailerso and to nost other Americansl today. In the 
fullest senses the world which the opponents of the chain stores sought to 
save in the 1920fs and 1930's has gone forever. 
4LP,. 
Appendix Table I 
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* The 26 lines comprise all types of food, drugg tobaccog variety, 
apparel, dry goodss department storeo general merchandises furniture$ 
musical instrument and hardware chains. The figure for 1929 was 
calculated by the rTC from Census returns. 
(Source: FTCI Chain Store Inquiry$'Ctý6%4th'and, Ddvelopmdrit'6f Chain 
Stores, pp. 66-67)o 
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Chainrl'ancllriddj5dziddlit 'St6l4ddj '1929ý '1933; '1935 
1929 1933 
Total 
* 1)5436158 165260119 
Chains ich 1486037 141,676 
Independents lb37Sb5O9 lb3490356 
. 'Sdles (add 000) 
1929 1933 
it 
Total 4991146653 25,037b225 
Chains Aft 908340846 60372OSS4 
Independents '381081)504 17DB466332 
' '1929. '1933, '1935 of Total Sales% 
Independents 77'. 5 
Chains 2060 




















includes other types. 
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Chain'St6rd 'Saildd "Ad IS '6f'T6tal *Pdtdil 'Sdl6d '6f JBIAiridsp 
Chain8'6f'4'dp'M6td *St6: bes* 
Apparel Drug Variety 
Year All Trades rooa Group Group Stores Stores 
1929 21.48 31.68 28.22 18.46 82.85 
1933 26-99 38,28 30-51 25.04 91-15 
1935 24,51 34,87 28, S3 25.70 90.78 
1936 23,, 37 34.20 29,43 24.98 89.66 
1937 22.36 32,65 29o76 24.75 88.43 
1938 23,31 32.69 30.45 25,57 87.56 
1939 22.76 32.85 30,40 25,59 86.79 
1940 22.38 33.42 31,12 25.96 86.47 
1948 21,43 33-99 29,89 22.70 84.76 
(Source: Department of Commerce, Survey of Current')3u: §iness) 
455. 
Appendix Tabld'VI 
Chains of 'More thdii'100'St6rdfiý'1939 
Tv-De 
No, of No. of Sales in 
Chains Stores (add 000) 
40 330539 202790005 
4 3g209 ( X) 
12 41583 776,433 
23 4,491 259pBSO 
% of total 





















4 19209 61b413 15 A 
5 29598 166b540 44.6 
12 3b865 1119998 3861 
3 521 19)362 5.3 
1 121 (x) (x) 
8 19141 59b644 NA 
4 19234 152#946 4043 
8 19832 1759482 68A 
7 2b678 109b324 1945 
131 61s021 5b630b692 55.7 
W= Not Available. 






State Anti-Chain'Stote'Tax Legislation. (Source: institute of Distributions 
Retailer's Manudl'6f'ttw§'atid'RdV_Xati6nsb ed. Gladys M. Yiernan, numerous 
editions). 





1926 1 - 
1927 13 3 Georgial Maryland, North Carolina, 
1928 4 1 South Carolina 
1929 62 3 Georgia$ Indianas North Carolina. 
1930 80 3 Xentuckyo Mississippi, South Carolina. 
1931 175 3 Alabama, Arizonal rlorida. 
1932 125 2 Louisianap Wisconsin. 
1933 225 13 rioridaD Idaho, Indiana6 Mainoo Marylando 
Michigant Minnesotab Montana) New Mexicos 
North Carolinal Vermont, West Virginial 
Wisconsin 
1934 40 4 Colorado% Xentuckyq Louisianal New Mexico 
1935 163 9 Alabama, California, rloridag lowas 
Mich-1gans North Carolina) South Dakotas 
Texasj Wisconsin. 
1936 27 2 Xentuckys Mississippi. 
1937 97 8 Georgias Minnesota$ Montanal North 
Carolina, Pennsylvanial South Dakotas 
Tennesseeb Wisconsin. 
1938 19 1 Mississippi. 
1939 99 4 Montanal North Carolina, South Dakotas 
Tennessee. 
1940 10 2 Xentuckyb Mississippi. 
1941 45 2 rloridaw Utah. 
West Virginia rai sed the rates of its 1933 tax in 1957 (subsequently 
repealing the law alto gether in 1970 ). Apart from this, no state enacted 
a chain tax law after 1941b although a few bills were introduced each 
year except 1952 until the Tnid-1960' s. 
4s7, . 
Appendix VIII 
'The Robinson-Patman'Acti 'aMeTidihjt'_Pbdti6h 2'6f'thd 'Cla&ton'Adt. 
Public No. 692,74th_Cong,, 36, U. S. C. As''Title'IS'Sec. 13 
The General Prohibition: 
See. 2(a),. That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce ... 
to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities of like 
grade and quality ... where the effect of such discrimination may be 
substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line 
of commerce) or to injure$ destroyo or prevent competition with any person 
who either grants or knowingly receives the benefit of such didcriminationg 
or with customers of either of them: 'Provided, o That nothing herein contained 
shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for differences in 
the cost of manufacture, sale or delivery resulting from the differing methods 
or quantities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or 
delivered: Providedý howdvers That the rederal Trade Commission may$ after 
due investigation and hearing to all interested parties, fix and establish 
quantity limitss and revise the same as it finds necessarys as to particular 
commodities or classes of commoditiesp where it finds that available purchasers 
in greater quantities are so few as to render differentials on account thereof 
unjustly discriminatory or promotive of monopoly in any line of cot=erces, and 
the foregoing shall then not be construed to permit differentials based on 
differences in quantities greater than those so fixed and established: And 
provided furtherg That nothing herein contained shall prevent persons engaged 
in selling goods, waress or merchandise in commerce from selecting their own 
customers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade: And 
provided further$ That nothing herein contained shall prevent price changes 
from tire to tire where in response to changing conditions affecting the 
market for or the marketability of the goods concerned, such as but not limited 
4EB . 
to actual or imminent deterioration of perishable goodso obsolescence of 
seasonal goodso distress sales under court processD or sales in good faith 
in discontinuance of business in the goods concerned. 
(b) Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this 
section. that there has been discrimination ... the burden of rebutting the 
prima-facie case... shall be upon the person charged ... Provided, howeverg That 
nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case 
thus made by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services or 
facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an 
equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by 
a competitor. 
The Brokeragd'Clause 
(. S) That it shall be unlawful ... to pay or granto or to receive or 
accept, anything of value as a cotmissiono brokerage$ or other compensation$ 
or any allowance or discount it lieu thereofs except for services rendered 
in connection with the sale or purchase of goodss waress or merchandise$ either 
to the other party to such transaction or to an agent) representative, or 
other intermediary therein where such intermediary is acting in fact for or 
in behalfo or is subject to the direct or indirect controlb of any party to 
such transaction other than the person by whom such compensation is so granted 
or paid. 
Advertising'Allowatices etc,. 
(d) That it shall be unlawful... to pay or contract for the payment of 
anything of value to or for the benefit of a customer ... as compensation or in 
consideration for any services or facilities furnished by or through such 
customer... unless such payment or consideration is available on proportionally 
equal terms to all other customers competing in the distribution of such 
products or commodities. 
459. 
(e) That it shall be unlawful... to discriminate in favor of one 
purchaser. .. by.. - furnishing ... services or facilities ... upon term not 
accorded to all purchasers on proportionally equal terms. 
Buyer's Liability 
Q) That it shall be unlawful... knowingly to induce or receive a 
discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section. 
Aseparate Section 2 exempted actions pending under the old 1914 Section 2, 
'Section 3,, the Borah-Van Nuys amendment: 
"It shall be unlawful for any person... to be a party to, or assist in* 
any transaction... which discriminates to his knowledge against competitors 
of the purchaserf in that, any discounts rebates allowances or advertising 
service charge is granted to the purchaser over and above any discount, 
rebates allowances or advertising service charge available at the time of 
such transaction to said competitors in respect of a sale of goods of like 
grades qualityO and quantity; to sell or contract to sells goods in any 
part of the United States at prices lower than those exacted by 
said person elsewhere in the United States for the purpose of destroying 
competition, or eliminating a compatitor... ors to sell ... goods at unreasonably 
low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a 
competitor. 
Any person violating any of the provisions of this section shall$ upon 
conviction thereofs be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more 
than one year, or both". 
Section 4 irrelevantly restated the rights of cooperative associations. 
460. 
Appendix IX 
The Co-Sp6ns6l, i§'6f'HýR. 'g464 '75th *Con -ý 'thdTatiftati "Iddath 'sidtitoidd" 'bill. 
An asterisk indicates that the Congressman did not return to Congress in 1939". 
The figure beside the name of each state indicates the size of its delegation 
to the House of Representatives as of rebruary, 1938. 
ALABAMA (9) MAINE (3) OHIO (23) 
Luther Patrick James C. Oliver Herbert S. Bigelowif 
Michael J. Kirwan 
ARKANSAS (6) MICHIGAN (17) Frank C. Kniffin* 
William B. Cravens John D. Dingell 
Martin L. Sweeney 
Wade H. Kitchens Albert J. Engel *OKLAHOMA (9) George G. Sadowski* 
CALIFORNIA (19) Sam C. Massingale 
John S. McGroarty* MINNESOTA 
(9) Will Rogers 
Byron N. Scotth John, -T, Bernarditi , 
Comer Smith* 
Richard T. Buckler 'PENNSYLVANIA (33) CONNECTICUT (6) Dewey W. Johnson* 
William M Citron* Paul J. Kvale* 
Robert G. Allen 
, Charles N. Crosby* 
FLORIDA (5) 'MISSISSIPPI 
(7) Ira W. Drew* 
I Ross A. Collins 
Matthew A. Dunn 
r. Caldwell Millard 
Robert A. Green 
William M. Colmar SoUTH-CAROLINA (6) 
J. Hardin Peterson 'MISSOURI (13) Allard H. GasquO J. Mark WilcWel 
IDAHO (2) 
John C. Cochran 
Orville Zirmerman SOUTH DAKOTA 
(2) 
Compton 1. White 
Fred H. Hildebrandt* 
MONTANA (2) 
ILLINOIS (27) Jerry J, O'ConneI16 
TENNESSEE (9) 
Lewis L. noyeret ' 
Richard M, Atkinsonfe 
Frank W, Fries NEBRASKA 
(5) 
TEXAS (21) Adolph J. Sabath Charles G. Binderuph 
Martin Dies 
INDIANA (12) 'NEWYORK (45) Maury Maverick* 
James 1. rarley* James J. Lanzetta* 
William D. McFarlane* 
Wright Patman rinly H. Gray?, Mrs. Caroline O'Day Nat Patton William T. Schulte William R. Poage 
'NORTH-CAROLINA (11) Morgan 0. Sanders0c IOWA (9) Zebulon Weaver Albert Thomas 
Fred C. Gilchrist 
Vincent r. Harrington 'NORTH, DAKOTA (2) UTAH (2) 
Otha D. Wearinh William Lerke J. W. Robinson 
KANSAS (7) 'VIRGINIA (9) 
John M. Houston John W. rlannagan Edward W. Pattersonýc 
LOUISIANA (8) 
A. Leonard Allen 
461. 
WASHINGTO14 (6) 
John M. Coffee 
Knute Hill 
Charles H. Leavy 
Martin r. smith 
WEST VIRGINIA (6) 
Robert L. Ra=ay* 
'WISCONSIN (10) 
Gerald J. BoileauA 
Raymona J. Cannonh 
Bernard J. Gehrmann 
George J. Schneider* 
Gardner 9. WithrowA 
There were no co-sponsors from the following states: Arizona (I)s 
Colorado (4)9 Georgia (10)p Kentucky (9)0 Maryland (S)g Massachusetts (15), 
Nevada (1), New Havpshire (2)) New Jersey (13)b New Mexico (1), Oregon (3), 
Rhode Island (2)b Vermont (I)l Wyoming (1). 
The list of co-sponsors is as reported in'NARD*JMImal rebruary 170 19386 




(i) Other Biblio&athies 
Extremely valuable is 
Library of Congressl Legislative Peference Service small'Buginess 
Bibliographyg 1941. As well as a wide range of materials bearing on the 
position of. small business in generalb this bibliography contains an 
Appendix 'Chain Store Referencesb 1920-19391 listing 1,139 items. At 
thiso the bibliography has many striking omissions and overlooks muth 
trade literature. 
Useful supplementary bibliographies include: 
Debaters' Information Bureaug Bibliography_ on 'the Chain Store 
_Question 
(1930)D very thorough to 17ts date, 
Ezra Christian Buehler$ ed. A'Debato 'Handb`60k'on the Chain Store 
Questions (1930)D pp. 7- 21. 
Institute of Distributions'Tolling, the Chain'store Story: -A 
Biblio 
on Chain Stores as'of October 1.19386 NYj 1938a 
(ii) Books. L PamPhldtr; v Dissertations 
Adelmanb Morris A-b A9P; 
_A 
Study in'Price-Tost 
Cambridge, Mass# w 1959,, 
ior'and'Public Policyg 
Armntanob Dominicko Tsb The Myths of Antitrusto Now Rochelle, 1972- 
Asher, Louis E. and Heal) Edithg Send No Money$ Chicagol 1942. 
Atherton, Lewis E. ' Maiii'Street on the Middle Border$ Bloomington, 1954. 6 --- 
Bar-aer. Harold. 'Di9tributionts Place in the American EconomySince 1869b 
Princetonb 955, 
Barnettý Harold R. g Man ManagementIz! Chairi-Stores N-Yot 1931, 
tt ti Chain Store Methods txposeds Los Angeless 1936. 
Baxter, William J. b'Chain Store Distribqtion and'Mahar-prents N-Y-s 1928. 
Beasley, Normanb'Main Street Merchantq N*Y-) 1948# 
Beckmang Theodore N. and Nolen, Herman C. 9 The*Chain'Stord'Problem: 
A 
Critical Analysis, N6Y. and Londons 1938. 
Bennettq David H. j Demagogues in the Depresgion: Imerican Radicala'and 
the Union Party, 1932-6g New Brunswicks 1969, 
Bernsteins Irvings The Lean Years: A History of the Ampican Worker, 
1920-33,1966 edn, 
Bingham, Alfred M. b Instirgent America: Revolt of thd-Middle Classes, * 
N-Y-9 
1935. 
Bjorklund, Einer and Palmers Jamesb'A'SttIdy'6f the Prices'of Chain and 
'Iziddj5dnddnt Gr6ddrs'it 
-'- 
ChidAgo (Univ. of Chicagob 'StiAdiet -17 75u-siness 
Idminittratiop% Vol. is No. 46 1930). 
Blaisdellb Thomas C. 'Th6'rdddrdl'Ttddd'C6mMitpion) N. Y. $ 1932 
46.3. 
Bloomfieldg Daniels 'Trencls'iTi'Pdtcl3'. I'Die-tiibtitionb NaY, t 1930, 
it it tChain Stores's New Yorks 1931 (Rdfdt6r! dd'Shelf* 
Vol. 7) No. 7). 
'Sales Taxes; general and retail', Me, 1934 (The 
Iefdr&icd 'Shelf I Vol. 91 No. 5). 
it fChain Stores and Legislation'$ N. Y., 1939 (The 
'RdfezIdndd'Shdlf, Vol. l2b No. 7), 
Blytheb LeGettob Willia'm Henry 13elk, Mdrchazit, 6f, th6 'S6ifth, Chapel Hillg 
1958 edn. 
Boddewynj Jean J, and Hollander$ Stanley C. 6 eds, jTublic'Policy'Toward 
'Retailing'. ' 
-*Ari'lzitdrhatiorial'Sympogitim'j 
Lexingtonb Mass, 1 1972. 
Borsodil Ralph), 'Thd'biqtribution'Ap,, ej N. Y. $ 1927. 
Brandeisq Louis D-blhe'Cutse'bf Bighess, N. Y. j 1934. 
Brodyb David, 'The'13utcher Workmen-. 
_ 
A Study of Thionizations Cambridget 
Mass., 1964. 
Bucks Solon Justuso The Granger Movements Lincolns Nebraskas 1963 edn. 
Buehler$ Ezra C. 6 A'Debate Hand book on the Chain'Store guettionj Lawrencep Kans. j 1930. 
Bunzels John H. ) The American Small Businessman, N#Yo, 1962, 
Burnss Arthur R. I'The'Decline of'Competition 'I 
N. Y'f 1936. 
Burrs Walters 'Small ToWns: An Estimate of Thdir'Tradd and Cultures N, Y, 9 1929. 
Byoirs Carl & Associatess Inc., 
(for the Great Atlantic & 
Pacific Tea Co. ) 
if it 
ti it 
California Chain Stores Assnog 
Tax, Los Angeles, 1936. 
Current Trerids iti Chdin Storei 'Tagations N. Y. 
1939.,. 
What Consumers of America did'to Defeat the 
Patman 'Bill i 'and WU5 N, Y, b 194-1. 
What rarmers of America Did to Defeat the 
Patman B 111ý and Whyg N#Y#j 1941, 
'What 'Manufactilrers of America Did'to'Defeat T-h; 'Patman B1111 and-Why, N. Y., 1941, 
What Organized'Labor did to Defeat-'thePatman 
Bills and Why, NOM0 1941, 
'What Real Estate Owners of America Did to 
'D Patman Bill-%'and Whyl N,, Y,, g 1941, 
Inc., The Fifty Thotsand Per Cent Chain Store 
Cameron$ W. Hs-, 'Otir'Juggernaut, 1932,, 
Cantrill Hadleyp ech, Tdblid'015iniftbA935-19461 Princeton, 1951, 
Carterb Joht F, 6 (The Unofficial Observer) AMOridah 'MdEjEliahs j N, Y,, p 1935 
Caslowb Winfield H, 6 'Thd'S6b-, ýbcjtlddý 'd'ti6Vol, Grand Rapids, 1928. 
464. 
Cassady, Ralph and Jonesp Wylie L. ý 'Th 6 'ChAzi gizi 9'Cdftd tit iVd 'Strtkdt2r6 'in 
'the 'Wholesale 'Grdddiy ýTradd -. 'A'CAVd_: Stu 'of 'thd * L69 * Atg6ldd 'FArM. 
'1920, ý46 & Berkeley 6 a949, 
Clark 0 Thomas D. ý 'Pilldý 'Pdttid6&td'dIAd'Pl6%4d. 1 'Thd'S6Iathdft'C6uTitIV'Stbre, Normans 1964. - 
Cochranb Louis 1 1955. 
Cohn, David L. j'Thd'Gd6d'OlcI', bAyss N-Y-s 1940. 
Colorado Chain Stores Association"Thd'C616iýdd6'St6td'rie-dzir; d, Laww Denvers 
1938. 
Converseb Paul D-t 'Business Mortality of Illinois Retail Stores from 1925 
to 19301l (Univ. of Illinoisp Bureau of Business Research Bulletin 
No. 41). 
Coreyb Lewis$ The Crisis of the Middle Classb N. Y. $ 1935. 
Covers John H. et al. jIThe Problems of Small BusinessI'(TNEC, Mdn6graphj No. 17). 
Creanage, Henryj'Thd'Guilds 'of Amo-pical N. Y. $ 1934, 
Dallas, Heleno'Chaiti'Storepp Pro and Cons N. Y. 6 1940. 
Daniels, Rogerb The Bonus Marchs Westport% Conn. 6 1971, 
Daughters,, Charles G. 1, The New Competition'and theIndopendent 
Retail Merchants- 
rort Wayneo 1929. 
it it Wells of Discontento N. Y. 9 and Chicago, 1937. 
Davidson, Craigs Voluntary_Chain Stores and Now to Run Them, NsYa and Londong 
1930, 
Davis, Thomas Carrolls Chain Storesyg. -rarm'Problems Baltimore$ 1933. 
Dommisse, Gerrit A. I'Regulation'of'Retail Trade Competition,, N,, Y,, g 1939. 
Edwards, Corwin 1). s'Maintaining Competitions N#Y#) 1949., 
it it The Price Discrimination Laws Washingtons 1959. 
Emmet, Boris and Jeuckb John E., Catalogues and Counters: A History of Sears, 
Roebuck and Company) Chicago* 1965adn. 
Ernsts Morris L. 6 Too Bigs Boston, 1940. 
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1959. 
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rrybergerg Harrison L. j*The Abolition c5f'P6verty, N&Y., s 1931, 
Fulop j Christina 0 'Competition 'for * Consumers I. 'A Sttiýy of the Changirig'Channels 
'of Distribution% Londons 1964. 
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Galbraith. John X. j 'Amgridan Capitalism-. -The 'Concept "of TowiterVaili 
Po%4er, Bostong 1952* 
Gaskillb Nelson B. I *Thd'RdgUlation'of -Competition, N. Y. 9 1936. 
Gellatelyo Robert; 'The Tolitidg 'c5f'tdchi=! m- 'I)dgpair,., 
_'ShopkeeparLi'arid'German Politidgi, 1890-, 1914D London) 1974. 
Gillespie, George n. 0 'Thd, Pd6pIo- 'l), 6=rid'a'Squatd, l)o-al, and, tha Torgotten Man,, 
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